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ï.wa#engagod la writing ajrf -^ udy#. thanks muht also-go to'ray..£upoivi oms 
i)r% kuGln dhd W  for tWir invalu^ help and guidcmoe, dmin^^
stages of the. Wrk^ 0-p):''ppoi'atidh'^  ^ - ( / % ' , . /f, ; f;-"!''/...
I ifould dlso 111(0 to ào%o%vledjgo th0 he]A friende and
a(quaihtànooa who'took a# active Interest in :tblô projéqt* liastfhut by 
no I leanaf l©d©t ’my thanks mot go to 4bh«Sv W|p«^'"who in typing. this manuooript
arid thereby Imposing orcio?? on its original. chaos rendorbd à‘-taak almost 
as,-great aS. the ono I fabod in writing thisf-study#
IL h. A. London ïkîv. 197k,
;)uMmar.y
wap<B>ai|p>yfci>MiüiW>iiiWi*r \ ' •' 7 . , " . .
This v;o)?k ;ls coneoraiod with a study of the relations between tîK? 51ova.ke 
and tUo Central Covcrnraoat of ’the First Ozecîioü3.ovak HopubliP from 19X8 to 
1938 in ii]oot of the major areas of social dovoXoynient* It is divided into 
nine’ Chapters of which OlvraterSVc ;ind the cos e of the work and ere
devoted to an aVaifiina.tion (Xi ,tho policioo of the central government in 
Slovakia» Othor'.cïï.aptoro deal with the history of Slovakia and the rousona 
why that region x/as finailly to becomo a constituent,,pra't of the Ccechonlovak 
KoimbXic:, ■ &nd th.c:re io also a,n attempt to examine the role of both individual 
filovak politicians and CXovak portion in the political life of the Kepublifu 
borne attention is also devoted to the import in the events idiioh pirocooclod 
the Lun’ich crisis of 1938* Olunpter Nine ccNStains vihat I. fool to t-ho 
concltioionw that can be drnw'n from the oxfmiination of the problomo to which 
my study is dovi^tod#
• ■
' %
^    i i i f  " L:.— Î— f } -
4 ;, :
omPTERom : ' 'A ' l
The dioihtegratlon of the AustrO'-Himgaridn Empire ; in 19X8. and its ' 
replacement hy ,a,nùmber of, îiexf,. inàëpehdent : states. did, hot put op end 
to the tOhsions and quarrels‘hottfeen dilferent nationalities (Magyars, 
Germans, Romanians* Gzeohs* Slovaks*! M.ipyenes, ,Poles, Ruthenians,
Groats, Serbs, and Italians) which had boon a constant feature of life i% 
under, the AüstropHungaîiah.Empire» In many cases these quarrels were - I ; ■
given I new life ahd impetus by the création :o,f the states, now
being able to functaon on both an intra as well as ah inter-national 
level, On the One hand, within each state ono: v/itnessed both two or 
more of the major r’'staat£ bo. Idend’' nationalities, xAp; together ^formed the %. 
majority of the population, at loggorheads,, often over questions of 
the form of the organization of the- state and governmental policies! !4s, ', 
examples one might.cito Sorbs and Groats in Yugoslavia and Ozeohs and! 
Slovaks in Czechoslovakia# Not to mention the grievances of the numerically
. 4 '4:'- ■ „,y, . .
weaker ethnic minorities vis-a-vis the central government of each state 
on whose territory they lived, e,g# Magyars in Romania mid Gzechoslavakia 
often claimed that they wore the victims of discriminatory ■policies and ,
- practice^ on :the part of their respective governments* Now on the other 
hand, thero wore often very bittor and sometimes'bloody clashes and 
• quarrels bokwoen the governments of those states over disputed boundaries 
and territories* Tesfn in the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia; the ■
Banat was disputed between Yugoslavia and,Romania!; whilst the!complexities
of the claims and countèr-c3aim^> over'Transylvania./involved Hungary, 
Poland, CseChoslovakia, the Ukr xlnO, .and Romania# ^ :
The ' height of these^ ’’naiibnalistic passions’* was reached in the years
191941922, as understandably it was the Paris Peace GonfOrence. that had
.béen: allotted the ixisk; of finaiiein]  ^Ithe boundaries of these states* ; %
Rent e éaohf one was cohoerhed to seoure as muoh territory as/poasiblé ;in. y 
bhn hope that-, its olaims vJbuld be repo#iGêd' in full bÿ the xConference  ^ ' : 
bisappaintment , ox, or the Oonforence*.s final decisions 6h the frontiers | 
of "the New Euro t", the presence in .each of the states of ethnic minorities,: 
and , the existence'of irredenta were.fac ore which help to explain why the 
years.ùÉrom 191&'193.8 were;marked by a: large'degree of, tension and instabillty 
in Central and Jfexstom. Eiirope* .This effectively hampered; any attempt #  ’ ..
aupra-natibnal co-operation# ),$ho ; Hungarian Gpveri%ment: and, I feel it ,1s , . ,.
true to add, a largo number-(if not thé'majbrity) of etlmic Hungarians ' 
could never .reconcile itself to the dLsmemborment of the 63d rmUti«national* 
Hungary# likewise, nono of these national governments dyer roc^ liced tlmt, 
given the' inextricably intermingled nature of the population of the region, 
it was impossible to malm: pthnlc -and nation 1 boundaries, coincide tota LI y. ' 
Furthermore there was ho v way of defining or re-defining inter-state
boundariea so as to satisfy all :tÈe territorial claims of these states*’'-;!':: v 
Indeed these state© were . like' a: re-creation in miniature of the old ' t'. 
Hapeburg Empire,: but on a slightly more..restricted scale,-with ;a single ! ; 
state and state apparatus serving, a:humber Of different mid in many cases 
-divergeht/hatioiialitlew#,'- ,
Huch a state was paechoslovakiai it opntaihed both Gzechs and Blovak© who ■ 
only. when taken together formed more t h a n o f  the total pupulation*
The remainder, boipg*cbmnosod of Magyar©, Germans, Huthenian8,!ànd Poles, 
among other nationalities too small.toIriiention*. The history of this state 
from 1918 1 1938 has ,hot been very closely examined by. academic©: in .Britain 
over the past 50 years# There has beén, à© it were, a tendency to view : 
the First Czechoslovak Ropubiio aa a kind of Central Europe an Utopia 
(especially In thè: yeara-just before and after. Nunich)* 3n view of its . 
advanced industrial power and its progressive legal measure© such a© health
_ /  ' \ " 'w. ... " I  '
and unerhplopient 'insuranoe, legal IrbguXation of v/orlcer’s* working conditions, - J 
land reform, « Lc* it seemed like .a stable island’of demdcracj in the sea 
of backward,, authoritarian, agrarian regimes thatIsu# Such a view,
in spite of the truth of the above-fflentJonod features, of: OzeoheGInvak v 9
society, becomes simplistic in the face of the one major problem in the 
interpretation of GzechoSlovak history oyer the past 5ÔIyears# :
The classic,.. British re#QnoO to 'this problem has been to seek the main .  ^V 
causes for the Munich debacle : in thé collaboration ..of two related factors,; vis* :
% 1* The main factor and prime; mover - thé growth of thé 
external tïiroat from Germany from. 1933 oh, with thé I 
growth of Hitler's Uggressive and expansionist policies 
(vide Ruhr, Austria, ..etc,:')*,'"/- ' . ;
; 2* His take-over, mmiipulation .and direction of the .
Bitdeteh German.. Party under the leadërship of Konrad Hènlein,
/. which was the mouthpiece . for large number of Sudeten
grievances (both real and imaginary) as a means 6f 
exerting pressure, ph thé. GzechosIpvak goVérUment /iU l 
order lo force it ^ to accede' to his (i.e* hominally ;/
'' Henlein* s)dem mds* In addition Hitler exploited the
- Sudeten Germans as a r ifth Ooluim lihicl^  ^ é^foré aiid 
. after jteiph cpUld porform useful'contrpi, sabptage 
.and intelligence-ga thering operations for ; the Reich.
Such ail analy 3^ however, .correct lin as far as it goes, but these,..
external factoi , ^lono are, in my ■View, insufficient,to explain GzPchps3.oval(ia*s
collapse in the. %oe of. 'Munich*-'. ,,lt ' fails to take' into'account, internal
: factors, of which thére are enough of ;serious import.as to merit closer
e amination* As?indeed: do all I he factors invo Lved in.the fate of a 
new state whose conception and birth in 19Î8 were endowed with considerable
goodwill on, thé part of, tho via tor ion© Allied and ABobo lat ed PowOra ahd 
great optimism on the part of politicians ouch .as T# G! Ifesaryk,'’Bonos 
and their eolloaRUos» '
Out of the many internal factora worthy of attoutioh I have ©elected that 
of the Blovako and more prooioely the area of their, relations with the . . •%%
0entrai Government from I9lorl93o* I'-1 have-done’so for ;two main reasons. . ; f
One, I/Consider this to he a particularly importuht faotor in interpreting : i
ând evaluating the oomploxities of Gobial!?eponbmio and political dovoloçmèttts 
in Czechoslovalcla during the period of thé First Republic (which for the 
sake of simplicity I shall take ae extending from the proclamation of 
Indopondonco in Prague on 28th O.otober 1918 iup till the Munich Af i oomont 
in 1938)* Two, frr too little attention has been paid to the Slovakt in - / ’
general -and ospecial3y to thoir rolo after 1918, that 1 feel I would like 
to. try to make a modost contribution towards redressing the balance .as ; it : 
were .by helping to correct cho imbalance .in our knowledge and our interpretation 
of events* ' '
X shall take as Vy starting-point the aftermath of Nor3.d War One and the 
creation of the new and previously unheard-of state called Ozechoslovakia* -
From its very beginnings the now. state was faced .with many problems.,.Call !
of which had their roots in ooncUfciona 'which'had developed during thej ; / .3
lifetime of the Hapoburg Empxî o or., werèç a%result 'of the'effects of thelWar , 'I
and the needs of the now situation that. the Reabe Settlements had .created#,.. . ;
leaving aside the question of Euthonia (Podkarpatska Eu©) we may say > : , :
: that the main underlying problem to be overcome xms the question of the ' ■ 
unification of the two halves of the country - the 'Gaech lands (Bohemia,
Moravia and hilosia) and Slovakia - which wore both unequally developed
4 /
’ -4, g-2 iu thoir economic and social strucbures, liaving béèh admihistorod from 
different centres (Vienna and Budapest) under different gbvernmontai 
regimes which differed also in political experience, and,competenoe.
Thus, since the Ausgleioh of 3.86?, which split the administration of 
the Empire between the Austrian Gormans and tho Hungarian, Magyars, the 
divQi'gohcy in thf' socio-economic development of the two. provinces had 
been reinforced by thoir allocation to two different spheres of governmental 
influences#
.%il8tltho Czechs under Austria wero able by dint of a long and hard 
Struggle to GGCUre certain eu3.tural and even political rights i/hich meant 
the strengthening of their national av;areness, through a.growing Use of 
tho national tongue, the S3.ovaks had suffered from Ein increasingly severe 
policy of.Magyarisation# The closure of the Matice.Blovonska and the last - 
few B:iovak gymnasia in l8y4-75 meant an end to Blovaks being able to receive 
: secondary ; education in their own language# The results of this policy during 
; the period 1875-1918 v/ere not-only the loss of .the greater part of the 
' / Slovak intelligentsia,. idxo.,became thoroughly,Ma'gyàrised (the so-called
iiagyarone©.who in spa.be o'* Biovak_,birth had adopted Magyar culture, speech, 
ways, and national awaronejS to a greater or lesser extent), but also on 
absolute décline in the numbers of Slovaks# This was due mainly to 
emigration (predominantly to the United States, but Slovaks also wont to 
.Vienna and Budapest in search of a bettor life), which absorbed tho entire. ,. 
natural increase in population of Hungary and thus became even more of a 
minority, -
Thus, reviewing tho situation in 19l8.ono must bear' in mind tho results 
' of Hungarian policies towards the Blovaks (<spfcially from LS79 on) in order
'4  ■■ #
*-6- ■ .... - 
to try and understand why the Czech Lands and Slovakia stood at different 
stages of development on tho ovo of Ozechoolôvaît,independence#
Returning to our discussion of the .problems; which the young state faced,
V70 may divido thorn (more or less arbitrarilyI-aûi afraid) as falling into
- q : ; ; ; /  ' ■ / : % - / '  , ,
,t#0; groups: -, . • ■ ;
1# . Ternporiiry problems which woro a direct result of the 
, 4 , end of tho War and the creation of tho new otate*.! v ! '
2# J?robI.ems which demanded a long-term solution, well
thought out policies aiid Qoneistently applied and •
effective execution#
' b fthe'" "first:, group of problems tho most basic one was the trahsfer of ; power
.' .from, the out/oDLng Hapsburg authorities'to the new dzeohoslovak ohes*'; ThiS - . ;
transfer was Ofiected in a'relatively painless way in the Czech ' Lahhs !: ;but 
ovents in BlovaMa were to . take a different turn# There the; Hungarian •
/officials;,did not relinquis]i thoir power until after thé 30tli October 1918, 
but in ./actual fact the writ of the Praf^ ue government did not ox bend as far 
/,às;;Blovakiâ#. A confused sibUation prevailed with the. Hungarians largely % ; :
hostile to the now stato, the Slovaks passive and hesitant at first, and 
a power vacuum in the area which neither Prague nor the new government.of 
Count Karolyi in Budapest coUld effectively fill# After many and diverse I
events .thé troops of the; Hungarian Boviet Hopublic of Be],a Kun withdrew 
• .and bho 0/echos lo vole troops under their .French commander' were able to 
(RGcupy.the entire area Of Slovakia and secure its boundaries# This, however, 
was not until June 1919# , . ,
!In\both parts of the country, however, the immediate need was to deal 
with the ravages brought about by the World War* In the first instance
it v/as necessary to set up a rudimentary administration to aliocato food
supplies and nx-ovido housing, repair war-torn industries and means of
communication, as well as administer tho notworikof government controls
dyer industry, agriculture mid tho distribution and rationing of food
aiid fuel supplies* In addition,somo form of representative political
-
body was dovised iu oi*dor to prepare a Constitution, pave tho way for 
oleotions and tho creation of an elected parliamentary body to function 
henceforth in accordance with the workings of the Constitution# All 
these matters occupied the two to throe years of thé life of the First
'44' ,
Thé legacy of the years of tho /mstro-Hun/qArian Empire might bo a generic 
■ I  I , / : - - ,
title for tho mere fundWehta3. pfobloms whacU rhe Ozeehoslovak government
attempted to solve* Those can be. sub-divided'imder the following headings;
1, Adrainls t ra.t ion
, ' 2 . Indus Iry ( inc. .lud ing communications and finance)
Agriculture
Bocial conditions
■/;: 5* Cultural conditions and education* ' ; :
r < 1' - ' ' ' ' '
ÿ :
/ k '  .. . ■ -
Administration,;
The Immediate problem to be faced hère was the transfer of the. administration 
from Viotma to.Prague^ 1 from Budapest to Prague, mxd;later totBndapost#' -c |- 
Whul*t his changeover oonld be effected in a reasonably sMobth manner 
in the " Czech Ixauls, as there .were aurficient hureaucrats: of Ozech ' , 2.
nationality in the Aûstrô-Hitngarian .bnreaucracyr'to .man the new. posts, . ' .!/
in Slovakia the on rt-helfflixif luijority ^ were either Magyars or "iixgyarones"
\( Miagyarise’d BJovaka)*. Many of the former and some of the 1 tt uc r fled to 
Hungary# Of those who romained many wGreitdiamissed or pensioned off by 
tho CzeohoBlovak au'chorltieè, either becaWe of their 'Mlleged" political , , 
nnroliobility or becauèè they had refused to.swear an oath of loyalty to ' 
the new regime* In' any Case the resulting dearth of.Slovak .officiais g . 
could be filled from on© .sotirco only #'thàh bf the .Ozèoh Lands, hure there 
was ..now the . extra prospect of using those Gsech of f icials ' who hid novr left ' 
their posts ln!|)arts of thé-former Empire* . /
Ministries had to be Bet: up W d  staffed and their activitieb co-ordinated* ;:;t 
An army I and' a police; force had to be created-and put to work* More important* 
however! was the need for a common Czechoslovak set of 1 xwk,* Until Ihesé: ; t ? 
had been formulated and put into oporntion!)there :werb two sets of lawi . 
obtkining on Gzeohos3.ovale territory*? In the Czech Mnds Austrian law but ■ 
in Slovidcin. Hungarian law'prevailed* The difference between/certain of ' ? - 
their provisions* especially in their definition of "domicile!* in regard ,
- to questions of citizenship- and nationality, caused hardship and suffering/ 
to a number. of ihdividuals who found; thernselvos in the unenviable posit ion 
of bèimg stateless *' Finally, there: was;.;the local administrative/sphere 
which requiredjaluniform and efficient system in order to" attend!#^ :' locd^ ' 
needs tUxd interests* ' ■ ., - '
Indus bry* Oomimmicatioxis emd iinmce ' . ' ■
Both halves of the country weio, in oompariBon with the/ rest of. Austria 
and Hungary respootively, highly developed.areas# In comparison with 
the Ozeeh L^nds, hov/ovor, Slovakia's Industries were rrelhtivély weakèr/H-': 
and had come into being later them in the Czech Land©, largely as’ a 
result of governmenta]. initlativo. They wore sustaihed by.government 
subsidies and protected by tariffs from external compétition*. Nevertheless, 
b3.ovakia cohtainod a con iderablo proportion of: Hungary' industry and 
played a vital role in her economy* i \ ! >4;
Once united top;ether in a common statb'both GgOoh and Slovak industries 
faced tho problem of a shrinkage in theiz!' internal markets from 5.3 million 
to approximately million people# Xri 'addition there were two main 
factors which aggravated this i)roblemi
' ,;1, The ptev Ailing economic climate: v/ith inflation raging ,
' in/wsv oX tho countries in the area, continual - 
!;/? / ■ depreciation of their: cutrencies, jmd depressed' world
/econoKrtiC'conditions*. !%■/? 2.
2# ; The?creation of these'new states meant an énd to the ■
relatively tariff-free:movement of/goods within the vast? 
territory of the Empire* ...Eadh country sought to. encourage 
the development of,it#,omi.industries by high,protectioniât, .
. tariffs* I,/?.;/ f ' '’4:?':!'%'? ',.. 44 ,^4 .y ' , .? ' : *
hence Gzeohoslovah industry 'foiaid itself with a large, ambunt of excess 
productive capacity on-its’hands* The weaker Slovak .industries?nbw found-44 
that they had'boOpme thp idompetitors of Ozech industry in an Uhoyen k^ vruggle 
. in'Which Lhey wore/lmmperGd oven more by the' lack of good I %
..communications and tho high railway tariffs* ' , '? ? .,.2 4 4 ■
' . .  ' -/ . I
Both read and railway networks were centred on Vienna and,Budapest /■ 
respeotively! made, quidk east-west/west-east movement more diffleult*
In the eastern half of the conntry, with à lower population density, t)ie ! . 
state of the' roads was hone too good,, especially in Euthenia*- The war ! ,=  ^'-/:!% 
had taken !: its toll of the railways $ which !wer@ urgent ly in /need of repairs . 
both to tr%ok and rollin'g^atoak, . Signalling equipment and atatioha! ,%Xn ! 
Slovakia the s ; I nation Was worsened by the? fact,,that goods tariff©-.wsre! 
IgOtEO# higher tiiMi in.. the Gzeoh. Lands*!' This was due not only to the . - I
lack of any diréct eaatrwest line, but also to the fact that several of 
the lines were o.wned by private cboqmnies and. there was consequently no 
unified tariff strUctùrè* : . ' ' '-i -
On the. fihancial side the country w^ ©. Bavod!%om a complete collapse of
'  .
the currency by the orthodox financial policies' of ROsm . ' The very- 
sonndhèsB Of the .Currency, however, mitigated against Czechoslovakia*© 
économie revival;a© it,.tended to make her goods a bit too expensive in! ? 
the inuornational ■market» ; Credit institutions and banks had to be set on 
a, round footing;onoe ,again and extended to Slovakia .where ;such institutions 
were very poorly/developed*• An efficient tax and government monopoly system 
to ensure siuriG ont rev nuè had to be created| the budget jneanwhrle^showed 
a deficit for uh< firsu "'ew years and hence; loans were floated in fche ! 
West, but Gaechoilovakia'S; forei^ indebtedness, was never as great as that 
of !:some! of her - .neighbours * ' ' -
In agriculture, apart from the perennial need for improved farming .methods^  
better Irrigation, anti-flood measures such as the reNulatioa of river 
courses and thé buildihg of dykes, thé most important need -?as for land
' '- I./'-.' /' -i
reform# X dO/not?intend to go into this question in qany detail, but %.
oUffjLCP it to £ay bhat it Wct'- in Blovaki \ and Ruthehia where this 
problem was to be Zound ab xts acutert* 11idly uneven and unjust-distribution; 
of:land meant that the majority of the peasan,ts had to subsist oh tihy^ ^^ / 
pieces of land, using primitiré implements and poor methods, with tho 
result that crop yields wore exceedingly low* Traditlphally this/process 
had always been the main driyingf'forGe behiiKd emigration. In order to , . ; 
put right this state of affââra it would require not only the legal measures 
of a Land Reform lew but also, the-'provision of eXpert help and mney to , 
help farmers modernise their nctbodo! raise and improve their crop yield©, 
and hence provide a better living ''or themselves*
Social Conditions ; v • ;
living conditions of the majority, of the industïîiâU proletariat at 
' the end of I91O, as we] 3 as those of thé other /urban classes, v/6re.;fdr?from 
.i aatifâfàçtoryV LegislatiCh regulating the length of ttie working day and;; a 4 
■few other facets of working conditionsIwas extant in Austria/ whilst in?' 
Hungary there was hardly any* llie Blc.vak proletariat Was .numerically far 
i weaker than its Czech counterpart; union orf^ 'unization v/as also vmalcer and 
Gonsequently' both wages and general working and living conditions;Are worse 
in Blpvakia thàn in, the Czech Lands » , During the first few years of; the -
'Eeÿublio^ÿlégiG&atioh lyas passed on a whole ; host of matters, affecting; workers
' ' ' - ' ' I '  W-
and their living conditions* There uoic laws providing^unèmployment>payments
' ... V- ' • . ' ..V- . . : f - - ' ^  ■ .
■ to be made by the state (this was later transferred to the Trade Unions), 
laws oh slckiioss insurance, retirement ©nd/widowii pensions, annual leqve, 
child employment, and all the vital aspects of v/orking menle lives! - A ? 
’ start liad to be made on the problem ,of’providing enough housing of a decent 
, ! standard .for a3J. those who came f'loGking into the cities in search; of. wohk.
as well/aG those already living there* In addition there were provisions 
. /for improving public hoaith, measures to prevent tuberculosis (amongst .
Other.disease©); mid to lOBsen the : incidence of Infant mortality# In%the ?/ 
eastern half of the country Health conditions Were invariably worse.as / - 
there were fewer doctors and ho6pitâ3.s# -I';/.: :/ --. /%■?. !/■
Apart'from these general conditions «md the/measures #î%ÿed to deal with 
them I must mention eno. further social problem*t This was that of thé ??• r % 
minorities, of whom: the two'largest- groups were the Germans and: thé -Magyars# 
Belonging to defeated nations these two MiinpritieS were not accordedthe/? 4/“
right of self-dote ^jjiinatlon but were incorporated into, the new .state regardlésfe 
of their marked hostility and oppoètion towards it*? Hence relations between % 
them and the Central Government were fraught with; all kinds of. difficulties* : 
in/:this atmosphere of hurt national pride and"exaggerated (and in many ndsbs 
h©\ 3y*found! nationalistic’ feeling which prevai3.ed after the creation of 
the late, any IriMal vnoidont or c3.ash between members of ' these two : %:
minorities mid Czechs or Slovaks would only?enflame ah already tense 
situation! The peaoefùï régulation of minority!:grievances and the provision ? : 
of legal safeguards of their rights was of fundamental importance in trying "l: 
-to create some/kind ofVèeling of loyalty towards the new state amongst . ■
these .■minorities# Otherwise they would alivays posé thé threat that, under 
the influence of forces hostile to Czechoslovakia vas Hungary was and as;
Germany became/from 1933 ohwards), they would work tov/ards the. country’s 
destruction and their reunification with their own nation* In the case of 
the Magyars this could clearly be seen in the first three/years after.1918, 
when there i^ ere two unsuccessful attempts to restore the Hapsbur# in Hungary#4;:
Culture .and Education - ' .
or the cultural problems I have only enough space to mention the expahaipn^ '^?^ - ' 
and modernisation of the éducàtional system* .In .Slovakia this involved the 
provision of a whole area of secondary and higher education with B3.ovak 
as the language of instruction, something which had not existed since 1874*
- 22,;' 4  . '4  ,''' 4 '
. Primary educu?,tion iu Slovakia also ' réquirëd.:expansion and modernisation* ' '
In thio area the burdon wao'sharod between the/various denominations/and - : - 
the skabe, with the state, however, aupplying lhe major part of the: ' >
financial Adierewithal* As regards teaohing personnel! à similar solution?:/
\ . to that e%Ioyed in the administrative, apparatus wah adopted and large
numbers of Csoch teachers came to work in SlovaMa*' The bstter conditions 
' ‘ and extra ronunoration attached.: to. siAoh/posts were/ however, a fruitful
source of contention between Czech and Slovak teachers (as was?ithe case in., ,
' the bureaucracy) and Ogooh-Blovak rivalries and jéalo'usièa found plenty! !- 
fuel on which to food* Church-State reiationn in so'far as the Protestants - 
" were ^ concerned presented no problems:• as ! uho Protestant Church had spbhtnneOüsijr
de-Lagyarized itself after inc'k^ pondencé* ..Relations with the Catholics, *
, houevor were; domplioated by tho fao t that most of /the higher Glergy were , '?!
M%yar#and mohy ; of Lhe diocoses woi'O sub ject to the authority of /bishops i, 
./.whose aoabs lay ouLa de tho now state boundaries* The whole complex issue 
;v/as not, finally rbsolred until the ,3.ate(twenties with the .signing,of a 
Concordat 0.th /the . Vatican which regulated the appointment .6 f bishops # d  
other olerico/ 'as weli'as oihc3 questions of a religious nature* The 
establishment of good relations with the Vatican was of great importance ?! 
especially in Slovakia where the majority (8Q'0 of the population uezo 
Catholics and nearly a31 devout ones at that* Indeed, they were more than 
a little inclinedito view with suspicion the policies.and activities of 
thf C( ntràl GÇvërhmt nL, m  whom thé Biovak hiericals of H.linkd’s Slovak 
,, People*B Party (HdfS) saw the.dangers of "free-thinking" and "Hussltism"/ «I 
- : Certain wanton apto of destruction of statues and religious objects by ! .. 4
/legionairsB 'mid:, other?oyerrzéalous persons did nothing to allay Catholic 
"/^nu^ioionn*. ' 144^// -v'
' ' , . ' - .2 - 
Such was the geherai franiev/ork into which the Slovak problem (Blovenska 
dtazka’i) fitted# It oohsisted of the same social, économie .and political 
problems as in the Ozeoh Lands, pften present in a more, acute form, as 
v/ell as problems peculiar to Slovak opnditions»
Historicallyg political life in Slovakia.had been very limited, with the 
main impetus bei3.ig in the striiggle to-maintain and develops a common 
Slovak literary language* Because it was only tlirough the use of a "national" 
tongue? that a people dr . nationality (narod) could come to an. awareness 
of its own distinct "national" oharacter. In the various arguments between 
the protagonists of Czech as the literary language and those who advocated 
Slovak, there is no trace of the idea that.Slovakia or the Czech Lands .should 
form a ftally independent political entity* Political demaAids, never v/ent 
beyond some form4pf autonomy, both in a cultural as 'well as a political 
sense. Those Ozodhs and?Slovaks who believed in the concept of;a coinraon 
Czechoslovak people and Imiguàgé, with thé Slovaks as a branch (ioTien) of 
this;people (nardd), did not howéyer envisage their union in an independent 
Gzechoslpvakia* It was only after I918 that protagonist© of the ‘ , ?
"Ozechéslovalc" idea (see Chapter Titrée) began to identify, this earlier 
idea,pf the ethnic and linguistic unity of the "Czechoslovak" people with 
the concept of an independent CzeÉhoslovoîcia, a concept which is essentially 
a political one.
* ndrod people (in sense of ethnic/linguistic group)
narod a nation (in sense of above -t- common territory = common 
. political organization)
■ I ' ? ' ; . ' - ■ 'S - ! ; : ? ; ! !  . ?. 2' 2. 2 .2.
ï feel here tîmt I must utter the caveat that one should not be lured; 
into!thinking that participation of individual Slovaks or of foreign.
Slovali cultural organieations betokened the tacit agreement of the Slovaks■■ 
in Slovakia to any of the actions undertaken in their name, To an even 4 % 
greater.degree thaii in the Czech Lands ^there was no way during the course 
of:the war of sounding.out the wishes and aspirations of the Slovaks as 
to their political future, .
Neither was there only one political trend among Slovaks* The group of 
young intellectual Slovaks, pupils of Masaryk at tho University of Prague^ 
who were clustered around the neriodioal !"Hlas’' (Hlasists), were counter-- ■ 
balanced by tfie "clerical" group of Turciansky SvMty Martin, The Hlasists 
Were in favour bf/Maearylt’s political programme, whilst the "clericals", 
deeply,,Catholic/.were suspicious of.Masaryk’s seemingly progressive ideas, 
which they saw as/free-thinking and Hussite, They tended to .v/civ the 
simple aiid pious Catholic faith of tho majority of the Slovaks as one of 
the-.Riain'hallamrks of-the. Slovak people, Protestantism and the use of the 
Czech/language èind Kralice Bible they saw as a dangerous impact from Bohemia
during the Hussite Wars, There was also?the Russophile tendency of 
8 veto gar Hurbazt^ %  jan'sk;^  which envisaged some sort, of .link«up with Tearll 
Russia for Slovakia# possibly as an independent princedom under a.Romanov,
Furthermore, ohé.must be cautious of the tendency of many writers to project 
their own ideological stahd-poiht back into past events. This is evident 
in the noa-Gomtïiuniat .hist03?iaiis of the First Republic who identified and. 
imbued nihetoèhth-century ideas about the Czechoslovak people with a 
twentieth-century political content, as well as exaggerating the,"national". 
content of. tlieilussite bars, They saw such outbreaks as a sort of modern ; 
national-liberation struggle and ignored their deeply religious nature and 
the fact that Mïemian nationalism was conceived as being a love for and
" , - 4 ' I' ' . 4 . :. -
a loyalty to a particular geographical entity - Bohemia - which was 
irrespective of;national and ethnic identity. Hence one could be a German 
Bohemian as well as.:a Ozéch;,Bohemian* . ‘Modern nationalism, however, depended 
on membership pf a particular ethhio group.which was distinguished from ..
other such ;groups by, amongst other things, the possession of a common ■
language*
In a similar manner communist historians, especially in the. 195Gb, were ' 
apt to view past events in terms of 'progressive versus reactionary trends/ 
with the former triumphing in the communist take-over in February and the 
resultant establistoent of a "socialist" state* . ?.
Indeed, oho of the many pitfalls,to be avoided in trying to/arrive at a 
clearer interpretation of past Ozeçhoslovaîc history is that the. various 
chaiiges of. regime from 1918 on, vis First Republic, Second Republic, 
Protectorate, Thiï*d Républic (the 1945-1948 state), and the Communist Republic, 
and the conflict of various class, national and ethnic interests have 
meant that past events have often been overlaid with a variety:of:conflicting 
and often fundamentally opposing interpretations of the same set of events* ? % 
For an example see Lettrlch, A History of Modern Blovakia/. Kirschbattni,
Slovakia Nation at the,Oross-RoadG of Europe* and Glaser, Czechoslovakia '
- A Critical History* all three works:containing different and conflicting 
interprétations of thé/evehts of;Czechoslovak history from 1918-1945*, Like 
the Gzech and S.lovak communiet historians,/who tend to view history purely 
in terms .of Marxian social^economic; theory, they disregard or distort 
facts which cannot conveniently be fitted into their methodological framework 
in an attempt to defend the correctness of .their ovm ideological position 
vis-à-vis . their opponents* ' ■ . o- •./ . .  ^/?/ - . %  ^ . :
: !...
Even thé v/orks of R* 8eton-Watson, one of the few British academics to ■ 
concern themselves with Czechoslovaks^ history, betray his own bias :! 
in that he was:an ardent propagandist of. the idea of Ozechosloyak 
independence* His works are firmly imbued with support for the Gaechoslovak 
Government, and in his book The Hew Slovakia (Prague 1924) he give» very 
short sinrift to the the grievances of the Magyar minority and those of the 
Slovaks in whose demmids for autonomy he, like many other partisans of a 
Czechoslovak orientation, tends to see the machinations of.Budapest and 
the Hungarian irredentist movement* In’ spite of a quite detailed and, 
to my mind, accurate analysis of Slovakia’s problems^ his sympathies still 
clearly lie with the Central Government and its policioa*
Apart from his works there are very few works in Jîhiglish of any value on 
the history of Czechoslovakia and especially on the thorny question of the
y
Slovak problem (Blovenskdi otazka), Consequently most of the literature 
which exists on this question is not in English but in Czech and Slovak as 
well as other languages* , .
The material I have consulted consists primarily of: . >■ _
i) works oC the main protagonists « Bene^, Masaryk, Srobar,
. Hlinki, L uc* - including memoirs, biographies, and auto- 
biographies# as well as serious studies on various social, 
and poiitical problems.. ; ,: .
ii) works written by serious historians and academics such as 
Kamil Krofta, Albert Prazak and Professor €haloupeoky
iii) works published in the post- 1948 period .
iv) autonomist literature#
■ ■■ : ' ■ ■ -18- ■ _■ - .  ^ 4 ? ,4
Amonget tile first group are of course the works of T. G# Masaryk including
Bvetova révoluoe and Bones Bwbova v^lka a na^ reVoluce and: Bohemia’s 
Oase ■ for Independence to name but two, as well as Srobar’s Osvohodano 
S3.QvehskQ« There is :a vast amount of memoir literature, especially from 
the period just after I9l8, but most of it:is of very uneven quality and 
lièhoé of but limited usefu3n.ass* —
The writers mentioneci iii the second group all share a common "Czechoslovak" 
orientation which should be:taken into account when assessing the usefulness
The .publications of, the OzechoSlovak and Slovak Academies of Sciences, 
such as K pDciatkom, narodhoiiQ. obrodenia# Blovaci a ich narodny vyvin, and 
Dejiny Blovenska*. as well as the works of Vilem Plevza (mainly on the 
history and activity, of the Gbmmunist Party in Slovakia during that period) 
and duraj Kramer Slpvenske autonomisticke hnutl© V rokoch 193.9-1929 and 
Irredenta a sepGratismue v slovenske.i poli tike (studia o ich vzt’ahu), 
also provide useful sources of material#
However, ' very' few of the/wrks cited above deal directly with the subject 
of the Slovalce and their r'elations with the : Central Government from 1918-1938*
In view of this fact I have decided bn mybvui methodological, approach*
First .of all I shall attempt to;describe the conditions prevailing in Slovakia 
during 1918 mid ànalyse the various, problems that occurred as the result of 
thè country’s long historical development under the aegis of the Hungarian 
State for over 9Q0 years# In addition I shall examine the effects of this 
long historical development on questions of social, economic and political 
progress* Having arrived at as .complete as-possible a picture of conditions, 
in. Slovakia in. 1/18 or just prior to its incorporation into Czechoslovakia, I
2 -19- . . ;?•
shall then proceed to Gomphre oonditions in the Ogeoh Lands with those in 
Slovakia in order to analyse and illustrate the,difficulties.that' were\ 
to lay in the .way. of the political unification of these two formerly 
separate areas into one common-political unit, ■ .
From this starting point;! intend to trace the formulation and implementation 
of/^vernmental policy in. .Slovakia .from, 1918 to 1938 on the one iiand, and 
the reactions of the Slovaks, both individuals and institutions such as the' 
Oatholie and Protestant Churches,.the trades unions and political parties, . 
to such policies • aiid to. the government itself, on the other, I shall attempt 
to analyse not only such reactions but also the motives and thinking that 
conditioned them on both sides* In addition, I hope to trace the influence 
this interaction v/hs to have on the entire development of the First Hepublio*
In this task I shall call upon not ..only the testimony, of works v;ritten after . 
the events with which they deal but also contemporary newspaper accounte, 
editorials and comments, :in as far as these materials were available in .the 
United Kingdom as I was unsuccessful in ray,attempts to obtain a scholarship 
to study such material for a year in Czechoslovakia# It is upon the / .\
analysis of such material that to a large extent 1 will draw upon in the.;/ 
chapters that deal with governmental; policy in Biovhkia, its implementation 
and the Slovak reaction to it* By utilising as many different sources / 
as possible I libpo to. arrive at an overall view of Slovak feeling and hot 
confine myself just to the statements of the most vociferous opponents of . 
governmental policy and the largest single party in Blovakia by the raid-1920s 
Hlinka’s Blovak Feople’s Party (U8I&1),
I hope, thereforé, that by devoting a largo amount of space to a careful and 
systematic analysis of press material in addition to books I will be,able to
throv/ some new light on the whole question of Gaech-Slovak relations during ■ : 
the First Hepublio,ahd to assess ;to what, extent the failure to solve the 
8lovak Problem'was a weakening factor which# together with others# oontributed 
;to the. collapse-of Gsechoslovàkié in 1938  ^ ■ ■ ’
(1) From earliest times to 1526
Geographically the territory known as Slovakia lies in the heart 
of Europe# It is hound to the north and.east hy the Carpathian
Mountains# to the west by the Small Carpathian and Beskyd Mountains# y
which divide it from Moravia# and to the,south by the Danube and the 
upper arm of the Tisa Hiver# which# hovréver, do not constitute any:great 
or ünpassable barrier to north-south communications # Thé entire area* is 
broken up by alternating high mountain ranged and deep valleys and river 
basins # which explains the lack (until very recently) of quick and 
effective east'^ west communication links# as well as the, failure to develop 
any single large geographic centre, v/hich could have served as a focus for.
Blovak national aspirations (such as Prague was for the Csechs)#
The existence of Stone and Bronsse Age settlements in Slovald,a is fairly , , 
well attested by the nornial archeological evidëncè'^ # This. evidence 
indicates that Sloyaltia was well inhabited as early as 3000 B,C, : The 
first indentifiable groups to settle there# however# were Celtic and 
Germanic, tribes such as the Quadi and the Maroomman&i,# whose struggle with 
the -Homan Empire is fairly well documented* hater# during the 3th century 
A*D* # the Huns, and other nomadic tribes invaded# This led not only to the 
final collapse of the Roman Hhipirs in 4?6 A#D* but also to great movements 
of peoples within Europe : in order to escape fropi the ilunnish invasions ^ d  
the destruction that accompanied them#
It.is sometime during the period between the fall of the Roman Empire and 
the beginnings of 8aito*s Empire (circa-623 A*D,) that We must locate thé 
advent of the Slavs .to Slovakia# There is reliable evidence # such as that 
of the historians Jornandes and Procopius# which alludes to the presence 
of Slav tribes in Eastern Europe during■the 6th century A*D# # although they
may have .first penetrated into SlovaJiia from the end of, the 4th eentury* . ",
These tribes were.organized in clans# :each tribe being made up of several - 
clans* At the head of each tribe stood a tribal chief called knaz (priest) 
or kniéza (prince)* The clan was in reality an extended family type of : v.
organization, composed of several families ■ who were descended from a coimiion 
ancestor, with a system of communal ovmership of property*
Between the 4th and 8th centuries A*D. this type of clan; organization 
began to be superseded by a form of political organization which united \ 
several related tribes, living in a Compact area, into a:primitive, type 
of^stato* \ \
The first such recorded state vjas the.Empire of Samo, who is said to have 
been a Frankish merchant who. successfully united the Slavs around him, . : ‘
defeating their overlords, the Avars, in battle in :624, and the Franks later 
in' 631# IHs empire : collapsed, however, after his death in 638 and. many. of .■ 
the Slav tribes passed, back,under Avar domination*. ■ .  ; ' . ; i -'
Upon the defeat of the latter in 799 the Slavs became exposed to the growing 
power of the. Frackish Empire Whose emperor Charlemagne had: spWad . 
Christianity throughout his Empire.- By establishing border territories,  ^• 
or mqrks as they Were called, Charlemagne was able to pave the Way towards 
bringing parts: of those areas inhabited by Slavs under his control*
The exact origins of the Great Moravian Empire (830-906) dre of course 
■shrouded’in.mystery. It is recorded* however, that soon after Prince 
Pribina of Nitra (one of.’the embryonic S3.av principalities, of the time;.. , 
another one was Moravia under had become, converted , to Christianity
and had had a church consecrated in Nitra in 833 he was driven from.liis ; -
throne by who then proceeded to unite thé two .principalities, whose.
\ -^3- ■ ;vv- ■- .■
territories roughly correoponded to, present-day; Slovaiîia and Moravia# - 
The exact nature of thC' Great: Moravian Ipipirè# its extent and the tribes 
it encompassed have often been the subject of some controversy between 
Gzech an.d Blovalt îristoriàns\ They have seen it as a forerunner: (be it ■ 
ever so: distant) of either Czechoslovakia or an ihdependent. Slovalîia* ,, 
Hence they have# each in turn# stressed: either the "Czech" or *'Glovalc^ * 
element: in the Great Moravian Mnplre to the exclusion of the other .side#:
It .should of course be pointed out that , at the time no such. clea.rly defined 
ideas of nationality .existed - indeed the differences between the various 
.Slav languages .wore still small enough to enable spealcers of one language 
or dialect to be almost! immediately-intelligible to .spéaicers of andther . :
(cf* Cyril and Methodius* use of their native Salonika dialect in their 
missionary work)# = '' \
The final collapse of.the Great Moravian Empire in 906 meant that the :
8I0vales were absorbed: without tod; much difficulty, into the embryonic : ' , 
Hungarian State within whose bounds they were to develop for almost a full 
thous6ind years# : , .  ^ ' - ! .
The : proces.s of : their ..incorporation into' Hungary was # ho.wevor # a gradual . ■ 
one#!; The.tSlaV' tribes ^egan to retreat from: the valleys: up! into the hilly 
areas# Ho doubt they did so in order not' to bo caught in. the clashes which, 
occurred between the: Germans.and thé /Magyars#'ubo \fore contending for control 
of thé: Danube Basin# as well as:to;escape the.Magyar. plunder expeditions 
■idiich sWept.alï over : Europe-.during .the’first half of the 10th century#
Having been, severely/defeated by a, combined Czech an.d German force imder 
the command of thé German King Otto:i at the Battle of Augsburg in 935 the 
Magyars began to settle: down, to a more, fixed way, of life# Under the first : 
two kings # G^a (972-997) and Htepheh I (997-1038)* the work of consolidating 
mid Cliristianising the Hungarian State was!^egun* . ! ' : -.
. - a i t - :/ ' : , . \ :
Within such a state the Bloval-ts belonged almost exclusively to the , 
developing feudal peasantrywhich, as time went by,: became more and more 
bound to the soil until finally in 1314 the Hungarian Diet passed a law to 
tlie effect that the peasants remained bound to the land for all time;.
The cuitural and\eGonomic development of-Slovakia which was. experiencing: 
quite an upsurge ims totally disrupted b^:the Mongol invasion of 1241* .
In order, therefore, to rebuild his shattered kingdom King Bela invited ' 
foreign;sôt:blers#,.especially, Gormans#, to come-and repopulate:, the towns 
and villages in the depopulated parts of the countryside* This meant that, 
from now on the Blovai? element, in the towns would have to face German and, 
other non-*Màgyari-, as well,,as;. Magyar, économie. competition* ■ . , . ; ,,
The effects of the Hussite Wars bh the complex of prevailing.ee.ohomic and 
Social relations between different Classes and different national and : 
religious groups are difficult to ascertain with any degree, of aocufacy,: 
but it appears that owing to ;the different circumstances obtaining in 
Slovakia at that time the basis for a b'road^based movement.such as,that of 
the Hussites was lacking* : V:
Bohemians main èxport to Slovakia during this period was ho doubt the 
kralice Bib3.e,: the. subsequent use of which.was to strengthen; the position 
of the Czech language in.Slovakia* Even at that time Czech vjas beginning 
to be used'as a supra-dialectal administrative and coimoroial language: 
amongst the inhabitants of Slovakia and was thus a rival to,Latin^* The. 
latter, however^ was\to.remain,the official language of Hungary until.well 
into the first'half .of the 19 th century* . : . , , .
: Another.relevant fact connected with thé period of the Hussite Wars, apart 
from the introductidn:of their ideas into Slovakia, is the use that later, 
Magyar writers were,to make of the Hussite raids into Slovakia.- They 
claimed that,the Slovaks were nothing but the reconverted descendants of
the Hussitea 'who ; had remained behind in Blovàlcla when the main body . ■ ' - ' ■.
of the Enssito^ foroos,,finally withdrew# ; ;Thl s,was in spite of the over- ■ •
whelming amount of, evidence that testified to continuons Slav settlement, ■ 
in the area since the 8th century A.D# at least* ,■
In essence Slovale life did not undergo any major changes' until the defeat ■
of Hohaos in 1526# ' .v:.
From thé Bat tie., of. ïtohacs in ; 1526 to the Treaty of lozarevao^ in-l?l8 
Slovakia or Upper Hungary (A felvidek). heoanie for a , considérable, part of; 
the period the centré. of Hungarian social and national life; ; . For .over , 
a century and a half most of thé Hungarian Plain ;( Alfold) .v/as occupied hy; 
the Turks, whilst Transylvania, enjoyed .semi-autonomous status under Ottoman 
suzerainty* : ; i : ' ''"y- :'. '
I do not intend to categorise here, the various hattles, struggles, ware ; 
aiid revolts which occurred wholly or partially on Blovnk territory durIng - 
this period; .Suffice it to say that-they consisted in the main,of four ; ,
elements# : viz.*: - ! . - - ' ...1 '. / ' '  . !, '
(a) The struggle against the Turks ; ^ ' -
! (h) The conflict :hetween the Hahsburgs with their ' ;
' centralizing,tendencies and the nobles who sought to , .
- sa.feguard ànd increase their o m  .privileges; . !'
V  (c) The disruption caused by the effects,of the Protestant ,
Reformation and the later Gatholio Counter-Reformation; ■ v -
. (d) Rebellions against the authority of the Groim:(often
originating in Transylvania) * . Sometimes such struggles ■
involved one of the parties, enlisting the help of the
Turks# . 1 , V, ' ■' :
The economic effects of all this unrest,on Slovalcia were appalling. Apart 
from the Bheer loss of pppnlatioh and the destruction of property and, 
buildings etc*, as;a result of the fighting# a very heavy burden fell on 
the tax-paying classes, viz# the,peasants and tovmspeople# . The former were 
liable not only for state taxes,' but also fob forced labouf?#. building 
fortifications m.-'ound tovjns and villages (gratius labour) and actually 
.participating in the. fighting# ;Ih addition, their normal feudal dues wèré 
greatly .increased by the fact that, as Slovakia was the only area; which ! 
remained under habsburg control, a great influx of nobles seeking refuge . 
from the Turks took place with the;result th t by I787 oh average every ■ 
twentieth inhabitant whs a noble and hehce iioe from tax # ,
Invariably a greater tax burden fell on the peasantry.who wore faced with '
a constant rise in the number of labour,, days thOy were Compelled tO work . 
on the landomer*s lands (robota); This was primarily due to the..*lace of : ; 
adequate labour mid the latter*s practice of extending their ovm domains' 
by additing to them deserted and hence uncultivated peasant... l a n d s . ' -* .
The tOTOS were also adversely affected# both by the wars and the' taxes 
imposed upon them by Vienna as well as by the ; e^iects of y the nobility* s . ,
efforts to extend its own privileges at their expense# .
, Thé; îïïulti-national cliaracter of Hungary , in which the et.îmic Huhgarians ; '
.(Magyars) were themselves a minority of ,the population, was .further . 
reinforced (if not. actually created) during the Turkish .Vlars by an .influx ; 
of Groat, Serb and Romanian pëasants. They poured into Hungary to fill ■ those;
■ depopulated and devastated regions whose original ihhatitaiits had either y ; y ■ 
fled or been killed or .taken off into slavery by the .Turks ,
Ûn the credit aide of the balance sheet Slovakia inidoubtedly derived: 
benefit from being the cultural, political, social and economic centre of 
Hungary during this■period*- Bratislava became the,most important city . 
after the Turks had captured. Buda. The Diet met either in Bratislava or 
Traava and the,former city was for a long time, the seat of the highest 
governmental offices. The founding of,the Catholic University of Traava 
in 1633 gave a great impetus to Slovaic cultural life; the institution was 
attended by a great many Slovalcs and many.books were ;published, in Blovak
and, in other languages* ; Mother important influence on Biovaic cultural
' ^ .... 
life was Jan Amos Komonsky (Gomenius) whose works were.amongst those most
frequently published and read during the second half of the 17th century
in Slovakia* His views, especially in the field of education, had a great
effect on developments in Slovakia, amongst Slavalc Protestants especially* .
The advent of Maria Theresa to. the Austrian throne in I74# marks the. 
beginning of the period of ’^ enlightened absolutism" which paved the way for 
.the National Revivals that took place-amongst many of the peoples of Central 
. and Bouth-Iasteani Europe* Her creation of a standing'army,, which eventually 
reached a total of,108,000 men, represented an increase in expenditure: which 
could only be met by increased taxation* The bulk of this increasingly 
heavy burden of taxes fell on the peasantry; the nobles wore in general : 
exempt from most taxes and their takeover of deserted peasant holdings led 
to a decrease in the amoimt of tax that accrued from the land (i.e. peasant 
land).- . .■ •
Maria Theresa attempted to persuade the, Hungarian nobility to agree to pay 
taxes in lieu of military service and also to regularize and standardize 
the peasants* feudal- duties* Her attempts, however, met with nothing but: , 
opposition and she was forced to dissolve thé Austrian Diet, which was not 
called again in her lifetime. : . :\
In 1767, because of her fears of a peasant uprising,,she took steps .to :: : >
_ . -284= : . ' ' - - -1 . -  - y
record the peasantry's feudal duties and to make them as uniform as 
possible throughout the whole Empire* This code (Urbar) was translated 
and published in all the languages of the Empire*. The lands held by . .
both the landowners and the peasants.were recorded, as.well as the latter*s . 
obligations towards the former* The landowners were forbidden to .-add any 
nèw obligations to existing onesliut vjere, however, able in many cases, - 
either to get around the new regulations, completely or else use thorn to 
their owi advantage* , , , . ': . : !
Maria Theresa's reforms were continued and extended during the reign of 
■her son aoaeph II (1780-1790)*
(3) 1780-1875 / . ■ ■ ;'
The 10 years of Joseph II *s short reign, witnessed his .attempts to implement .’ 
fàr-ùeaching reforms, especially in the fields; of education^ religion arid , 
state administration» Borne .of these reforms were to have a great Influence 
not only on the development of the Blovak but also the-Czech and Magyar 
National Revivals# •
The process of centralizing the administration of the Empire invplved 
not only the concentration of state offices in Buda,, to. the detriment of 
Bratislava, but also the replacement of .Latin by ,German^as the administrative 
language in use in state offices, the courts and high schools throughout 
the Empire# The end of Latin as.an administrative language, put mi end to 
the use of a truly neutral language which favoured none'of the various . 
nationalities and did not emphasize national differences at all* It is 
no coincidence that from now.on language (especially the mother tongue) 
began to be considered as the most important factor in the development 
of modern as opposed to médiéval national feeling* . »
Joseph 11*8 attempts to malie noble lands liable for tæt, as well as.hiSx
'■■■■■ . ■ ■ ■■ ■ ■  ,
Germanizing tendencies, met v;ith the resolute opposition;of the Hungarian . ;
nobility, who saw in,them, a threat to their own privileges»- Under . : '
the influence of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of I7 89: 
the nobility-attempted to justify its defence.of age-old Magyar.(that .' 
is noble) rights and privileges. by plaiining the .right to national self- 
determination, the nation natui'ally. being;identified/with the' nobility",/
(natio hungarica)# It is around the 1790s that,we find the first ,,
recorded instano.es of laws being passed in thé . Diet to replace. Mtin . =
by Magyar.aiid ensure a privileged place for that, language in public life#/ .
:■■/, . ■ '■ v'' ' :
In the Czech.Lands the attempts, of the Czech revivalists Dobrovsky and 
Jungmann,(later also Palacky) to polish, refurbish ahd modernize the 
Czech language received extra stimulus from the trend/towards Germani- : 
zation, which many of Joseph Ilfs policies undoubtedly represented*
In the field of religious-affairs, however, thé issuihg of a Tolerance 
.Patent in 1781, which allowed freedom of v/orship to the Protestants, 
meâîit that they were now free to develop their owjex cultural activities'and 
learned societies* The most famous of these institutions was the Chair ' .
of Czechoslovak language attached to the Bratislava Evangelical lycee, 
which was founded in I8O3* ;
Allother aspect of;these religidùs reforms was the founding of a; general 
seminary in Bratislava which.opened in 1784* It was at this institution ; 
that Anton Bernolalc (1762^1813) received his education* In I787 hé 
published' his famous Philosophjcal-Critioal Dissertation on Slovalc Letters* 
in which he argjued the need-for a singleil.iterary form of the Slovak, 
language which would fulfil,a'supra-dialectaj. role but still be based 
essentially on the western Slovak dialect that wes spoken at that time 
in the area around Trnava ». ;
He. later published a dictionaiy (Slovali-Gzech-Qerman«-Latin-Magyar) and
■ \ “30“ . - . ' /, ' . -, ,
-a Grammar, %  1792 he, together-vdth his associates# founded the 
Blovalc Learned Society which had'its main centre, in Trnava and branches . 
in several other Slovaï^  cities* In the first -few years, of :its existence ' ; = 
it published, a'large number of works both in Latin and in Bernolalc's. ; 
nev7ly«Codifled literary .language on a variety of subjects. Bernolali:*s/ 
language was,wel]. 'accepted by the Catholics and it began to bè used fairly 
extensively among Slovak writers, of whom perhaps the most famous was the / 
poet Holly (1783^1849). ' . -
/ V V/
However# the Slovak Protestants# Including Hollar and Safarrk# and certain
:■ ■ ' . ' - , ■ ’ . ! : ' . ■ 
of ..the Czech revivalists I such as pobrovsky# oppo.sed Bernolali's imiovations-
•on the grounds that either Slovali was too vulgar aiid under-developed a
V ■ V/--, .
language to be. used in literature, as %ms Safurik*s view, or that it had 
far too few speakers and many differing dialects to sustain, its own 
literary life. Thus, in face of the appearance of certain Magyarizing _• 
tendencies it was better for the Blovaks to join ranks .with the Czechs and 
enjoy the benefits of their more developed literature and wider and better 
educated readership, rather than attempt to create an .independent: Slovak;, 
literature and literary language in the fact ofltùch difficult conditions 
.(Magyarization, -the low level of economic and soci j1 development in 
siovalâa, .the multitude of dialects, etc.). ;
Puj Lhermorof in contrast ' to Bernolak's concept o Slovak as a dialect
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ■ ' -A -K ■of the Slav language and of the Slovaks as an ■ j l u c  op indent branch (kmen)
of the Slavs stood, the idea of the Czech-S3.ûvaîc bVanch of the Slavs
. (eeskoslovenslcyjMmen) f with the Cseoho-Slovalc language (?) as the common
langage of Czechs and Sloval^ s. In view of the large degree of mutual
intelligibility of the two languages, as.well as the 300-year-old tradition
Of Biblical Czech among the Blovak Protestants^ it is easy to understand
why Slovak should have been thought to be merely one of the dialects
of Csecho-Slovak, of which literary Ozeoh was. the common literary language^
..(especially when one takes into accoimt/that comparative . studies in .
Slavistics v7ere still in their infancy)*- , = ‘ 3
It must: be stressedi howeVer, that the rapid growth which the Czech . 
language underwent in. thie périod (viz* not only Jungiiiann' s neologisriis, 
but also the many Germanisms which v;erè-entering into the. language) meant 
that;the Slovaks very ofteU: found these; new fornis very .difficult, if not % 
impossible: to understand* Cçnséqxiently the forra of Ozoch wMch was - 
recommended for use in Slovalcia was often interspersed; mth .Slovak elements 
in ai'i’attempt to arrive at a linguistic hybrid which would be .both , 
understandable and acceptable to Czechs.and Slovàlœ*: . ; '
The importance of the Bratislava Svdaigelical Lycoo for thé Slovaïc National 
Revival is x#ll demonstrated by the fact, that it was there that Xdudovit 
Stur (1813-36) studied and organized his. felow students into a society 
dedicated to the struggle for Slovalc freedom*. Along with Josef Hurban 
and Michal Hodga he eventually succeeded in creating .a new Slovak literary 
language.which was supra-confessional and based on.the•widely-used central 
Slovak'dialect* . ■ -- - ' •;!
As was the case with Bernolalc's efforts | . Stur's new codification met with 
the opposition of oortain Czechs (and also, kollar)* For,a time Slovakia 
had at least three literary languages, yig* Bernplaîc's Slovalc, Star's . 
Slovalc aiid. Biblical Csech, not couiiting new Czech (the new langivage. with 
Jimgmanii*G renovations and Germanisms), and Old Slovak (a-form of Czech 
which included as a compromise some Sloyalc elements* It was some time .
however before.both.Catholics and Protestants alike accepted■Stur*s new 
language. In 1843 Stur was able to-publish a newspaper (Slovenske narodnje 
noviny) which incorporated.a literary supplement (Orol tatran.sky)* .Both ; ; 
these publications were written.in the new language* ;ln addition to this, 
in 1831 J,M* liurban was able tO;publish the first volume of a journal 
devoted to intellectual ; pursuits ( Slovalc Views - Glovensk^ polii * ady ), ..
;!■ ■ ■ . ... !  ; ; " - \ 
also in the nevj language* This publication, however, folded in August- , ;
1832 as the government demanded a very high sum of money as the deposit
Ikauoia) that all newspapers were required to submit-from which fines for
infringements'of the eensorship'-régulâtions or for libel were paid,
The resistance to., Stxtr'o efforts was caused in part $ rightly or v/rongly, ,
by the feeling that the Uloval^ s, by Insisting on their own literary 
language, were Mthdrawing from a common Gzech-Slpvak unity (odluka) mid 
creating their own national language,.'and hence by extension .their ovm. 
national feeling .and national.' identity, In short they were .declaring , 
themselves to be: a separate natioh' at a time when .the conditions for their 
successful national existence were far from auspicious, To .many ;of the 
Czech thinkers of the time it .seemed impossible , for an independent Blovalc 
nation to survive ahd prosper in the face of the growing dangers of .- 
Magyar!zation.,.And in view of the Gubsequent ;eymts, from the troubles 
.of 1848*#49 through the period of Bach's absolutism, thé AuBgleich of I867
mid the final closure of the last three Slovak gymnasia in l8?4 and the .
!' - ' ' ■' . ' . ■ ' ■ y/y/;
Matica Movenskdtlh 1873# who is to say that such:fears were at the time 
not at least partly justified? - ! ■ ' ! . ' . ■
During the events of 1848-49 the Slovales axici.their demands . for cultural 
and territorial-automy vxithin the bounds of Hungary were rejected by • 
Kossuth, who allegedly .said "the.sword shall décidé between us". On the 
hand, Vienna distrusted the. SloVaîcs and made sure, that-thé. Slovak volunteer 
forces were disarmed and dispersed oncé thé .Hungarians had been = decisively 
defeated at Vilagds* Thus Slovalc support for Vienna during the critical !
of *48-49 did; not bring its owxi reward* ^ In face it was quipped that 
the'minorities received-as a reward whàt the.Hungarians.got as a punishment, 
Hungary/was divided into five districts after 1849, its constitution was 
abolished,, and it was ruled directly from Vienna* No special rights, or 
privileges were, given to the non-Magyar nationalities aiid they received no
/ _ " : - ' ' : . \\ ' - -  ^
form of autonomy vAiatsoevar*. Vioma tended to/use. Hollar and his .group' s
opposition to Stur*s. language in'order to hmiper SlovE^ ,demands for, . !
Gultural autonomy and the use of Slovalc in éducation# instead Of Slomk,
however, the Austrian Government permitted Hollar to publish the Slovalc
version, of the government newspaper iii Vienna in Biblical Gzeoh# This,.
language was■ also,used as the; official language of the who3:e Slovalc are.
in the Ko&ce district of Hungary, one of the ■ five ./districts into which .it -
was divided# Of these the Bratislava and Kosice districts comprise.d .most !.
of Slovakia# ' . - ' '
By 1852 it seemed-that both Slovàk"Catholics and"Protestants ,wore agreed ' 
on the use of 2tur*s form of literary Slovalc together .with some modiflcàtioni 
of the orthography on more : etymological lines in order to reduce the gap 
beUfoen.it and standard.literary Czech# In the political atmosphere that 
prevailed in both Austria mid Hungary during, the period of reaction
from the defeat of the Hungarians in 1849 ui\ti3. 1859,.when Austrian 
forces were defeated;by the combined : armies of Napoleon;III and.the 
Piedmontese in Italy, Slovak literary production fell-to an all time low# /; 
There was.only one newspaper that continued'to use Stur*s language, and \ 
this was - the Oatholic News (Katholicke noviny ) under the: editorship of 
Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik#
%ur himself spent the last-years of his life under ; police surveillance ; 
despairing at the failure of hie and others* attempts to raise the general 
cultural and-social level of thé Slovalcs he turiaed towUifd^ S .'extreme . ■ ■ ■/ .
Slavophile ideas# . In ihis last wOrk :>Slavdom and the world of the future :• •' 
(Slovanstvb a svet buducnosti) lie- expressed his belief in the historic ' 
mission of the Slavs under the leadership of Russia# .This work was/not 
lished until ton years after ..his, death, mid then only in Russia#
After 1859 the Austrian Government WaS; forced by'/ité: Italian defeat, to 
restore the old county system of local government in Hungary, hnd .
eventually to recognize the historic rights of the Hungarian-Kingdom* '
A provincial Diet was set up that was to send a certain proportion of its 
members to a central legislative body in Vienna (Reiclisrat). The latter 
body was to decide on all matters that pertained to the Empire.as a whole# - 
Magyar was proclaimod the official language in Bxngary and Magyars once 
more assumed the leading role in the county (Kipa) administration# It 
should be stressed that the main political class still remained the.land- 
oimîng nobility, both the magnates and the middle and lesser, nobility , 
(slachta) # ■ v , .
Along with these activities efforts were made at various times to found a 
Slovalc literary institute Matica Slovenska , which was to/encourage the 
development of the Slovalt language # Originally the idea of a pan- 
Slayistic/institute was suggested by Jonas Saborsky, one. of Kollar's . 
co-workers# After this, proposal was attacked by the Austrian press the ■ 
idea was changed to a purely literary and cultural body# Despite all 
Kbllar's efforts to persuade the Austrian.authorities to allow the creation 
of such a body he x-/as unable to get them to give thefpermission. ...It was 
in fact not until I863 that the Constitution of the Matica £lovenska v/as 
finally approved by the authorities and it could be established in 
iur^ahsky Svaty Martin#
It was intended to encourage the publication of works in the new Slovalc 
literary language, as well as to develop and enrich its vocabulary# .
Many other peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, notably the Serbs and 
Croats, already possessed such institutions, and they had played a very 
important role in the hktional fevivals that many of these peoples had 
undergone# In the twelve'years of its existence the Matica-£lovenskà 
was active in the field of literature, linguistics, history, science and ; - 
.foUclore# It provided both a focus, for Clovalc national aspirations and 
helped to compensate for the lack of any national political bodies, which 
at the time the Clbvalis did not have and.the creation of which would
hardly.have been allowed by the Austrian authorities*
The iSlovalc national movement began to stir once again* After 1839 a 
small group of Slovalcs under the leadership of Ondrej Radiinsky and Jan 
Bobula sought to orientate Slovak policy towards the Liberal Party and 
such lixngarian liberal politicians as^  Be^c and Eotvéfe x^ ith whom they 
sincerely believed, they could reach an understanding, an understanding 
that would guarantee some sort of linguistic and cultural rights for the 
Slovalm# This was the beginning of the so-called "New School" policy 
(see Chapter Three)*
.Such a view was vehemently opposed by J*M, Hurban* Ho considered: the
liberalism.of the aforè-mentioned Hungarian politicians as merely a mask
to fool public opinion and trick the nationalities into supporting them in
the elections to the Provincial Diet* In these elections not a single
Slovalc candidate was sucoessful# Furthermore, the Magyars had completely •
reasserted themselves in the county assemblies and the majority of Slovalc
officials-had been dismissed#'^  Hurban's vlev/s were thus in fact motivated
by very sound fears. In order to try and remedy the situation he drew -
up a list of .Slovak demands in the form Of a memorandum, which he presented •
to the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna in I86I* Apart from demands
for national equality, public schooling, the right to form various types
of associations whether literary, cultural,.industrial or enonomic, the
most important/feature of this Memorandum was the demand for the area
inhabited by the S3:ovaks to form ,a .separate constituent province of the .
Empire* It was to have its om.Diet, educational system and an independent.
Jîvahgôiical Church# This marked the beginnings of the Memorandum movement
and most of these demands were incorporated in the Memorandum of the Blovalî ,
Nation ; dravni up and presented at a m.ass meeting of several thousand Slovalîs 
V  ■/' ' U 4 '
in Turciansky Svaty Martin on the 6th. and 7th June I86I# The most important 
difference between this and Hurbah's version was that it demanded the 
creation of a-separate Slovak autonomous territory (okolie) within Hungary
whbsé territorial integrity it respected* In spite of.opposition, . ^
primarily from .the 'Mew, School", the demand for the creation of the '■ /'/y 
okolie vjas includedV .^d in order to .demonstrate the loyalty of the Slovaks . 
to'iîùngary it vJàs, âgree.d that the Momorondnm should he, presented to the 
Hungarian Diet# . 'The; then premier, . I^ oloman Tisza, turned it. over to the 
,Nationalities . Committee -which’was composed, predominantly of Magyars# /
There. it was / quietly ■ forgot ten and thus su f fered the sanie/' Éaté as the 
Slovak demands of'/18 It was, however, far less inclusive than these
earlier demands ^as it contained very few demands .such as.; greater. civil ; 
rights and.was primarily■concerned with gxmrantees of SlovAc individuality 
and identity* , A .further at tempt/.was made to . achieye this goal when,. in ! ; . 
pecémher 1861, a Memorandum containing .the two; xtain deniands for the ./ 
locognition of .Slovak,natiohhood and.thé'/creation of,a separate Slovalc „ 
toirxtory was presented to the Joseph, ' .passed, it on to ,
the Reichsrat from where it eventually found its %vay hack to/the.Magyar 
authorities who denounced it as an act hostile to the Integrity of Hungary,
Vienna refused, to listen to Slovak demands and the policies of the "New 
chool" were finally shovm. to he bUnltrUpt by the events of 1874-75 when 
the Matica 6 .0venskèL and the last threC. Slovalc gymnasia were closed by 
Order of the/Hungarian Government for allegedly anti-Magyar pan-Slav , 
agitation, From now/on;thqre seemed. tO be only two directions in which 
Slovalc national aspirations ; could be directed, towards the/ Historic Lands 
and the Czechs or towards Russia and the Russi^ms, And these represent 
two distinct trends in Slovak political.thought which we can see recurring :
in the 18900  ^on.the one, hand with Masaryk. and the lHasists, and oh the 
other in the 
(i847“19l6)#
somewhat, "messianic" ideas of Svetozar .Hurban-4fa jahsky
The third alternative, which was to: quietly continue the work of Sturf
especially, in' publishing and education., was also: pi actised* _ ' And. in.' : ;
spite of the greatpressure of ;Magÿ,ariàatioh xSlo^ alv national life and . /
/natibnal consciousness still, survivdd. It is precisely as a measure ;/ ! ./ •
of the correctness: of Stur*s .ideas that we .caiiv see, that the only way 
for the. Slovaks to develop, a modern /iiatiohalism x/ras to develop and'extend . 
the usé /of their oxm: laiiguage iii:all, possible fields I juët. .Us the Magyars 
and Czechs had done earlier) * This, l/ps something which could; not. be: done - :
■by/ adopting, a language, however/close ,/àhd uudeiMtandabXe. it;' might be, '/ /
.which was/felt to the alien; to the broad mass of the people# . /
By lo75» in .spite/Of/.Mugyarizationi ‘ the closiiro of Slovalc./. gymnasia and /.
the Matica /jfcLovenska/and the'failure of the Memorandum/movement .to extract 
any concessions at /all from either/Vieima or Budapest, .Slovalc hational. 
consciousness / was well on its towards being formed. Indeed it ; ;
:contihued to develop, often in véry.qùiet and/unobtrusive way#, right up 
Ùntii'l9l8w.. : ' -.ÿ r'"' '-/ l '
This/period IS characterized by several continuing trends/ in Slovalc life* ; 
Firstly, the. pressure of Magyarization/increased*/ 1879 mâuked the 
introduction of a law making Îîagyar a /compulsory subject/in elementary 
schopls, and no teacher was allowed/to teach/ if he were ignorant of the' 
Magyar language^^ */ / The closure /of/ the / last tlireé Slovak /gynmasia in 1874. .
meant that /Blovalcs would have to go . /abroad, ■ either to Vienna, / Budapest ■ 
or/ Prague, in order to ; gain/further 'education, the. /lack .of/ which in the 
Slovak language .meant;, that it whs/how eabler. lor the / Makars to win .over .. />,, 
and assimilate,a large number of the Slovaks. This.was.indeed the avowed 
intention.of the Hungarian authdrities Cyide Bela.Grunwald*s book A ■-felvidek. 
first; published;in;. 1878), ■■',.■/■ - •// : - ',
Secondlythe /minority, status of the Slovalts,/,in Hungary, was further/ . / \
wèaîœned by increased emigmtion, especially to the USA# This .may be seen 
from the.fact that.whilst the Magyar population increased by 4t)#^ o from 
1867, to 19Ô0ybhé increase registered by the Blovaics'was only ll.Sjii. 'l .
This gives some indication of the loxf level of both agriculture and industry 
in Hungary, in that they were both unable to keep pace with the natUml. . 
increase in population^^# From I90Û to 193-0, however, if Hungarian . 
statistics are to be at all trusted, the Slovak population showed an- ; : 
absolute decline from .2,002,163 to 1,946,537^**
Political.life in Sloval^ ia, which had reached its nadir by l875, remained 
fairly inactive after the failure of the Blovalc .candidates in the I88I 
electionsÿ The Slovak National Party;* whose prograrmne ms,based on the 
1861 Memorandum, decided .to boycott the ô3.eotions in, 1884, 'a policy which 
they maintained for the' next ten years I894 ■ the . Slovak National
pqrty . joined the newly-^ organiised People's Party of Count which /
they left, again in 1905a After their lack of success in I896, I90I and 
1903 they succeeded:in getting four candidates' èlècted to the Hungarian 
Diet in 1906/and three in 1910# ,
During the 1890s the influence of T#G# Masaryk and his ideas on certain 
Slovalc students studying in Prague led to the founding of a new .newspaper 
lEas .which was to be published in Skalica in Slovalcia* The Ozecho-Slovali 
Union (Jednota) had been founded the-year before th propagate the idea
of OzechowSlovak unity# At first this; organization xms firmly supported
- - y
by Slovak politicians Bvetozar Eurban Vajansky and Martin Dula, but. 
relations between Martin and Pra^e soon cooled# ; At the same time in  ^
SloVaîcia the young priest Andrej IHinka was beginning his organizational 
activity among the S3,ovalt peasantry#. . He became active in ficliy's People's 
Party- and in I898 stood as parliamentary candidate for the Huzomberok : 
constituency, but lack of .support caused him to fail# From that time on he 
began his efforts to found his ovm Slovak.People's Party, which finally .
The. massacre of Oérnova occurred in 1907| V;hen the Hungarian gendarmerie i 
fired on a crowd, of, villagers who were at tempting to prevent,, the v !/ 
consecration of à. church in Hlinlcal s hirthplace without .Blinlca being . 
present (having, previously been suspended) * More than a dozen people 
were killed, over sixty were injuredb aiid in-addition a savage, political / 
tMal was instigat ed "/against eighteen of the villagers f ,which resulted 
in heavy fines and quite severe sentences This incident helped to draw 
worldrwido attention to the "Slovalc" question# Among those who became 
interested in the Slovaics were Henry ;Wicldianr Btéed#.-.R#¥* Béton“Watson* !/ 
Ibsen, Bjonsen* and the..French academic//^^ Denis,, all of whom played 
.an important role/in the struggle for Czech-Slovalt independence from 1914 
.to 1918* ' - . ' '
It should not be forgotten that during this period Blovali cultural life / 
still managed to survive.aiid was in.many, aspects quite,active, especially*. 
in the fields of literature and thé;press* In 1881/Vajansky began to re- 
publish Slovalc views (Slovenske pohl'ady), and, cultural organizations such; 
as the women's organization givena* among others,- imre quite active* In 
addition to this Slovak workers in/Bratislava and Budapest.were beginning 
to : organize themse3ves.into unions in order to press their demands, often' 
in conjunction with Workers;of other.nationalities * The Hungarian Social 
Democratic Party founded in /I89O and the Blovalt party'broke//away in:
W 05. ;;;!;// ;;// ' / ;;v
.Right until 1914.the pressure of Magyarization was maintained* Numerous ■ 
Slovak intellectuals, were tried and sent to prison and.Slovàlcs were eveh ■ 
tried for speaking, Slovak mn public places# -.The Slovak language was 
banished from the railways and other public services and tliere was a marked 
effort to Magyarize iplace names * names of/rivers,, etc*. In 1893 the/Bafiffy.; 
government decreed that all local and state government officials were to
î , -
have- Magyar :-names • Slovaks and othqr non-Magyars could. Magyar!ze their 
hanies (aiid: hence be considerëd as Magyars; for official purposes) upon 
payment, of a one-crovm fee (10 d#)* ■ Count .Appoayi's Education Act of 
1907 further extended thé process of Magyarization in schools*
The outbrealx: of .war. iîi 1914 was not ' marked by any great demonstration 
Of either anti- or pro-Austro-Wngarian feeling: among the Slovalçs 
; Xunderstandably so in face of the, fear of further I&mgarian repressive 
measures)# Slovalc politicians adopted a policy of assuming a very low 
. :. profile and apart from à. few ritual declarations of loyalty towards the 
: ruling Ixouse (such as Juriga made çn thé 26th April and 9th December 1915)
. ■ the Blovalts remained/politically very passive* Indeed under the prevailing
conditions there was very litt3,e else that they could do until the very 
last months, of the war# As was the ; case in.the Historic Lands (but to a 
greater degree) most of the key events in the struggle for independence 
which culminated in the creation of ah independent: ,Czechoslovald.a took 
./..place abroad,and'wore .thus far more influenced by external factors, such as 
the attitude of the.allies, the course:of the war, etc#,, than by prevailing 
' home conditions» t; Of these.. the .presence ' of a ; large and well-organized .
. Slovak community in the.H8A was to play â key role* / .
ThesMtekaoxm aa Gzwhoslovolda which came into being in 1918 as a reanlt 
,Qf the .Gollapao Of thç .AuotrO'-Ilungayiàn .Empiro was esaentlally a now 
imlitical unit# _Xet the idea wliich lay behind its qreation, the idea:- 
that the Ozeohs . and the Slovaks ^despite the obvions difforenooa in their 
political and -hi&toriôàl '"dévelçpBient.were ao olonely related oa to form '
=bne ^.bhithral -dhd, _linÿ*i0tio ' wholes already poaoeased :'a respectable lineage
■ b y % 8. : ' r : . ,, ' ■ , .
The controversies ever the character of the Great Moravian Empiré (see A . 
Chapter Two), need not detain us here* like many other .trahciènt political .!
imita of the time it' wad 'not. baaed/ upon .any national or- othnib.- idea# / /
Contacts betxvoen OsecM aiid Glovalte occurred almost thronghoht the ehtii'e 
period of their-: -reepeotive hiatoriee* but it imc not until the l^th oontury 
that the Czechoslovak idea began to play an important and aorioue role in 
'the thinking of/06ebh .and Slovak, ihtellectuala*
The exact nature of the ethnic and linguistic relationship between- Gaooha 
an&Glovaka iù, â thori^ y topic that io boat loft /W antliropologisto and ' 
lin^iiata# Yet it can still bo 'aaàerted with a great degree of certainty 
that the tifo Icm^iages '%diibit a 'markedly high degree of mutual: intelligibility# - 
which wan undoubtédly-n.factor 'in -facilitating contacte between/the two' -
peoples despite the différent/political byotoma they were 'subject .to, . .
Within the oOntoxt of tho liiddlO Agés and t W  feudal (stHndôf^ stOfitlich) % 
■nature of society .iii the vnrlouo kiiig##9s imd principalities of - Centrai ! - . >!'■
Europe .hùoh os Bohbmin and Ihmgary^norrml oontqots botwoon Czechs and 
Glovolm took pluoo mainly in thé ;opherca of trade .end culture# The i I
establishment of Oharlas Univeroity in 1348 in 0;ëgué was an important =
faoWr in this iTeapeot% ' The H W o l W  raids into Sloyoltia which took . .. ,.
plnÇO /in the 13th Oentm^y did not meet with O'g^oat deal of àûcoesG .in ! _ 
spreading their/roligiopaidoas^ but they oertainly helped to encourage 
theuee 6f the ùzèoh ihngimgo.in Slovakia, where it wan employed mainly , -
as . ân adminiatraitivo /laûj^^gG. GOQond. only to latin#,. It was not entirely '
unkndim for many SlovWt toimapêople*; oertâin members of the.etlmioaliy-mixed
Hungarian nobility^ and even; oertain persons within the ruling dynââty
tp/have some kppwlèdgo of \t3iis loiiguage* It finally beoamo the literary ;
and llt%*rgloal .'{jLÉn^ kage; 6'fKthp' - )31bvnk Proteatante who used the Ozeoh- 
language Kralice Bible (1379™94)# . .
During the Mlddid" Âgéa/e^Xiatw» before the Impact of the ideas of the 
Enlightenmont folt# national feeling ap.Ruch was of an. entireiy 
different type, qp^ared to its l^th oentury version# It wan -in ' moot.. oaGOA 
baaed.;not upon'membership o f e t h n i c  or. linguistic gi%)Up but rather on.= 
territorial : and googrophioal conceptQ* Oné .vïaà . thua a "Bohemian" or à 
XHùngarimi" irreôj;)éctivp^ ; of etWlo origin or rà6ther"tWgue« ÿhrthermorê . : 
poiitibal rights wore ,almpnt p^ioluOiVGly the'prerogative of nobility who 
conopivod of thprnselven aione àa .constituting t W  "mition"' as oppoaèd/to ;: 
the "rabb3.e" (plobs)* They may hot have thought of thomsolvea in national = 
(i*e* .ethnic or terms after ;d%)ie impact of the Enlightenment
as wo do not rohlly find miy trace, of tho?Osechohlovak/Idoa during this . 
period# Ç ,
The rc-oonquest/Of Hungary firom /the 'furlta marks a convenient turnihg-^polnt 
ih-'.the.. hiatory:^ h'jf the growihgcpentralizâtiôn of power InfAuhtrp-Hungary, . .
By the.: time Jpsqph, II attempted to implement hiw. reforms the position of 
the/Slcyako Within Hungary hud begun to deteriorate# The rèsistmice of
:-, , '/ Jiÿé, ■' ■ .'V '
thé ihmgarianaobiilty to the rootrlotioason their powers and privileges 
which these proposed reforms seemed tp threaten found expression.in their 
determined opposition to this proposal to adopt German ae thé Gold 
administrative language to.be used within his entire domain* German 
wouM t%s replace latln in Hungary# The Hungarian nobility, however, were 
sueooaoful in fitting Magyar in plado of German, although the prooeefô .by 
%:iliieh one replaced the other ifos a gradual one* It nevertheleao mount that 
native Magyar Gbpaltcra had a définito advantage in obtaining posta.both 
in central and Ideal adniinistratioh# ; Magyar nationalism -devoloiied very 
slowly at firetÿ, bht cyon prior to 1848 one con discern the beginning of 
t)mt' strain of/xenophobic oliauviniatio prejudice that flatly rcfuaed to 
admit that the Blovaka as wall as the other nationalities should be alloimd . 
any basic cultural righto, such as the use of their oim language in aocondary 
and higher education or in local government* . ;
The boginnlngo of the OaochoGlovak Idea- arc rooted in the oamo soil from ;
.which sprang thé idçaê of pan-Blavism and Alav reciprocity# Theao date 
back to the period of the Enlightenment and the national rovivala which 
followed in its wake and which occurred among moot of the pooploa 'of Oontral 
mid Houth-Eaotern Europe* Blav reciprocity meant that tha Slava were to. be 
considered as one ueoule or nation (narod) that had not yet boon diffi^ reiitlated/ 
into widely separate ahd divergent peoples *ae had happened in thé case of 
spcaltere of Gorhkmic and Romance languagoo* . Unlike them, the Slav tonguea 
still ratainod a grW:or dog.roo of mutual intelligibility and a clopor- . 
family likenoes ..tbàh any other language group in Europe* Thio fact, together 
with -Bome -extremely -romàntio'notions about the youth, vigour and creative 
cnergioa of the Slavs# led many thinkora to conclude that the future of 
Europo would bo dctormined by the Slave* ;. .
' '
The Slovak poet iCollav, %Ao however wrote in Czech,- and both Bernois and ■ 
vv:'. V
stur (800 Chapter Two) represent opposite points of view in the question 
of the.'èthnlo affinities of the Blavo. Kollar oonsldered-
the Slava ac one people (naroc^ divided into four main branch# (kmeny) # 
vi%* llU6ql;m0,!d#oM (Inoludliig S l o W m  Poles, and Illyrians (South ,
. -X ^
Slave)# He .thù$ :dlQaûproyed-of Bernolak's and Stur#.efforts to create
a separate : 81o;mh/ liW:ém%' language, and for sovèràl valid reasons# The - 
most important qhe among - them was .that he genuinely believed that the : ; 
Caeohs and thé Sloya# wei'ê hut one people, that Slovak Was. thus but .a! ;! '! 
.dialect of ;Oze<di| rànd iHiàt the Slovaks wore too weak and opproaaed to be .. . 
/able to mmtain# 0èpa#te literature and cultural life* Degpitehhia 
use of.; Gaookj l<t 0.1èr * a poetry was. still able, to rouse' feelings amongst 
many Slovaks at thoir:,; Ipw-level of material progress and with the poverty .:: 
of'thebulk of thof^lovak popuiation*' ./ : !
' "it" '4!'" ':':}rrv:-f< ■■■' ' '
For hernolali:, ahd làtpr Stqr the Slovaks were a separate branch of the Slavs
'and Slovak was .hither â diâloc.t Of the Slav language, which was Boriiolak's ■■'
.view, or else #!iùdéii#deht member of the Slav lan^ ciOGG grqup#. It thus
followed that SidWc .national life could only bb- oarriod out .through the.
medium of. the Slevàlt language* Unlike the Serbs 'and the Romanians, however#
the Slovaks had/ho statecomposed of their compatriots which,might be able '•.•
to offer them oulturAl' and material suppo^ -'t as was. "forthcoming from the : .
nominally lndop##nt principalities of Romaniq and Serbia.
During the critical, .period of 1848-49 ho|h the Bseohe and tlie Slovaks bad 
been equally uhsuocessful in their attempts to extract #mé form of 
political concessions f^ ?ôm the ruling hpuso. Yet if" we compare the cultural 
ond material pax>gress. that" had been; achieved , in' 'both Slovakia and the Czeoh 
Lands between. 1848 and the advent of the Austro-hUngarian 'Compromise .
■ (Auagleioh) in -186®#' whiqh effectively reorganized the.. Empire oh- a dualist •
we Gee that"the Czeoha had far and awaya greater meaeure"of eüoùOBB 
in renewing and refhrbiehing their language and adapting to the manifold 
needs of thé modern Industrial world ae the industrial revolution was 
' beginning' to make Itsolf f e l t  in the Oaeoh Lands by the late iSGOe. =
The Blovaks* however,' were unable to obtain any concessions as regards . 
/autonomy or cultural rights from the Magyars in eplto of thé, existence of a 
Gdbtion of. the -'Blovalt political camp, the. Mew School (Nova Skola) # It sought
to wean Slovak policy away from dependence on the idea of Slav reciprocity and 
the goodwill of the sovereign in Vienna, to whom deputations of Slovaks' . 
would address their'various picas and memoranda* The members of this group 
thought thatpln return for a definite expression of loyalty to the-prown 
of St# Stephen/the Magyars would be prepared to grant, the Slovaks some 
GonccGGlona* such as the guaranteed use of Slovak by the adminlotraticn in 
the courts and schools;o'f--those areas,where the majority of the population 
spoke no other language# -.The Nationalities Statute of. 1868 seemed to contain . 
such lihguiGtlCvproviaions* butGot only did it remain a dead letter,aB the. 
provisions it foresaw were never carried out, it also started out with the . 
assertion that all Hungarian citizens irreapeotive of nationality* formed 
part of the indivisible and unitary Hungarian nation# The version of. the 
draft bill thut/fms adopted and passed by the Diet was ^thus^ in' direct. . 
contradiction to the veraiph that had boon drawn up by the Romanian and , 
Serbian doputieP^#nd.which demanded recognition of the.various nationalities 
of Hungary as nations.in their right, equal rights, and a measure of . 
linguistic and territorial autonomy# Mono of thoae demands were met#.- :
* -Here -0,J#0# Street in M s  short work Slovakia *- %st and Preaent, London
'1928, mioses the point when he writes that had this measure been adopted
it would have aâtihfied all Blovek demands. Demands for territorial
.-autonomy such as were made in 1848-49 inevitably meant legal recognition 
Of Slovak nationality'which this measure completely denied# -
The nationalities :\-mv&. grossly wnder-ropresehted- in the Hungarian
/Diet in proposition to their numbers, Siovaku alone would havo been
entitled to otW; forty deputies, whilst they had never Guocoeded in 
/ electing mrë thhii. seven, although the number of Slovak candidates was 
almost always, lireater than this# .The following figures from the 1910 
Hungarian■Census give an idea of the. numerical composition of the 
. - , Hungarian population; ' ly
Nationality ' n ■■ Absolute figures -
Magyars „■ , 9,944,627. - . 94*9 ■
•Homahimio . 2*948,186 . " :■■■.• 16,1  ^ '
Siovalm 1,946,997 1 ' 10 .? :  /  ...
::Qennans 1,903,397:: 10*4':.
Sorbs and Croats, ■ 696,294 : -3#6 ''p:r / /: - -
■' : Nuthenes '■■■' 464,270 p ■'. 2,9 I/ ..■
 ^ Oth&rs' ; ' . 401,412 ,  ^ ' 2 ,2  \  ^  ^ -
Total : ; : / ' 18,264,449: p l; 100*0 , \
' ~ ------------------- -- ^ -T-----------
, HiBtorically the Osqchs first.began to show/an interest .in :the Slovaks :
during the period when the Czech language was - being sucooaafülly revived and 
developed in the face of thgentrenched position of German, which was:still .
. the main language of administration, culture,, commerce, and eduoàtioi^ 
during the/first half of the 19th century in the Czech lands. : The Slovaks 
wore Seen as the closest Slav.group to-the Czechs and a bridge tlmt linked 
them with the Russians.on whose support the Czech revivalists wished to 
believe they cquM  count*- .The. wealmoss of .'both Czeclis and Hlovaks^ compared- 
to the stronger position-’of Qernian and Magyar culture and;language^v/ao often 
one of the argumente that were put forward in order to, discourage those ; -. ^
\ Slovaks who sought, to-Create a-aepamte. Slovaïç literary language* Come .' .
' Czech thinkers ‘argned : that they . heeded' the "Slovaks in order to form a ■
. ' . - ,,:
Stronger imit 'of soBie-.mwen ;td eight millions vrfiich .waiil'd be better^ equipped to 
fbcse up, to the oultural dmigora of -GermahlKatlon,. •which the large German 
■minority In the Ozeoh Lands, backed by .the cultural-reaoureefei of Germany,. ' .
represented# ’ . ■ ' ,''-1 b/ " '
■ Many young. BlovaJî^diemayed at, the oonditiona under which his people were - \
living^ saw in the progress that the Gzeche were malting during the 19th century 
a worthy object of admiration mid a aource of help* This sentiment wan . 
eapecially strong among those,Glovaka :who chose to go to .the Czech lands in •
order to-oompiote their.education* Similar sentiments of admiration for . 
the unity of Gzocha and Slovaks .and' their, close relationship•to all Glays 
were expressed in a book'-v/éltten by J* 11* %rban in 1899 v  in which thé .; -
author, . a young Blovak,.,:=-deacribes' his experiences and Impressions of life 
ih'theJGzech Lands during a visit ho made there, b- . ■ • 1, ■
As'-the position, of the Czech language grew-raoro aoouro and the Czechs 
made àdmnçûs in most économie and . social nphereG .bo the development of ' ■
Czech.polltioa açcàêd to move àway from the idea of thé basic cultural unity 
of Czechs and .Blbvaka, the\latter having traditionally been considered a 
■branch of, the .Czech.nation, and towards a more political interpretation of 
the righto of the ,Czech nation,i baaed on the old laws and. rights
of-the...Bohemian Kingdom*' ^uoh arguments, utilising a historic rights 
approach, could not'make any claims for thé inclusion of the Slovaks in any 
autohoTaoun or indépendant political unit with the Czechs, To have done m  ~
would have îïioaiit denying the right of the Magyars to retain ■ Slovakia bn the - 
very - samo grmmds. of historical rights ( historicke' Pr6b ) wore used by 
the Czechs to claim the restoration of "Bohemia" Within its ancient, boundaries#
•■■■." V., , . -. V  / ■ • ' '-'b'::. • ■ ■■■.'.' .
Undoubtedly the auocesa of 3tur*s linguistic '"schism", as many Czechs and even
00)10 'Slovaks (vUiong them SafaFrlc and Kollar) , termed the 'former's.: creation of
on independent Slovak literary language, had dampened the ohtjuusiaBm for 
the Slovak oâuso. wlilch had .earlier gripped many Ozochs (Slovalcia in fact :
received very Xâttlb attention from Czeeh politicians at homo even during 
the: first World .-Wwr)» They v/ero.;: simply, inoapabla of understanding the 
seeming stubbornaee.a. with which thé. numerically tiny and , weak Slovak 
intelligentsia clung to : the use-' of; this new- language in spite of the growing 
dangé* of Magy#pi%&tion#
OT. 0* Masaryk'svimpact on Czech political life was quite considerable, but 1# 
had a great effect on political developments. in Slovakia too# In his. work 
ae Professor of Philc.spphy at Chaylea University ho had among. M s  pupils • a - 
number of Blovbko who Wro influenced by his ideas and sought to implement 
thorn in Blovakia, adapting them to suit Slovak conditions* .
The existence of the âuatrO"*Huugarian Umpire as a state was all the' then Czech 
politicians accepted unreservedly* ' Likewise during the first half, of the ■ 
century the Czech historian Palacky, during the troubled period of 1848-49 
at .the Slav OongrpBs: held In Prague, did urge the re-creation of an autonomous 
'Oaech district within %ho framework of Austria in its historic boundaries 
to which all those sixteen bounties in Northern Hungary that .wore inhabited 
by Slovaks should be attqchod*# Here we can .see in embryo the. final form 
that the new state'-took in 1918* What îtearyk in his programme did stress 
Was the fact that political advances such as the gradual enlargement. of : the 
franchise and the. wider usé; of Czech in public life should rest on a solid . 
base of advances-'in' health -care, -literacy, and the general social, welfare ' 
of the .mass of the population# This policy of steady, small and solid '
adViuieoB (drobn&f pr..^o): 'fdrind- ready adherents, ‘ among them Vavro Srobar# ;■ - 
Ho, together with- other Slovak studonts/ was eventually/able to publish à - -.■ - 
newspaper that first appeared in Jun© I898 entitled The Voice (iilao) . .
which sharply attacked conditions in. Slovakia and other Slovak political 
groups, whilst at the aame time promoting Masaryk's ideas* . : .. /
The establishment im Prague on the 7th Hay I896 of a Czechoslovak: Union 
(Se'skosloxHniekgf^ leqnota)« whose aims wore to strengthen Gseoh-Glovak unity 
and to support the cultural and economic development of Slovakia,'/was at, 
first welcomed by the Martin group of the Slovak National Party. They soon r 
withdrew their.support, however, in view of.their ouspicipns about the 
ideas and .activities of Hasaryk's pupils (called *’Hlasiats"), ':Who8e newspaper • 
soon began to adopt a hypèr-critical attitiido towards them*. . - :
The latter groiip. were led .by the Protestant poet Svetozar Hurhan-^ -Vajansky, 
who believed that Slovakia co’u M  only progress when it had béen liberated 
through a change iti the world balance of power. . Xn other wordéphe. believed . 
in the liberating .mission of the ïbieoian Tsar/vdio together/with national 
liberation would bring cultural, social, and economic progress to. Slovakia* 
This point of view was diametrically opposed to Masaryk's idea o£ drobna~nraco. 
of which this group were moat suBpicioua. Their suspicions were not so 
much iTtotivated by the ideas themselves as by two factors not directly linked 
to this policy* These wore the idea that was inherent in the concept of 
Gzeoh-Slovak imity, that" the Slovaks; were but a branch ( v6ev) of the Qzéch. 
nation (narod) &Mà' Slovak was but a'dialect, of G&ech* Thus,they .feared that : 
there would one# again be attempts made to persuade them to cultivate the 
use of Czech as their 3.iterary language. Secondly they may well have seen 
in the barrage-of criticisSB directed against them in the columns of Hlas 
an attempt to exploit the discontent.that,their policy of politicai passivity, 
as.seen in their boycott of election to the Diet in 1879, I88I^  1884, and 
. 1887, q^roused in ■ Slovakia, and to replace their influence .-by' th% of. the 
Hlasists* . ..The latter would then be able--to propagate their, ideas without' 
oppoaitidnyfrom this group.' . . .
Another group of politicians within the National Party.; v/ho were opposed to 
MaSaryk'a ideas v/ere the Slovak Catholics under the leadership of Andrej
. * 5 0 -  . . . : ' .. .
Hlinka, the vioar ofRuzomberok# He had been co-operating closely with 
Count Sicily's Hungarian People's Party since lB99* but his defeat in ‘ 
supplementary elections to the Diet in I898 was eventually to lead him to 
try to organize his o\m clerical party, although such a party did not really 
come into existence until after I918. His disagreement with Maearyk's 
pupils, apart from the vexed question of Czechoslovak unity, was not.so 
much about the content of Masaryk's ideas but rather the progressive and 
secular spirit that motivated them* Hlinka himself had been undertaking work of
a very similar nature among the. Slovak peasantry for some time* He established 
various types of co-operative associations, temperance societies, reading 
circles, and institutions to provide,cheap credit facilities* All his efforts 
to raise the cultural, moral and physical level of■ the Slovak peasants who 
comprised his flock,were imbued with a deep desire to preserve them in their 
simple and pious Catholic, faith* He was therefore deeply distrustful of 
Masaryk's ideas, as they were rooted-more in humanistic valiies than in 
religious ones* He saw in them the dangers of a corrosive influence that if 
it were allowed to'operate in Slovakia unchallenged and unchecked might 
succeed in alienating Catholics from their faith* The fact-that the Slovak .
Protestants seemed in the main to form the bulk of those who supported the
idea of OzechoBMvak unity must also have aroused his suspicions. Despite 
their agreement to use Hlovak as their literary language, the traditions of . r
the Czech language and the Czech Kralice Bible were still strong among them*
This may in part, explain their stronger idéntificationvwith the Czechoslovak 
Idea and their preponderance among the ranks of its supporters.
It should be stressed that there were other reasons vdiy Hlovak Protestants 
played, such a disproportionate.role in the Czechoslovak independence movement*
Firstly the Catholic Church in Hungary v/as heavily Magyarized and it was
thus; almost impossible for a nationally-conscious Bio vais, to rise to a position.
' :  ^ / ' ' . ' : , '- . , . ; 
of miy im%)orWiqe In the Ohuroh hiorarqhy. Beoondly, as Protestant , '
clergy wore all6%#d to marry, , thôl^ olilldroh. were very often given a 
good education-éîid broTtglit/up; to be conocioiis and proud-of thoir o\m -, ' V
language mid people* :yAe we: Mve. seen, however, hot à^ï Proteatahte were . -
prorGzeohpsldyali: m d  It was almmat invariably dependent ôn .tho partloular
indïv!î.dual as t W  HlÀêistQ were dram from both denominations. /
Masai^k's energetic defonqo of the Jewe and M n  exposure of the absurd
nature of the %lood libel" (based as it is upon, a total ignorance of ’ ■;
Jewieh religious law) at the time of the Hiisner case, when a Jew (Kilaner) ,
was accused of murdering a Christiaiv girl-ohild in order: to obtain her blood, 
deemed by ignorant Oliristions to be'necessary for the baking'of thé Passover 
unleavened broad (i%tao). may also hove .aroused his suspicions. Not, , ..
because ■ Hlinka ;Mmsélf either believed this or thought it to be of any' •
consequence, but rather because :he mhy have thought that. Masaryk had failed ' '% 
to realize that^in Slovakia^the Jews were almost exolusively identified 
with the Magyars mid/were oxeesslvely chauvinistic to'thO;point of being ,, 
more papal than thé Pope, whllat a number of them were engai^ êd in t 
oooupatloné such. me money-lending rnid tavern-kooping that Hlinka;-sav/, .
rightly or wrongly, as being partly responsible- for the poor living , ■ . •'
conditions of the Blovok peasants* In his view a.certain amount off If not‘ - 
open anti-Semitism, than at least h carefully nurtured distrust of Jews . ,- ;
might well prove effective in weaning the peasants àwôy from their harmful 
inflUehoe# Hère -for once the Hlasiats v?erc of .roughly .the same opinion*
'Hasaryk however-never formulated a systematic concept,of what the Czechoslovak 
Idea would entail/ In the pre-war period with the notuhkn exception ; of 
Palacky (see page 48) it was mainly ■'confined to the ethnic and linguistic 
sphere and did not have the additional connotation of a, , coramon state for 
OMOohs and BlovakG, . . . . . \ 1 '
The political impliocitions were then not readily apparent and the'baeic, 
idea of a unitary C’zechonlavak people, and possibly language, did not 
receive such a sharp definition at the time, Masaryk did not attach 
a great deal of importance to the language issue, Ho did not object to ■  ^
the Blovalm ueing their ovm longuago, which he later considered’an 
archaic dialect of I'feach # Many psople considered the Blpvaka to be more 
Slav and thus leas Germanised than the Czechs although it le difficult to -, -, 
attach any exact meaning' to these two terme. ' ,
During the First. World War the Czechoslovak resistance movement led:by .. ■ 
Maoaryk gradually , camo to the conclusion that the future inWreats. of 
Czechs and Blovcika would best be served by the création of a new stdto 
comprising the Ozeoh Lands and Slovakia# Maoaryk'e concept was essentially 
based on the argument of a people’s natural right to self-determination, 
although there was an element of histaricaiights in the delineation of 
the boundaries of tho new state* The will of the majority of Bohemia’s 
inhabitants, hoiN^ yer, dashed with tlmt of the Gorman- miiiority, who in their : 
turn wore to .claim the right to national self-determination in 1918-19# The 
inclusion of the Germans has, been sebn as the triumph of historic rights over 
the right to national self-determination. It should, howevez',,be. pointed 
out that tlîè will of the majority of Bohemia's inhabitants (the Czechs).
in favour of the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia in which the 
Slovaks could also, be included on .the basis of their right of national 
Bplf-determinàtioh.expressed in their desire to live in,a common state with 
the Czechs* . ■ .
in seeking to explain their case to the Allies it was necessary .to impart ' 
a more political hue to the. Czechoslovak Idea and stress the essentially ; 
unitary nature of relations between Czech and Blovak* Thus'one spoke of 
the Gxechoelovaks aS being one people With, two distinct branches and two ■
'  ^ ; ■■ : .. . : ' 
wi'y'similar laûfpagcvs» . TMb was done not only in order to make it : '; ;
possible-to ,claim thé création of Chechoslovakia on-., the.' grounds of the right 
to national self-cleti)rûtihàtionV or because'the Allies knew very little. 
about èither ’ Ozéoîts Slovaks mid h/ould, have been confused bad there been , 
an attempt.to explain the exact bharaoter of relations.between the two 
peoples, but also because/most of the members of the movemont, both Ozechs 
and Slovaks, genuinely believed that they oonsitùted qnè nation and that the 
need to display national luiity and present a united front ims paramount, / 
This last consideration'-'also .applied': when the hepublic had already been 
established for two of its neighbour's, Poland mid Hungary, .v/ere unfavourably 
disposed towards;, the new'state# Furthermore, during the first few years'of 
its existence the political leaders of;the German minority refused to 
recognize it,\; maintained ,;a very negative attitude towards /its very existencoi 
arid refused to oo-oporate in ^ my. way vfith the Central Govorhmerit#' , .
One can. thus understand viliy the state was basically a unitary one which 
did notcprdvidé any formal recognition of ,the .autonomy of .separateriess of 
any one of its Constituent parts, "i*e* 'Bohemia, Moravia, : Bilesia, or^  
Slovakia* Thé, need for national unity, both during ^md after thé successful 
struggle for natiorial liberation,'in the minds of Czechs ;rind BlovaW alike 
far outwmighed the demands on the part of a few Slovaks for sorap recognition 
of Slovakia’s nationhood or separateness (svo.ibytnoBt*}# : ■ ' '
g . ' ; ' 9 ;, : ' - - , ,
The American Blovalm , who by. 1925 numbered some 700^000 ,: were organized 
-in variouB associations, of which the most important were : the-BiovaR League,: 
which was riori-roligious, the various Catholic unions, the BVangelical unions. 
Gymnast! (Bokol),, .and women’s unions of both .dènominat ions* The Pro tes taut a 
numbered some,10a of the total number Of Blovak# in the HBA#' The financial 
and cultural support which these, organisations v/ere able to. give to their 
compatriots in Slovakia before 191o'was-an important factor; in helping to
Stave off tho worôt offeots of the. Magyarisation polioioo of the Hungarian 
Government# .
Maaaryk was able to iiSilizo the support of tho American Blovaka and Czechs 
in his struggle for Gsoohoslovak independence (see Chapter Four). It Is .. 
questionable to what extent Slovaks in North America wëre aware of the wider 
ramifications p£ his version/of tho.Czechoslovak Idea, for the various 
agreements (both of Cleveland and Pittsburgh) were primarily intended to 
influence the qatuse of the struggle for national liberation and could not 
be token as committing the Slovaks in Slovakia to any form of autonomy that 
they-may not have wished# ■ ;
It is .significant j in view of the later îiysteria and accusations of bad faith 
that were thrqim ât Masaryk and Bones iàr allegedly conspiring to withold 
from Slovakia the autonomy that was promised to her by virtue of the Pittsburgh 
Agreement (see Chapter .Four), that during the period 1918-20 when the 
Constitution of the Republic, was being dravm up not even those Slovak 
politicians who were members of-Hlinka*s People's Party, saw fit to protest 
against; the fact that no aiitononiy vms envisaged for Slovakia* Neither did 
they object to the; fact that the underlying concept of the state and the 
nation (in other words the Czechoslovak Idoa) was basically a unitary one.
When opposition to the league Government arose and the slogan of autonomy was 
first proclaimed it was clearly for, political reasons. It did not reflect a 
widespread desire on tho part of the majority of the Slovak population, whoso 
discontent was caused'by a whole range of social and economic factors.
The place of the Blovaks and Slovakia in the different versions of the • .
' - - 8 - -/ '  ^ . - ' ' ' 
Gzechoslovak Idea that existed luring thé First Republic is an important ,
theme in the history of this period# Unfortunately Blovoics seemed to judge
the Central Government and its policies far more by its attitude to the vexed
. ' ' ' : - \ ^ . ' ' . \ ' ' ^ ' 
question of Blovàk nationhood aiikl it’s rpcognition than by the solid results
and successes:of its policies from 1918^38 (espooiàlly in the field of
education)# Despite those.matorinl.gains which might have been expected.
to strengthen the state and/the; Biovaits’ attitude towards it, the question
of ; (Slovak national ;feoling was left ,unrecognised and unsolved during the
entire lifeti# of•:-thO:,First’.Républio#-' , ' ’ ' .
^  UAj /AND ':.'
- / . O '  "0  ■'■. ^ ' - ' : .  i N b E P m P m C E  1 9 1 4 - 1 9 1 8 * : ;  ■ ; : / • ■ / . ;  ' ' / O' : " . '
The oùthréàîc of ;war; iiiçAugust; 1914 ims not greeted by any:spontmieoiis . •’ 
manifestations ; of ,either pro- or anti-Habshurg feeling among the Ozech : ;
and Slovak inhabitants of the Empire# A sombre mood nrov iled; the 
departure of Czech mid Slovak/units to the Russian front often became. - 
the . foCal point ' fcn'/ theisinging; .of :pro*»l<UBsian and pro-mtente songs, r':
proof .that, a feeling of pan- lav Solidarity still : ekisted/amongst; the. / ;
Slav Subjects of the House of nabsburg^y. The. Magyars smd;.German by 
contrast- greeted the news of war with/cries, m d  /shouts;:o/f ; joy: and enthusiasm#/ 
Political activities were voluntarily stopped, and: boih Czech and Slovolc 
i^epresentatives in the Diet/made ritual; aeclaràtions; of loyalty to the 
ruling dynasty# Such actions, hoWoVer, were of little avail for the first 
desertions. on masse of Czech troops /to the %ssians unleashed a wave, of - 
/répressive measures /and /persecutions■ throughout the BnpireL although, in / /' 
Slôvalïia the situation was even worse.# , chrohicaliy. under-­
represented in the. .îMngariàn Diet,//its people were" far/poorer than in thq 
Historic Provinces, ..their, national consciou-^ness was^/wealœr whilst the 
pressures of Eagyarization were much stronger than; the/corresponding . ' ,/
pressures.of Germanization to/which;tho/Gaecha had.been;subjected.in the 
Historic Provinces* It was therefore far.less, possible for the, few political 
leaders that Slovakia liad at the time to undertake any measures of either 
active or pa.ssive; resistance /against the Aùstro-Eimgaï/iah: war effort* ,
Hence4the . main centres of ; Czech and siovolc resistance lay/abroad in heUtral 
and Entente countries/, : where , ever since the first hostilities ^Czechs aiid ' -
Slovaks had been organizing :propaganda campaigns and attempting to .form / / 
military wnitS ;within the. Allied armies*.;, ' ,P/ : ' ; -
:An important element in thé struggle against the ,Habsburgs/was the presence - 
in-different parts of.the, world of■ sizable Czech and Slovak communities, .
- - ' ' ' '/ -57- - ' - ' : ' ' / :
of whloh tile largest and best orgmilzed were to.be found in the United
.States* The-American.Slovaks had been .of great help in the last two 
decades of the last century to their compatriots back in Slovakia, not ' 
only -by remitting, money but also by sending books and newspapers printed . 
in the United States in the Slovak lahguage* - This helped them to keep 
alive the idea of Slovak national identity at a time of intensified; 
Magyarization* These communities were to play a vital'role in the struggle .
— -  "
As, early as August 1914 groups of Czeclis and,Slovaks who resided outside 
the frontiers;of Austrofltogary began, to organize some sort of resistance/ 1. 
to thO: war effort: of the Central fowers# - In.ParisV v/hore-there was a . .. 
small colony of Czechs and Slovalcs among whom may be counted the famous 
Slovak .astronomer and aviator âtefanik, a .Czech National,Council was formed# 
The Largest number of Czechs,and;Slovaks (after the, USA) were to be found 
in the. Russian Empire, and it was not therefore wholly unexpected tliat the / 
Tsarist authorities would attempt to utilise such pah^Slav sentiments as 
these groups manifested in their war pi^ opàganda# Various manifestos* ;
composed in all the languages of Austro«îîungary and issued in St# Petersburg* 
circulated among the non-German and non-Magyar sections of the Austro- 
ikmgarian population and. promised them liberation at the hands of the 
victorious Tsarist armies* whose early advances and gains were, however* 
soon reversed# The formation of units of Czech and Slovalc volunteers to 
be attached to the Imperial Russian Army and called Druzina was allowed#
The first meeting of Czechs and Slovaks took place in 8t# Petersburg on 
the 28th August 1914# This congress, as it was termed, announced the 
autonomy of Slovaî'Cia on the basis of common co-operation, end further 
resolved to struggle for the formation of a Czechoslovak Army to fight at 
the sidë.of the Allied forces# In,; these first bursts of activity the place 
of Slovakia in the plans that were being advanced was understandably vague* 
as wore most^if not all^of the plans themselves# However* given the first
wild hopes ‘that/.those early Russiàn military’; victories engendered'aiid ;. 
the BuSGophile feelings of such Gseoh politicians as Éeirel. %t -
iG''/$0:SBlble to imderstaild the idea .that the future state* hé it ' ,
Ozeohoslovalc or Bohemian, would hè:u monarchy* very probably with a
Romanov oil the throne* i This was a constant .demand of those Ozeoho-Slovalc 
units formed in ,Russia around March 1919*;. They ; wire generally considered 
to be among the most conservative ■ elements, of■ the ■ Czechoslovak ..movement;, 
for national' liberation (zaliramicnz odbo j) * Thé vast majority of their •;
members: had been living in Russia for some ÿéàrs and man^ . of them had ;: ■
naturally.fallen under the more conservative/ihfluehces of Tsarist - 
political l i f e * .. ' . .
In the West Masaryk had been ac live''':'from the; time of his ■•first meeting-', / 
with Setoh-Watson in, à/hotel icon 3.h Rotterdam in neutral Holland:d.n , ■
November.. 1914* : At thismeeting they discussed the war situation in : ' 
general,/ as well as.the prospects for "the Czechoslovak Independence movement^ . 
Shortly afterwards Masaryk escaped from Prague and eventually made his way 
to London where he was offered a teaching post at London-University* :/A. 
Memorandum entitled Independent Bohemia was handed to the then head of the . 
Foreign Office Sir Bdwar^ d Grriy /in ;Aprll;;1915* ThiG .Mèmor£mdum outlined- 
Czechoslovak aims and suggested ' the cizeation of an iîùtopeMent ' Bohemian 
kingdom embracing' Bohemia, Moravia, /Silesia and the Slovàî^ /districts of ./ .: \
Northern Hungary* The value Of auch/a nOw/àtato to the Alliés would lie . 
primarily in its position in the middle of.. Mro%)e. for together with other - 
similarly hèwi renewed or enlarged states it wouid form-part of a barrier, 
to any pan-Germanic expansion to. the East, or South-East*; :
'Slovakia is a'ccorded/'/very brief , treatment/in /this work*/ The essence of ' ■ 
Masaryk’s views were contained in a few lines " 'The SlbValiis w o , Bohemians . 
in spite of their UGÎng. their dialect as;their' literary langage* The.
■ Slovaks also strive for independence/aaid .accept' the programme of union with
Bohemia" * This view remained- essentially unchanged during the whole of - '/ ;
■Masaryk’s life and is easily understood in the light of his family , 
haokgroxmd*. That of Glovak national feeling which dates hack as ■
far as Bernolak (see Chapter Two), who considered the Slowdcs to be a ' / . .
separate people emd the direct descendants of the original Slav settlers 
of Slovalcia* and, is best typified by Uudovit Siur aild; his struggle to : : /
create a separate. Slovalc literary language ^ %ms .entirely foreign to 
Masaryk, It is thus.understandable that he should not have accepted such - ; ' 
a clear-out distinotion between,Czechs and Slovalm (and. their j respective / 
languages) as was mad© by those Slovaks^who felt themselves to be a 
separate people from the Czechs (although still closely related to them)/ 
who possessed a different tradition and a historioal development that was, ■ 
in many ways dissimilar to that which had occupied:in the Historic lands* "
The pressures of war and the need to present a. united front in the '■ 
independence struggle meant that these differences could not be over-stressed^ 
Those western leaders with whom Maéaryk* Den^ and Stefa^ik had to deal .
had little sense of.Central European history and whould doubtless have been 
very confused had there been an attempt to portray the somewhat complex 
relationship that existed between Czechs and Slovaks C.as, well.as the : :r .
various interpretations of what this ehtailéd) in the context of :the , / v 
simplistic but vitaily necessary taslc : of propagating the need to destroy : ,
Austro-Hungary and liberate her oppressed peoples* The feelings and 
opinions of Slovaks and their political leaders at home.in. Slovaîda could 
not, of course be accurately ascertained, end so it Wcis the.American Slovaks, 
being the largest and most well organized colony, who;became the mouthpiece 
for their compatriots in Slovakia* ,■ "■ - ■, ■
The first event of major importance in the United States was the-signing; . 
of the Cleveland Agreement of the 22nd October 3*933# The text, of this ; . ’ . 
agreement was allegedly prepared by the, Czech National Federation ;
(Sdruzen^- ^ eakych brganizacii) and agreed ,to without alterations by members 
of the Slovak League (Slovenslc^liga)» : The agreement stipulatedî /
1) The autonomy of both the Historic Lands and Slovakia. V,. ; ■
2) The union of the .Czech mid SloVEüc peop3.es .(naroda) in a / vV- , 
federative union of stutes, which complete autonomy for 
Slovalcia, her own parliament (snem), her oimdivil service, 
complete cultural freedom; as,'well as full rights fpr. the
use of Sloyaic, and her pvm financial and political. - ; 
administration with Slovak as the offipial language#% - '
. $) : Electoral/ fighte; universal* secret and direct# •
4) Form of government : aipersohal union with a democratic '
state organization (sriadenxm) as in the: United Kingdom*/
• 5) These points form the'.basis for mutual agreement and may■ ' ' -
' be enlarged dï’ extended; only on the basis .of the mutual ■:
consent, of both .aides* The, Czech National'Federation ;
reserves the-right, to. make;-any appropriate changes-hs does 
the Slovedc League# • / ' % \ -
. Cleveland. .Ohio 22nd October, 1915* ,. . : i " -
The thinking behihd the actual formulation of the text betrays, a great 
concern for,..'giiarantees'to. ensure, the. autonomy of; .Clov^ dcia, to thé point of 
envisaging. a kind of conforation to: be: /xrritten into the. main body of thé ■ 
text* This leads one to believe'that thé ;text _ of, the Agreement .was , - : ;=. :
idéuticai to that.: of a Memorandum which the Blovait League. was preparing / 
just before the start of the War ' and which to. present to President
Wilson and to .circulate among foreign political leaders arid diplomats*
The references to Va ‘personal union #•*,* as in England" àrë very yague ; . 
and imprecise# Obviously this arrangement is.to some extent modelled . .. ; 
on that, of the Aüstro-ïïungarian Ausgleich o§ I867* Yet one cannot tell
from : the; text .whether this ■ ’basie : ;for/regu3;atlag the cJ rtionship between .', 
the Historic- iandq. arid .SXovalcia; XB:-in the Eontext of aii indopendent , 
Gzeoho-SlovaJx.; state’ or within - the : bounds of a ' renewed and r.eformbd , v "■
Anstro-IIungary organized .'aiid admiuisterèd aa,a . frep :confédération: of ■
, several sovereign peoples # ' jSuoh Was the ■ coreof, the ideas put forward ' Z; * " 
in. A « Popovi'c * s book’ The United States of Ans ur «a, pubi (shed in • 1910* . •. ■ ‘
The concept of a personal union is," however, almost entirely cohfined to 
a monarchical system of.government* as the :institntion of. a presidency . ; . 
Would be.too prone.to p^ l^itical instability and lack of Gontihhity for it 
to '.function e f f ectively in .uniting /two or : more: states' in a common linit f - ./ ; 
At"' first'.Masaryk had suggested - in/ his memorandum. .."Independant Boheà&a" ‘ 
that the future Gzeoho-SloVak state WOuld; be a Kionarchy^  yo.t prior to ;
1918 hovrever-he had. changed his mind and come out xn lamur of a ‘ . '
republic(as ■ he himself says , in .his work-'The How Europe"), which would 
have made, many of the/ provisions■of the; Cleveland'Agreement very difficult 
to enforce*" //,1/ ' / . _/ / A ' ' ■ ' / ''
The following month saw both the inauguration of a regular newspaper, 
called la Nation Tchegue which appeared in Paris under the editorship ' : 
of Professor Ernest Denis as well as'-:the publication of 'a declaration, 
signed by Hasaryk and representatives of all the Czech and /Slovak ' 
organization/in .Europe -and North America* It/.proclaimed the ïFabsburgs ‘ /: ; 
to have forfeited their right to/ the .Orioch tlirohe* The most important / / 
feature of this document was that It placed "Bohemia’s future" firmly:/; / 
in the hands of -the Allies* . ' ■/ ; ’ : •
The next two years. 1916 and 1917 .were devoted, to attempts to strengthening 
the,propogatioh of the.Czechoslovak cause and to recruiting troops for/a .. 
GzeohoslovalrfAjt^ y in the. United-UtateSj/: C0h'ada, France, Italy.’and the 
Balkans*: In jAay:I9I6 Masaryk transformod the Czech National Committee into 
a National Council with himself as ohairmEm, Benes. as:Ceneral CCcretary- /
./ ;-/v -■, f - '• X . - ,
and Milan Rastislav Stefanik aa the Slovalcia’s representative, although 
the latter had lived in ITrahoé for several years and was,a naturalised 
French citizen# ,/' ■ ' ; / ■ '
Masaryk at first welcomed the attempt, made tovjard the end of 1916, to 
form an association of all/the representatives of the Czech political 
parties who sat . in the. Austrian Reichsrat# ; This association vdiich was 
located in Prague itself ./was %ovm as the Ôzèch Union (Cesky jvaa) and ; 
had a/smaller/National Committee (Nàrodnf Vyhor) headed by a veteran: . 
politiciaitv of the. Agrarian;party/Antohin Svehla, Masaryk’s hopes that 
this organisation would pnraue overtly anti-Austrian: policies were soon r: 
to be dashed# The Allied Powers/in response to President Wilson ^ s Note - 
asking the belligerents to state their war aims, mid said that.one of their, 
aims .V;àé. '*the libération, of- Italians | Slavs, Rumanëftfand Csechoslovaiis 
from foreign' r u l e % h i s ' was without doubt a great triumph for. thé , > , 
Czechoslovak indépendance movement as the Czechoslovaks (although being 
Slavs) '.were specifically mentioned by name.: : r-.
The response from, thé Czech Union was a déclaration o*' loy ilty to the 
ruling house*,.. This occurred. just before the accession pC I'^ iperor Charles 
On the. death of Franz Joseph and could conceivably have been the price >. .
that the Czechs had to/pay in order to ensure the granting of a royal 
pardoh to two Czech politicians,: Alois<R^an mid Karel: Krawiar^ .then tmder 
sentence of death for allegedly seditiohs;activities^ Shortly afterwards ^ 
both the Czech Union and its." national Committee took part in the coronation 
ceremonies whilst three Czech politicians Stanek, Sméral and Mastalka 
took advantage " of the occasion to publish a iettèr in- which they dis- -. 
associated themselves from : the Allied Note and pledged, their loyalty to : 
t h e n e w A « p e r q r , \ / . . y . q . : ^  A  . i / .  ' ' \  -
/Such reactions may be partially explained part of a wise policy of
keeping,, "tvjo' irons' , ill the fiio*,". . Tl.!© accession of a new . fkperor and 
the abdication’of the Tsar combined/with the ever-increasing and widespread 
feeling of war-vîeàriiiess had. increased the chances that Austria would 
malte a separate peace with the Allies*:. They would then be. free to throw 
■ the-entire weight of■their forces against Germany*. By April 1917 the 
United .States was also to be counted among Germany’s adversaries and a 
formidable.one at that, whose military and economic strength was seriously 
under-rated by the Germans j In which case Austro-I-Mngary would have 
been preserved intact and it would have been a question: of Czech and 
S3-ovâIç leaders at home ■ trying to gain as wide a degree of autonomy as 
possible*
The re-opening of.the Austrian Heiohsrat on May 30th 3917 gave the leaders 
of the nationalities the opportunity to make speeches demanding national 
self-determination and the transformation of. the Empire into a free union 
of national states*' The Czech delegates, who had been urged into speal^ ing 
out by the actions of over a hundred Czech writers* They had issued a 
declaration calling upon their delegates to defend Czech national rights 
and civil liberties but did not forget to mention Slovaîîia as well, although 
the formulation they employed spoke Gf "the unity of.all the branches of 
-the Czechoslovak people in a democratic state) whereby the Slovak'branch 
too should not.be omitted*" ,
In Slovakia the situation during 19.17 was still very quiet* Ferdinand 
Juriga, one of the three solitary Blovalc deputies to the Hungarian Diet, 
had already made two ritual declarations of loyalty to the Himgarian 
Crown (on 26th April 1915 and again on 9th December 1915) and in hia 
publishing activities which consisted mainly of pamphlets written in 
Slovak he still called upon Slovalcs to support the regime, often appealing 
to their religious sentiments to do so. We shoiùd however not think of 
his activities as being in any way different from those Czech politicians
who made similar statemonts^at a time when it seemed to’;be/question of 
saving what one could# tJlien the, end .of. Austro-Hmigary was; in sight it ■ 
was again duriga-: who; spoke . ’
jteOdtober Revolution had.had a great impact on both the conduct of the. 
war and the morale of the combatants and the civilian populations* On 
the one hahdiif tended to increase the longing for peace on the part of 
the war-weary masses to vdiom the Bolshevik slogans of :gread. Land, and a 
just.peace without indemnities or ahhOxations must have had a certain appeal# 
On the other hand the Virtual co|i|aps,e of the Russian front meant that / - 
the end of the war would be further delayed, as the Germans,could no# ;/ 
concentrate the bulk of their offensivo operations on the,Western front, , 
whilst it would still be some time .before, the United States would be 
able to put largo numbers of men and, vast amouhts of material into the / ' 
field# Hence in thé last year before the Caecho-BlovaJc state was established 
(28th October I9I8) the importance of the need;fOr .fuosh'troops in the 
form of the OaOchoslovalc, legions, that were' then in the, process of •'
formation and training, grew# With it came'the. eventual recognition by 
all the Allied Powers of Masaryk*s.National Council as the Provisional 
Government of à soon-to-bo-liberated independant Czechoslovalcia and the ‘
conclusion of various conventions and : Agreements between the Allied , 
governments and the Cgechoslovalc National Council#
Within the Czech Lands, and Gloval^ ia the last year of the war vjas marked . 
by an upsurge in' the number Of strikes and other distrubahcos/such.as 
food riots and mutinies some of which were brutally repress.ed;# :'There were 
successfiil general strikes, in the Czech Lands in Januairy and in Slovakia 
in May as well as a declaration on Epiphany (6th January) by thé Czech 
representatives, in the Prague Diet# It/demanded the right. to indépendance , 
on the basis of thè historical rights of the Czech nation including the / “ 
Slovaic branch* Tliree other dec3.arations that were of vital;/importance, in-
■' ■"■■■// /-65- . . , ■/ ■■: .
■:propOgating .the idea of. a-single etat©>v/hicli'would, contain in'addition 
to Czechs and Slovaks substantial national m i n o r i t é s also ,passed 
in tha.t year#; Of these that Of Fittsburgh vihich rBubaeque'ntly: became 
. khoim-as the Pittahurgh Agreement (Pittsburghoka .Dohoda) . was a riiajor ; . ; /
bone of contention in/the argument between „ hlinka,81ovelc People’s 
■ ; Part^ which demanded autonomy on the, hasis laid dovm in the Agreement and , ■
indeed that .this'Agreement.should.be incorporated into : the -Constitution, 
of thé First Republio^and the.supporters of the'Central government# There .
■ Was considerable disagreement .between, these tv;o sides of tlie interprétation 
to be put on the provisions of the .Agreement and the. extent to which they 
should or could be held to be binding on the actions and policies of the 
%atraX government I There were in addi tion lesser qohti^oversies surrounding 
thé - formulation, of ..the. two other declarations*;! These were, the Resolution 
of the 1st of Mqy. 'in Liptovsky Svaty Mkulas and that of Tureiansky .Bvaty 
Martin from 3Cth October 1918# ? AA' ’ / ■. . /. .
, The .Resolution of the 1st. of .May was pasoed at a meeting of Workers to
; ■ Gelebrate the 1st nf May in Llptovsky'Svaty nilailds in /Slovakia# ,■ The
./ text was formulated by Vavro Srobcor who had been-one of the founder-members 
0 è "îÉLasist" movements (.See Chapter Three) ; and naturally ; a firm / ' 
up jorter/of/the idea of Ozecholovâk imlty* Briefly the text of the ,. - /.
\,L.'olution demanded the right of national .self /determination for all nations.
; or Au.strb-Htmgary "including the Hungarian branch of the Czechoslovalt. :
people; .(tedy 1 uhorské j vetve &skdsloVenskeho kme&)f. It has been 
' /suggested by one HimgarieuV-revisionist writer lajos Staler in hia worîf; ' ■ '
' "tîngarns, Vergav/altigitng" (The Rape of Hungary^Vieima 1928):; that .the text 
. ; ; was changed to read thus from the original formulation ; which.rah "tedy i 
uhorSkej Vetve elovenskdSo kmena/naroda" which ('and the - Iluh / .
: branch.of the Slovalc (or Slav?) peop3.e# This would have been interpreted ,
/as meaning that the Slovaks expressed their willingness to remain within .' 
■Hungary .with' a certain measure, of autonomy, . Steiir purports.- to show a ' 
copy;of the declaration^ with the alterations entered by hmid in ink,:.but
..it is liai'd to .give credenoe to M s  vlewa which,rare motivated by à/wild 
desire to show./that the Blovalis didv'.aot. vdsh to-brealç away fro# their 
long:historical association, with the Grown of St# Stephen and were coerced
into doing so# . The weight of. other available evidence fails to corroborate :
. ■-"/"■ ' !  ; ■ ■:/ :-v-. .
this idea, - , , ' .;
On the 20th May shortly after this'Meeting thé; Slovak National Party .held, ■ ' • 
a conference^ . . ., which representatives of all the existing political trends - . 
(except the Social Democrats) in Slovakia atteMed^.and ;deolded to send to 
-Prague through the medium of the President of the Slovak National Party the- ' 
■loilov/ing unanimous resolution# "The Slbvalc National Party stands for ,
Lhc unconditional end unrestx'ieted right to self-determination of the 
Slovfdc people and claim, on that/basis, for the- Slovak people’s their ; , . 
participation in; the creation of an indépendant state, consisting of . . ■ ./
Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia*"/, ■ As/hlinlm put it so /succinctly,
AA.'"' A'- -.-4 ";A!A'.\
■"ihé ■ thousand-year marriage has failed* We must' divorce
.The previous month April 3'rdbaw. the .ceremony of the "National Oath" in . 
Dragué led by .the vetran Czech m/itor Alois' Jirasek, at which 'people pledged 
their allegiance to the future state* The Jubilee of, the ' completion of 
the National Theatre (l6-20th May) provided a further occasion for a ; /
démonstration of Ozebh-Blovalc solidarity" when à speech by the agod Blovalc 
poet hviezdoslav won great acclaim* -Thé end of the following month brought 
the signing of the new famous (or infamous) Pittsburgh Agreement on June
T M s  .Agreement was negotiated during the course of Masaryk’s highly 
-•successful tour, of the United States which did much to bring the Ozechoslovalc 
- c'aUs.e to the notice of the American public, at a time when his Czechoslovalc 
M d  just become involved in clashes with the Bolshevik Hed /irmy* The 
representatives of Czechs and Slovaks met,together in Pittsburgh to discuss 
the policy they were to adopt on thé place of Slovakia in the future
- / ; - / ' - ! ! ' '
V' '■ ■' .' /.'/ ....■■■'/■■' . ; ' ■,"■'-■■■■--■■, / . - i 1/
independent Czechoslovak state*' The provisions of the Agreement. were 
as : follows S ■ / - - V ' .!
CzéchrSioveîC': Agreement concluded in Pittsburgh Pa* 30 May 1918# 
The representatives.of Slovak and Czech organisations in the 
United. States,. The Sloval^  League, The Czech National %.
. Federation and the Union of Gaech Catholics discussed in 
the. presense of the president of; the Ozeoho-Bloval-; .
National Cpuhcii Prof# Masaryk thé. Cseoho-Slovalv question 
and the present declarations-of oiir . program and concluded -
/ the folloMng: / '; ' '/ : . '■-/ :
No .approve the pfeliiieal program which strives for the 
■-. union of Czechs and Slovaks in ah-independent state, ■ 
consisting of the Czech .Lands and Slovakia#
Slovakia is to. have its own administrâtiôh, its-.ovai ' ■ ' '
parihmeht ("snem")# its own courts#
The. Slovak language will be. thé official .Imguage in
: the schools, iif the offices and in public life generally#
The Czeehe-Slovalc state will bé a republic, its ' ■ . '
constitution will be democratic, / . , ' ■  ^ /
The organization of the cooperation of Czechs and Slovaks /' 
in the United States will be .deepened andvaltered according 
. totthe-needs of a, changing situation and. with the mutual
understanding-of both/sides# Detailed arrangements ;
' ' . % _ .. ..
("Podrobne usanovenia") on!the organization of a.Gzecho-/
Slovak state ore to be left to the liberated Czechs and:.
Slovaks, and their authorised representatives# .,/
Years, afterwards this.document was to become one of the most powerful ' 
■weapons,in the bands of-illinka’B Sloval^:People’s Party-and the central; 
plank of its program.of political opposition to the Central government 
and its incessant demands for autonomy* It was constantly termed the
' ' ' / ' .68*;
Slovalc Magna Carta or; Bill of Eights by the Autormiists who claimed that 
it was being denied to the Slovalc people by the "Prague centralists" 
and their supporters in Slovakia#
The truth, however, is a little more complex* Firstly.one could not
expect a document, dravai up by what were in effect American citizens to
be.binding on the future actions of Czech and Slovalc.politicians, actions
that to a large extent would have to bo dictated by circumstances
prevailing at. the time and which could not have conceiveably been foreseen
by the signitories to the Agreement* Secondly Hasaryk had good reason to /
consider this merely "a local understanding as to policy ; concluded in
order to appease a small Slovolc faction that was dreaming of .God Imov/s
■ l3 -what sort of independence for Slovakia " as he was undoubtedly worried
by the fact that à Hungarian nobleman and politician of allegedly socialist
:. ' V..' -if- ' ' . A - '
persuasions, Michoal Karolyi, had been visiting the United States in an
effort to persuade-its goveriAnent to preserve the territorial into integrity
of Euhgary as well as by other campaigns for an independent Slovalcia
linked to either, îkingary, Russia, or Poland' '#... Masaryk therefore acted
in order to ensure-that it would be his program for an independent T
Czechoslovalc state that would be seen to have the whole.hearted support
of the American Czechs,and Slovaks# The last clause of the Agreement^ •
however^which left the final, arrangements in the hands ■ of the liberated
Czechs and Sloval^ s themselves^is capable of mdely differing interpretation^
but it does serve to show that Masaryk did not act in bad faith by signing
this agreement# The last clause clearly ensures that the final shape of -
the future .shape and -SlovalMa’s place in it would be decided back in a
liberated Czechoslovakia* . : : .
Events were moving fast back in the Czech Lands# The National Committee 
in Prague was ..reformed on the basis of the relative strength of the parties' 
as represented by the last elections to the Reichsrat in 191Î# At first
, - 6 9 -  y ;  . ■ ' .
thq Slovaks, who/weroMf anything. cjrronically undér*representoà in the 
IMingarian Diet (of 453 members), where they only had tiiree deputies instead 
Of at least .the, forty tha;4 their relative share in the Hungarian 
population should have given them, were only alloted four representatives, 
but this number was later raised to fifty-six and finally to seventy* ‘
The/aims of the Committee were in fact to pave the way for an eventual 
take-over of power ;from out of the hands of the. Austrian authorities*
'It soon began to function almost .as a state within a state* The eventual 
result of such action meant that the final assumption of authority^which; y 
took place in the name of the Gzechoslovalc Provisional Government^ happened 
smoothly and without,any bloodshed# ;
In Slovakia^however'^the existence of ,a similar body was not revealed, 
until; the l9th. of October or nine days before the talce-over in Prague,
One of the three ClovWk deputies in the Hungarian Piet Ferdis Juriga, 
now spoke} out* He had been one of Andre j IHinka’s co*workers in liis 
efforts to raise the cultural and social level of the Clovali peasantry 
of hie diocese and himself had suffered a fine of 1200 croims (approx* . 
@48) and two years’ imprisonment in 1906 for two articles he wote in the 
nevarpaper ICatoiick:^noviny^^* In hie speech to thé Diet, which was 
frequently interrupted by shouts of protest from the Magyar inerabers, he. : . 
declared that the Blovalis claimed the right to national self-determination 
and refused to recognise the right of the Magyars to represent Slovaîîiu/ ' 
at the.Paris Peace Conference# This right was vested exclusively in the . 
Slovak.National council which together with its competent organs was alone 
empowered to speak in the name of the/Slovak people# A '' ‘
Local branches of this body soon sprang up but they lacked both the 
administrative staff and the military and police arms that were available : 
in the Czech Lands, where a very large number of Ozeclis who . he].d such 
positions could be.counted upon to support the National Committee when the
■-A-.' '■ / ■  *70- :  ; , . '■ :
time came» In yiéw of-this fact and farther'that thé Hungarisai military 
and jjolice authorities remained in power even after the formal 
proclamation of ^ Cgeohoslovali independence in Prague on the 28th of-October 
1918% : then it should come as no surprise that the text of the Declaration 
of iW^iansky Svîity Martin should reflect à. somewhat cautious note* This 
Déclaration was drafted at a meeting éf a number of representatives from 
the Dlovali National Party, Slovali People * s : Party #.d the Social Democrats 
which took placé from the 29th 30th of October^
A  " : 16 t  ^ ' . ' ; '
Briefly this Declaration echoed the.demands of Jurigafs proclamation of
the 19th October t but it also spoke of thé ‘^ unitary Czechoslovaîc nation
^harod'O living within the bbunde. of Hungary^ and wont on to say that
."the Blovaic people (hnarod") were linguistically and culturalfhiatorically
a part of the unitary Ggecho^ 'glovalc nation* , In all the cultural battles
which the Czech nation hus fought and which have made it famous the world
over the Blovali nation,too has had its share* "The Declaration further
demanded the right to national self-^ deterraination for thé ;pzecho"Slovale
nation and expressed its agreement with President Wilson %  Noté of the
18th of October and. its acceptance by AustrO*-Mngary*s Foreign Mnister
Julius. Andî'asey# . ■ . . . ' '
Thé forRTulation of i the text suggests that the SloVaîî leaders were unaware
of the Allies''intentions and wished to ensure that they would not be
cOnaignod to the Hungarians at any Peace Conference by claiming to be an
indivisiable part of a imitary OzechoyBlOvalt nation* This formulation is
however imprecise as the text in other places speaîcs of both of a Czech
and a Slo vale. nation# It may merely ref loot the. speed with which the
declaration was ;drai-A up the variety of versions of which there were at ,
' leastAthree^ and above-ail^ the fact that.events were moving too fast for
them to keep up» "' . i-. , ' , ' . , . ■ 1 . . \
111 connection with this last point many stories have been told in .; :
autonomist publications about thé arrival of Milan Hodza from Budapest 
that evening (30th) * ' with nmvs of the proclamation of the Republic in 
Prague on the S8th. It is alleged that he deliberately changed the wording 
of the declaration 00 read more in favour of the idea of a unitary 
CzechosloVal^ nation or alternatively browbeat those delegates present 
into doing so by tlireatening that this was the only way in which they 
could get the. Allies to accept their:,dernand3*. As far. as we can tell 
there is no concrete évidence to, support these allegations* All Hdd^ 
seems to have done is do have crossed out the clause calling for separate 
representation for Slovaliia at the'Paris Peace Conference, as this was not 
a matter for the central government in Prague, and to have brought the 
demand for national self-determination into accord vzith the situation .created 
by Andrassy*B acceptance of President Wilson's Mote# ■ . V,
Neither does there appear to be àny trace of a .secret clause in the /; 
Declaration, according to the terms of which after a period of ten years 
the SlovuîCB would be’free to change - their minds, if they so desired,: ; / 
about remaining in a common state with the Czechs* Some of the original 
signitories may liave stayed behind.to debate various issues, some of which 
may have arisen out of matters concerned with the Declaration (as is 
asserted by the publicist and journalist Ferdinand Pefoutka in M s  
monumental work Budo3aK&iT St^tu) but# as the majority: of the delegated had 
departed by the 31o^ those who remained behind, could not possibly be 
considered as being empowered to alter the original Declaration in.any 
way whatsoever#
The most plausible explanation for this legend of a secret clause seems 
to .be that there was a meeting of the Executive CoiuMttee of thé Slovalc 
National. Council on 31st October at which the question of Slovaliia* s status 
within Czechoslovakia was discussed and it "appears that there was a 
suggesti&i that .it should acquire autonomy within a set period of time#
The maximum figure of ten years was mentioned# This view is reputedly - 
based on the minutes of tliis meeting that were never published #
Many Deolarations Resolutions had boon-passed# ■ Many speeches had 
been made# But this does not alter the: fact, however unpalatable it may 
have been, to many Slovaks, that the Slovoli National Coimcil was unable, ;
for many good and valid reasons, to carry out a transfer of powers and
impose its own authority on Slovaltia as had'the Czech National Council 
boon able to do in the Czech Lands# The Central §ovemmont in Prague had ,
eventually to resort to military force in order to assert 10s authority 
over Siovaî^ ia-and remove the. Hungarian armed presence# \p shall have ,., 
to examine this confused and chaotic transition period Z ., l^which 
lasted from the end of the Vto until the middle of the next year,, together 
'with events in the western half of the country where the political- system 
was'rapidly being evolved in order to. determine how:and why Blovalîia gained 
a type of administration, that v;as later to attract sb much criticism'and 
opposition, :. v; , ■. ■ ; ,.
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CHAPTER FIVE : OËNTIDYL mVlimWT lOLIOY IN 8IDVAKIA 1918-1929.
Introduction
The creation of an independent. Czeohoslovak state is generally considered 
as dating from between'the l8th mid the 28th October* That.is,from the 
time of Masaryk's Declaration of Czechoslovak Independence in Washington bn 
the l8th to the final proclamation of an independent state on 28th October# * 
The later, legalistic arguements as.to the exact date on which the■ new state 
canie into-being could not hov/ever affect in any .way the fact that a transfer . - 
of power from Anatro-Hungarian to Czechoslovak hands happened in the western . 
half of Qzechosloyakia yet failed to occur in the eastern half# The reasons 
why the Blovalcs were unable to rid themselves of the former Hungarian officials 
who had ruled over them pill bè examined in detail'in this chapter#' , .
Section One . - '
The Establishment of dzechoslovak Power in Slovakia 1918-1919
i) Blbvakia in 1918 -
Slovakia in 1918 was : in a■very poor condition* Four years of war had 
imposed a great burden on her people in the form of losses in agricultural
and industrial production, loss of life on the battlefield and the cumulative
effects of tendehcies that had been apparent even, before the war had begun. 
Vis-a-vis the Czech-Lands Slovalcia was economically and educationally weaker, 
her roads and railways were not as extensively developed and.this rendered
Goramunications more diffipult and:hampered the development of Slovakians , 
industry,;^  Her . agrioultural population was proportionally larger than in, ., 
the Ozeoh Lands (60,#i against 41;6 ) whilst the distribution of land
was very unequal# Jùat over half thé total number of holdings loomprised .
'.p . - é'.:-.- ' ' ' ' ' '
a mere 0.^ of thq total area whilst at the opposite end of the scale
of the total, area comprised only 0#^ of the total number of holdings ,
Lifo.expectancy, infant mortality and adult mortality rates and. the rate 
of/population ihorease CSee Tahlo One), all these indices showed that 
Slovakia was weolcer than>the Czech Lands* The net increase in population 
for the Blovaks Was only 16Â (279»770) from l8g0^1900 whilst the/Magyars .
registered the astounding figure of 8l  ^# Even if we talce the unreliability 
: of Hungarian statistics into account this was an astoiiisMngly small increase# 
Their excess of live births over deaths in the same period, calculated on 
' the basis of thé average natural increase per/1000 inhabitants can be shbv/n 
to have numbered at least haif-a million#'; The missing 230,OOP may be/.
: attributed to. two main factors « .  ^à ■ " , ; . .. ‘
. 1* { Migration within , Hungary and/emigration abroad, primarily to : ' •
- : /. /-:/the United States* .' '
/ : 2*.Statistical Magyarication whereby Slovaks allowed themselves
' for^ /a variety.'of reasons to be recorded in the .census as / . 4  ■ . ; ‘
, ; \. :Mâgÿorë» (The .test of nationality was baeed on a rather . . ' / I
, . loose : definition, of habitual and .customary language • )
Bearing-thèse:factors, in mind we may understand why the number of-Slovaks 
in Hungary.Shoimd On absolute decline of 40*774 or 2*3^ over the period/ 
1900-1910# (As shown-in the Hungarian census figures .for I9OO :and 19lO)*
.T'<-
The Industrial .dévolution had come to. Hungary later than it did .to the 
western half of the Dual Monarchy and thus Hungary still remained far/more
•^4
agrarimv a country#’ The last tv/entÿ :to thirty years of . the nineteenth 
c entury saw m  upswing in the ? pad e p f, ; industrialization that to a c ertain . • ^
extent/was deiiberately, fostered by the Hungarian government# . It spent ’
large: sums ;of,money in the form of;subsidies to various industries, many : . ;
of which were located:in:Blovaicia# According to the foliowing figures" ■
Slovakia and RutheniaV: containing: only 17#3^ 4 of: the total population: of 
Hungary and 19#3/d of its total area, received in the period 1888-1914 33#^^ 
of the total miount of subsidies and of that allocated, to . the textile .; 
industry * H3oth Blovalcia and Huthenia played, an important-role in Hungary's - 
ecohpmy - there.were over 23^000 workers employed in,the metallurgical ; ; V 
industry alone, including the famous Krompachy works in BÎovàlcia which had / 
an annual :iroh-ore‘output of over 1 million tons, half of which was exported 
to Austria'^ /^  # The following figures may serve to illustrate what, proportion, . 
of Hungary's industries were located in those areas that were later incorporated 
into the Republic* Slovakia, and Ruthenia/together contained:
TABLE TWO
30^ of Hungary's timber# ;./
of her iron# . ....’ -
. 38*30 of her iron-ore ■ ■ - .
All the zinc* . . .
; .34# of the manganese ore* , ■
. :23#Cyi of her salt# '
. 26*^0 of her metallurgical industries#
20  ^of her wood. ■ / //.
33*?^  ^of her textiles* < - - ,
V 93#?^  of the paper,industry,
1 9 of the stone ,. : . / w „ ;
27*4/1 of. the v/ine and beer
l<j#S^  . of all mines ancl factories employing more than 
twenty workers, ' .
; ■ -.V; ■- - . .76, . A  .
. 21*1# of all those employing moré.than one hundred"
. , - workers*' a I
17* of the total number of industrial onterprised.
Table Three (see Appendix) gives a comparison of industrial production .in 
Czech Lands and Hungary and Slovald.a in : 1913 which serves to give us an 
indication of how much of the Republic's industry could be expected to
be located in the eastern half of. the country* The total number of
"industrial workers was.only 178$677^^ (227,9P0 if we include small-scàle 
©nterprises, craftsmens workshops etc# .) whereas it. was no less than 
1,881,935 in tho Czech Lands*^ Dospite the fact that a large number of 
Slovaks lived and worked outside Slovakia (in I9OO the Census showed that 
of the 2,019,641 Slovalcs in Hungary only l,4l6,349 were living in Slovakia) 
and the relatively high share of Hungary's industries that were located in 
Slovakia and Ruthenia the area possessed far fewer industrial workers than 
the.Czech Lands* This holds true even when the difference in area and 
population is taken,into account and allowance is made for the many Slovaks
who worked in industries located in and around Budapest as well as for the
fact that the two areas are being compared on. the basis of pre-war data, which 
does; not reflect damage caused to industry in both halves of the country by 
the war*
Economic factors however are not themselves sufficient to explain the 
political passivity that Slovali leaders continued to shov; even after the 
Republic as established*
ii) The 816vale National Council and the Liberation of Slovakia
..r —  ' . ...........' ...:...
The:, existence of a Slovak National Council (SNR-Bloi e^nsk .^ndl Q^dn^  rada) 
v/as not in fact revealed until the I9 October when the sole 8lovait deputy.
y .. . - ##77- . -y '
ill ; the Hungarian Diet Perdis Jurigà (See'Chapter’.Four) made ;à;.. fiery speech 
in which he demanded virtual indepehdehoe for the Slovaks, refused ..any 
longer to recognise the authority of the Diet in Slovak affairs and reserved ’
this right exclusively for the SKR# The leclaration of TurKiansk/Svaty^
■ i7 ' - ' y : ; ' -
Martin* which took place two days after the transfer of pov/er in■the,Czech
Lands makes it quite•clear that it is. this body which alone shall possess :
the right to speak in the name of the. Slovak people; Yet by the 4th^November,
a mere-five days later$ we find that a Provisional Slovak Government
: ( do%isna  ^s3ovensk<C vl^a) had been nominated in Prague with Vavro Srobàr at
its head* He was' sent to Slovakia with a small force of gendarmes to restore
o r d e r . B y  the,23rd January 1919 the ■SNIP together with any other bodies^^
were abolished by a Government decrée issued in Prague by the Minister with
flill powers to administer Slovakia (Minister a plnoii mool pro spravu Slovenslca).
This decree was dated the 8th January but long before then the SNR had lapsed
The actions of the Central Government were motivated by three main factors
viz, : '. ■ ' ' ■ ' \7 / . ' . y
1, The lack of contact between the SNR and the Revolutionary
National Assembly (RMS - Revolu^x n^rodnf shrom^deni) in
. y Prague which was. mainly due to the confused situation in ■
"SO y '
■ ' . . -x y Slovakia at the time # ... • .. . '
2* The alarming reports emanating from Slovalcia that spoke of
: , . • looting, rioting, armed intervention'by Hungarian troops - . y
and police, lxcts of , violence against unarmed. Slovak civilians 
: as well 08 the alleged occupation of parts of Slovakia by-; / .
Hungarian: troops* ' y „ .
.3* - T^ ie possibility that the SNR might have entered into direct , -. /
negotiations with thé Hungarian .government of Count Karolyi , ’ 
who had come to power after the overthrow of the now 
' ■'discredited government of Count Tisza*
It may be remembered that ''there - were - t W  main wingo within thè BlévakV : :
National Party CBlevenslm. rWodnà Btrana ## 5N8). in Mfirtin ; One of them 
woG.openly GuGpioioue of a pro-Gzeohoelovak^ooùree whilst tho other was 
markedly in favour of ouoh mi orientation in Slovak political polioy# , The . 
first group oompriséd not only those Bloyak Catholics ("olerioals*') grouped 
around the leadership of Andrej Hlinlm but Prot'eotzuito as well of whom the . 
most noted was tho poet/Bvetoear Hurban-Vajahsliy who had always opposed 
■ the ' implementation -Of .-HaoryH's ideas and. teachings in Slovakia; (See Chapter 
Three), ' y ■ ■ , ■, ,
The other group consisted,principally of the "Hlaoieta" (Boo Glmpter Three) 
who oven before the war had been drawing closer to the small group of Slovak 
Social Democrats ù&fch vAiom they found à common cause in tho struggle for
univeral su'fferagO# ' Like the Illasists they too had a pro-Ozeohe-Blovak 
orientation - and' thus felt- iîBpalled to use the let May celebrations to make 
: some sort of demonstration, in favour of -Caeohoslovalc unity» This they did 
by issuing a proclamation- that demanded the right to national self-determination 
for the Blovalsa in Hungary* *»»
The worries of thé Central.QoVerhment in Prague were not lessened by the 
fact that early ' in,. the month of November the Hungnrimie had ooxicluded an - 
armistice in Belgrade with the French -general Frachot D'esperoy# This like.
’ ' pp ■ ■_
a previous ormis-bice concluded in Padua" left the- administration of Hungary 
in the hands of the former HtmgaPian authorities^^ 'ond--neglCoted to -draw ■ '
any provisional demarcation line botween Hungary, and Ogeolioslovakia* The
/implications of these .provisions were not lost on the Ozeehoelovak authorities 
who-had been anxious to avoid the very situation which had boon treated by 
the signing of those yàrmiatices# T M t  is thoy had isfished to do nothing that 
might give Kai'Olyi% regime a legitimate excuse to interfere in Blovaltia on 
: the pretext that it was still legitimately part of Hungary* Further grounds
for conoern vje.po seen in reports of thè establisHment in Presov-of an East . ; 
Blovak Republic by the pro-Hungarian and anti-Gzeohoolovak separatist Viktor 
Dvorcsak^^ and the opinions of one Dr* Jmi Mudron'*^  ^ The latter v/as reported 
in the Hungarian Press as being the head of' a party in Martin that v/as in 
favour of Slovak autonomy v/ithin the hounds of Hungary whose territorial 
integrity v/as to be maintained# Hence we:can begin to understand the “
apprehensions that lay behind the Central Government's inclination to attempt; 
to occupy Bloval^ iia militarily: and force the Hungarians to withdraw rather 
than to wait for the final décision of the Paris Peace Conference bn the 
final-boundaries betv/een Slovakia and . Hungary* / -
Count Karolyi took great pains to try to .disassociate himself, .his government 
and the Hungarian people from the acts of the- previous regime. He thus, 
would bo in a bettor position to claim that Hungary v/as ho longer the 
prison-house of the nationalities, but a frbe and democratic multi-national' 
state where each.hatipnality v/ould have political and. territorial autonomy*
He could argue that it v/as the will and desire of all these etlinic groups 
to remain in close political association v/ith the Magyars. Hi order to 
shov/ his sincbrity and as a mark of his, good faith he v/as prepared to allow 
plebiscites .to be conduoted^in order to demonstrate the truth of his claims*.
■ ‘‘ '■ y-
As Minister for the Nationalities ih:.;Karblyi*s cabinet he appointed Oscar
é-: ' - " '
Jaszi, a Bocial Democrat and a man of considerable talents . who had made
a special study of the natipnalitibs problem (A nemgjetisegi' kef dés) in.,
Hungary* Jaszi further possessed the advantages of enjoying-the sympathy
of certain Slovaks i/ho had got to Imbv/ him during the struggle for the
establisliment of a .universal and secret franchise in Hungary during the -
-7 ' 7.-29 ' 7-'" ' 7 .:y:' / 7 r f y  y"
pre-war.-period* , y  y:., - y
, :-7 . '-y \
This man was nov/'entrusted by Karolyi with the task of solving the 
nationalities problem in Hungary;, To, this , end he issued a ball to the 
SNR . to enter into negotiations with thé Hungarian government in order 
to effect the.withdrm/hl of both Hungarian and Czechoslovak troops from ; 
the area and tho transfer of the territory thus vacated to the authority 
of. the SNR*, ,.,;Kobar was filled with apprehension at this /move bn the part - i- .' 
of Karolyi *s govornment for he considered merely a ruse to enable the 
Hungarians to .reassert, their control over Slovakia'^  and seize as much 
territory: Us possible* : é U )  :
At this time a new political institution appeared on the scene which v/as t ■ 
to. have considerable^influence on the course of events in Slovakia, This., 
was the Slovais Olub$ an all-party/association comprising all those who 
had been nomihated to represent Slovakia in' the Revolutionay National Assembly, 
a body that had essentially developed from the Czech National Committee, Its : 
main function Was to prepare a permanent Constitution, ;V /i-À
Unlike the other representatives in RNS the iSlovalîs %/ere not members of the 
various clubs or associations of the different political parties but %/ere 
all-grouped:together in the Slovak Club* Of its 34 members that %/ere at 
first allocated to Slovakia a good dozen were Czechs whilst of the Slovaks 
some thirty were Protestants, a fact that is treated with a great deal 
of sinister significance in autonomist literature. The ireponderence of 
Czechs and Blovais Protestants has been seen by them as merely a device to 
ensure that Slovakia was, firmly incorporated in a rigidly centralised 
Czechoslovakia*,
According to R..W,,Beton-Vfetson who later spoke to many of the Slovak 
representatives none of the members of,the Slovak,Club,- even the Catholic . 
ones, disagreed at the time with the measures that the.Club Undertook. .
Although ohé.might have expeoted the Slovak’Protestants and the; CzochB, 
to. have had. à more unreservedly pro-Ozeohoslovai< attitude-one cannot close . : 
one's eyes Ip the fact that. to. a very• large) extent it was thé pressing . 
needs of the moment .that decided policy* Hlinka's criticism that the ProVisidna)! 
Slovak GoVornmont was neither elected nor nominated hy the people r is just 
not valid in. view of ,’the ohjectivo situation* Neither for) tliat matter was , 
the BNll a populcrilly. )eIeG,ted ; chdsen or nolïiinated body* ,
The Provisional Slovak Government was of/very short duration*. Its authority; ; ■; 
ceased with the establislmient of the first Central Governraeht'on the l4th '
November' I9I0*’ Dr*. Srdbar as lias already been mentioned was sent to restore 
order., in Sldvald,a oh the authèpity of .HNS.) Together with a ; small number of. 
armed police (Between 5P and ?0) and with some t%/o hundred troops at his 
disposal ho began , to move onto Slovakia fio'm Skalioa, a. small'to\/n on the 
Moravian horde c, where he proclaimed ihe establisliment of thé Czechoslovak 
state on the 6th November*He was then réoalled to Prague'^ , and the 
occupation" of Slovakia by:.Csechoslovak forces proceed very aloi/ly. There :
was a lack of armsy only à small number of. men available and the state of
/ .. ) ..7) 7 . -........ . '
their morale was low os they
the, armistice had been, signed*
%/ a "t , had not expected to' have to fight again once
In an effort to reach some understanding with the Prague government over the . ' 
.question of 8lovakieit) Karolyi sent a representative.to Prague*' He arrived 
on yth November but the negotiations into Which he entered with the central . 
government w»jee unsuocessful and were soon broken off* By the 11th November 
Karolyi*s government issued a proclamation in Budapest protesting against a v^ ) ), 
what it termed the Ozeoh invasion enid declaring its determination to maintain , 
the frontiers. of. Hungary by armed force:, if necessary* Military préparations 
were also undertaken mid part of the réserves were mobilised as well as 
artillery and armoured units*^^ à . '■ ; )' " • )
\ïhesé preparations had their desired result. The Czechoslovak units 
were forced hack and there was heavy fighting for the town of Trnava v/hich 
%/as located'in the centre of a rich grain-gro%/ing area. It had a,large . 
unreqnisitiohed stocks of grain ttiat belonged to rich Hungarian oxmers Of 
large estates and these; %/ere an important source of future food supplies* 
Tmava %/as re-captured-from the Hungarians around the 24th November and this
;action %/as. necessitated by the large number of %/agon loads of grain and
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other supplies tliat the Hungarians %-/ere beginning to transport #  Hungary*
All the Slovak representatives in ENS.prqtested strongly against the 
Hungarian attack,7^  declaring that there could be no question of a foreign 
(Czech) invasion of Slovakia as it : %/as an internationally recognised part
Y  ' : ' . " 7 ; A 7. - . : 7' ,i7 ,
of the CSR, ■ Furthermore the Ozeçh troops ; %/ere carrying out the instructions 
of the Provisional Slovak Government* : The.Slovak deputies also pointed to 
the participation of Slovak troops in Czechoslovak military Operations as an
: .;r-; ■ - ' : ■ 4, ^
expression of their right to national, self-determination. T%/o... declarations 
to the'Slovak people i/ere issued, one in. order to stop the flood of fùlse
rumours that %/ere circulating among the Czech troops about the reasons for
. ' - - ' ' 7/ .^ '7/44; " '. .7 :A ..''"'7;.;, y)
these military operations in Slovaliia . and the other to assure thé Slovaks
of Czech feelings of love for their Slovak- compatriots and their fraternal
. ;-4g- : ; ; "
help In liberating theniselyes from the Magyars* .
The Slovak delegates also took the step of declaring that in; view of the 
creation of a. Czechoslovak Government and the opening of .IHiS tho-.authqritÿ ' 
of SNR had passed to and the Czechoslovak Government* Furthermore
thefSNR could not enter into negotiations nor assume any political po%/ery ; 
(st^tnx moc). The members of-the .Slovak Club declared hox/ever that;they 
%/ouid have no objections if the Czechoslovak ambassador in Budapest, Dr, Emil' 
Mtodbla, the President, of the .Slovak Club, Matus Dula end a Slovak member ,
. ' : - 7: y .. . - \
of the)RNS Dr, Milan Hpdza %/ere td .opeh negotiations; withttlie Hungarian. ,
Government on the.question of the %/ithdrawal of their forces from SXovakia,
' ' - ':;''-46 A:'" ' À
There could be no question of a %/ithdraWal of Czech troops, . : ■ .
.The SIffi could .not. have exercised any authority anyv/ay as its. President . '
M, Dula, %/ho had been elected Itresident of. the Slovak Club thanks to the 
efforts of Srobar %/ho apparently;had. decided to ignore the BNR entirely 
and had chosen this method of transferring its authority to the Club, - had 
been arrested by thé Hungarians %/hen they occupied:Turciansky Svaty Martin 
in the middle of Novembèr 1918, . , . . . . ^
Interestingly enough the: fact %/as that; Dula and other Slovaks %/ere alleged
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to have Been negotiating with Sai-olyi at the beginning of October I918 in
order to try aiid ;gain: ^onie ,sort!> of autonomy for Slovakia %/Hhin Hungary,
■ ' . ■ .'. . ■ ■ . : ' ' " " 
According to ÎÇarolyi's accountthe meeting took place, in Budapest ,some time
' ' .1 - ' .'y ■: _ . y
^. It may be instructive to quote most ■ of, the relevant pajggage from Karolyi* s. 
memoirs#'
"My . first meeting %/as %/ith the leaders of the: Blovak National Party, Matthe» 
Dula, its President and .several others v/ho demanded autonomy. for .Slovakia / 
but separation .from.Hungary %/as never eveii mentioned. They sho%/ed themselves 
most tractable and their lines of thought largely coincided .%/ith ours.
When %/e had closed the discussion Dula pointed put to me that although %/e 
%/ere in full agreement they could not pledge themselves definitely to 
a leader, of the Oppositidn %/hoso %/o%d %/ould not be binding on official 
Hungary," - \ : " . 2 . .  . ./ -. . -
after the 8th October* The Leaders of the Slovak National Party demanded 
autonomy for Slovakia.but not independence end were generally in agreement 
with Karolyi on all points,.. Their i/illingness to .agree to autonomy %/as,
I feel, mainly a tactical move on their part. They hoped to; ensure that, 
%/ëre things not to go vieil for the Gaechoslovak. and were Karolyi to come 
to a position, of pov/ex'/for at that time' he was still only an opposition • 
politician# the Slovaks 'viould at least have, a certain minimum of coheretei . 
demands to which he had agreed and to %/hich they hoped to; be able to hold 
him and any new government that he : might form. . )
As we shall see i.from Milan; Hodza'r* actions in Budapest the Prague Government 
%/as , ,mos t anxious to avoid any ; cburse of ac tion . that might , lend the slightest . 
hint of legality to the K&olyl regime.: .They \/ere-concerned lea t., they annoy 
the. Allies or prejudice their: case at the Paris "eace Oohferenoe %/hich %/as' 
scheduled to open: at t W  beginning of 1919* In this case Srobar may %/ell 
have Gonsidered that the %/isebt "courhe of action was to remove Dula)and / ;
the. other members of the party from Slovakia to the saüètuary of Praguè^■
%/herc Hungarian influence could; hot. penetrate, . . ;
That the. Hungarians %/ere still eager to ; ,exploit ;: the ;BKR-for their o%/n 
ends mhy be deduced:from the suggestions: that. Karolyi made to the Prague 
government in a telegram* He proposed that Slovakia-should be Administered 
neither by the Magyars,- nor by 'the Czechs but by the BPR %/ho in return %/ould ’ 
recognise the integrity .and' ihdivisiability of Hungary. When this latter 
demand .became ïmo%/n in the .‘RNB the Slovalr deputies )%/er©'reported to have 
shouted angrily ’U/e don't wnnt it •» we'd rather/die**y Karolyi*s offer, / 
%/hich %/as undoubtedly based on. the military strength of ; the Hungarian-position 
and the corrosp;oiicHng: x/ealmoss of the Czechoslovak forces, was understandabiy ; 
rejected on the grounds that .Slovakia %/as already part of Çzechoslovàkia,; a 
state. reco^ised ' by: the Allies * V :: ::a -
Thus the- Belgrade; Armistioe oouîLd on3,y. apply' to, those parts .of Hungary that 
had not yet been, recognised as parts of Independent states or as-Independent 
states,?^. InV the matter Of.the évacuation of Hungarian, troops from Slovakia# 
however. Dr. Miian) Hodzk:hov; fepiaced DrEmil Stodola as Prague*s .accredited 
representative, in Budapest. The latter v/as'; recalled to Prague v/here his : : 
statistical lüiov/ledge of Slovalc affairs, was needed to . prepare material for) 
the coming, Paris .Peace Cohforerice.f^ ; ; 7-
Hod^'s activities in.Budapest seem to have aroused a'storm of angèr and 
indication among his feliovf politiGiahs.^- It seems that although he 
was clearly avmre that his only task v/as to negotiate the évacuation: of 
Slovak territory by Hungarian forces he evidently exceeded his mandate and 
caused the Oentral Governrnent a great; amount of embarassraent by not, only.: 7
discussing areas outside his competence but also by agreeing to the drafting 
of a provisional demarcation line that left much territory claimed by 7 
Czechoslovakia v/ithin-Hungary# - . In his. discussions with the Hungarians' 
thè; idea of. some form of shared administration v/as mooted %/hereby areas 
in Slovakia tiiat had more than 50  ^Slovaks among thè inhabit ants %/ould come
under thè jurisdiction of the SNH whilst those areas in v/hich Magyars predomin-
. . 7- : " ' - .:;7. '% \ .
ated %/ere to bavé, linguistic autonomy.
Hodza*s actions may have been motivated by four different reasons, viz.
a) A desire to gain; time to enable the Czechoslovak forcae to>
7: . regroup, talm in reinforcements and fresh supplies.
b). To try to secure-as many concessions as possible,; including 
the v/idest possible degree of autonomy, in the event tlmt
the Peace Gpnference v/ould decide in favour of the Hungarians .. 
c ) A : desire to play a leading role . %/itbin this autonomous set-up 7 
7 inside Hwigary#; ' : ' 7 ; ' ' '
d) To tey and use the threat that/Slovakia %/ould remain associated 
v/ith Hungary in'some way in order to extract concessions from 
the Prague government in the fdrm of autonomy for Siovaltia 
. in ifhicii he, Hodza could play a major role# ,
Ilod^ a later claimed in a %/ork published in 1929 timt he was innocent of all
such charges and this his.only Concern had been to try and gain as much time
as possib3.e as the Hungarian forces wore'far superior in number to those at 
the disposal'of the Republic in Slovakia and the Italian legions had not 
yet arrive d , H e  claims that he rejected Karolyi*s first draft version of 
an agreement that v/as to hand over part of Slovakia* the sorcalled Slovak 
Imperium t^o the control of the SNR %/hilst at the same time leaving in place 
the former officials of the state administration'and/the judiciary^and that
he stood firmly on the basis of Slovakia as an integral part of the
He further argues.that he v/ae compelled to negotiate further but on ah 
unofficial basis onlj^  after both the Slovak, Club and the Central goverment 
had issued declarations, against his negotiating %/ith the Hungarians on the 
1st December 1918#^^ He %/as very %/orried by the lack of understanding that 
the French generals Esperey and Henrys had repeatedly sho%/n to his pleas that 
they should order the Hungarian troops to retreat* In order to force them 
to recognise the fact tîiat Ozechoalovak forces had boon recognised as 
Allied troops and thus had a perfectly valid case for occupying Slovakia, 
he eventually îiad to get this point straightened out in a note f^ o^m the 
head of the Allied forces# This note hoi/ever failed to contain any 
demarcation line and thus Hod|a %/as forced to negotiate a provisional on© 
that still left Certain areas claimed by Gzecho&lovakia inside Hungary* This 
act further angered : Bénes and many Czech and Slovak leaders''and led eventually 
to his recall*
■■ ■ - : ' 7 7 7 ' : " ^ : ; 7 : ' 7 \ . 7 7 : : 7
The ■ %/lioXe affair, seems to be somewhat of a aeries . of totâl misiiaderstandinga 
due primarily to a lock, of commimication beti/een Parish Budapest and-Prague# 
Hodza was unable/to Imoi/ how his actions in Budapest v/ould; %e Interpreted 
in Prague; and Paris# )There reports in the Hungarian Press on thé progress 
of the negotiations %/ere sure to cause a great deal of alarm'in;viey/ pf, 
their tendency to distort the truth#: Benés committed ah error,df ;judgement, 
top in not r^ecalling: Hpd^. sooner ar at least giving,.a>.clearor set of .■
instructions before imalting a hasty deoiaration y/hich seemed to disavow him 
and : v/hich may have encoûrâgod the Hungarian Gpvernmént in their efforts to 
exploit every pOssiblé sign of disharmony and disagreement bpt\/eenCsochs and 
Slovaks# jaszi as Minister for the Nationalities was continually receiving ' 
information from ;i%ngarian high officials. in Slovakia that indicated that > 
there vmro still spmeipOGsibilities of. Hungary retaining Blovukia,^^ The 
Liptpy 2iupan Egon Eakovszky claimed for example in a report dated 16th . 
November,, tliat In a,private conversation he had had v/ith Dula some- two weeks ; 
before, the latter, had intimated that a .settlement of the Slovak .question 
bn the'3v/iss cantonal, model might still.be, p o s s i b l e * i  . 7
In view of this great propaganda effort rfodza definitely mustbbear a major; 
part of the responsibility for thxs: fiasco as he exceeded his authority 
in continuing to negotiate with the Hungarians on .even an unofficial:basis, 
As a man v/ell used to the oonspiritorial nature of. Hungarian politics he 
should have boon a lot v/arier of trying to outsmart/the Hungarians single- 
handed# '
Whether or not Hodza’s account of his actions is true they v/ere quickly. . 
disavowed both by . the Blovalc Club and Bene^ who v/as in Paris preparing 
•Czechosioyakia's case at the PeaWi Conference* There ; he, had to face, the :
angry recriminations of the French and the- Americans who as Czechoslovakia' s
■■ - . , ’ " S ’ ' " .
Allies had felt that she Imd broken the solidarity, of the Allied approach
.. .. "88-" : ... : ' y .
to the defeated Oentral Po%/ers by negotiating with one of them# Prague 
was finally forced to recall Hod^a from Budapest and break off the
negotiations* ■ This v/as, especially pressing in.viev/ of the skilful use that
65. '.
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the Hungarian Press %/ere nialcing of Hodza's visit by publishing false
reports, reports that greatly alarmed members.of the National Goundil, 
the exeoutive body çf HNS, as %/ell as members of the Slovak Club# The 
latter body v/as forced to issue various dementae as %/ell as a proclamation 
to the Slovai^ LS explaining the reasons %/hy the negotiations,, had been broken 
off* The net result of Hodza's actions •hq%/evor must have been to malte 
hrobar and other Prague politicians very suspicious of any attempts to 
establish an administrative body in Slovakia that would have any degree of
65 ' ‘ .
autonomy# This could %/oll have been one of the major factors in ihfliiencing 
the decision to set up a Ministry %/ith full po%/ers for thè administration 
of Slovakia# This came into being on the 23 January ,1919 and %/as most 
decisively an instrument for the implementation of central government 
directives and policy in Sloval^ ia#
The military situation improved during December I918 and Czechoslovak troops 
g.ràdüalü#" began to re-occupy most of the. main toims in Slovakia#: .In a
note from Commander Vyx of the Allied forces to the Hungarian Government 
dated 3rd December the Allies; declared that they recognised the Czechoslovak 
troops operating itl Slovakia as Allied troops# The latter* stiffened by 
contingents of French and Italian troops began to advance.as the Hungarians 
%/ithdre%/ in accordance v/ith the instructions contained in a note that was 
handed to the■Hungarian Government by the Allies on the 4th December*^^
68By the end of December about t%/o-thirds of Slovakia had been evacuated,
although this is not to say that there had been clashes of a local nature
l'OOÊ
70
69
%/ith the %/ithdra%/ing of Hungarian forces# ' By January l8th, 1919 this.
process had been virtually completed,
 ^ ;v^  y , .a/’.--
Durlng, the first week of December Srobar had already, begun'to draw up 
oontigenciy plans, for the administration of Slovakia* Ho. began by. drawing 
up lists of all thosG persons in Slovakia who would be capable of carrying 
out t>he necessary fimotlone of public administration». In à; law* dated 7 :
10th Dec ember and entitled "Law on J2itra-ordinary Droyisional; MeasureB
in Slovalcla" he took measures to prevent anarchy arising in Slovakia in the 
v;ake of the withdrav/al of Hungarian troops. Indeed such was its purpose ; 
as was clearly stated by Karel Kram^ the presiding bhairman of the Cabinet 
(predseda vlady)» As Péroutka .says this was a clear indication that: Hloval^ ia 
lacked the same organizational backbone that hand ensured such a smooth transfer 
of pov;er in the Czech Lands. '
The. most important aspect of this Im/ v/as to be found in Paragraph 14 v/hich 
stated that the Central Government had the right to give full po%/ërs to 
one of its members to carry out any measures that he sav/ fit to ensure
the maintenance 6f good order and the.smooth functioning of the state
administration#; Decrees issued, by him to this end required only his
'7 7g: ■ ■ ■ , ' ' A ■
signature in order to be valid. ■ These wide pov/ers were later consolidated
by the. dissolution of all local administrative bodies' and the transfer of -
their powers .to a commission that v/as to be appointed by the Minister with 
full po%/ers for the administration of Slovaltia, as this post became Imown. 
The Minister v/as mentioned in the lav/ by name and was none other than
■ '■■:' %/■.'/' " ■■7-
.Vavro. Srobar# -, : - .
The .most striking feature of this nev; administrative, arrangement) v/as tliat 
for the time being it left in their posts all those former Hungarian 
offMais v/ho were prepared to swear an oath of loyalty to the .Gzeohoslovati 
Republic, In viev/ of the ill-feeling that this, move was bound to cause 
in Slqvakia .v/hen those same hated officials v/ho had formed 'part of the
old oppressive'Himgaï'ian state-apparatiïs'%/erô seen to bo. still at their \ \ ■;
. . . 7^' '/\:7 ' - ' 7 7 ' . . - . '\7i
pds.ts'under the nev/Republic many Hipvaks may have looked upon slightly 7-7 1
askev; at this %spéqt of oentral government policy *
Upon.? deeper reflection however we can appreciate the wisdom of such a 7
policy inspite of Its effect on public opinion# Its tv/o main virtues %/ere?
. ■ ..... , ... . > ,
Ù) . Xt greatly alleviated the enormous and insurmountable problem
that would have arisen had Srobar aittempted to replace all the
officials.essential to the administration of Slovakia by Slovaks
loyalty to the Cbntral Government, , 7 ' -
b) It gave those Slovak officials %/ho had become Magyarized and | .
were registered as Ifegyars in. the Hungarian Gensuses a chance \
to declare themselves as Slovaks* • 7 711
This %/as something .%/hiCh it v/ould have been very difficult for them to’d):
under the old order and still keep their posts. According to the 1910
GehsuB of 12*447 state officials in.Hungary only 35 %/ere.recorded in thé 
census, as being ,6f Slovak nationality. Of 948 county officials there %/ere 
only 18 of 823 municipal officials only 11* of 1133 public and district 
notaries only 33$ of G6O secondary school teachers only 10 and none of 
464 judges and .cx’oi‘al la.%/ officials, Similar figures can bo seen in the I9OO 
Gensus %/hen the total number of Slovak men and %/omen in all branches of ' 
public life %/as 3*428 as. .against 111^208 Magyars, .10,023 Roumanians and |
13,790 - 7 ?' . ^ 7 ' \
In connection %/ith these Magyax’ones (as these Magyarised Slovaks v/ere callé^) 
a t%/ofold question no%/ arises, Hov/ many of them %/ere there and how 
reliable %/ould they be in thé, ne%/ Republic? ' ■ " '
As to their number .it seems highly unlikely that the lov/ number of Slovaks 
aho%m in the above figures %/as correct. There had been no Slovalc seoom
. :: ■-  ^-91- : '
education sinoo 3,874 and lienee .those officials who declared theinselves to 
be Slovaks’must haVo’received their secondary education'in schools %/here 
Magyar, %/as the exclusive language of /fM-hvcKDAA^ ^ivOn'the rate of population- 
increase for the Biovales between IS75 and 1910 it seems impossible that, 
there could not, have been many more Slo vales among those officials i/ho for one
reason or another preferred to let themselves be Imoi/ii as Magyars although
it is. very difficult to ascertain %/hat the exact number of Magyarono officials 
■ %/ere*  ^ ,■ . . -) ,
The question of loyalty and political .allegiance is still harder to define#
In the Ozeoh lands* with a fe%/ exceptions* most Oaeclis %/ho had. %/orked as ' 
officials under the Austrian regime %/ere not considered to represent any 
danger as there '%/as absolutely ho change :of a return to. Austrian rule*: In 
Slovakia, hoi/ever* the situation %/as entirely different and %/e can understand 
the apprehension, %/ith %/hich: the employment of Magyarones %/as vie%/ed* For 
not only, %/as MagyariKation a orueiler and more brutally repressive process 
than the corresponding pressurés of Germaniaation in the Czech Lands but 
also the national oonsoioüEness, of the Slovaks was as a consequently lo%/er . ' 
and more easily extinguished# This is clear from the, phenomenon that some 
of the most vociferously anti-Blovak propogandists %/ere themselves of 8lovait 
origin# Such, a man ,%/as Bela Grum/ald who ,%/as on© of , the prime instigators . 
behind the decision to close. the last tiiree'S lovait gymnasia and the Hat ice. 
SloVonska in the years 1874-1875* Haxiy .Magyars mid I%gyarones ho%/ever were 
later, to complain that they;, %/ere dll measured ,%/ith the same measure and found 
wanting# They %/ere forced to re tire or leave the country %/ithout their 
being given an opportunity to prove their loyalty to the hov/ state. Doubtless 
many of these plaints %/ore ill-founded^but they still serve to show.that 
the Republic \s administrators had valid groiuids for, vie%/ing the Magyar one 
element %/ith dome degree:of suspicion and. hostility# ' :
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it should be stressed that all these Hungarian officials were only to be 
left at7their posts as-temporary expedient, \/hilst Brobar- and his colleagues 
grappled v/ith thé problem of trying to.create a reliable and efficient
"'/" 7' " 77' , - ' '/■- , 7 gQ '/  ^ -
form of civil admihistratibn for Slovakia, :
7"The same decree that named Srobar'as Minister for Blovakia^ "* also named 
.government référants who were essentially equivalent to the Ministers#
Their competence %/as limited to the tbrritbry of Slovakia and v/ere subordinate
to the relevant, ministries in Prague, as can be seen in the very v/ording of
7l\'7 .7" "'82 1 ' 7 . - 7 -
the decree* Although this institution of référants ensured that many of
Slovakia's heeds and problems could bë dealt with one the spot without the 
heoessarily being referred to Prague/for guidance, they %/ere.conceived essent­
ially as being there to aid and. assist the Minister in his task and not v/ith ,:
■ -7.’ : ■- . ' ’ ■ ■ - '/' , ■ . /.'■ 03 -. ■ -,
any intention of providing Blovalcia with a form of ministerial autonomy#
. - /' / ' '-'04 . ' 77. /.
There i/ere originally 13 referents viz# Interior, Agriculture, Finance,.
Trade, - Rai1%/àys and Posts, Justice, Militia, Education, Catholic Affairs,
Protestant Affairs, Bocial Welfare, Food .and Public Works* The referanti
for both Catholic and Protestant Affairs %/ere not nominated at the time
of their establishment as he.did not yet have the consent of the individuals
he had in mind#^ "^  The Référant for Catholic Affairs v/as to be Andrej Hlinka#
In this we may detect an attempt on Broker's part to try and involve Hlinka
in actively playing a part in Slovakia's government. Perhaps this %/as
Intended to smooth out any feelihgs of hurt and envy #ie latter might have
liad in viev/ of the disproportionately large. role that Brobar %/as not playing
in Blovak affairs* Hlinka, ho%-/ever, did not accept this offer and as %/e
shall see later from his journey to Paris %/as already set on an anti-Prague
course*
\ \ \  -93- . , - .
The local administrative system Of Hmngary differed markedly from that 
of Austria In that the orgého of state.control v/ere not separated from 
those of local govarrmant# Political oonti’ol ih Hungary rested in the. 
hands of bodies called' "oowitios" (komitats or M%^y) and the larger towns 
which themsielvos %/ere equivalent to a-county* The counties were sub-divided 
into .districts (okresy).*
In this system^ a major role v;as'played by an official, called a luApgn 
or ispah* He %/as, the nominated head of a countyyand represented the 
interests of the Eimgarifm gwernment* The majority of the officials in 
à county or large tov/n were elected to their posts by tho county committee 
that %/as on elected body comprising both elected members and "virilists"#
The latter uorq those tmq^ayers who paid the greatest amount in direct 
state taxes %/hi 1st the francMso for local government %ma as limited as that 
for electiona to the Diet# ,
Thé'county system in Himgary not 'only gave a great.deal of autonomy to 
local areas but was also.of great antiquity* It had always been a feature 
of .Hungary since the creation of the Kingdom of Saint Stephen and there is 
some .evidence that it may even have pre-dated the advent of the Magyars and 
thus may have been’a feature of the Slav principalities'that 'existed 
in the 8th and 9th centuries* Ae ah institution that had such a long 
tradition,in Hungary it bad ahmys effectively been the preserve of the 
Hungari^m mobility even i%i those areas in \/hich the nationalities predominated 
and this had become a. further means of ensuring Magyar hegemony#
V" /
Thus in addition to the référants Brobar was forced to nominate Slovaks to 
fill the posts of those 16 zupggxa who were head of the 16 ooimtiea that 
lyerè rough]y equal to the entire territory of Slovakia* Such .posts in vim/.' 
of their importance could hot bo left in the hanrlB of their former occupants*
, - 9 4 .
The new Blovak Annans who thonisolves comprised 7II lasers, 2'priests,
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2 doctors and an estate ,o%'jner were given quite wide . powers similar
V y -
ineoope to those enjoyed by Brobar but limited to the snuller area of 
a county*^ Oiico the old IIunRarian jSuuans had been dismissed,2jrobar 
and his aides proceeded to abolish bh© old coiinty ..qommittee and appoint
a new one in its place, consisting of Ip nominated Mémbers of tho public
89 . ' :
and ten county officials» .
Having thus c-roated a skeleton administrative apparatus for Slovakia,
V  / ■ >/ :■
Srobar and his roforants made their v/ay to Zilina, which was to be the , 
seat of their operations until Bratislava could.bo occupied and made ready 
for their arrival# This in fact did not take place until 4th February
V  /  ■ ■......... ■
ileanv/hile Srobar ;md his colleaguos %/ere inundated with the thousand and 
one problems of one sort or another that required thoir immediate attention
O')
as he describes in his memoirs. By this time Slovakia had at least
acquired some form of administrative machinery, albeit one %/hose functioning
92 -v/as often hampered by poor communications^ and her frontiers were in:the
process of being secured even though they had ^et to acquire a definitive
shape at the coming Paris Peace Conference. It should be stressed that the
system of administration that Slovakia possessed at the beginning:of-I9I9
%/as a oomev/hat centralist one, thoro %/as at this time' ho%;ever,7no diK?cer «tble
disagreement with Con krai Government policies in using such methods to secuxe
Slovakia's'incorjpox'ation into the on the part of the Blovaks %/hose
representatives in Prague themselves did not v/ant,,as yet, any form of
93
autonomy for Blovalcia,
Slovakia had by tho beginniîxg of 1919 at last been incorporated into the 
V
GSR* In this process hoi/evor the SNR had played a relatively minor role*
'“ 9 5 ’"
I'his inability of ajiy credibXo Slovak body in-Slovakia to play any sorioua 
part in ills own liberation and the creation of an administrative system 
suited to its needs v/as one of the factors fihat were to influence central 
government attitudes towards the question of Slovakia's autonomy for a long 
time to come.
Aï... "
,'r ,r.
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Section Two
The Early Years ISIS'"3.923 Until the Introduction of the Hew Zupa System .
Although at the hégiiming of 1919 few people could have. foreseen that -, ; 
uSR a M  Hungary were sOc&n to. engage in a fresh bout of fighting over 
Slovakia^ it was still clear to most observers of the political scene 
that a great'deal, of work would have to be done before Slovakia could be 
given a settled;and final form of administration.
At tliat time most of Central Europe was still in an extreme state of 
chaos as those newlyrcreated states struggled to overcome those difficulties 
into which they had been plunged*' These were essentially a result of the 
Great War. In. nmny of Oseohoslovokia's neighbours (especially Austria and 
Hungary) there was rampant inflation as the pre-war Austro-Hungarian crown 
sWc to unbelievably low levels,^ ^ as well as the now familiar spectacle 
of food shortages, hunger riots and other forms of civil disturbance* There 
were attempts to.set up Soviet republics in parts of Germany, the Baltic 
states and Hungary, some of which were, for a short time, successful. ,
It is against such:a background that we must attempt tb .evaluate the 
situation in Slovakia* The danger of a Magyar attack still existed and the 
Hungarian government was still concocting schemes for the autonomy of the 
Ruthenes^^ and the Hungarian Germans,These schemes were incorporated 
in laws published in December 1918 and January 1919 and were followed by a
, . ' 9*7
similar scheme for the Slovaks in March of 1919* Various pro-Hungarian 
bodies, such as the Upper Kujigary League, constituted on 10th February 
1919,^^ also added their voices to the swelling tide of protests against 
the ’'Gseclf* invasion and occupation of Slovakia, as the Hungarians termed 
it. As, yet there Were no military hostilities but there had been no let-up
in the propaganda war# It was evidently aimed at trying to, convince : 
the Paris Peace Conference which was convened in plenary session for the 
first time on January:l8th 1919^^ of the justice of Hungarian claims to 
Slovakia and other former Hungariaîi territories*
The situation in Central Surope was in fact so chaotic with so many 
military conflicts that the Oonneil of Ten (One-of the main bodies at the 
conference) was forced to issue a warning that ’’territory gained by force 
would-seribusly prejudice.the claims of these who use such means.” ; ;
Militarily all was quiet in Slovakia during the first three months of 1919# 
Srobar*s main preoccupations were to ensure that the population was as : : 
adequately supplied as possible in a situation where theae were severe
Srbbarls efforts.were not helped by a, strike bf railway and postal workers 
early in the spring of 1919 that threatened to paralyse all traffic* It 
was broken only by the arrival of several thousand volunteers from Bohemia 
and iXbravia* This strike- was inspired from Budapest where by the 21st 
March Karolyi's government had been finally brought down and replaced by 
the Bolsheyik regime of Bela Kun# It itself this strike was a milestone 
for it : marked the beginnings of a trend, the results of which were to v 
bedevil Csech-Slovalv-relations and provide, the Slovak Autonomist movement 
with an importât propaganda point* This employment of Czech officials 
.and workers in Blbvakia v/hoae numbers grew as time went on was later to- 
be seen by some Slovaks as barring their way towards their gaining posts 
commensurate with their qualifications and aspirations. This was above all 
true of. those Blovalcs who thanks to the all-round improvement in education
I:: .. . ' ..  ^i ^
in Slovakia now possessed secondary and higher educational qnalificqtions#
The higher salaries m à  allowances that.ware paid to Ozech officials: (primarily 
because they received extra payments for living away from their domicile ' 
and thus ixr mfiay cases had to rndihtain tWo homes) wore also a great source 
of envy and indignation.
By 1919 despite the-firm pro-Ozechoelovak .stance of members of:the Slovak :
Club and Brobar's governmentI opposition to Prague's policies seems 
to have reared its head. There were reports that the former Blovak; deputy 
Fordid Juriga îiad founded a dBlpyak-Hungariaii irredenta” and that a 
warrant for his arrçst had been issued bÿ the Prague governraeht on the 
15th February. : I am inclined to think that these reports were entirely 
false and v/ere perhaps.deliberately put about by the Hungarians in order 
to try to sow the seeds of discord between Czechs and Slovaks. Peroutka 
who is normally a reliable source in these matters seems to have overlooked 
these reports.:.but he maintains that dUriga was solidly pro-Gsechoslovak 
until January 1950* Wo have ho reason to disbelieve especially in.view of 
Juriga's reactions to the new® of Hlinkà.'s trip to Paris, in September 1919# 
Hlinka's actions however would seem to indicate that he Ixad been dLssatisfied 
with Brobar's activities in .Slovakia for some time* : He may v/ell haVe disçûssed 
his apprehensions with Juriga as both men belonged to the same small,group 
of Slovak clericals but there is no evidence to suggest that Juriga would' 
necessarily have agreed with" his point of view* y ; .■
The fall of Karolyi's, government was partly due to a decision, of the Peace
Conference that ordered,the Hungarians to give up considerable areas of
5 -^ "-1 . 106 ' - ' " - . // ' 1: '
'Transylvania to the Roumanians* Bela,Kun the leader of the newly-
proclaimed Hungarian Soviet Republic which was allied to the BoViet Union
refused to carry out the Conferonco's orders. It was obvious from his actions
and the.very Liet bhat he had çùme to power, that the sudden loss of. X 
Hungary*sfoimor extensive territories had greatly outraged Magyar - 
public opinion* One couldctherofore not expect"any improvement in the 
situation rogrxdTng Bloval^ ia and her frontiers as now nationalistic % "W
feelings M d  boon reinforced by ideological reasons. An autonomously : \ .
organised ahd éocialiét Hungary in the. form of a free association of 
national BoViot republics may have been presented to some Slovak workers . \
. ^ . ::^ À ' : x:/ - '"v. ' ' ' ' . ' 't: : '
a more alluring alternative than a non-socialist CBR, vjhioh under the X '• ."XX-
r  :XX.u'/ ' . :X - .X :-,-XX:
leadership . of Al^ .is Rasrn the Minister of Finance was pursuing highly  ^ X' ;X,
orthodox financial remedies against inflation*" . ■. ,.. X,'X
The Gentral; Government in .Prague-however was miable to, devote all its time, , 
energy or attention to the:problems of Slovakia. On the international 
front pzechoslovakia was occupied both militarily and diplorâàtically iii . ' X.
a dispute with Poland over the Duchy of Teschen as well as the many 
other complex questions of pre-v/ar, debts, war debts, reparations and the . _ 
establishment of definitive state boundaries. At home in Prague the National 
Assembly was busy trying to draft a Oonstitution and issue important pieces - 
of social legislation* such as an eight-hour vjorlcing day and a . six-day 
Working week, sioltuess, unemployment, old-age and widows pensions as well ■ 
as the preparatory legislation for a land reform, a measure that was long X 
overdue in both halves of the Republic, ■. ‘ .
In the midst of all this activity the Slovaks suffered the misfortune to
" - ' ■ " - ' ■■ ■' , ^ X'. "
thé only one man who was as well-lmovm to the outside world as Benes and
■■■■: "'h.v.‘ . , V , , .
Masaryk.' Milan Hastislav Btefanik (See Chapter .Three), was killed when • , 
his aircraft crashed shortly before it was due to land in Bratislava on X
kth April 1919* I'uter Autonomist Literature and especially those histories
: 'X-/X X-' X X .XX'-:-;,:, .-.. xXy;
that were written during "the Slovak State that lasted from 1939 to 19i^f5 
oftenaccused the Gzeclis of having deliberately shot down his aircraft 
in order to eliminate all trace, of Slovalc influence on décisions taken 
at the very highest level* This charge is blatantly nonsensical as ^
Btefanik was an ardent centralist mid ”Ozeoh-slovak for whom there were : 
essentially no differences between the tv/o peoples,- . ■.. )
This greatest v\fuo for the Republic m s ' a syoibolic one* For with
and Masaryk he, represented the creation of the as the joint effort ;
of both Ozeehs shd Blovaks, After his death.Slovak Autonomists could ; ,X
point to his absence and level the charge that, the Republic v;as a Czech
state with Czech loaders, run by Czechs for Czechs only* X . :
During April enid May 1919 Bela Kun and his comrades oontinutdlto Strengthen
X X - XjQg ' \ '"' X . • ■ ' X. ■. ■
the Hungarian army* . v- It was not long before Hungary and Czechoslovakia
wore at war,:(20th May)? ■ The tide Of: military conflict need çoncern us 
but little let it suffice to say that at first thé Czechoslovak forces ■
■ ■' - -'"'v.' . . -■ : -X ■ ; ■
suffered grave losses* Kosice Was captured and at one time the Hungarians 
threatened to cut off the eastern most part, of Slovakia, before the 
Hungarians v/ore defeated with the help of the Roumanians v/hose army occupied 
Budapest* Thus thé Bolshevik regime in Hungary was brought to an end* ,x :
An interesting experiment in appealing to the.class as well as the national 
GonscioiiShess and feelings of Blovàiîs as well as those of Ruthenes and Magyars 
was the establishment of a Hlovolt Soviet Republic iin Presov in Eastern 
Slovakia on. l6th June* It lasted however a brief two weeks and. thus wo 
cannot obtain a groat .amomit of information as to the degree of popular 
support that it enjoyed aiiiongst ordinary Slovaks* It did have, however, 
the support of Communists of all, nationalities including Czechs and 
Slovaks who, brgajiised invtheir own Czechoslovak section, actively Supported 
Bela Kun*s government: and even, in certain cases fought in the ranks of the 
Hungarian Rëd Army* Its,president was.à C.zéçh Autonin Janot^k* X X
In Paris., thé Feace Conference, .finally accorded to Czechoslovakia almost 
everything that she had demanded# It was here in September 1919 that;
Andrej Hlinka ohose to.bring Sipvakia's grievances (as he saw them) to the 
attention of snoîi an international forum as the Peace Conférence* He was 
probably encouiaged in-this'course of action by his .companion Father 
J.ehli^ ka, who later.bedame one of the most virulent anti-Ozechoslovak X 
propbgandists there Was, settling eventually in Budapest* This encourages X 
us to speculate on the possiblity that Johlicka was already a paidXHungarian 
agent at the time of Hliukà's visit to Paris* ; , ‘ X
In any case Hlihka gréâtly, outraged both Czechs and Biovaks alike for 
not only did he undertake his journey without the consent or knowledge X 
of the central government but he sucdeeded in seriously embarrassing the 
;government..in spjdqing* He trayelled via barsaw v/^ ere he was...furnished with 
à false Polish pâssportyio doubt^with the connivance of the Polish government 
who'were only to willing to do 6iyth%g that it could to embarrass' its X-X /X 
Xneighbour in .view of their 'quarrei over Tescheh^ By bringing, .such a ' x 
sensitive and delicate, issue as thé question of Blovak autonomy to a.... .. 
conference wlu 1 o the eyes of thé : v/orId would bO; on Ozechoslovu.kl;a ,Hiinka ■ 
succeeded in,acu vcly embarrassing the Czechoslovak Government by pointing 
out that all was not.well between Czechs and Slovaks who were to form the 
basis pf the.new state* X-x xWe.have no cause, to doubt Hlinka's loyalty or 
suspect him of being pi*o-Hungarian in any way, but by his. actions he helped; 
.focus the attentions of Czechoslovakians enemies on a potential v/eakneso : 
which it might repay lo exploit* ' ■ ... ,X ' ' .
Hlinka's activities were condemned by his fellow-SlovakB .i,nXthe Slovak GlUb* 
Upon his return to Slovakia he was arrested and Sehtonced to .a period of 
imprisonment* This howevery wasymore like a form of internment, as he. was
X','.:./. / v-. -1Ü2- ' ' ' . ; . ; ; . y
’■ ' '■ ■ '' ■' -X'X.'.HP ■■ '■ ' ' '■ '■■■" ■
not kept In a X aor brough to trial# Ho wao fi*ial3^ released ia
Hâroh Ï92Ô;,. A b G3ab deprived him of hla but he
stood la thé %Bp paT%lWa0âtary eleotloào mid was eiodtodm
It WAG whilst W::wâà,\la %rlG that iv6 first see him referrlag to the .x;,. 
provlGloaG bf t&q ;Pi#0Wrg^ AgrOdWiit (Seo Gliapter Four), espeolally to . _
tho. faot tWt 03bv^ia waG xbb have its owa Parliameat (Gaem)# Ho obems to  ^ x 
have c6%lùtolÿ prpviplo%%G of its last olauae $0 the of foot that ,
the. final say oA:'d0tailadX'm%%,g^  to bo left to the fully aivthoriaed '
répreaontativocx ôixth0 Ozéohe and Slovaks, after their liberation* How 
authoï*iaed^aQmJ mvtpd- bad aot elected represoatatiirea can bo is ■ naturally x ■',.... 
open .to'debatéè however* the mm^ of Slovak voters disagreed;with /'x-
central govoramqht pbliby in as far ao the non-implementation of the ; X' X
, Pitthbnrg 'Agreement was concerned x^ roudd not the résulte of ■the voting ■'• x
in -the Parliamentary elections in 1920 been different? Ao it was most of - 
the vote wentxtoxparties,that ware overwhelmingly pro-Gzechoelovak in their 
orientation# ' ilivea Hlinka^ # party did ■ not. Campaign ,alone but. in electoral 
Alliance With xW^ dgçpWGlovak People^ G Party# ThercXwaG no maGGivo ewing - \ ;
of abstentions or Wything that conid be oven remotely iiitcrproted aô an . : )
anti-government yotoi, We thus haVo to flnd Hlinka^g. Cheirge , of deliberate x 
breaoh of xfaith on the part of the OêntralGovGrnmént not proven# This lo 
not to say that xthe arghïsénttthat the Slovak League,, one of the signatories x , X x 
to the Agreement* wgw not yet àt the time of signing a properly consitutpd 
body under:,American law and ±huG^ tl%o whole Agreement was null and void from r \ 
the start'was a partlcu3nrlly convincing or relevant one# This declaration 
never Imd,way; enfdrcÀ^IO legal? content# : Its great significance lay in . . ?
its propaganda Value at the time in helpi^ to convince the Allies of y 
the need'to creax^ o Xan independent Ozeohosil^ ovakia#  ^ , ^
' / -1Q3- - '
ÂB in M s  .critiçiBms of the Provisional Blovak'Government Hlinlca here betrays 
his lack of understanding of-the objective conditions that determined many
of the Antral g^vemmeht decisions & This may be seen chiefly in his
insistence that the Gehtral %)verhment should have done, something diametrically 
opposite to v/hat it did and.could do despite the fact that such courses of 
action as he adyodated at the time were totally unrealisable*
Hlinka wanted Slovaicia to have its own parliament yet. at the very same time
V  ' ' '. . ' ' ' ' " - ' ■ . .  . • :
Brpbar vjas Gbmplaining of thé difficulties he was encountering in his attempts, 
to find ^pons for the .four counties that had . just been liberated# Either 
there were no suitable and qualified Slovak candidates for these posts or 
even if there were, they were unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities that 
were involved for one reason or anOther# Thus personnel questions soon began X 
to dominate Blo.valiia's reconstruction and the influx of .Czechs may well have 
been one of the reasons .why the. Slovak People's Party ' raised itsdiare of 
the vote from in. the first elections to the National Assembly held in
1920 to inXthe elections to the new ^upy that were held‘at the . end of 
September 1923*, !" In addition there, w.ere several anti-religious incidents . 
that in themselves were trivial but served to inflame Catholic opinion# The 
most Wellrlmoi’flL :of these was the destruction of the Coluàin of the Immaculate 
Conception, a monument in Prague, , that was erected to commemorate the 
Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 at which Bohemia lost'her independence# . 
There were, also-alleged incidents of Czech BokoIs"' tearing down crucifixes
*8okols were essentially gyimaastic organizations of Czechs that helped to 
foster à national spirit# In 191Ô-20 mtuiy of their members were armed and 
helped form units of militia to keep order in both halves of the Republic*
' ' ' ' ' \  ^ -, - 317 '
from the ifa3.1s of buildings whenever they entered Bloyak. tovms ' and
' - - V ' ' ' .. ' iTR: ' - , . ' ' ' .
similar manifestations of an mrbi-clerical attitude*" This was the , 
heritage of the; struggle against Austria where the Oathoiic Ghureh had. 
always, been indentified with the-ruling house. All these incidents were 
unimportant in themselves but they .played into the hands of H l i n k a  S lo v a k  - 
People ' a Party (Hlinkoygf B3.ovgaska ;i* vdova strana - H B ÏÎS ) who saw in them v,. 
yet one:more indication of the ill-will Of the centralist, atheistic and 
conimunistic Cséchs.^H ,
Slovalîia's problemB vjere so comp lex and ' inter-dependent that it is, clear that 
a concerted attack oh them wbuld îiavè to be made in several different fields , 
at once of v;hich the most important were Health, Education, Land He form and r. 
Communications .especially roads and railways* In order to achieve this it; ; ' 
wouldîbé necessahy to create a new and permanent administrative system as. X • 
well- .as to .flncl,'the experienced mid qualified personnel to staff it* ■ : ' '
An .attempt to do this may be, seen in the- reform of local government that took 
place in 1923#. It was introduced after long delays in Slovakia only, .although 
it was intended to.be usiifprmly applied to the whole of the Republic from 
1st .January 19?3,* ' ' .
Resistance to this reform was for three main reasons* On there were many 
peoplé in both halves.of thé Republic who were opposed to the destruction 
of, the old histoi'ical - units that had long traditions behind them and to; 
which a certain .amomit of local pride and feeling v/as attached* Becondlyr ' 
there were fears that it might be dangerous to create such small areas as 
' the, 21 new zupy were intended -to be as ettoio minorities such as the Germans
. . ?  ^. X;' ^ -103- X- X. /- . X . .- " ' 1 X;, - . ^ .
in the Gzech Xiands mid the Magyars in Slovakia would m>ost probably constitute X 
a majority in several of, them* They then would effectively have autonomy 
and this wqs something that the National Demoerats.who tended to be the 
most, chauvinistic of the Gzeohoslo.Vdk parties,wanted to avoid at all costs.
' X : ' . X., : ,V ■ :
The same argument applied to Slovakia as it seemed imost likely tliat . EBL'^ ; ;
.would control most -df t W  6 &py that were to be in Slovakia* Thirdly 
the provincial system of administration (see bh3.ow) in the Czech Lands . 
meant that qértaiii political parties’had their political strongholds in the . . :
provinces and“th"S was above all th#e.of the Czechoslovak People's Party* It;
drew most of lu" political strength from Moravia which was an area that X..
was far more Cauho lid in its religious feeling than Bohemia* ,
■' 120 ’ ' ■ " ' ' X ' ■  ^;X. - ' ■/’
The reform itself had its roots essentially in the heed to find some forni 
' of uniform administrative system for the entire country* The old Hungarian X ^
'and Austrian systems had been taken over unchanged after the creation X- 
: of the Republic and. there, were important differences between them* In the 
Austrian half of the;Republio the basic administrative unit was the province 
■. (z§m%) of. which there were three. Namely the old historical entitles of
Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.; ... Bohemia was .a unit that had a population of 
some sovon million .and an krea of some 22^00 square miles - a fact that made , 
this sort of provincial administration very alov; and cumbersome* To a 
lesser extent this was true of Moravia and Silesia as well* In contrast to 
Hungary Austria possessed a double set of local government bodies possessed 
limited competence in fihancial, cultural and social spheres* . ■
Hungary however Was organised on the. lines of very ancient self-governing . 
corporations called, counties (àiîpy in Slovak) tliat consisted of both countryX 
areas and towns large enough to .have municipal rights (prftvo municipalne)* 
Each ..county was further divided into districts (okresy) and smaller towns
: / -  : t  . X / : : - - ,  " - ' ' - ;
that had a regulàted magietracy '(regiilOvan?rmagistrat) wereXequivalent to
-'a. district# Both were directly subordlhatod to the . relevant bounty# The 
countyywas an ijiatrutaent, of both central and local government with an 
executive ooBimitteo that oonaiatad of both elected members and , those who paid 
the greatest amount in direct state taxes (viriliats)* The majority of 
county, officials vxere .eiebted whilst the chief, officials (supan - isfian)
.was appointed by the; Hungarian government and roaponsible t.ô it* ■"
The reform envisaged that the entire territory of the Republic would be " 
divided into 21 of which ë wore to be in Slovakia, 9 in Bohemia and
3 in Moravia aiadXSilesia and 1 for the whole of Tesiïi whose fate was yet % 
to be decided, X ; . ; . . ■
The zupy, as snqh, were to consist of both, an elected and mi appointed or 
nominated element# She former was.to take the form of a representative 
committee (zastupltel*S.tvo), elected for.a period of six years - the same was 
to apply to the districts (okresy) - on the basis of adiiIt imiversai direct 
and secret franchise* It was to have 35 members but in Slovakia there was
on additional provision that one^third of the members were to be nominated 
by the central, government ”dn the case of .exceptional circumstances,
Despite attempts to make the official posts elective as well*^^^' the officials 
who staffed the new system were all appointed and were empowered to sit in on 
meetings of the.;representative committee, to take part in .debate and even, 
to vote (up to 5 of their number)*^^^
The iKupan who was;the chairman of both the representative committee and its 
specialist committees was appointed by the minister of Interior* The
•i " ... " ' ' 3  . ' ■' 3 ‘X 1?*f\
latter retained powers to dissolve thè committee and preseribe new elections.
: : ?■?' : , - r-. -  ; .  ■■
Ho, 'zjupi#* -pAwGrq.wth regard to the. rèpreGontatiyo'oômmlttèé*'
Ho qponod had ItR -GObolone#. fixing;'the dutoë.çn whioh- thoy wore to . .
take pMoo* . r p'-'vuinqht ôbW^ittoo of joi^ ht mo#orG m W  .oight' miWtitutoo. . ,..
to W W  tho pJWAOw ôf t M  'r##ôéAtatïvo .oomiM.ttôo woa.? "
not i& Gç&ülèn. X . - \ -  ^ , . - . -' i  ^ ' '
Tho, oetablioWo^j&t :of:.auoh .ÿ^ ayatem in ..&31ovakia wao Wtivatod by n doGlro to ? 
avoid, .giving BliovaMà. tho ïtind of aûtomo^y .'^  ^that a proVinOlal ayotom' - 
would Wvq: onthilodt For if (ïloyAia would hàvo boon preho^od ao a slnglo : 
adn)inloti%xtiŸ9 .i#it W  Bohç&iinytbon it .wuy woll Imvo meant tMt .=-. :
thoXMtonomiot Wvoèont vmild Wyo: 'g^  otrong foot^ h^old and power buoo#
Thia in tho viow of tho Slovak Glib '' would bavo gtreugbhëhêd the irrodontiôt 
offorto of t h o . % ^ a %  iAo 00 f ^he.'myomont oo.^amem%d of weakening ? 
C200ÊGGlGVakia*/^^%- . y - y. - X X'-' - - . ' '.' X
Ond dan thim sqd .that t W  inatitiition of the Now itunv woo in an far <w
Slovakia oonoWiod tiôtivà^ hi many inetahcoo^by; a doairo to raaintaih 
affirm grl%). on ^ lovàkW.O'adminiotmtiôh by thd Gontral GoWnmeht* - % o  
prdvioion iilloÿféd^ ORt^ tliii’dXof the momboro to bo nominated .dooa to .
baVo booomo J-'or^  or loss; atmnda)'j praotioo and wad to'/roimin ^ ^  foroo - 
until lot I9W# institution of a MiniGto#'?for S10vaItia waG X
rôtained with p.TWiont m a t  in Bratislava, iiltbougb tho offlooo of tbo . .
\X \ ': X .'/- ' -"x. ' ^ Xx- /' ' ' ' - - . ' ^ '
Bo forants worà $radualiy olosèd^and .thoir powora transforrdd to Braguo,:?;
Subordinate offiddà'for ddpartmQntn:'Of the Hiniutrion of tbeXbitoridr, ihibliq.
WdfWi .Agrionltnrd, Boqial %lfare and..Hoàltb remained ÿoW? worn aubjoct' td .-
'/. .'- X . '"' X ' 1%R - ' ' ' ' ' '  ^' ' ' ' ' '
the. Hinintar: for. ÆfSovakin# * X By 1927 bowovor this inatitution had lapaod 
and; wan "not ro#Wd# '. \ - -X' . ' .' x./.- ' . ..".X'.'X ' -
: : - X  : ■   ^ '  ■ -
At the qpèx of, this new system in Slovakia there should have been a body 
called the Provincial Oouaty Union 
provided,a forum for the discussion, of those matters which effected Slovaîtia
as a whole but this body never carae into being* This was possibly for the 
same reasons as v/oro behind the creation of the counties themselves,
The idea of a county-based system of local government for the Republic may 
vieil have had its roots;in Slovakia's, past but it should be stressed that ' 
there wore important differences between the Hungarian system and the new 
”%obaAan” system* ? Firstly, the actual territorial division of Slovalîia 
into six large counties,in-place of the 16 smaller ones .that existed under 
Hungary meant that tlièsèXnew imits cut right across old bbundaMes, in a 
fairly artificial pay^espeoiaXly as care had been taken not to.create any 
bounties where :tht^Magyars might be in a majority. . Secondly^ the new system 
v;as Biore centraiisedXas the Oentral Government not only'appointed the zUpan 
but also nominated one-third of the:representative committee and appointed 
the officials#; : The latter had quite wide powers in regard to their intervention ; 
in the functioning of tile representative committee* In addition to these 
features the new counties had more limited areas of competence and finance X;, 
than had previously been the case and,the agencies of the various central 
ministries did not come under their control, The status of those towns 
that had municipal rights (mmiicipAne pravo ) and were thus equivaient to 
a county, was reduced to that of a district (okres) with the two notable exception
of Bratislava and Kosice,'^ ^  ^Thus all towns now had the same status as only 
the smaller towns with, a regulated magistracy. (regulov^my magistrat) had 
had under the old system* This demotion of some of the larger Xtowns as well ' , 
as the disappeaùaùce of what were after all very old and familiar units of 
local government-must have provoked a certain amount of hostility to the Central 
Government and its policies* It might conceivably have helped to gain for 
HSL'S the votes, of those who wished to express a protest against.hurt local 
pride, . ' , . ./ . ; . ' :  ^ "
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The situation In Slovakia after the defeat of Bela Kun*b -armies and 
their withdrawal from Slovakia as a result of the Roumanian occupation 
of Budapest was,still such as not to leave any room for complacency on thé 
part of the Central Government# There was no guarantee that any Hungarian 
government which - would eventually replace Kun*s defunct regime would he . 
any more inclined to give up its,claims to Blovaliia, Inside the Republic 
the financial situation was not good either as we shall see#
Economy and currency
During 1919 and. part of 1920 there were frequent strikes and other forms 
of industrial unrest throughout the Republic# Those distùfflbànoes. viere 
caused mainly by fluctuations in the exchange value of the Czechoslovak 
crown that had a severe effect on the cost of living# On the Zurich exchange 
the value of the croim fell from,34.Swiss centimes^to 4 centimes from 
spring. 1919 to summer-1920 when it rose again to centimes# The effect 
on prices was most unhealthy ^ and the index for foodstuffs and other 
necessities stood, at 1384 in 3-920^ "* ,^ taking 1913 as the basé year (=100)*
This rise 111 prices inevitably fired a demand for higher wages but they do
not seem to haVe increased as fast as the rise in prices as we can see
. / s149
from Table Four! below# (The figures apply to the whole of the Republic)
TABLE FOUR -
lNORm$E .% AVERAGE EAmiNGS FROM 1913 .TO 1920
Type of Industry . Ë
Chemical industry 300
Clothing Industry 900
Textiles and Paper 900— 1000
Food Industry , " 1000
Furniture Ibidustry 1100
Iron, Building 1000— I3OO
^ - X X :  ,■  ^ . ?■_ ;;v.' :
In-Slovakia tlils trend was worsened!hy the measures that Alois Easîn the 
Minister cf Finanqe took .to protest the crown against further rapid depreciationX 
This involved s.aparating?the,crown . , from the ;Austro-Hungarian currency whose 
value was falling rapidly* This was achieved by closing all the frontiers 
for. a week from itech 3rd to , 9th 1919 and stamping ; all the banlmotes in 
circulation with the. exception of one and two-crovm notes. These were X 
later withdrawn ■ as; v;erë most of .thé; stamped notes and replaced by new noted ^
printed inXthe U.S.A,: ' In, Slovakia many banlontotes with, forged stamps on them . 
circulated and caused financial losses to many Slovaks#. Furthermore
many Slovales-hod be ^ n forced to subscribe to Hungarian War loans %iàt .,
Czechoslovakia had decided not to honour# Prior to the stamping operation - 
however the Aup u o-IIungarimi bank in Vienna was offering advances of up to 1 ;
7 %  of the nomiiml value of thgso bonds in cash# Once the Czechoslovak 
currency had been esthblished this process of conversion was now impossible 
and:many Slovaks suffered severe financial losses by accepting whatever was 
offered* . A third, factor that helped t o ’swell discontent was the system of 
food-rationing with Its attendant but necessary evils of fixed prices, price / 
controls and requisitioning# Slovakia (as part of Hungary) was.largely .. ‘
spared this during the W a r a s  a result of the Hungarian "policy of tryiiigs^ é/i' 
to,., keexi mbs t o.f Hungary * a ■ grain production within the country# .'A fixed ' • ; 
purchase price for grain inevitably meant that the producers v/ere: getting'; 
less thmi they doùld have obtained in a free niarkeS and this new doubt greatly 
annoyed'the. Slovaic peasantry especially. at a time when the price of most 
goods was 'fast rising# The Slovak consumer too, unused to such privations 
must also-have grumbled and blamed the Central Government for Slovakia's ills#
The post-war economic climate in Slovakia
Late 1920 marked' the 'feegimiings of , a post-war economic depression ' which 
lasted to the end of 1923 and affected the v/hole of Central Europe# This 
crisis was a direct consequence of the new situation that had come into .
being as a result of the, oollapse of Anstro-Himgary and Germany*s xie . 
.Each of thé .nmi. Ètates'/bhat had once been part, of Austro-Hunsary began to 
erect. 'tarrifbarriers, in an attempt to ^onter the growth of .’its ovm ■
industries by protecting them from foreign competition*
Gzéchoeloval^ia contained within itself a considerable proportion of the 
productive Capacity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire., a capacity that was 
now in excess of the needs of its thirteen million inhabitants* Home of 
this eiccess COÜ34. well be absorbed in the form of increased exports but 
, it seemed difficult to avoid the closure of some plants. Slovakia's industries 
were newer and.in many, cases had come into being as the result of governmental 
initiative and were sustained by subsidies, The Csechoslovak Government :
however did not renew tills subsidy, without which in thé difficult conditions .. 
that.prevailed after the end of the War these industries.could not survive*
They were unal&le to compete with similar industries in the Czech Lands and 
simply folded*' (Home 200 factories were in fact closed) :This had the. 
effect of widehing the gap between ; the tow halves of the Republic fop V . 
although.many new factories were built in the Czech Lands after the war ?
' r’U,'
very few important new factories were established in Slovakia* The ■ 
'Antral government failed to realise the significance of Slovakia's industries. 
in providing CÜÏ outlet. for the increase in the available labour forbo that . ; 
was a. consequence of Slovakiais higher birthrate, higher in fact then the 
'average .ibr the Republic or any part of it vâth the notable exception of ;
Ruthen.ia (bee Table Five). The opportunities for absorbing the increase in \ ; 
population in agriculture were strictly limited, especially- in view of the 
fact that It was no longer possible for groups of agricultural workers to 
migrate down to Hungary to work there during the harvest season, vhicb was I 
a feature of H.lovbli life right up. to 191$. %  in fact continued thereafter, A
albeit' at. a reduced* tempo and to. countries further afield, such as Austria, . i , 
Germany and France* Given all these factors it /comes as.no surprise to \
' -112-: A : ' ' ' ' -:
see that HloValcia was faced with a.serious employment problem as reflected 
in both;emigration statistic (Table c^) and thé lower proportion of those , 
for whom, the labour exchanges in Slovakia were able. to, find'.work (Table Six)* 
The effects of the economic crisis on Slovak industry are summarised in 
Table Seven from where we can see that during the last fohr months of 1922 , 
14,355 workers were, laid off out of a total industrial work-force of
2ÿf.5ôo.b5 : ; ' ' y l ? "  : A  .
The Central, gbvernmeht conceived of itself as having a mission to try and 
raise Slovakia,'s standard'of living and narrow the gap between the two halves 
of the country, once the frontiers had been secured and a permanent 
administrative system established». It failed however to realise the importance 
of industrialisation in this process» This lack of concrete industrial 
policy a failing which tended to perpetuate itself right up. till the end of 
the Republic was one of its most serious failures* One whose effects 
political parties su.ch as HHL'S and the Communists would-be slow in exploiting*
The political situation kt home and abroad during 1919 and 1920 also gave the 
Central Government cause for alaW^ W, Although Hungary finally signed the. 
Treaty of Trianon on 4th .June 1940.it was clear that the new regime of 
Admiral Horthy had, like its predecessors, not given up the idea of trying 
to regain some if not all of the territories that had once been under 
Hungarian control* As Hungary was thus opposed to Czechoslovakia it natu&ally 
found, a ready ally in Poland with which it enjoyed good relations and in 
Italy which had amb itions of its own in Central Europe* Ozoc ho Slovakia 
therefore laid great! emphasis on maintaining good relations with Franco but 
also sought to ensure some form of close cooperation with.two of the successor 
states that had sizeable Magyar min<of'JW:Si and thus were equally threatened
"A. '- A . ' _113_ A
by Hungarian revisionism viz, Rôuàania ai^ d the Kingdom of the Serbs, 
Groats and Slovenes (SHS) as Yugoslavia was then Imown,
During the first attiewdpt at the restoration of Charles Habsburg to the 
throne of Hungary^whlqh ocourred in-May 1920 and resulted in all tîiree 
countries nobilising their armed forces, the foundations ware laid for what 
Was làtèr to foe Imom .as the Little Entente. This was essentially .a close 
military alliance.between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rouraania, aimed 
primarily at. preventing not only such a restoration but also any possible 
revision of Hungary's treaties with her neighbours# These treaties had 
left large Magyar minorities-in each of the tlireo countries* Minorities 
that, were significantly lai'ger than the corresponding minorities of Slovaks, 
Serbs, Groats and Roumanians Iq^ in post-Trianon Hungary.. The 1920 
Hungarian Census gives - the following figures for such minorities in Hungary.
TABLE .EIGHT
MINORITBIS IN HUNGARY 1920
Slovaks
Roumanians
Ruthenes
Croats
Serbs
141,882
23,760
1,300
36 ,838
17;131
1.8^ y of population 
0.3A of i5«jt)ulation
0.3^ 6 of population 
0.2^ of population
The Gzechoslovalé Census of 1920 gave the;figure of 634,82? Magyars, the 
1931 Roumanian Census .i| 333.j673 Magyars^^^ and 382970 Magyars^^^ lived in 
the Vojvodina district of Yugoslavia. The total population of Hungary in 
1920' was no more than 7# 3 million even including the Hungarian Jewsyso that 
at least two million Magyars were living on the territory of states other than
A: , : ; , ' A / ' .
Hungary* ,. This fàot helps to ill^ninate both the driving force behind . 
Hungariknism irrédéntisin'and the fear that. it inspired* A fear which, 
affected, all the;t)u?ee governments of the Little 12ntente to varying degrees*
Of these three countries CaeGhoslovakia was probably more worried than 
either Houmania, or Yugoslavia by the presence of the Magyar minority, in 
Slovakia as she was the only country to be hemmed in between t'%:, hostile 
neighbours^Poland and Hungary. And it was in .Slovakia where the Republic's 
greatest length of frontier with both these-two countèfes was Ideated# .
Charles Hafosburgls two restoration attempts naturally caused great alarm 
among the Slovaks* It seemed clear that if the Habsburgs were successfully 
restored to the throne of Hungary then her case for a revision of her frontiers 
might be considerably.strengthened.as well as her claims for the restoration 
of some of her former territories* This was because Charles. might also ■ 
claim the right to rule over ,all-, the lands that had comprised the Kingdom 
of Saint Stephen# Such a move, were it ever to succeed which was most 
unlikely, would upset the delicate balance of xpwer that the Peace treaties 
had created in Oentral Europe# It was, therefore, to be expected tliat the 
Allied Powers (especially Britain and France) would back the actions of the 
Idttle Entente and lent them their full support* Fortunately such a course 
of action became unecéssary as both attempts failed and Czechoslovakia could 
once again continue to .grapple with the task of past-war reconstruction*
Constitutional Developments.
By 1920 a permanent Constitution had been drafted and adapted and the first . 
free election 'was held in accordance with its provisions# '
The' Constitution provided for a President and a bi-cameral assembly# . The 
latter was elected on the basis of an adult (21 years of age and over) direct,.
. ? ■ . .  ^  ^. ; . ; ; 
secret and miivernl franchise with a system of proportional representation 
with the èntif# territory of the Republic divided into twenty-one electoral 
districts* The last feature however aroused a certain amount of dissatisfaction 
foi owing to the more mountainous nature of the terrain in the eastern half . 
of the country the electoral districts in Slovakia and Ruthenia were larger
than in - the Czech Lands and consequently the number of inliabitants- represented
- 160 'by a deputy in both chambers of the NationaSAssembly varied significantly*
There v;ere only nine deputies allocated to the whole of Ruthenia in, the lower, 
house, the oharnber of Deputies, whilst Prague with a similar population had 
forty-five* Objections:were also raised to the provision that a party had 
to reach a minimum quota of votes in each electoral district in order for 
one of its candidates to be elected* This meant that if the votes oast for 
it in one district were not sufficient to elect a deputy they could not be 
accredited to.those cast for candidates of the same party in another 
electoral district* This explains the;anomaly of the elections to the
. _ - , . ? M 9 4
National Assembly held .for the first time in Ruthenia on.:;l6th Harch^ v/hen 
the Jewish Party polled a total of 7^  ^of the vote in both electoral districts 
but failed to roach the quota in ëither. w^hilst the Agrarians with only 5.3^ : 
of the overall poll wore able to get one deputy elected*
Another feature of the system that was open to criticism was the fact that 
the Oonsitution Imd been drawn up and adopted by a body that was not elected 
but had rather sprung into, being as a revolutionary assembly that claimed 
to represent the will of the ; Czechs and Slovaks. Public opinion in the 
Czech Lands however had swung to the left since the last elections to the 
Reichsrat in 1911 on the basis of which the members of the Revolutionary 
National Assembly allocated their seats# It could thus be.asserted that as 
such it no longer accurately, reflected the wishes of the Czech electorate*
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The Blovàlcs had 36 representatives of whom apart from several Oseohs the 
majority were Slovak Protestants# The Slovak Catholies could therefore 
claim that they were not adequately represented and were not in agreement 
with the final form that the state took as reflected in the Constitution#
Bo could those socialists who were, not satisfied with the mere provision 
of social legislation and wanted more state ownership and stronger #»rkers 
councils, as wéll as aembors of theeOthôic minorities Germans, Poles,
Ruthenes and tfetgyars who were not represented in the Assembly* At the time 
of its deliberations the Gormans were united in their efforts to remain 
linked to Austria whilst the final attachment of Ruthenia to Gzeohoelovakia 
was not.confirmed till the middle of 1919*
This was a regrettable omission as the minorities would later be able to 
claim that they had been incorporated into the Czechoslovak state against • 
their will and disagreed fundamentally with the nature of thé state structure 
despite the provisions for the use of the minority language in all areas 
where the minority population was in excess of a certain figure# These 
minority guarantees wore incorporated into the Constitution as Czechoslovakia 
had already committed herself to such provisions in the peace treaties she 
Iiad signed#
At the time the Constitution was being drafted, in the wake of the euphoria 
generated by the liberation of the Gxechs and Slovaks from the Habsburg^ a 
certain centralizing trend prevailed. In view of the situation prevailing in 
Blovakia at the time this was not entirely un justified* The State v/as 
conceived as a basically unitary organism rather than a federation or 
confederation of different constituent parts# The Slovalts had appeared to 
give their assent to the notion of a unitary Czechoslovak nation by adopting 
that version of the Declaration of Tur^ajr\sky Bvaty Martin (see Ghhpter Four)
. ' - - ’ ■ ?■■■.' ' 'lé'j ■ 'A '%'^ ', ' . . ' ' "■ ■
that was proposed by Samuel Soc h ■ and spOke of both a unitary
CaQChoalovak nation an& a 810vais nation instead of Emanuel Btodola's
version that spoke of the S lo vales freely joining the Czechoslovak State. A .
In view of the fact that the Hungarians were still in; control of Hloyakia
such a formulation may have seemed too bold and frank to the majority of
thèAdelegates who:may well have tended to err a little on the side ofcaution* '
The,/municipal Ol-ectioni which were held in June 1919 Only in the Czech Lands 
there was still fighting in Slovakia, which lacked any permanent administration, 
feetors,which made the holding of elections impracticaïile^  :showed a. great j 
swing.to the Social Democrats who captured dne-thind of the poll^ A This 
proportion was maintained in the 1920 elections to the National Assembly, 
the results of v/Mch ,will be .discussed in detail in the next section.
By 1923 thereforO/Blovakla had come a long way* Her boundaries and territory 
had been secured and à permanent administrative machinery established,' The 
Central Government liaving overcome the immédiate post-war problems of food 
supplies etc*,; and^having received à mandate.in the electionsyms now in 
a position to be able to implement lohg term policies in Blovakia, Buoh 
policies should liave. gone some, way to improving the living conditions of 
its inliabitantsto a ,significant degree* The results of Central Government 
policies up to 1929 vdll be examined in the.light of relevant statistical 
material in Section Ibur* . -
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Beotion Three
PARTY FOLITICB IN BLOVAKIA 1918-1929
.Prior to I918 Slovak political life v/as of .a very limited nature. There was, 
in .fact, only one Slovak political party SNS-Slovenska*narodn^ etrana the : 
Slovak National Party and although there existed different trends within 
the SNS they had by I918 not yet been formed into separate parties. .Andrej 
Hlinka had attempted to form a Slovak People's Party (SliS-Slovenska I’udovop 
@trana) after his imsucessful candidature in 1908*when he had stood as a 
candidate of Count Lichy's Hungarian People's Party (Neppart). Hia. efforts 
began in 1912^but by the outbreak of the First World War v/hen all political 
activities were voluntarily stopped^a realS. grass-roots party; organization 
had not.yet been set up, , ■
The Hungarian political system offered fewer opportunities for the 
development of a modern party political life in Blovakia than v/as the case 
in the Czech Lands, Combined with a very restrictive franchise that amounted 
to no. more than of the. total adult population^vient a systematic use of 
terror and other violent methods which were directed against both the 
political opponents of the regime as well as members of the nationalities. 
Both these groups Were thus prevented from freely exercising their right 
to vote for a candidate of their own nationality. In all the Diets that 
sat from l84? to 19I8 taken together.there had been no more than twenty
163Slovak.mandates v/hllst on the basis of their numbers alone the Slovaks 
should have comprised nearly ICP0 of the 433 members of the Diet, The very 
backwardness of Hungarian political life with its attendant evils of bribery 
corruption and nepotism had the result that Slovak political efforts were
A v V / ' :  ;A; ..
almost entirely expended in maintaining their small, foot-hold in the Diet ? 
and:attempting to hold hack the ever-swelling tide of Magyarization that •? 
threatened to engulf them*
as was almost invariably the oase in Blovakia from 1848 to 19iB . -
came to the 8lbvales: from outside* And from two very different sources* The 
first of these was the Czech Lands where conditions for the development of - 
Czech political parties were more favourable under Austrian rule* As a ' 
.consequence of the successful revival of Czech cultural and national life 
there existed not one but several' Czech political parties. They sought to 
defend Czech interests such as the growing demands for a wider use of the 
Czech language in education and'other fields, within the Austrian parliamentary 
system* .The United States of America during the later îialf of the nineteenth 
century.had absorbed ;a large number of Slovak immigrants (perhaps as many 
as 250 0^00)* Theso.Slovaks had in the: freer atmosphere of that country, 
been able to organize'themselves into various cultural associations. The 
latter published books* newspapers and periodicals in Slovak,: copies..of which, 
were often.sent to,Slovakia,as well ha financial support in the form'of 
money remittances to members of the family and relatives,whom the emigrants 
had left behind in Blovakia. Apart from these two forms of support however
the American SloVales v/ere able to help their compatriots to resist the lure
;  ;  ' ■ . . /  • ' . '■
and allure; of ;the Huiigariaii national idea (A Magyar allami. esame). by maintaining
and cultivating a .deëply-felt sense of Slovak uniqueness (svo.ibytnost* ) if
.not of Slovak nationhood* The latter provided the Slovaks in Slovakia with
an alternative Idedlggy to the official Hungarian line*
Thus these two factors, the Czechs and the American Slovaks, within the Slovak 
body political ^  like':a.catalyst on the various trends in Slovak political life 
that were to develop into independent political parties, after- 1918»
These trends were prihcipa3.1y/three in:number, clepicaliem, "Hlaeisà" 
and : agrarianism# , Thé first of these v/as represented by the small group ■ 
of ;Catliolie priésts imder the leadership of Andrej Hlinka* During the 
prè-v/ar period this group had been active in trying to organise self-help 
organisations améïïgst the^lovak peasantry» Thes©a cooperative associations 
were both for temperance purposes and in order to provide a source of cheap,, 
credit so that thé. Slovak peasant could be free from the grip of the money­
lender and the iim-keeper, . who. in many cases happened-to be dews. It was ' 
thus inevitable that a certain tinge of antl-s©mitism was often to be found 
in the-political progmm and ideology of these groups» Just as the first 
trend was sustained by the help and support of the American Slovaks, who 
despite the more liberal and secuiàr atmosphere of American Society still i 
rob lined thoir deep religious belief, the second trend, that of thé 
’'lllasists’’. (See Chapter Thrée) ' reflected the influence of the milieu and 
ideas-of the. CKoeh lands, on Slovakia*
"Hlasists" is a generic term for a diverse group of individuals, comprising - 
men-such as Vavro Srobar, the Stodola brothers and Pavel Blaho among others*- 
What they all had in common was that they were influenced by the- ideas of 
Tomas Qarrigure Masaryk* The latter had been,expounding his ideas through 
the medium of both his/teaching activities at the newly-formed;Caech v 
university in Prague as well as on the pages of his ovm periodical Oas . 
which he purchased in 189$* He had had,a short career also as a politician ■ 
in ,the Austrian Keichstrat where he had formed his own one-man Party •
(the Realist Party)*/ The.PHlasists" who were so-called after the newspaper 
in which they put forward’their ideao, subjecting the state of affairs in ,, 
Slovakia to a vigotpus .barrage of criticism, saw the panacea for Slovakia* a 
. ills in Masaryk’a concept of **drobna^prace”* This was a policy that ,v/as; 
aimed at making small significaht advances in such fields of social welfare 
as health, housing and education as a preliminary step before making any
: . ; \ - : ' , - \ . . ;./ :. - ' 
political demands* The I’Hlasists” also advocated the necessity for close 
cultural cooperation with the.Osedhs. and w e r e a n d  large^  ardent Czechoslovaks, 
They sincerely believed in a unitary view,of the relationship between 
ÜEîeoh and Slovaîî# They considered, that these two peoples were two distinct 
branches of one nation with one language of which Czech and Slovak were : 
two distinct but closely related groups of dialects* Their Csechoslovakism 
as well as the progressive and secular nature of many of their ideas often
brought them ;into conflict with members of the clerical group# \ These
' conflicts continued often in a more acute form after the establislmient of ; ; 
the Republic in 1918# . - ,o
The third discernable trend was that of agrarianism which is closely linked 
. i^ ith the-hame of hr# tîilan Hodza* , Although he was well at home in the 
political environment of Budapest he was an ardent Blovak nationalist who had 
successfully stood as a candidate in the blGOtions to the Hungarian Diet in 
’1905 and 1906 where he represented the constituency of Kulpin. in Slovakia,
In^  view of the predominantly agrarian nature of Slovakia and the large, 
number of sniall*^ holders aiid landless agricultural labourers there was 
undoubtedly-a largo number of potential voters among such groups of Slovaks 
whose 'desires for land reform could be effectively .translated into support for 
a Slovak agrarimi party* .Hodza was most probably impressed by the growth - 
of tlieG^eoh Agrarian Party led by Antonin Bvehla-and sought to emulate a 
‘ similar, sort of success in Slovakia*
. Social DomocraOy could hot be'counted as à major, political trend in view of
the small proportion of the working population engaged in industry but its 
importance should hot be discounted. Its origins were both outside of thé 
. SMS and'S3.oyalcia proper* For it was in Budapest where the beginnings 01 the 
Social Pembcratic Party may be discerned* A separate Slovak Social Democratic
-122- ' -y:
Pai'ty was hot in fact'created under Hungary# Slovak social’democrats were 
grouped'for a time in a separate section of the Hungarian party until 
dissatisfied with the attitude of that party with regard to the question 
of:Hlovak autonomy they left the Hungarian party and joined,the Czech party. 
The vast potential strength of the Hocial Democrats was not realised until 
1920 when in the Parliamentary elections the Oaeohoslovak Social Democratic 
Party polled over lialf-^ a-million votes in Slovakia alone. . After the split 
between the left and right wings of the party which resulted in the eventual 
foundation of the Communist party in 1921 the total number of votes cast in 
1929 declined to 5P/> of the 1920 figure.
A fifth group and one that was associated with the’ SHS was the.small group , 
of Slovak Protestanrts under the poet Hvetosar Hurban-Vajansky. He placed 
their faith in the Kusoian Czar# Blovalcia*s. liberation would come from 
Russia alone, an attitude which engendered a policy of passive and patient 
waiting for the day of liberation. This group was antagonist to the efforts 
of,.the "Hlasists" and v/aa completely caught out by the events of the War*
They played a very small part in Slovak political life after 1918.
The period from 19X8 to 1920 was à crucial period for the formation of Slovak 
, political parties as by 1920 all those parties which were to play a part in 
Slovak political life had already been formed in readiness for the forthcoming 
Parliamentary elections. But each of the parties still.contested the election 
either in alliance with a Czechoslovak party or as an actual part of a 
Czechoslovak party. Political.activity was also to be seen among the members , 
of the minorities in both Slovakia and Rutheaia where Magyar, J©wish and 
even Ruthene political parties and groupings soon sprang up.
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Two main Slovalc political parties were founded* , These were the agrarian 
Slovak Rational and Peasant© Party (SMES-Slovenska i|arodna a rolnicka 
Btrana) and the Slovak People*® Party (SLP-Slovenska l*ndova strana), ;
«haww^*ir.»wi.a<r-w> - . ' ' w.'il n>n h luim^.uuiÿi
The latter party cam© into being after the end of the war in November of 
1918* It may well have owed its inception to the desires of a group of 
Slovak priests to, ensure the replacement of Magyar bishops by candidates
- ']55 ' ' -,
draim from amongst their own number* A.Slovak People*® Party had been 
founded as early £\s I9O9 when a group of, Slovak politicians Srobar and Hodza 
but not,AndreÔ Hlinka,attempted to draw on the type of support which the 
Hungarian People’s Party CHepPart) had been enjoying in- Slovak areas for 
some ten years* Once having gained S3bvak votes however the latter party -. 
reneged on its promises to try and gain some small Concessions for the 
minorities. It thus became necessary for the Slovak National Party within 
whose ranks the Slovak People’s Party functioned to try and gain those 
S3.ovak votes which Imd formerly gone to the Huhgarian People*® Party, by 
adopting a similar sort of program* ; A main element of this program was 
an appeal to religious fColings of Catholics, The post-war party took over 
this trait and a certain proportion of its support was duo; to the fact 
that many Slovalis looked upon the party as the defender of their religious! 
feelings which had been outraged by such acts of vandalism as the’ ; 
destruction of the Column of the Immaculate Conception in Prague. Hlinka 
protested, against this act in the National Assem)^.^^^ This together with 
similar acts that were often the result of an excess of anti-religious 
zeal genuinely outraged the feelings of many Catholics who were in no way 
draim to CL*S by its persistent campaign for autonomy. 'Catholics looked 
upon their parish priest ' ( farar) as their leader'^and in voting for SI,*S 
they were in ,lmny cases’just following his advice. ■ - ■ :
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170 yThe demands of the Congress of Slovak Priests in Slovakia held in Ailina 
on the 21st and 22nd January 1919 were for the retention of church schools 
the creation of a Catholic college of theology in Bratislava, the autonomy ‘ , 
of the Gathq3.ic Church in Slovakia and the occupation of vacant bishoprics 
in Slovakia hy Slovaks# These demands were ; supported by SL'S who pressed 
Brohar to accept thorn# The last two however were matters that only Home 
could decide and the Vatican refused to accept those candidates v/hose names 
were put forward by the Priests Congress and SL*S# Relations between SL*B 
and Brobar worsened, » the large number of non-Gatholic in the Slovak 
Club being yet another bone of contention# The Priests Council in Slovakia 
(a resolution dated 28th November I918) asked for representative places in 
the Club to be granted to Slovakia# There was undoubtedly jealousy on 
the part of Slovak Catholic priests at the seemingly disproportionate role
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that Slovak Protestants seemed to play in the 8lovait Club , and there were 
calls for Blovol^ s to. support Blovalt Catholic students so as to build up a y
, . , ' ' : ] ■ ■ ■ .j ^
Blovak Catholic intelligentsia* The first few issues of thé party newspaper 
Blovak in 1919 were mainly concerned with attempts to stem thé flood of 1
support for the Booial Democrats, ■ The party leaders were evidently not 
only worried about the election prospects of their oim party but feared that . 
Social Democratic influence if left unchecked would lead to a loss of 
religious faith among many Slovak Catholics# Thus a further element of , 
•hostility and opposition to non-religious secular ideologies such as Social 
Democracy and Marxism became'part of the basic ideology of 81*8 which in . 
1925 added its leaders name to its title to become the Hlinka-Slovak People’s- 
Party# (HS1*S)# This i/as the only political party which incorporated the 
name of its leader in its title during the existence of the First Republic 
and this was to a.Certain degree the reflection of the impact of Hlinka’s : 
personality on his followers. , •_ . !.
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Thé Slovak National and Peasants’ Party (SN * oamo into existence at
175the beginning of 1919 as. a result of the fusion of the SNS with the, group
V V / '
of Slovak Agrarians led by Hodza and Srobar, the latter having refused the
176 ^
offer of help from SL’S in founding this new party* Political agrarianism
‘ rt 177in Slovakia had been quite strong prior to 19lo. In the western part
of Slovakia, around the tom of Skalioa Dr* Pavel Blaho had been active in
organising cooperative societies among the Slovak peasantry as well as
providing educational activities to help raise the standard of Slovak
a g r i c u l t u r e B y  1914 there were some 34 cooperative societies in the
whole of S l o v a k i a * T h e  major force behind Slovak Agrarianism was Dr* Milan .
Hodza, a skilled politician who had been one of those whom the heir to the
throne of Austro-Hungary Franz Ferdinand had been inclined to consult for
l80information on the political aspirations of the minorities* In his activities
V  ' ■in Budapest Hodza had pursued the moderate course of attempting to create a 
mass party in ■Slovakia so as to win cultural autonomy for the Sloval^ within 
Hungary# In this policy he cooperated with other minority political 
leaders especially Serbs.and R o u m a n i a n s . An essential prerequisite for 
the creation of a mass party, which, as nearly of the population in , 
Slovakia were involved in agriculture, could not be other than agrarian in 
nature, was the introduction of a universal, secret, direct and equal franchise# 
In the struggle to acliieve this he found an ally in the Slovedî Social Democrats# 
He was in no way in sympathy with their ideas yet looked upon them as being 
concerned like him to defend Slovak interests,His political demands had
a certain social content but this was priraarilyliimited to some small measure
. 184of land reform to alleviate the chronic land hunger of the Slovak peasantry#
The 3NS which formed the other half of the HKàRS was very much the junior 
partner# It was much smaller as regards membership and the number of
, ■ , : .. : 4, ;  ■-
subordinate party.braiiqhes, Thé 8M8 was in fact thé remainder of the. old
pre-war party after the Clericals and Agrarians had constituted themselves ' 
as a separate party#- Its members consisted of-the conservative group of 
politicians based in Tur^ i^ànsk  ^.Svaty iforbin, ’ both Protestant and Catholic, 
who during the course of the war had maintained a very passive posture# They 
were in many cases unable to realise that a new era had come into being with
the establisliment of the Republic in 19l8. The old unity of the 8NS, which
had represented most of the main political trends in Blovak life with;the 
■notable exception of: the Bocial Democrats, could not now be regained# .
. . h
CQIÏINTRAL m V È m M M m  mLÏÜIBS IN SLOVAKIA 1918-1929 : ' :
With- the establièhroont• -qf the Ozechoolovak Rojiuhlic, and the final incorporation 
of Slovakia into^ it the ..Gontral Govoriment liai taken on responsibilities ■
for/ an, area that . was* . in every v?ay far -more .imier-developed than the, Czech 
lands. Its economy wa largely based on aghicuiture: arid. v;as. unable! to sustain 
a sufficiently high level of économe activity to be able, to provide work 
for -the mnmal increase in populâtion* The causes of this underdevelopment _'! 
were both' historically ahd climatically determined. % For years Slovakia had '
'■■■■'.--A ‘ 18= ' -,
been: a land of hot emigration. The very slow growth in her population
especially that .of the/Slovaks diguised in fact a fairly high fertility index 
and birth rato# This pan be from the low Increase in the population in the 
decade i901-l9lG 4*6 per 1000 inhabitants - affigure that is lower than
' 'i/' ' ' '! - ' / 186' ' '
;anywhore else in Europe.with the exceptions of France and Ireland, The 
effects of .omigratioa on,.Slovalcia'cmi be seen from .the fact that the increase . 
per thpuèaîxd iiihabitants .of middle age from I85O-I90O was only 2.8 in Slovakia 
but 6 .7 in the Czech Lands, In addition to this there was a certain incidence 
of migration within Hungary. This took two main forms viz# the seasonal 
migration of,agricultural labourers* who worked in Hungary during harvest-time, 
ahd 'a more ,sett3.ed .migration of Slovaks to Budapest and .the surrounding area 
(as well as to Vienna), where■ they worked in industry* domestic service and on 
building-sitee# By th© late I89O’s there were in fact considerable colonies: 
of Blqyak workers:in both cities although it was in Budapest that worfind 
the; beginninga. of tlie/83,0vak Bocial Democratic ûîovement.
There exists a;, démograpîîic tendency for the fertility of : a population measured 
in the number of children per coup3.e to drop from a high level characteristic
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oï agricultural societies to a lower level, which is to be found in more 
advanced industrial societies. Slovakia was no exception to this rule 
and the number of children per couple was higher than in the Czech Lands./
We may thus deduce that it was most likely that the. population of Slovakia 
would.contain a higher proportion of dependents than in the Czech Lands*
Vie ;can. see from the -date^  . contained in Table 9 that this was indeed the case,
TABLB MINE v
^&tio of Dependent to active sections of the population in the Czech Lands 
mid Glbval^ ia ' 'i. ' -
'Mi'ii#  i Ml I bWtf*# . . . .  '
' Slovakia : - ../% - / , é
' . Dependent in fo Active in % Ratio Dependent in Active in % Ratio ^
.1910 : 50*4 ■ 49.6, .1.01;1 60.2 39.8 I.5I1I
1920 ; - 55*4 44,6 T. 1^24:1 60.4  .39*6 1*56:1 _  : . -
1930 4 . 51.6  1*07:1^ : 41*2 . :1.43:1 . f X i ;
We,thus see that the active population was smaller in Slovakia* , Yet it had 
to bear,a greater bixrden i# the higher number of dependents in an economy 
where the per capita income was much lower than the Czech Lands and. hence 
the standard of living too# TMa fact Shows that the higher ratio of 
dependent to active sectors of the population was one of the many factors 
that would'have to be overcome 'in order to raise living standards.in Slovakia# 
In my survey of the Central government policies I shall in my final summary 
in the last chapter try to distinguish between the extent to which these 
policies merely alleviated the external symptoms of Slovakia’s problems 
iaîxd how far they v/ere successful in initiating long-term changes in Blovaliia’s 
society^ changes that would have eventually.helped to eliminate or greatly 
diminish these problems peculiar to Slovakia#
'' ' ^^29»
Education ill Blèyakig .193.8-1929
In üïiderdeveloped societies education must bo on© of the main, if not the 
main, priority* It must first provide at the basic level the necessary 
means for the entire, population to acquire literacy* In Slovakia by the 
end of 1921 82*44/tf of the population çoüld read and write, as opposed to '
97*45%) in Bohemia, 96*45^  ^in Moravia, 85*856 in Silesia and around 54*0(16 
in.Ruthenia*^^'^ -In the case of Slovakia theeeaaverage figures conceal 
variations between different regions and the fact that men tended to be more
literate than women# .They also give no clue to the proportion of the
population who wore semi-literate.that is^they could read but not write or . 
vice versa*
Literacy is the foundation upon which any further education is based* Slovakia 
would require in the years to come a. certain number of teachers,.administrative 
workers, officials and technical exports in all professions and walks of 
life* It would talce time to create an educational system capable of satisfying
all Slovakia’s heeds for qualified personnel* Meanwhile tho help of a large. -
number of such personnel from the Ozech Lands was vital and absolutely 
indespensable.although their presence in Slovakia would undoubtedly cause 
certain problems*
From 1875 to 1918 there had been no secohdary schools at all with Slovak 
as the Imiguage of instruction* Even.in Blovak primary schools an .ever- 
increasing proportion of teaching time was devoted to the study of Magyar*
It seems that the Hungarian government was.prepared to spend more money on 
making little Magyars out of little Slovaks than in. teaching little Magyars 
to road and write* The .effects of this policy can be seen in the very small 
proportion of the Hungarian intelligentsia who were recorded as Slovaks in 
the 1910 Census* Bveton^^^ gives the figure of 0.1^ of Slovaks as belonging
to thé intelligeiitala in the period. 1905*1907 aîid 1913.-1913* The figures 
for the entire Eimgarian population are 0*5% and 0*7/6 respectively* ^ .
Even if we allow for a large number of Magyarlzed 8lovales among the Hungarian 
intelligentsia -.the total proportion would still not exceed I6 of the total 
Slovak population# This was clearly too low a figure to be able to supply 
all the staff with the necessary educational qualifications to fill those 
posts in Slovakia!that the central government would have to create in order 
to implement its policies
Prior to 1918 the only schools that the Slovaks possessed were elementary 
(primary) schools. These were run mainly by the various relipjous denomin­
ations who ih;return for financial support from the Hungarian government were 
obliged to teach the Hungarian language and to cultivate the feeling of
' " "I QO
belonging to a. common state in their teaching. In fact the Magyar 
ianguage was required to be taught to such a level that "the child of 
non-Magyar tongue .can on the Completion of the fourth school-year express 
its thoughts :intelligeably in the Magyar language in word and writing," 
(Paragraph 18. of the I9O7 Education This provision meant that
most of the teaching time was devoted to Magyar, Ministerial order Mo. 
80000/1910 fixed this at 21 to 22 hours per as Paragraph 18 conferred
on the Minister for Education the right to determine the'number of hours 
prescribed for the teaching of Magyar.
Likewise the feeling of belonging to a common state meant in reality that 
Slovak pupils wbhG punished or expelled' from Magyar sfefcpols for alleged 
hpan-Blavistic agitation" which in maiiy cases was nothing other than the 
normal manifestation of the desire to speak or study one’s native tongue.
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By 1918 there were only 2?6 Slovak primary schools with 390 teachers and 
30,118a According to A* ^tefanek who was both Referent for Education in 
Srobar’s administration of Slovakia and Minister for Education in the I929 
Udr^al Cabinet, only 94 of these schools could be described as Slovak « 
the rest having been almost completely Magyarized®^^^ A further factpr, in 
the low level of education in Hungary was the lax attendance and the number 
of children of school-age. who vjere not inscribed, .which in 1913 amounted to 
no less than 32,700p}95
After 1918; the most urgent question that faced the ..Cehtl-al Government in its 
educational policy was the need to provide enough teachers.to ensure that 
Slovaks could obtain education in Slovak right up to university level*
This would necessitate using a large number of Czech teachers in the first 
few years whilst enough Slovak ones were undergoing training. Various 
conflicts arose on the question of the employment of Czech teachers* There 
were allegations that the professional, moral and personal qualities of some 
of the Czechs who were sent to Slovakia were Unsatisfactory whilst the question, 
of the salaries,, allowances and living, conditions of these teachers^ as , 
compared to those of their Blovak colleagues, also provoked controversy, 
Finally, the widespread use of G^ech as. both;a medium of instruction and in 
periodicals, school-books and,Other publications as well as the vexed 
question of various attempts that wore made to reform the Blovak orthography,. 
allegedly so as to .bring it closer to Czech were also things that made 
many Slovaks slightly-apprehensive vuïid uneasy about the central government’s 
intentions in Blovalcia# Naturally such incidents were eagerly seized upon 
by the Hungarian revisionists as conclusive proof that Slovaks would welcome 
a return to Hungarian rule* This was a most forlorn hope.
V  /
The referent for Education, A, Stefanek issued an order in December I919 
dismissing all teachers in Slovakia who had hot yet taken or did not wish to
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take an oath of loyalty to the Republic as well as those who had ho knowledge 
of Slovalî*'^ '^^  This move was bitterly criticised by Magyars as an example 
of the government’s aiati-Magyar bias. Given the fact that in 1918 the majority 
of teachers were Magyars whilst the majority of their pupils were Slovaks 
what then was to be done with those teachers who had no knowledge of Slovak 
or whose knowledge was insuffioent for teaching purposes? In I918 there were
198only 390 Slovak primary school teachers but 5,000 Magyars although the
latter group constituted but 21*56 of the population of Slovakia* A
reduction in the, number of monoglot Magyar primary school teachers was in
view- of these facts almost inevitable even if there had been no question of
their loya,lty to the state (which there of course was). Individual cases
200of hardship were bound to occur yet this does not prove there was any 
attempt to deprive Magyar teachers of their livelihood* Later various <^ ates
were fixed by which teachers had to pass an exam in the Slovak language,
' ■ 201 Geography, History and the Czechoslovak constitution*
Primary education was made compulsory and extended from six to eight.years 
from the age of six to fourteen (Law 226/1922). There was a proviso that in, 
Slovakia this was to be introduced gradually in as far as the personnel 
situation would permit but at the latest by the beginning of the school-year 
1927/28.
Secondary education was also split between the various religious denominations 
and the Htate*^^^ The question of the three catholic gytfeiasia that were 
taken under state control ostensibly because of the unregulated state of the 
Catholic Church in Slovaliia which would have meant closing them or leaving 
them in.Magyar hands^ '^^  was regarded by HSL’G as coming under their sphere 
of competence*I They therefore asked for at least three of the gymnasia to
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bo returned to the Control of the ohuroh but this was not dona chiefly 
because; of the opposition of Lrobar who was later. Minister for Education 
in the Banos' cabinet that lasted from 26th September 1921 to 7 October 1922* 
This whs later to serve as an excuse,for liBL’S departure from the coalition 
into opposition against the government, ’
In,Slovakia there ware basically two typés of secondary .schools, .The 
"Burigerschulen" or "mestiantey" that provided an esaent*Ê-lly less academic 
and more practical course of study over a period of three years than the 
second type the grammar-school (gymnasium or real-school) which was devoted 
to a■niore academic■appraach, .
Law No,137/1925 regulated the structure of the first type of school and i
brought.it into accord with the structure current in the Czech Lands, It 
was to be entered, after passing the necessary examinations, upon the completion 
of five years of elementary education and last for tliree years* During this 
time the same .subjects as at elementary school were to be studied at a more f . .
intensive l e v e l s : The:number of children in such schools/also known as 
upper elementary schools by 1926/27 is shovni in Table Ten* We may note the 
lovr percentage of Magyar, piipils who went on to study at this level compared, 
v/ith the number/of Slovak pupils* Approximately 8,9/6 of Slovak elementary 
school-pupils (in 1926/27) as compared to only 2 of Magyars* This led to 
Qoraplûirits that this was a deliberate policy of denationalisation* It 
should be pointed out that the proportion of those undergoing secondary- :i
education:who were Magyars and Jews was .somewhat high* A possible explanation 
for.this phenomenon was that Magyar Jews now wished their children to receive
secondary .education in Blovak* By 1930 of 136,737 Jews In Slovakia 44,009 
described themselves.as Slovaks*™ in the Census. This was a considerable 
increase on the figure of 29,290 Jews of Slovak or Czech nationality in the
, ; y / 6/ ' -134. ' - ' ; : . ' .  ^ . / . . ^
X921 GeUGUsw^^^ .One can only eurmise that one of the effects of this riae 
in the number of: Slovak Jews and mi even sharper drop in the number of Magyar 
Jews, from 21,744 in. .1921^ ^^  to 91728 in 1939^ '^  ^- was that most of the Jev;ièh 
children who received secondary education did so in Slovak schools* 1200
out of 4438 M;rj 3\j attended Slovak, German and Ilutliene secondary schools in
; - .:pi2 : ' ' // ' ' - / ' : ^  i ^1927/28* " th u, may well have been the expression of. their parents wishes/
to. identify theDiselvès as. Slovaks instead, pf Magyars,.
The more academic grammar'-tyhe .schools, as well as cqmmericali.;agricultural, 
toclTUical schoqls and teaCher-training:establishments were all taken over 
from the Magyars 'and developed to fit Slovakia’s needs,.-•;This meant primarily , 
the introduction of/Slovak as the language of instruction in the majority
of such establishnientV & fact that v/as deeply resented by thé-Magyars* :
If we .consider the date shown in Table-Eleven we see that the proportion of
secondary school pupils who were Magyars was still 1#. in 1927/28 whilst the . ,
percentage of purely llagyhx'* establishments was still'13,Eh, ( ' ' .
We now. turn to: the question of the establxslmient of. higher education - ' . 
fhcilitiOB and. .méré specifically the creation of a Slovak university which 
came into being in 1919'*"1920# It bore the name of a famous Qzech thinker 
and pedagogue of"the.17th;century, Jan Amos Komènsky (Comenius as he is better 
.icnovm in the losb) mid was really the Elizabeth University buildings in Brat- ': '
; islavu, an in: li.«mtion founded in 1912/and poorly attended during the War, 
it formed the nucléus of the nevr Slovak univer^y- although a distant precursor 
may be found in the Academia .Istropolltana which v/as a 15th century theological ' 
.college at whiqlr secular subjects wgro taught as well. (It was founded in 
Bratislava in 1467 but failed to devolop)y It was attended by many Blovaks. 
Bevepal other institutions were also founded in the Republic at this time; and
and it v;as partly the . lack of adequate finance that prevented the university 
from.ppening with more thauyone faoulty, the others being added later*. Thé- 
Medical Faculty opened on.30*7*1919, tlie philosophical Faculty from 22.10*1921 
and the. Law Faculty from the winter .Gomoster of 1921/22 (Paragraph 3 Law , .
No. ^1927:Sb* ^*a*N)\\ " ,i . ; ' ' ' \
In .addition to this problem there was the problem of. finding enough staff to 
ensure that the university could function*; This could be solved initially . 
by the same means as were adopted in other areas* namely.thé expedient of . 
employing Ozeoh professors. This was in itself a Wise move but the Blovak 
Autonomists wore mmoyed by the .choico of such mob as Dp*; Albert .Phazak^  
and Dr. 4 lav Ohaloupeck^. who as men,of high standing ; were/extremely pro- : 
ûaochoslovak in their views but not c.hauvinists* Thé pride of these Autonomists 
had also been hurt by the decision"to .name the liniversity ufLo r'Oomèniûs and 
not some more ideiitifiably Slovak figure# , - ' . •!. ■ ■ ■ . ;
The importaiiCG of a University for Slovakia cannot.be undér-estimated*, For . 
the first time Slovaltswculd be able to obtain higher education in their./
Dim language* It would not be possible ;to train those specialists: of whom 
Slovak would later-have need* As Sto’fanek says in his work on the sociography 
of Slovakia à ..considerable number.. Of specialists; 'trained, under. thesé prof-.
essors of' .whom th# Autonomists;weare so critical*. . By 1930 there; were ;
2,038.students enrolled of whom ; 1*447 were from Slovakia* In 1919 the 
University Imd started with onlyil44 students at the Medical Faculty* .
Of the total higher éducation budget of 9I million,cro%vns in 1930 this
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university received 9^:or,8,100,000 crowns, which/for a much ;smaller ; ,
.... ■_ :■ .;■ 220-!' ' 
university (The Oharles University had over 8,00 students alohe) ; and the . .
only Cue of its, kind in Biovakia.was hot ungenerous • One can however criticise
: the fact that no technical. institute; or'Polythcimic, ooniparable to those in
: the Czéch Lands, v/as founded'in Slovakia during this period#. :
Unfortunately it:reqiiire® à considerable amount of time to train imiversity 
profqssorB of sufficeht calibre*.It is; therefore not surprising to learn/that 
as late as. 1943/44 approximately 20^3, of the prof essors at the Oomenius ^ ' 4
University were stili Gzeqhs (20. out of 107,)*^ ^^  In . 1938 there vmre only 
24. Slovak profeshoi's .and ,56 C^cch^^^? althoiigh this 4 ; in no way distracts 
from; the very solid achievemi nxo of the university up to; 1929 when it / ■
possessed 55 professors, 34 ddcentP, lebturera and assistants and 151 other . . 
members of staff* 8,085 Btudents had passed- through its/portala of whom . b
769 took the degree of doctor# ; . ' . ; '■ i. . ' '
As wé can sea; from these data #nd thoae contained , in Tables Ten and Eleven 
by 1928/29 there had been considerable quhhtative _as well às qualitative 
changes in improvoment#; This had contributed to. a significant raising, of 
education levels, in Blovalcia compared to 1918 although there still reimined 
a great deal to !be done# \ - . , < '• , . w; : ■ ■ . / ■ /
Land Reform in Slovakia, I918-1929 : ■ • ' , ; '  - ' 4,
Perhaps ■evOn.hiior.o than in the Ozech Lands-thore.was a pressing need for Land 
Reform# .;The proportion'of the laiuV.in Hungary that belonged to owners whose • ■
holdings exceeded 100 hectares was. 45/*, .81/6 of these holdings, consisted of 
estates of 1000 hectares or ;more# In the. Ozech Lands /only 1 ^  of the. total 
land area cohsistéd Of holdings exceeding 100 hectares* "  .In Slovakia .16*4/ ' 4; 
of the total land area was 750 metres above sea-level or higher whilst this 
proportion v/as only 7*5*^  in the Ozech Lands# This meant that the overall ; 
fertility of the : land was lower due to the greater proportion of hill and- 
mountain - land# ■ This problem was. compounded by the lower level of agricultural
techniques and the fact that mo.st of ;bhe-more fertilO land belonged to Magyar
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landowners v/hosO estates were concentrated along the southern edge of Slovakia#4
Thus there were a considerable number ..of landless agricultural labourers who
together with their dependents were estimated to comprise 31/ (555#500) of. the ; 4
total agricultural populcitioii in 1910# - It was this uneven distribution,
of/land .which -was the - ÿriiibipal" driving force behind Blqvnk and Magyar
The main prinoiple® of !the: Lmd Reform wero elaborated! in /Lav; 215/1919 of the 
16th.A p r i l . /  It laid, down that ail land of more than .250 hectares in extent: 
or more thaii .150 hectares of. agricultural 'land were to be sequeeted although 
Special/exceptioT could b© granted, for;holdings up to^500 hectares in area,"• 
Oompensation‘v;ato :>ô:paid ih oaeh or in bonds^according bo the average./-!; 4;- > 
price prevailing in 1935^1915 plus various al3.owances for the state of the : 
property token over $ /and any improvements that had been made since IstAuj^st 
1914 as well as for any other property or. livestock which had! also been 
sequested. From/the'day ,the property was taken over.4/ interest was ! to be v 
paid on the amoiuit assessèd as compensation but the owner could not demand/ 
immediate payment# '"'‘/4''/„ 4 :/// //\
A/further measure (law 81/1920 from 30th January 1920) laid down guidelines ■ 
for thé distribution. 'of the land, those persons who wore eligible to receive 
land and in v/hal; quantities. A previous meamire had already , breated'a State 
Land Office (Law 530/1919 " 11th June I9I9)/ This body was charged with 
- supervising/the/ implementation of ;fche/Land. E and was given very wide-
powers'to decide.to whom and in what/quaiitities and/in what way it would 
distribute'-the/Ihnd. ’ , . ;!/., ;, / ' ''■//;■./
These measures âl'So .laid dovni the. amount of land, that could:, be distributed! 
in lots /varying from 0/ îo.15! hectares depending on its/quailty,to peasant : 
applicants .in order /to create viable peasant small holdings# ; This lav; / 
annulled the!Upper limit of 509 hectares (that could be exempted) in order. ,! 
to ! preserve .parks and .cuitural/aîid historic monuments etc*. .It soon came to 
be established'practice’ that in order to effectively utilise ; farm machinery
' 4 7 : 4 ' 4 ,:/ 7 4 : ■: :■
and,buildings!.an estate would not be completely broken up but only reduced 
in .size so that enough land would be. left to form, a raedium-Bized estate*.'
Such estate® bèoame îbioVm as Residual Estates and the question of the , people ,
they wore given: to * former owners,and lease®, estate officials and legionnairea :
who fought, in the, pzechosloyalt legions, often led to. charges; of. political . 
favouritism, hepotis/M and corruption. ■. ■/ ' ' . ■ , !■
The provision of credit facilities to enabl© applicants to purchase holdings . : 
with’lidvances. of up to 90/ for the land and 5 0  for the buildings was regulated 
by yet another law * (No * 161/192O 11th March). It provided for a.fixed rate /. !
of interest and!à long period for; repayments, and guaranteed that the loan ; ; /
could; not be' called in before time* , ■ . ;' . ' , ■ \ ; " . '
In Slovakia even before the land Reform came into.effect &obar issued a ' ;
spl.t-îâi o'rder^ ^^  ^that allowed peasants to ! use pasture!"land belonging to the 
o\mers of large estates in return for à!small< sum. This was, done to help 
the poorer sections of the peasantry obtain; pasture for- their flocks# Because 
of delays in completing the land Re form by 1926, the government- was forced: 
to rent off sequested land to 65,0^4 peasants who had;the smallest holdings* ■! 
They received about;33*78^ hectares about;0*5ha each* Bimilarily part of 
the■sequested land had to.be given over to satisfy the needs of housing-and 
building. By 193O :.approxirsiately 2,422 hectares for building purposes had
'/I'V/ .; '/- ''W:./'/'- ' ' % : /  " ; y-.
been distributed to; l4^  089 applicàûts in Slovakia* . -
By 1929 the land Reform was not yet completed (Bee Tables Twelve, Thirteen 
and .Sixteen for .results up to 19301 *1 ! Bvoh if the. entire land area of 
Slovakia would hi\0 been divided into equal holdings then the. .average size 
of each holding would have been iO#3 hectares* Of this only 6*3 hectares 
would have agricultural'land* This does not take,. however^into account the
; 4  : ' ,4'/4,. 4/"U9- , ■ V 4  444:, -4:'V_,
varlatlbnQ in mpll fertility and tbe.u©© of madhinofyY whioh tended/ 
more/ wideGproud, .on t W  larger Wldihga* Tho nffocta/of/'tbG l,4md.:U 
were/ to alleviàto rathoïf thmi solve probloba of Slqy^kia* s agrloulturo - ' : ; 4
although it /did djotributo ]^ qertain ^ amoihlt of land to.^thoop whOinoodad it# : .
The création of the reoidnal oatatoo has been orltiolsed W  thooo whb:àr nc' 
that moot of the.available land should have been:distributed to thosp.wivh 
holdingGOf le&s than thirty hootarea# If thie had been done.agricultural, 
prodnotioh .might Wall ImVO fallen as holding® Of above fifty héçtW^eG. were^  ! - 4 
mère auited to. l4n^ge^schlè '3rodnetièn methodG inclndj^ig the née .of maohihOry,"/ 4 
Gûoh .a coursé pf action would hot hâve holved tiie imderlyihg problem© of '- . \ -
Slovakia*© agrioul/tW^) which, to my mihd, lay deeper in the relatione between : 
thq/.total àvàilhble amoWt of .agrioulthral Itmd/tmd the hize of the hgrlculthral 
population* Thè làttor . increased by. no less thtUr:15#5^ 6. (for the ac.tivo^ ^^ ' Y 
Sector) in abaoluto terme from 1921 to 1^ 30 in Slovakia but! by o n l y 4 . 
the. Ozeoh Lsnds '^*4 By 1929 the problem of Bioyakid*©:. rural ovor/p6%}ulation 
was .©till, far from being sqlyod* " : ' 44 4 . . . : ; . . i / Ly//. . :
Hemth.Oare in A l o W U a  1918^19^"''^ . ./ ' .' : '  ^ "4 . , 0 .
Slovakia imdoubtedly .liad.a .lowbr loyel .of gonei'al. health care,.thmr in tho 4': % 
woatern half of tlie. Republic* which was 'the legacy of oonditiona which had 
.oxiqted uuf''ev Hunga$'y# . Dôé3^itè this fact, the increase in population in ;
©lovàkia ( ou ;inuèd' toj bè: higher, than in the Oaoch/Lohd® tlirqdghqut/the ' '.
%;hole iifo tiW of the Rèpûblip# I^ Gan thès deduce! that a conclderablè: .
bhrden would fall oh.health/faciliticK.'in:#lovakia aé .a direct reoA/of thé .
largo numbo.r of chlidreh.'#b;wqro boih e year#y. . .4 4; '4. 4., ;.
BlovAia benefited from thé general adyances i;r medicl^io. thu6.. were., made during. ; 
this period although the; imprèyémoht .wa© not. .a©: 3;%id:. ae. in the Gzeoh Land©*,
Adult'^mortality. rato®-feli fs/om’19*0,per/lOOO ;invl!9l9';:to 17*2 per 1000/in , 4 /
, : -1*0- - ;
1929 a drop of 9*%# Infant mortality was some 11L lower In 1929 at 
165*3 per 1000 live births than in 1920 (the figure for 1919 is : 
at, 130 per 1000 live births due to the effects of the War) when it'stood at 
185.9 per ,1000 live b i r t h s M o r t a l i t y  from tuberculosis remained almost 
constant at around 200 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants from 1921 to 1929 
although it declined sharply from a figure of approximately 340 in/19l8,f^ '^
These declines might not seem to reflect a high level of central government 
expenditure in this field as in the western half of the country mortality 
rates overall declined much faster but it should be borne,in mind that /
Slovakia was a predominantly rural society where the difficulties of providing 
medical services jbhat would be within reach of the majority of thepopulation^ 
were hampered by several factors# Tile most significant of these were the 
low population density, the difficultyOature.of the terrain which was often 
mountainous and the fact that ?6 .0  of Slovalcia’s population in, 1930 lived
’ • ' -, ' 2^8 ■ ■ • ■
in communities of 5t 000 or lees ae against ; 81,4?6 in 1921. This meant that
the provision of such services as piped water (which was properly cleaned and
filtered) and. èfficéht.-sewage and drainage systems was harder to implement.
And to à certain- extent the existence Of such modern amenities has a decisive
effect on both general health and mortality rates. By 1929 Slovakia had
8,24,0 hospitaT beds almost double the 1922 figure, 4,201 beds.'^ ?^  A start
had been made bn the momentous task of improving public health, in Slovakia
but there still remained much to be done in order to try and;narrow the gap
between the two halves of■the Republic. Ju the matter of public health and - ■
other social factors such as housing, employment and education all play a role#
A lower standard of living,prevailed in Slovakia where the per capita income
in 1930 measured by the amount of bank, deposits was only 1200 crowns whereas ;,
240it was more than three and a half times that level, 4250 crovms, in the 
Czech Lands. This discrepancy would also be reflected in a lower level of 
general health# "
' ' . ' y:'/ -. ' ' ::: ' ' '  ^e:/ '"
The fQorgmigutidn pf^ J^^ ^^  ^ BlpWUa , 1 / : : //
This wà® linked vjith spécial probleins* The most pressing ones were the lack 
of a well-developed Slovak legal'terminology and the small number of Slovak 
lawyers and judges'* In faot . according to the 1900 Hungarian Pénsua there 
was not a single judge or crown court official who openly declared himself - 
as a Slovak# In/addition a, problem had been created by thO:-decision to, leave 
the old Hungarian body of laii in /force in'Slovakia# (Law 11/1918 - 28th ■ . ■ /
October 1918),* ■..In the;.Gzech Lands Austrian' law remained in'force* Thus the 
Republic was forced to keep two divergent systems of law.in Operation# , : 
Eventually this necessitated the establishment of a special ministry (that for 
the.unification of the laws) which had the task of reconciling any conflicts 
that;pcourrddbb.ttwaeh these two systems as well as bringing.the provisions 
of both these,ststerns into accord with the hew body of CzechoBlovalc law that 
was gradually being created# The. most serious area of divergence in the 
interpretation of.Austrian and ihmgarian law was in the definition of domicile 
with regard to"the acquisition of citizenship# This affected mainly .members
: ■ ■ " : 4 : . : : 4/ 4; -  , . 4,'.. ,..V44.4i ;
of the Magyar minority who found themselves Suddenly "stateless". They were 
in many cases not recognised ,as Gaechoslpvak citizens despite their long.years
of residence in those areas that later formed part of the territory off : the.
2^1 ' 4 ' , "  ' .
Republic#-' .. ^
In line with general:practice,in the case of former Hungarian officials in 
Slovakia, judges too were not asked to swoar uliegisjice to.Czechoslovakia / 
but were only-requested to give an undertakihg to observe ..the nev/ decrees 
and Taws of the Republic*' The great majority refused-to'do azo./). and withdrew 
to Hungary leaving the Slovaks no choice but to employ OzOch.judges Imd
officials. ';4:.4 : "  ' 4 .  . . T;--
The judicial system was reorganized on the basis of three instances* Slovakia 
together with Ruthenia dame under the jurisdiction of two.High court® one 
in-Bratislava.and the other in Kosice. .Under them came Girouit courts and 
then District court®. All three levels of court dealt with both.crirainai 
and oivil.offehGes aaid the High Courts and Circuit Courts also functioned 
as courts of appeal#The seriousness of the offence determined at which level 
it.would be t]rrvi whilst the final court àf appeal was the'Gzechoslovak. /
-Bupreme Goux*t in'.Brno* A separate section for appeals from Ruthenin was 
established at :the-Kosice High Court, The Presidents of the High Courts had 
wide administrative jurisdiction over the courts üdià' their jurisdiction 
out of the budget provided by, the Ministry of Justice as well as the right 
to appoint subordinate court officials, A uniform system of pensions and 
mlaries for thé mi tire Republic v/as set ,up and those districts whose centres 
lay in Hungary, were rearranged imder existing, .centres* The new High Courts 
canie into .operation on 1st January 1921 and in line with the protection of 
the rights of linguistic minorities as■defined by the Peace Treaties thë 
courts in those districts whore there were minorities of more, than 2 0  of 
the total population v/ho se language v/as other than Czech or Slovak were 
obliged both to issue and accept communications in the minority language.
The amounts spent on the courts,in Slovakia rose from l4 million crowns^^^ or
6 , 0  of the total budget in 1921^*^ to 61 million or i9 ,0  in 1929 /^^  ^
v/hioh seems to be an equitable proportion* ; The qiialitiative improvement must 
have seen incomparable as in the. pre-19l8 period Hungarian judges would, 
often impose very harsh sentences for the most harmless displays of .national 
feeling and ' the general level of the legal proceedings,,v/as often ladking in 
objectivity and. impartiality. . .
- -  ' ' ' ' '  : v ; 4  ! / ;  ■'■' 4 44^
Railways 1918-1929
The development of -road and rail systems in Slovakia was an/ essential step, ; 
towards the integration of her economy with that of the Czech Lands* Prior 4/ 
to 1918 the natural .focal point for her economic activities.had been Budapest• 
There converged all the railway lines from all parts of Hungary including! 
Slovakia, lines that conveyed raw material and semi^finished goods dOim.to 
Hungary and brought back to Slovakia finished goods and other articles*
With the emergence of the Republic in 1910 there occurred a change of 
;■ direction from south to west in / the orientation o f Slovakia* s exports * It 
was necessary therefore to improve and develop those lines that connected 
Slovakia to the Czech Lends, something .which had been totally neglected under 
the Hungarian! administration*
Furthermore there also existed the problem of differential railway tarrifs 
for passengers and freight*: These were generally higher in Blovakia! than in 
the Czech Lands*. They were a result of such historical factors as higher 
charges under Hungary.and the private ownership of many lines in Slovakia
;■ ' ■ '4 ,4 : 4 - - 247 .
whose owners,charged more than was the case in the Czech Lands* - .Such ! 
chargés have been estimated to have been 5 0  higher per ton/kilometre than !; 
on:private lines in- the :C%eoh;Lands,a factor which seriously affected 
the ability of goods .produced in: Slovakia to compete in markets in the Czech 
Lands* The greater distances involved in transporting both finished goods ; 
and raw materials-inevitable meant proportionally higher costs* ;
Although the railways system had not suffered any direct war damage during 
World : War I the Hungarians had weakened it by taking .away some 20, 000 wagons 
and locomotives.^ The later bout of fighting between the CSR and the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic had caused considerable damage to the railways
.' 0 ': . ' : . - -  ^ % i '4 ^ :%Âo
especially to bridges and this,was worsened by very bad flodding in 1919*.
An investment , program for tile development;-6f ; the railway uÿstera . inythe-
-4 '■ ■ : . ■ ■ - . • -4;- '■ . VT' '
Ronublic. was draim lip; as early as 1920, 4/: r It foresaw the construction of
sixteen new lines totalling 550 kilometres of which jfe, kilometres^^^ were to
be. in Slovakia* Of The total of 963 million crowns that were,to be spent'
on 4the cohstruetion of these, lines no. less, than 757 millions was for those 4 4
lines that v/ere. wholly! or partially in Slovakia* In addition to this expenditure
over 1,000 million crovms a year was. projected from 1921 to I925, when the pro-4
gram was due to,! be completed. This was vintended to pay for all the ancillary •
works, improvements to track and to biiildings and the provision of new
/ ' /  ' 4, ''4 ; . :■ 253  " ' ' 4  '
locomotives and rolling-stock. ;4 4,
The'scope,and expenditure of this program was totally unrealistic, in the
light of both the post-war economic situation and the amount of technical help .4
necessary. -By I925 only one line of 3.4 kilometres length had been completed .
(from Zvoleh:to. Krupiha),; the studies for the other lines were not yet, .
254 - . :-4- ' ■ ■ ' . 4 ' " 255'''' ■ ' 4'.' 4. 4 '- 4'4 - . :  .
completed . and the necessary.experts were lacking* By 1930 a,total length
of 160 kilometres of line had been completed although the entire;program was
not/completed even by the end of the Republic* At least 1,600 million crowns
were: spent^^^ in 20 y^ -20 of the projected expenditure of 6,431 million
crowns*: Although the central government Was not entirely successful in :
implementing this investment program and executing all the projects foreseen ;
it v/as able by 1930 to expend 207 million crowns on the construction of nev/
: railways in Slovakia, of a projected 757 million crowns* The amO&it of goods !
carried in trucks in-Slovakia rose from 977*1^0 tonnés in 1922 to 1,896i431
in .1 9 2 9 4 5 7 4/.. ■ ■ -!! ; ; -  ^ 4  > 4  /'-:;; : /
The Provincial Administration Reform bf-41928 '
We now turn our attention once more tothe sphere of public/administration*
The Ètma reform was introduced in Slov/dcia. on 1st January 1923 but failed 
to take root in the G^ech.Lands: where the old provincial ©ystem was maintained.
 ^ -145- :  ^ 'Vs/'y'-: ■ ;  ^ y/': -v: : ■>■'
Thus^aè in the case of the legal codé t^he Republic still lacked a uniform 
system of local government* . ' ’ .
The Provincial Administrative reform was intended to overcome this duality.
It was also motivated by, certain politicaT considerations, as we can see in 
the actual timing of ;its introduction, that were, primarily connected vfith ; 
the attitude of HSL*S towards Coining the coalition* ' It was at this time 
comprised of the main non-socialist parties both Czechoslovak and German.for 
whom the extra 23 seats which IISL*S won in the .1925 Parliamentary elections 
would have been a vaidable addition to its majority. . In-return.HSL|S-v/Cre 
bound to demand some;concessions towards the realization of autonomy for 
Slovakia* HSL’S;entered the coalition on the 15th January 1927 and the law 
relating to the establishment of the new provincial administrative; system.was 
promulgated on lAth July 192? (Law 125/192?)
Upon close examination of this measure we dan see that it was far from the 
kindiof autonomy that HSL*S had envisaged as far back as 19@219h@h $hey 
presented a Bill .jn thé National Assembly. This Bill contained provisions 
for a wide measure of autonomy for Slovakia^^^. in all fields of social and 
economic affairs including a Parliament (Snem),for Slovakia. This proposal ; 
was defeated by a large majority in the National Assembly.
Thé new law contained two main elements. These were both elected membore and 
nominated members of the new administrative bodies. The basic unit was the 
province (Krajina) of which there were to be four viz. Bohemia, Moravia ,; 
Silesia, Slovakia and.Huthenia. The autonomous position of Silesia whose 
populatiob consisted of a large gepmàh minority (^0/ of the total) and a small 
number of Poles as well as Czechs was,thus formally abolished. Each province 
was to have an elected provincial assembly (zastupitel* stvo) - whach formed
VÏ',. \
: : . 
a permanent committèe .to “represent, it' when'^ver it was not in: session as .
well, as various specialist committees. : An'interesting stipulation was. that.
.only two-thirds of thé members were elected. The remaining .one-third was ;
nominated by the: government as ,was the provincial President who presided over
the assembly and its component bodies, his .variousddeputies and. the officials
who ran the Provincial Officei. The assembly was a consultative body whose
members discussed matters arising out of thé various spheres of competence
allocated to the assembly such as healthy transport mid economic affairs.
The appointed (i.e. nominated) bureaucratic organs were responsible-for the
day-to-day administration of the Province and the implementation of deoisions
: that the assembly or one of its committees had taken# : The appointed: members
usually belonged to the various political parties whose candidates hadbbeen
Quccessfully elected to the assembly. The proportion of elected to nominated
members was not always 2:1 but sometimes greater as can be seen frCm Table
FCUrteeni This was because nominated members were appointed fin proportion to
the strengths of the parties : thatrhad contooted the elections. From Table
Fourteen we can see the proportion of the vote that each party needed ih order
to gdin one seat (elected and nominated being aggregated) and that the,
Agrarians were awarded a greater number of nominated seats than was warranted
by the number of votes they obtained. Yet one of the smaller parties the
National Democrats did much better. The former party gained only 3  of the
poll yet it had twice, as many seats as’the BKb who gained of the POll .
or the jewish Parties who received 3*^2^
Apart from the imperfect representative machinery of this new system went ' 
ahother provision v/hich further réduced thé power of the elected element.
The official Referents who were the heads of thé various departments of the. 
Provincial Office were given the vright to bé present and vote at.any meeting
, ; . .,, ; -l4y- ■ ' . - '
of the.assembly when items, that fell under the competence of their particular 
department were under discussion. -
The provinces were sub-divided into districts (okresy)* These were organized 
on similar lines including the one-third of nominated'members and a nominated 
head. CnaÜ^lnik) of'the district assembly* The latter body was to have - 
between eighteen and thirty-six members in total.
The basic, problem that/hampered the functioning of this rather cumbersome, ■ 
system was however: fiiaancial* The provincial administrations were empowered 
to obtain fhnds by means of direct state taxes and taxes on i^ods aad services* 
In the; case of Slovakia the total available tax reserve was proportionally 
smaller than in the Czech Lands, because of the lower standard of living in 
Slovakia and the fact tliat many Czech firms, including banks, that traded 
in Slovakia had their head offices in Prague where they paid their taxes* 
Slovakia's income from Various local taxes .in 1928 (compared to the rest of 
the Republic) i/as as follows* '
TABLE FIFTEEN ' ' ' . ■
. Kgs. . %'
Bohemia 940,402,719 64
Moravia-Bilesia 346,229,948 23
Slovakia .195*093,010 ' 13
TTTAL 1,481,725*737 100
Slovakias share was thus rather low in respect of the proportion of the 
total population of the Republic who lived in Slovakia (23^). This fact 
had become apparent during the period when the new aupa system sM© still 
functioning in Slovakia. Over 7 %  of their total budget was oxuended on
,  ^ -148- , - / : ; .
the construction of roads and the proportion of state taxes that each '&pa 
was forced to levy varied from 60-70» in'Bratislava and Kosice to over 10Q^  
in each of the other four MiPv, : ^  despite the effotts of the Minister for 
Slovakia to redress the balance.
If Slovakia would have been granted full autonomy in accordance with the 
demands of HSL'S then it still would have been dependent, financially to. 
a certain extent on the Central Government as the amount of money that could 
have been raised by.way of taxes v;ithin Slovakia alone would not hâve proved 
sufficent to provide as much investment in all the necessary social services 
as was done by the Central Government. And in view of the harsh economic 
climate of the Thirties this was even truer as agriculature in Slovakia 
remained in a very depressed state for most of this period, 8y 1930 it 
still provided the main source of income for almost 60  ^of the populations
Conclusion
By 1929 industrial production in Czechoslovakia in most branches of industry 
had reached the pre-war level. In the few years from 1920 to 1929 the 
foundations had been laid in Slovakia for a radical transformation of the 
administrative and educational systems. Considerable improvements had been 
made on the railways^ althoiigh these were hamstrung by lack of funds^^d in 
other areas such as health care. There were many shortcomings in government 
policies of which^as we.shall see^the most serious was the lack Of ^coherent 
industrial programmei^ fer industrializing Slovakia* Inspite of these .short­
comings there Jiad been undoubted progresb in many fields since 1918.
•Section Five
THE SIDVAK RESPONSE TO CENTRAL gOVERNmi]NT-POLICIES' 1918-1929 '
The results of the parliamentary elections in 1920 imre slightly bewildering 
in as far as Slovakia, was concerned. The Social Democratic Parties both 
Czechoslovak and: %gyar gained no less thàii 46% of the total yote.which in 
view of the predorainahtly agrarian nature of Slovakia's economy was somewhat’ 
unexpected. One would have expected both SL'S and ifWRS to have done much 
better tlian the lS| which they both, received* Our interpretation of this ■ ;
swing to the Social Democrats in Slovakia should be tempered with caution.
It cannot be talion as either massiVe endorsement of government policy in 
Slovakia or a protest, against it. %  the difficult conditions that prevailed : 
throughout 192Ô all the: parties were agreed on the need to maintain a united ;
' front-/and there was nO sign at all that the members of SL'S disagreed with 
the fundamental provisions of the constitution. Hlinka's trip to Paris, had 
been condemned, as much by, members of his ovm party as by anyone else. Vte 
may beet interpret these.results both v/ithin Slovakia and in the broader ' 
context of the, Reijublic as ah expression of both protest and concern; at 
social and economic conditions and thevhope that in voting the Hocial Democrats 
into office they would be able to implement measures to qorabat these social 
and economic ijroblemsi ■ V . ' _■ ; : -  ^ . .■ -
brobar,as the Minister :fpr„ Slovakia,.still retained vàde powers. .. It .appears 
that he had incurredr the displeasure oflthe Social Democrats by putting .; '
obstacles in the way'of theii’. attempts; to expand the Social/Democratic union
' ■ ■ -ISO ■■■',
orgonlzation in 3lpvakia: whilst: at tbe same: time actively 'encouraging the 
formation of He was disliked too by BL’H who resented,his strongly'
pro-Czechoslovak orientation# : A h opportunity to oust hini soon occurred in /\ 
April 1920 and was seized, upon by the Social Democrats and both the ' 
Czechoslovak'People's-Party and This arose out of an incident in which'
the representatives of striking agricultural workers were fired upon by the 
p o l i c e . A l l  the members of the above-mentioned parties thus joined. forces 
and attacked .^ rob^ r eavagely^^^ oalling him a murderer ^'d holding him 
responsible for the police actions* As a result of this campaign he was’ 
forced to resign. His successor was a.Slovak Hdoial Democrat, Ivan Derer,- 
whilst S"robar was appointed to the Head of the newly-created Ministry for :
the Unification of the Laws^  -i \ " ; , : % .
D^er was^^^ and: still is^^^ in the opinion of V.3. Mamatey a centralist ' 
who for a Blovalc was so lacking in faith in his own people that he considered 
that most of them were lacking any human consciousness at: all. He even 
went as far as to play on 8robar's role in the events that preoeeded the •
signing of: the Declaration of Liptovsky Dvaty Mikvlasr in\^ 1918 in order ’
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to suggest that Srobar.had in mind some sort of autonomy for Slovakia.
'■ “■ v' ■
This charge seems totally unbelievable.in view of the kind of man Drobar was
and is in Mamatey's eyes a good pointer to Ddrer's lack .of tact,q quality
that was highly desirable in the holder of such a sensitive political post .
as: that of the Minister for Slovakia. . . . '
In the election campaign all the Slovak, parties polled in.close association 
with their counter-parts in the C^ech hands. SL*.S did not poll separately 
but on a joint ticket with the Czechoslovak.-People's Party. WikS did-poll 
separately as; the.Ûzechpèi.bvak Agrarian Party refrained from campaigning in
in Slovakia in order;hot to split the agrarian vote. This form of cooperation 
continued-in the;Assembly itselfi Thé. Slovak Club was not renewed and these 
Slovak parties formed joint cliibs v/ith their Czech, partners, although as we 
' Shall see in both cases,, these associations were short-lived..
The, success of the Bpcial Democrats in Slovakia was aggreat disappointment 
for SL*S .which was forced to attribute these successes to à deliberate policy 
of government terror as;v;e .may see from the tenor of the following statement 
that. Juriga made in /tkb .National Assembly on ,10th June and which it would be ■ 
most instructive to quote.^^? He said hWe(i.e. SL*S) do not consider thé 
elections of April l8th and 20th as a free expression of the Slovak people. ; 
They involved non-Slovak.soldiers, non-Slovak officials and other non-Slovak 
factors. 'A terrifying■censorship of the press, an arbituary.imprisonment 
of our people and leaders.prevented this act from being an expression of the 
free will of our population.^ v .'
This statement marks : the beginning of the long journey of BL* S into opposition 
and the dissolving of all ties with the Czechoslovak People's Party. In this 
process the question of Slovakia's .autonciiiy was. to .play â large role. It had 
not been'an issue during the election campaign* Hlinka however had as early 
as 1919 become convinced of the' need for autonomy to the extent of undertaking 
a trio.to .Paris to try to convimm the Peace Conference to'make,some/provision 
for this;in.the peace treaties that involved. Czechoslovakia. Autonomy was 
for SL'S a means of combating what it considered to be the excessive and 
Centralizing influence of the Minister for Slovakia and ensuring,a political 
role for itself in thb administration of Slovakia. The results of the elections 
which .showed-that SL*S Could only obtain 1^  ^of the total poU made it even 
more imperative for it to try and eliminate Social Democratic .influencé in .. 
Slovakia and replace it with its oxm. It cannot be. entirely ruled out ..that
- -132" - %
SL’ii ' Itself to be the only genuine Blovek pollticiii party
'lia the 8NB had joined , with ,the Slovak Agrarian» to form ..Thia)  ^,
party could not help but f&ll wa&er the Influence of the purge and powerful-; 
Czech Agrariam - party.' in: whoné parliumontary club it pat, ■ ' ” . .
In spite,of tW,E|'movement.towards,.oppo#itiom 81/B wee atill prepared to ,', 
co.oporate with thé'other'.BIovaH.isartie.o and Ito parliamentary pertmer the 
People*«Party* . .During September 1920.when a caretaker,Cabinet of officials 
had to he ro^orWd to$ SL'B limited its actions to prote.s.ting against this '-. - 
arrangement:'-ihid■ px5>®ising hot to put 'any obstacles in the way of this, cabinet', 
as'loag'-as it npMld tlm' rule of . -. -, .
ÎI0 detailed fer. autombny. were advanced-.during-1920 and 31/S merely
demanded that Slovakia*s admlnimtrâtioh nïiowM he entrusted to a committee 
headed by the Minister; for Blqyakla#^ , ..'BL'B even entered., into, negotiations 
with the new Miniotcsr' for Slovakia#'- Dr, B i ^ i i r t u  It drew closer both to' .the. 
Blovak Agrnriama and the B'oclal 'Domocrhtu. who both adopted.-thi« demand/an 
part-of their program end formed a Polltlc.Nil committee, representing all the 
Blovak .parties I1.I Fragjte in November 1920. ;  ^^
There,was a carMin - tension between then,©,, conciliatory rsovea and the desire ,:■ - 
to strike out on an,bati"Preguo autonomist oouree. This can b© oeon in .the-.- . 
mttitude .o,f; 81/3 oxecutiye committee ■ toward'© certain incidente in which-Czech" 
trooph had clàahod with; 81/8 supporters at tWlr public meetinga in, Hlovakia* 
The moat serious of these incidents occurred in M^eitdvo on the 10th October 
1920 luid led to th% ticiithp of two si/3. supper torn, 31/3 exploited auch 
incidents in order to demand -the creation of a sepan'.kte Blovfik ^ army*-'and 
tlpreàton to givemp their aeate in the National .AsBombly and return to .Slovakia 
if their demanda were not met.
The inauguration of three Slovak catholic bishops whidh had been one of 
the party's demands removed a possible source of friction* SL'S entered 
into negotiations with the caretaker Prime Minister, Dr. Jan ^ ern^ with a 
view to its being represented in the new Cabinet. • SL’S demanded autonomy 
in the form of a representative asBembly presided over by the Minister of 
Slovakia, and the return of three .Catholic gymnasia to the control of; the 
Church. ; ,
All the gymnasia run by the Catholic Church had after 1918 been taken over by - 
the state as it was not deemed wise to-leave them under the control of the 
Magyarized Catholic clergy. As the Evangelical,Church had reformed, itself 
and rid.itself of its Magyar clergy a similar course of action was not under­
taken in the case of evangelical gymnasia. The government.however was
contemplating taking them into state control because of the shortage of funds
275that the .Evangelical Church was experiencing. As three Catholic bishops
had not been appointed there was no excuse for the government not to return
the three-gymnasia. It was loath to do so in view of the fact that the
Blovak bishops stated that they could afford to contribute only 10  ^of the
total.pmount needed to cover the cost of running the three schools including
teachers salaries. This seemed a bad bargain to the government as it would
seem to have very little influence over the schools in return for contributing
90% of the costs. This would have entailed the abandoning of the principle
of a state school system to- which the Social Democrats were committed. In
order to pressurize the government into concedeing to their demands both SL*S
and the Peopbe's Party withdrew from parliamentary commissions and refused
to return unless their demands were met. As the government needed their votes
in .order to be able to bring in measures to increase the turnover tax it was
forced to give in* The then Btlnister for Education in 15erny*s Cabinet,
V
Hv Busta formally promised to hand over these schools to the jurisdiction of 
the Church.
■ /, . - -• ' t . :/■
Meanwhile Busta had been replaced by ;Brohar in the new Cabinet ,headed 8 .
by BeneK# . &obar, - who was'opposed to .the'activities of SI/B in Slovakia ,/
with whom his party Sh, RS was in electoral compétition, did'/not; consider ■ •
iiimseif, bound by the promises made by Dr, &usta upon whose head the Social ■. ,
Démocratie press had heaped the blame for this decision despite,the fact ,
that' he was only doing his job.^^^ Both.;^ J'it^  and the Slovak Social Democrats
had protested at this government caj^ itulation and stated that: this was a/polity
ical affair that should be decided by all the parties; The Government had :
been embarrassed by paving to abandon the principle of a state school system
and give in to religious pressures and were thus not too worried by the; ./ .
threats that 31/.S made,/saying that it would cause difficulties. ; 3L* 8 saw
that it would hot get-the schools after all and re fused to vote for "the budget;
Thé People's Party tried to malm it à:compulsory matter of club;discipline , i
and SL'S left ;bhe club and founded their own association# The issue of the
three schools was not the real reason,as before this, issue had come, up in,
September the leaders of Sl/S had stated that their stay in thé People's,Party
.Club was only a temporary one#as they were prevented from defending Slovak
interests by thé discipline which membership of the Club^imposed. / After
their departure from the coalition SI.*S began a campaign of agitation against
Czech teachers in Slovkia# '• . . ; ,
The first Sloval< plan , for autonomy appeared at the end of. June the foblowing 
year, ,19,21 and envisaged the creation of a CzeCho-slovuk ^ Federal Republic#^- 
This.was to consist of two sovereign states the, Czech Lahds and ; Slovakia 
each of which was to have its oi-m Constitution, legislation and Foreign Policy, • 
The independence of each state v/as limited through the person of thp, joint 
President of the Republic and the need to màice war and conclude peace.jointly, : 
.This federalist, structure was to be set on the basis of a fundamental.agreement 
which, would regulate its functioning and additional agreements on a most. '
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favoured nation .basis v/ere to be oonclüdèd. in order to solve common problems.
The same votes v;a© to be accorded to each state in joint
oonsxtltafcions so that Slovakia would hot be overwhelmed by the Czech Lands 
with its greater population and more-developed economy*
The project that SL*i> presented in the National Assembly on 25th January 1922 
was very.similar in content to this plan* Both were in fact very much based 
on the Austro-Hungarian model after the Auegleich of l867, and were the , ,
creations of Dr Bela Tuka* a former Hungarian university professor. He had 
succeeded in a very short time in gaining Hlinka's confidence and became
' ' ; '■ ' '■ ■ ' ■■ -V : ■
editor of Slovalc & although he was suspected by some of being a Magyar agent.
His task v/as thought to .be to utilise the position of extreme opposition to 
the:Central Government to try to prepare the way for Slovakia to rejoin 
Hungary ^iroiigh the strategem of uniting SL'S with the Hungarian Gliristian . 
Socialist Party**“ 5
The project prosentedin the National Assembly envisaged the creation of a 
Slovak Diet of .61 members* .It was to have competence in the fields of education, 
religion* trade, justice* agriculture, public works* social:vjèlfare and 
finance* Its Cabinet would be appointed by the President of the Republic 
but acts of the President would Mveto be counter-signed by the competent,
Slovak minister in order to.be valid in Slovakia* whilst laws enacted in 
Prague could be declared invalid in Slovalcia if they were rejected by a two- : 
thirds majority of the Diet* Common spheres of competence ere to the apmy, 
foreign affairs and communications* there was to be a common budget. One third 
of all;central government officials in Slovakia were to be Slovaks - a somewhat 
impractical proposal in 1922 - and Slovakia was to have its own army units 
stationed on its territory. We can thus see that some of.thé most extreme • 
proposals contained in thé original plan had been slightly modified but it
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still remained a wholly fetloraXiat solution that in the-' political ■ cliiaito ' 
of the timo was highly unlikely to be considered practicably by most of the 
deputies and senators of the National Assembly* Indeed it was defeated-by 
a very,large.majority when the time camo to put 81/3* proposal to the vote.
Thie rejection oonfirmed the BL'8  in Its opposition course. /At its Congress
;in Mlina'in August 1921 thia had become perfectly clear with the publication
of a memorandum entitled (with more thaïi a touch of histrionic pathos) 'Hi
cry of Distress addressed to the civilised world, by a nation condemned to :.
d e a t h . ^  This doOument gave voice to the économie grievances ■"of those who
had been hardest hit by the post-war economic crisis and lay the blame for =;
this state of exclusively at the door of the central f^ oveiaiment#
asserting that this was the reflection of a deliberate government policy.
Despite this- attitude of extreme opposition there were still./hopes that Sh'S
couM.be induced into jçin|àg the coalition ae late as, Bop tomber. 1921 when
Masaryh visited Blovaltia* He was greeted upon arrival by. Hlinka who assured
him of Slovakia*© loyalty to Czechoslovakia.' Masaryk in turh assured.him
that-Slovakia's individuality would be. respected and some;form,of autonomy
rooted in the Constitution would be granted to Slovakia, By.this he
probably Imd in mind some form of administrative-autonomy. This w6s suggested
by Milan Hodza who proposed the creation of-a'p|'©viucial. assombly based'on ; /
the new aupy system.: ^ ’ This type of autonomy may have been suggested to
avoid the situation that might have been created if Slovakia hàd been granted
ite ovm Diet yas this might Îîavè clashed with the-' -jjowors-of-,tlie; Minister, for
Slovakia. In the legislation enacted by-the Revolutionary National Assembly
in 1919 these powers :had been very generally., defined in W e r  to cope,.with
" ' ' ' - ^87 -
the threat Of a Himgarian occupation of Slovakia." , '
This fom of 'aiitonoHÇf did hot really satisfy the demands of 81/8 and two
months later it dissolved its Hnks with Srnraek*©.People*© Party, Sramek .;/
incidently had been the first one to articulate the demand 'for autonomy that
' ■ 288was being voiced in Slovakia, The reasons for .the SL*S decision to go 
into opposition could well have laid not.so much in the failure to obtain; 
concessions in the fields of schooling and autonomy.as in the shrewd real­
ization that in a period of economic depression that began, in 1921 it would 
be easier to obtain votes in opposition to the government than as part of 
it. This meant that it was not faced v;ith the unwelcome, task, of explaining 
central government policies to the voters. To many Slovalîs these policies 
seemed totally ineffective in view of the worsening economic crisis and the 
closures of industrial, plant in Slovakia,.
The leaders of SL*S were (for the most part) patriotic Slovaks but they had 
never had to bear the responsibilities of.government and thus found it easier 
to make political capital of the prevallihg situation. They were-in many ways 
typical representatives of the very.small.Slovak educated class (intelligentsia), 
As almost all of the economic. activity, in Slovakia up to, 1918 had been in the 
hands of Magyars* Germans : or Jews it was .not surprising that they should not 
have possessed :much understanding of economic affairs and the need for economic 
development as well as political.'liberty.
The Slovak National and Peasants' Party proved to be a most ephemeral creation, 
Composod-of two highly divergent elements it proved imposBible for both the 
Agrarians, and the Narodni^i, as members, of SNS were termed* to remain in 
one party. There was dissatisfaction, amongst. the latter becaue of the small 
number of seats that"were given to former.members of 3NS (of 24 seats in 
both chambers only 4 v;ere. allocated to 3NS)., There were also differences 
of opinion between former Hlaeists and the more conservative Martin politicians 
who were critical of Brobar's policies in Slovakia during his time as 
Minister .for- Glovalcia,
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SN3 parted company with the Slovak Agrarians on 30th March 1922 and reverted
pQO
to its original name. It now began to move towards a more independent 
policy and the first party program spoke of grad'dal autonomy for Slovakia 
and seJ:i*kiovernment for its counties and districts on the basis of the Pittsburgh 
Agreement* At the same time the program stressed its loyal attitude to the 
Caechoslovalc state and its feelings for the Czechs based oh fraternal affection 
and pan-Slav reciprocity* The party newspaper Marodnie goviny attacked the/ 
proposed Eupa Bill in its issue of the 24th April 1921# It specifically objected 
to the provision that one-third of the members of the representative body 
were to be nominated, the ban on the discussion of political matters, the 
purely consultative role of the assembly and the fact that it,could be dissolved
by, the Ministry of the interior. In addition it objected to the fact that the
Provincial County Union (Zemsky*^pn^ svaz) would be able to carry but only 
those measures.which it had been instructed to do so by the Central Government 
and pointed out the dangers of decentralization in South and East Slovakia 
where the. demotion of some of the old.^ pa centres meant that they could.no 
longer function as bastions against the Magyar threat. The Magyars would thus 
gain a certain.degree of autonomy in those areas which was not a desirable
t h i n g * T h e  leader of SN3 Dr.Emil Btodola now put forward his proposals
for self-government in a short work entitled ’4) Samosprave Slovensko", In 
this he put forward his plans for the introduction of a system of self-government 
based on the existing territorial units and in accorded■with the Pittsburgh 
Declaration* He criticised the lack of guarantees to the Slovaks of their 
legal equality and suggest that the County Union should bavé more than 24, 
members that is 4 from each of the six new zupy that were.to cover the whole of 
Slovakia* He suggested that each large aupa should send between 4 to. 6 members 
each and the smaller ones at least 2 to 3 members. As there were 17t^upy in 
Slovakia this would have had the effect of at least doubling the size of the 
County Union, In Stodola's pbn it was to become the Diet which Slovakia liad . 
been promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement* At the end of his project he stressed
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the fact that it did not represent the official policy of
In two declarations in March and May 1922 issued by 3NS there was little 
mention of autonomy. The party declared that it adhered to the Martin 
declaration but invited itself to asking for Slovak linguistic rights, 
individuality and religious feelings to be protected. It suggested that
a committee whose members were to be dravm from all political parties in
c" ■ ' ■ 296.'Slovakia should be created to assist the Minister for Slovaliia. The
Slovak Agrarians limited their concept of self-government to the spheres of
administration, economic and.educational affairs and church matters whilst
3WS based their approach on the provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement^^^ which
meant nothing less then a separate Diet (snem) for Slovakia.
SL'S welcomed this new policy of and the two parties agreed that the
principles on which they could cooperate were.to be discussed at a joint
Congress* The inflùencial Catholic wing of 3N8 was to a large extent responsibl
for this move and at the joint Congress held in Trencianske Teplice in May 1921
Stodoia's proposals were discussed.. A joint déclaration asked.for the revision
of the qualifications of Czech civil servants working inSlovaicia, protested
against the zupa la w ^ . . demanded that, the old zupjSf be left untouched and
urged the creation of a Schools Council for Slovakia that would influence
the curriculum (to-ensure that it had a strongly religious basis) and Control
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staff appointments. On the question of autonomy they decided to meet again
■300 ' ■to draft a resolution. •
3NS. wasyshowever^  opposed to Tuka' s dualist p l a n s , I n  a mémorandum which
\y
Stodola handed to Beaes on the occasion of the latter'o visit to Bratislawon 
5th May 1922 he stressed that administrative, linguistic and religious matters
-i6o~  ^ . : , ; /rA.,,';
were not enough mid that Slovakia needed provincial institutions such as a; 
schools council^ #^ '^ :^ provincial administration and administrative council in 
order to best solve its problems, ./Both Tuka’s plan and BtOdola's proposals 
had urged that this new system of self-government/be/set up by the end of 1923 
yet there was stxlla'fundamental difference between the attitudes of 3NS and ' 
BL’S, The former; still clung to the idea that Czechs and Slovaks constituted 
two branches of one nation whilst SL’S had based its demands on the.concept of 
an independent Slovak nation# Gradually SNS began to retreat from this', 
position. In hkiy 1922 it issued a proclamation (Qhlas) .in which it defended / 
Slovak individuality and this was followed in July by a Declaration that said
that its earlier statement fromMarch had been misused as an argument against
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autonomy. Stodola was not happy at these developments and resigned as
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did two other members Ivanka,olid Pauliny, who joined the National Democrats,
BNS was weakened by these internal riftsy and this was one of the factors
that: prevented the party from playing à major role’in Slovak politics. In :/-. '
the zUpa elections in 1923 it received less that 1% of the total vote. Unable .
to make an impact on the electorate it tende.dto form electoral alliances with
other parties and eventually fell under the influence of HSL’S,
The 3lovait Agrarians rejoined the main Czech party soon after the split with 
3N3, Hodza tended, to cooperate,with HSL'S for tactical reasons in his struggle 
with the "Hrad" group of politicans but the Agrarians as a party tended not 
to criticise central government policy in Slovakia except where'it formed ' 
part of their broader campaign-on such matters as land reform and taxes on
grain imports to protectddomestio producers, The Land reform had a strengthened
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the Agrarian‘positions in both the Republic and Slovakia where in view of
the predominance of the agricultural population its future was assured. The
party never polled loss than a quirter of a million votes and was after.13L’S. .
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the largest single party in lovakià. Its ideologx was based on the
3% - .. ' 3:"ü6ï- '
importance of the peasantry for the economy of the country and the idea that 
"the country was one family" ie, that social conflict between class and class 
had no place in agriculture, . The Agrarians were in general ardent proponents 
of: the GzéchoâlovaJlc idea and thus had little sympathy for H3L*S demands for
V
autonom;^  although Hodza was not entirely devoid of understanding for the need 
to create an efficient system of self-government for Slovakia*
The triumph of the Social Democrats was short-lived, A gradual process of
schism eventually led to the birth of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
-V
(KSC). towards the autunm of 1921, In Slovalsia this process had begun in March
1920 when meetings of Magyar vmrkers in %ilina proposed the foundation of a
socialist party of Czechoslovakia that would incorporate all the Republic's
nationalities#'^ , ■ At its conference in Kosice from the 23rd to the 30th June
1920 it called for the creation of workers Soviets in Czechoslovakia and fulfile^
the 21 conditions necessary before a.party could join the Comintern. The
left-wing of the Bocial Democrats.who eventually became the iCSC was especially
strong in Slovalîia, The Blevait© formed their own party on 19th August 1920§H
which included members of all the members living in Slovakia, The left-wing
in Slovakia and Huthenia held a C o n g r è s in ïîubochm at which the delegates
313represented 24*000 members. The Congress accepted the 21 necessary conditions 
of the Comintern,The founding Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party 
was held on the 14th May 1921 but the Polish and German communists were opposed 
to joining and tliis did not tolce place until the autumn of 1921 when the 
Unifying Congress took place éfter the intervention of the Comintern and Lenin 
personally# The effect of this split on Social Democratic support in Slovakia 
was not fully seen till 1925 when it polled only 4,3% of the vote.
By 1923 SL'S had experienced; an increase in its support. Its share of the
■ ■ ' - 'V-: ' - , ,/ . '3 - ' ' ■' - ; '
poll in zupa elections: v/as 3C> and to a certain extent we-must attribute this
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rise.to the effoots of the economic crisis when about 3OO factories were 
515closed# Although SL'S increased its share of the poll compared to the 
Parliamentary elections it was not the only party to do so# The Agrarians 
gained 21% of the vote in. the zupa elections. One cannot therefore conclude 
that SL’S autonomist slogans reflected the wishes of the majority of the 
Slovaks or as they were later to claim SL’S represented the political will of 
the Slovak people#
The Communistn party v/as unable in this period to present an attractive
alternative to SL’S* The Provincial Action Committee for Slovakia and Ruthenia
set up in September 1920 v/as abolished from the Nev/ Year 1922-jtogether %ith
317the secretariat asvA/ell as the Union organizations. The Action Committee 
had wide powers and could correspond.directly with the Commintern in Moscow,
The four regional organizations set up in its place lacked these powers and 
suffered from a shortaggeof trained.political cadres. The first regular 
Congress of the Communist Party held in I923 approved the idea of a unitary
318Czechoslovak nation. Although this was reversed the following year at the 
2nd party-Congress after the intervention of the Gommintem^^^ it remained in 
practice till the, 5th Congress in 1929 v/hen a new line was initiated by Klement 
Gottwald; This failure to imderstand the 8lovait national question was 
marked by the fact that no separate Slovak Communiât Party was created although 
the Ksy was Imoim as the Gormnunist Party of Slovakia (KSS) in Slovakia,This 
q;as definitely a factor in the failure of the party to _ « stem the
flov/ of votes to which reached its peak in 1925,
Support for HSL’S reached its peak in the parliamentary electionsy^hen it 
gained no less than 3%» of the vote. The Social democrats slumped to à tiny 
4.3  ^v/hilst the Communists'gained Igpi, This indicated that a great deal of
tlie: support that the socialist parties had enjoyed in 8lovakia in 1920 had 
since evaporated* Borne of it v/as captured /by SL*S# By it aggressive use ■ 
of the slogan Of autonomy for Slovakia as the only solution.for its problems 
SL'S was undoubtedly successful in turning a great amount o #  sooidl disc ontent 
into support at the polls# This discontent was directly attributable to the ; 
effects of the. economic crisis which lasted until well into- 1923#
Thé Communist Party was hard pressed, to try and counter .the/propaganda campaign 
being waged by îîSL*8* Under the influence of Klement Gottwald and Julius - , 
Verc^k.à/prees campaign was waged in the Communist press for the autonomy of. 
Slovakia as a necessary prerequisite to the fundamental reconstruction of 
Slovak dooiety*. which in their eyes was the oply solution to Slovakia's problems. 
It was also a democratic demand c£ Slovak workers and a means of combating the v 
influence of There was in fact at convergence of ideas between the ,
two parties and there had oven' been talks to try and explore the possibilities 
of some form of joint a c t i o n # I n  the fifties. Gottwald's part in this campaign 
v/as suppressed and Ver%Tk-v;as accused of neglecting the connection between ■ 
the class struggle and. the national question^^^ Gottv/qld published an article 
in Pravda Qhudoby on the 30th July 1924 in which he suggested that the Party
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should join together the national with the social demands of .Slovaks At
the All-Bloval^ià Conference of the KsS" in .Filina on 25th July 1926. he presented 
a memorandum the title of which was adopted as the conference slogan./^  It 
was entitled "Vypraote Blovensko"* That is, free Slovakia from the oppressive 
operations of the Czech haute bourgboisie,'^^^ In it hq put forward the theory 
that S16volcia Buffered from the joint exploitation of both Czech and Slovak 
bourgeoisie. Despite this theoretical approach no mass actions were undertaken 
to press for thb granting of autonomy and no counter-weight toHBI/B was created* 
The K8G was unable to make a wider impact on the electorate and by 1929 its 
share of the poll in : thé parliamentary/elections had/slxtmped to 10^^., . . /
HBL'B maintained their attitude of extreme opposition until,192? when they . -
entered the ruling'Coalition• The p r i c é mrWy Mbs Jmduction 
'.of.,a .provincial /form/of administration’ wfe/lck wæ/W pruvide '
some genuine form of autonomy# %  fact it was as much subject to the control 
of the centrai gpvermnent .as was the earlier zupa system. In the second,. 
set of .elections to the ^ upy %ield in 192? IISh'B shôwed a loss of some
100,00 votes,/ This may well have been' caused as/much by an abatement in the
general, level of discontent, in view of the fact: that industrial production " 
was once more rising, as by the decision of HBL’B to! join the. coalition.
The latter act may v;ell have disappointed many of the, .’party's supporters ' ; 
who perhaps had begun to realize that despite its deraagoguory it v/as incapable  ^
of effecting any, real ofemgea iji living standards, Furthermore by, joining  ^
the government, whose policies in Slovakia 1151*8 had been fiercely attacking 
since 1922 it could well have strained its creditahility in the :eyes of some . 
of its supporters*; They, may well have considered that, the party was, after
all,, only interested ill pursueing its ovm ends, at thé expense, of the . voters.
Thé Blovalc Agrarians under ;Hodsa were fervent advocates, of the/Provincial ;;/ / 
Administrative Reform*^^^:l%rhape they hoped to ensure that the Agrarian' /
party would continue to ; hold its!o\m: againet îîBL'fî, In the. elections to the ;
ne%'/ - Provincial Assembly held in I92B they won, with one more . seat than ; ; 
HBL'B although they .polled less votes, The Communiste on the other hand were 
in principle in favour of autonomy but were critical of the large element of 
control that the Central Government retained over the functioning of this
administrative; system through the appointed.civil servants who carried out
■ .. 3' . ■ ' /.;
the actual day-to-day administration of the province, KBC also disapproved
Of -the’undemocratic provision that one-third of the members of thé representàtiVc
■ ■ : :  y ■ , ■ ' :■
body wore to be nominated, \ , ; 1. .
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.Right up to 1929 the Social Democrats were unable to regain a significant 
number of votes from K80 although their aetual share of thé poll,more than 
doubled by the time of the 1929 Parliamehtary elections. Defer*® influencé 
in the party successfully blocked any attempts to try:to reappraise the , 
party's attitude to the question of Blovali: autonomy. This may well account 
for the fact tlmt they were-unable to outdo the Communists electorally
' / . ' - %/' ’ ' ■- 3,- .
although their union organization in Slovakia .had the most ■numbers,'/■’ /
The event that really shook public opinion in Slovakia and to a certain extent 
served to divide Slovalc political parties into pro and anti-autonomist camps 
was the "Tuka affair"* This was eventually to serve aa an excuse for HSL'S 
to leave the coalition although this was probably more a case of its desire 
to regain lost -votes in thé coming parliamentary elections. [ The Provincial 
elections in 1928 when it captured only 2#^ of the poll hxd been something 
of a disappointment] than any genuine concern for Tuka or belief in his 
innocence of the charges that were to be brought against him, '
The affdir started in a quiet enough way. On New Year's Day 1928 Dr Vojtech 
Tuka published an article: in the party newspaper Blovak in which he brought 
up the question of. the existence of a secret clause in the .Declaration of 
TurcianskiJ^  Svaty Martin from 30th October 1918,^^^ According to thè terms 
of.this clause after a period of ten years had elapsed from the date of. the  ^
Declaration the Blovaks would be free to decide whether Slovakia:would 
continue to rema:ln.an integral part of the Republic or not. Consequently 
there would arise in Slovakia after that date# he claimed# a juridical.vacuum 
('Vacuum juris" was in actual fact the title of the article)* The laws of the 
Republic would no longer have any validity# taxes could legally be witheId
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After a private prosecution by one of the signatories to the Declaration 
which served to maintain this affair in the forefront of public interest the 
Central government was forced to act# This was in order not to allow these 
claims which went far beyond the concept of autonomy and amounted to no less 
than a legal justification of Slovakia's independence# to remain unchallenged* 
Tuka was stripped of his immunity as a deputy and put on trial in the latter 
half of 1929• Ho was charged with treason and espionage# convicted and 
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment although there was some question of the 
reliability of the evidence* . His connections with the Hungarians however were
revealed during the course of the trial#
The majority of Tuka^s colleagues in HSL'S refused to disavow him and 
maintained their belief in his innocence and saw the trial as a frame-up by 
the Central Government# a crude attempt to discredit the movement in the eyes 
of the electorate* All the members of ïfâL'S had displayed a resolute attitude 
to the question of Hungarianrevisionism during Lord Bothermere's press 
campaign.in the Dally Mail-in June and August 1927 and could not be considered
as in any way pro-Magyar yet in their attitude to Tuka they v/ere content to
follow Hlinka*® example as his word was generally taken as law within the 
party* Only Juriga dared to disagree with him and for this crime he waw 
expelled from the party in,February 1929* He formed his ovm splinter group 
which, in the 1929 elections failed to capture enough votes to elect even 
on© deputy*
HSL'S showing was not as good as it might have hoped# Its diare of the poll 
fell 28*1% and it registered a loss of 83,OOd/votes compared with the 
last parliamentary election in 1925* The Czechoâlovak parties, excluding
V  , , ■
KSG, polled some 100,000 votes more than HSL'S* Although this result v/as
' '  ^ ^ '/ 3 - 3 / - \ -33
better,thaii in the zupa elections in 192? wo are still forced to conclude
that the improved showing iftf the Ozechoslovaît parties who# represented a
firm commitment to the Ozechoslovak state were generally in favour of no ; .
more;autonomy than whs already provided by the Provincial reform# reflected
a measure of disappointment and disillusionment among HSL's’ former supporters.
This, however cannot be interphttddaas a positive expression of the approval
of central government policies by the majority of Slovaks. ; ■
1929 was the best year for industrial production in many branches of industry, 
in the Republic# Production once more began to exceed the level of 1915 
and this factor may well Influence how Slovaks voted in the elections* It 
together with the revelations that sprang, out of Tuka's trial may well account 
for the failure of îîSL'S to regain the position it won in the I925 elections* 
Unfortunately this rise ih production proved to be an all.top brief intermezzo 
before Ozechoslpvalcia was eaitght up la the .effects of the Depression*; Ih 
Slovakia it vjould prove to be very severe indeed and-a most rigorous test of 
the efficiency of central government policies#
■ . —l68— ' ' î ” .
Gimem six : cEmmi Gov™™T poLicy iN smvAKiA 1930-1938
Section Qnei /' ....
Slovalcia.mid the years; of Crisis . . -
The Caochbolovai^ : Hopublio via© during the .last decade of its existence 
faced With one type of crisis or another# At the ■ beginning of the 
Thirties a worldrwide economic depression occurred* It ;ms eventually 
to hit the Republic’fs industries .quite severely .and its effects receédod 
but slowly* Hitler's successful, rise to power in 1933 marked the very , : 
.beginnings of the crisis involving the Republic?s external security that / 
v/as to culminate in the signing, of the Munich Agreement in 1938#
It is. against such a background v/hat. we must view the situation in 
Sloyalcia during this period and attempt to. analyse the specific effects 
of thèse two crisis èn Sl&vaicia attitudes towards the Oentral Government 
and its policies# In addition to this the participation of the Slovaks ; 
in thé events that preceeded Munich can bnly be underatood if t-jo try to 
take,; into, account their reactions to the implementation of central 
government policies during the life time of the First Republic from 1918 
to 1938* . Thus I feel it would be most , instructive to attempt a qualitative 
anaiysis of the results of ,central government poJ ji cies, over this, period#
1939i the year of the. great Wall Stréet. crash in the United States .that ; 
marked, the beginning of the Depression, v/as the year in v/hich industrial 
production,in most branches of Czechoslovak industry .reached its highest 
all-time level# Production finally, overtook the pre-v/ar level of 1913*
Just one year later# however, it had,already began to fall and did not . 
regain this level until just before! thè end of ; the l^’irst;Republic# - ■
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Ae we cau see from Table Twenty-two in the appendix Czechoslovakia was /' 
not really badly affected by the crisis until 1932*; Then output fell by 
over à third* It took longer for her to recover tlian it did for other . 
countries and by 1934 output was still running at approximately one-third 
below that of 1929,
Slovakia was also badly hit by this crisis as it affected all export
industries upon which the foreign trade of Czeohôslovaî<ia was based#
Hungary was one of Blovalîià's most important:trading partners and Slovakia
y '/ . 1
accounted for about half the total trade between the GSR and Hungary # 
Slovalcia's trade with Hungary consisted predominantly of raw materials, 
woodi paper and iron ore. whilst Hungarian exports to Slovaida were almost 
exclusively agricultural produce* ,
By 1930 however the Oentral Government was forced to abandon its trade 
agreement with Hungary in view of the domestic agricultural crisis, v/hich 
broke in 1928 and depressed the price of agricultural products # ; THs v/as 
done in order to prevent the continuing and unrestricted importation of 
agricultural produce from Hungary, from driving domestic prices any lov/er*#
The effects of this move on Slovakia's trade with .Hungary were drastic.
By 1934 Slovak exports stood at 14*9% on their 1929 level « Ihis fact meant 
that many Slovalc industries, primarily timber, iron and manganese ore, cotton 
and saw mills £uid clothing, were badly affected.and had to deorêase their 
production*
Thus in the case Sloval^ ia v/e have to consider the combined effects of ; 
both the agricultural and the industrial crisis* Unemployment or short-time 
v/orking among the Republic's industrial workers, meant that they received 
loss money than before* They were thus forced to reduce their consumption 
of many items. A drop in consumption, meant a reduction in demand and this 
in turn meant that Slovalc agricultural products faced a shrinkage In their 
meirket : in the. Czech .lands* This in turn helped to keep agricultural prices
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low* which effectlvély depresoed. the; living stiandards. of most of Slovakians 
agricultural population, i ' -
In a pi-edoiiiinaMlf : agrarian dountry : unemployment oiitside the industrial ? -
sector is a very, difficult concept to defih© adequately* : In times ofl
crisis, agricultural'producers, may respond by. selling or slaughtering some 
qf,, their. live*-Btock| reducing the area sovm and -foy consuming a larger, parti , 
of their own production* For that sector. Of the population that possess 
some land can never he said to he totally devoid of any means of subsistance*' 
The case of landless agricultural workers hovmvér must have been far worse,; 
as hot only were they deprived of emplopient^ as there vjas far less deroand , ; 
foi? .their services in view of the economic crisis * but as the majority 
: were not members of a union they did not receive unemployment pay but only ; . 
a much lower level .of assistance L ‘ ‘ ;
Emigration had always been one of 81ovakia*s greatest problems and a ; ' 
hall* m^ark of the inability of her.-economy to absorb all the natural , ;
increase in population. Obviously the effect of central government, poliêies
in this field would be of great interest to. maiiy Slovalcs* , In terns of 1
absolute figures there was undoubtedly some improvement over thé pre-war’ . ' 
period as Slovakiais migration losses were 216*557 for 190l#1910 alone * ,
yet. as we can see from Table Twehty***three Slovalcia accounted for over half ; 
the total number of applications; for .passports*■'. Even though the number of. / 
■applications fell sharply... in the 1930*"37 period ;81ovalcia*s share actually 
^creased/from 52*#. for 1920^50 to 53*3^ for 1920*^ 37 W  57## for 1950 
to 1957# In terms.of applications per thousand of population the position . 
was as follows Î •. . ■ . ■ . . -
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TABLE 0 Jiim-FOUR..
\ Slovakia  ^\ , GSR i ' -
1920,.57L - . . /  59/1000 : 20*7/%000 . -
I920r50' : ' I 57/1000 . 24/1000
i95o?%)7 : :/i 8*5/1000' - / 346/1000
From this analysis we can see that Slovakia was proportionally far more . 
severely effected^. 'With;only some"23;i of-the total population-of the ■ 
Repuhlic she almost invariably had more than 5 #  of. the applicants who 
were granted passports,. Sloval^ ia*s .migration losses have been calculated 
as : 124.052: for 1921-50 and 116,901 for 1930^40 on the basis of the
difference between the acàùal increase in Slqvaîcia*s population and the
. \ "4 ' --y : V . y 6' ' ' -
excess of births over deaths within the same period *, These losses mount
to: 27* of the imtural increase for the . period 1921^30 and 31*^^ for
1930-40 reapectively* / I’rom these date we can see the extent to which
Slovakia: was characterised by a relatively high level of.emigration and
clearly this fact must have inflitenoed Slovak attitudes to the Central
Government in some, way* it was mofet probably one of the many factors that
accoimt for the support shoim for IBL'S even after 1929 ao although the
actual numbers of passports granted show a stoop decline Slovakia still
continued to. furnish the majority of the:applicants*
’^‘Data supplied : to me by the Immigration and Naturalisation Service of the 
ÏÎS Department of Justice show a decrease in the number of immigrants to 
the. United States from Czechoslovakia from 102,194 in 1921-1930 to only 
14,393 in:l93Q^4o, 1 . .4 ^
. ' . , ' %% '" - . ' ' /_ ' 
The demographic effects of emigration upon the, original:population 
structure,vary in their intensity and nature according/to the size 
and type of the emigratory movement*' In Slovaicia certain areas had ■ y 
been more prone to emigration than others with the result ;that the ratio , 
of men to women was substantionally altered and the proportion of older
age groups in the population increased as emigration;primarily effected
. ' ' . ' ' \  \  ' ' ' ' ^  ^  w "
young malesI most of whom were unmarried * .
By 1934 a marked dovaiward trend was nOticable in the figures for the 
annual birth-rate in Slovakia that was,steeper than;the decline in the.v 
death-rate, so that the average ahnUal increase^ i,in:rpopulatiOn, i$e,, the
\ ' - y' \  ” % ■/ -V ■ ■■■■■■-. ' - - —
excess of live . births over deaths/ lessened* .T&s alarmed
many Sloval^  demographers who saw Slovalda threatened; with depopulation^; ; 
as a result* For a decline in the birth-rate was the a].most inwitable 
Concomitant of the process of industrialization and could be seen ih all 
the industrial countries, yot siovaJcia still remained a predominantlyt 
agrarian country* If wo compare the figtxros; for the totals number of those
(both in the active and dopendeht sector#) who drew their liveîihood from
 ^ /' ' ' 
agriculture in the 1921 ând. 1930 Censures ' wo see at once that there was
little change in Slovalcia* There was even a small rise in . the absolute ■ .
' ' /; - " :11 " / ' : ' ' 
number of those in the agricultural sector * • - .
T M iE .TMTf-FlVB - ; V. , <
p m a o m  ACTIVE IN AGmOPlTURB . \ , .i y
, r 1921 # of 'population 1930 #  of population .
SioVE^ia 1 1,761,748 56*76 i;822/ll4 57*72
I^hemià: ; 1 ,896,657 28*45 . 'l,656,976 '25*02 y . _
Let us now consider the next set of figures' that show the average, 
number of persons involved in àgriculturè,per .100 hectares .of land.
•1?5«
Bohemia
Slovakia
Including Pasture Laud 
48*7 per 100 hectares 
61*2 per 100 hectares
Excluding Pasture Land 
52*4 per 100 hectares' 
.76*1 per 100 hectares
One hectare of land thus had to support more people in Slovakia than, in
13Bohemia in spite of the fact that yields were lower and the conditions 
for agriculture less favourable . If we compare the number of people _ 
engaged in agriculture from 1910 to 1920 we arrive at the following 
figuresl'^ 'f
TABLE
Slovakia
Bohemia
1910
1,815,348
2/184,826
1921
1,817,878
1,980,589
1950
1,892,042
1,710,723
Xhorease/Decrease 
Slovalda : , 
Bohemia' ;
^78,694
-474,105
1910-1921
^4,550
-204,457
1921-1950
*74,164
-269,656
In Bohemia it, bhus follows that all,the additional labour-force that .became 
available .due to the natural increase in population must have'found employ­
ment in other sectors of the economy* ;v In Slovaliia however the increase 
in the :agricultural population amounted to.# of the natural increase for 
I9IO-192I and 22*5^ of that for 1921-1950, Slovakia, by 1930 tWyefore : 
still remained a mainly agricultural country iipon which the effects of the 
economic crisis were .somewhat hidden as there were not,so many industrial ; 
workers who.could be made idle* The imemployinent figures for Slovakia 
are therefore someidiat surprising (see;Table'Twenty-Eight) for they reveal 
that up to 1956 Blovokials share of unemployment increased constantly 
reaching a final figure of l4*08# of thé Republic's unemployed in 1956#
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-It should bo stressed that from 1931'to 1936 not:only .did the, total number
of imempioyed rose faster than. in the ■ Republic ae a whole but that it also ,
fell .at a "Slower rate* It. has been argued that. «Slqvalàà recovered faster ■
from .the effects of ;the Depression because the.numb# of workers insured
against illness was 13*4# higher in Blovalcia in July 1937 than it was in
1929 .whilst in the Gzech Lands it i#s still below that level^^, Hiis may
be due $ wholly or in part to the fact t#t the production of crude iron
rose sharply from 1934 to 1936$ when it attained levels of production
that - had not been .,reached since 1922/ The extraction of iron and manganese
pies, necessary to the production of steely and the hewing of broim coal
also recorded increases* The amoxants of both bfowh coal and iron ore
overtook the' 1929 level in 1937 whilst that of manganese ore remained a
little below its highest recorded level of 1930* What it significant
is that in the Czech Lands the production of iron ore.did not regain its.
former high,level of 1928 by 1937$ although its recovery was just as .
swift as in Slovakia* Table Thirty-One would seem to confirm that this
recovery in Slovak industrial output did not occur until February 193?
vfith the exception of the isolated month of November 1936* ^
This rapid rise in the output of heavy industry was the reflection of the. 
growing uncertainty and insecurity that had enfolded Central Europe since . 
1933# The large investments that the Central Government was forced to 
malce in, arms production and the construction of frontier defences help , 
to explain this rise in steel production , that benefitied heavy industry*
In other sectors Of the economy. unemploynieht,did not begin to decline 
below 460$000 (see Table TMrty-Qne) until April 1937^^ and many light 
,inditëtiîies (especially in the German parts of Bohemia and Moravia) were 
very uadly hit* - Unemployment was perhaps one of the main factors behin§ ., 
the growth of Konrad .Henlein s^ Suctetendeutsche Parte! * Bÿ .1937 industrial 
production in Czechoslovakia was still only 96*3/ of the 1929 level . - 
(Europe's as a whole was. H2*3^i and the tISA's 102*7^ .^). and her eiia.x-e of
world exports had shrunk from 1*84/ in.' 1929 to 1*56^ In 1957 *^ These 
were imfavourahle ;. indices of the state of her economy which as it was 
so highly dependent on exports xms; of a .type that Was.highly susceptible 
to prolonged economic crists, . ' ;\:V'' / j
Thus the situation in Bloyakia during , the Thirties could at. best be/ 
described as static* The Central Government wa# unable to pope adequately 
with mi economic crisis v;hich it .could ;do very little to control as it 
had no way of intervening in what was basically à free enterprise economy# 
Sômè.Slovaks and almost certainly the poorer ones.may than have been 
very easily tempted into blaming the Central Government, for their economic 
state* They thus tended to give their support tç: 1191'S* The party 
. seemed to have undergone a swing to the right ^ #ssibly under, the influence 
of the many European states that possessed authoritarian and Fascist; 
regimes.which in certain cases claimed to have a Clérical or Christian 
Socialist ideology* Inspite of the very harsh offoots of the criéis 
howevor central govprnnient support was not complotely eroded* The / 
^parliamentary elections of 1955 demonstrated clearly that a large . 
proportion of tho electorate was still prepared to accept that Oentral , 
^overmnent policies, inadequate as they might, have boon* nevertheless 
repro'sontod a genuine, effort at the amelioration of. conditions of Blovalila,
B é o t i o n  T w o :  ' ■ ; /  , /.■■ -  ^ , /' '■
Political Developnonts. in. BlovM^ia. during- the ,*30*b
Most-Ofthe Works of both' a general- mid a spoolfio. nature that, deal - , ,:■
with the history of the Czechoslovak'Repubiia during this; period % ;
concentrate their attention almost;exclusively 03i t?;o ciosély^'linked /. / '.
-phenomena* Viz, the growth of henleints. Sndetendentscho Mrtei (8dP) ; 
within Ozechosiovakia and the ësWbïiolm^t of Ca Nazi intÇêr^  ^ ■
' Both these, factora wore to be involved in the#equOnce of events ; that; : /. . ' 
culminated in the Munich Agreement and. the subsoquént transfer::of : t .v,/; 
Czechoslovak territory that this entailed* /'■ ' ' .. '/ "i ■ j,; - :■
Thëïimpaot .of .thesei two phenomena upon the- générai internal political. . V'; , '
development within the' First, .Republic has been 'comparatively ■little /studied 
by. historians#.; .For both the economic effects of the Dépression era ehd . : 
the threat to Osaechoslovaltia»s' security:that, the/.Nazi;'regime represented,' 
Coupled with thtî continuing hostility of . hor/Morthern: and. Southern neighbours '• 
Poland and .Hungary, were factors that were. to . have ' an important bearing /./ : .' 
on the .attitude of the .Slovaks both to the exihtencO of the : Czechoslovak ' :;
state and their role in it# /The Slovalc :Autonomists ' were ; quick" to.., utilise ; -,
the' opportunities tlmt a clmnged .situation presented, in order :to extract 
the maximum of : concOssions .' from the Central Government ,: but in concrete . . .
.terms: little was achlovo.d before 1938* ' '/ , •,./ / ■
The Tito Tri&il provided a convenient' excuse for hBL'S to .leave the- .
coalition.mid go into, opposition, this move prompted far more -by
.electoral considerations timn by any belief in Tide's innocence* The. ; ;
loss of votes that, the party sustained in the 1929 elections to the ; '
National Assembly (see Chapter Seven) caiiriot;be directly attributed to ..'w- 
the : revelation about Tuka's activities as a spy and .agent provocateur //;. f 
for the Hungarians that emerged from his trial*. It represents however an •
y; ' _ ■ . .. .  ^.-17?"  ^ // . - /
upswing from the even lower position it îiad. reached in the. 192? County/ 
(Jupa) and the I928 Provincial elections* ,’ It was most; probably due to /. , 
HSU 8 having entered the /Coalition, as it was c primarllly a .partÿ tliat to - 
some extent funetioned as a reservoir fpr. the floating protest vote of ; 
those - who mshed to register their discontent i-zith ' O3|0j;or; other aspect - ;
Of social and economic conditions in Slovaîsia*.., In tlieir itopoganda they 
tended to blame the Central Government for deliboiut ^ ly neglecting 
Slovaîcials economic development and treating it nert'ly . as aix agricultural 
colony .where they could send the excess civil'servants who could not be./ 
found jobs in the; Czech Lands* It wa^ thùs very difficult for such a 
party to justify its entry .into a government ooalition;When for years its 
appeal to the voters had been based lipon n virulent antii^ governrAent stance* 
it was thus obvious that it had to convince its supporters that; this , 
volte-face in its policies had come abqut, for/Very good x'eaaons*/ Hamely 
some form of concessions in the shape of an administrative system.responsive 
to-Blovak âeeds ttot some 'went towards providing .ahneasurO'of autonomy, '
. for Slovakia# . - . ■ . -
' The Provincial Reform of 1928 (dis.cussed at Ibngth in the proceeding . - 
chapter) was intended to provide HSL^S with éonerete proof that their/ 
demaixds had been met * The actual nature of the proposed reform however 
was. ‘such that the proposed administrative system would only have very - 
limited and rigorously delineated spheres of odmpetence*.. It would still : 
be subject to the overall control of t #  govorhment. authorities who. 
appointed the President of the Proviiioial Assembly, the latter having a. 
wide range of powers*$uch a system did not provide any of the necessary 
elements of an .autonomous System of government althougb this point; may-not 
have.been;readily apparent to the majority of the electorate*.
The tactics ' that IfôL*S adopted.: in trying to present the reform as a; triumph 
■do not'seem ;to have been successful*/ Part :of the party's supporters idio
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had helped it achieve the a speotacular success in the 1925 elections now 
failed to be convinced that ;they should continue to support it* The party % 
lost ground in the 192? County (-%upa) elections to the tune of a 100,000 
votos^"-,'over 60,000 votes in the first elections to the new3.y**ereated 
Provincial Assembly in 1928 and 80,000 votes in the 1929 elections to , . 
the-National .Assembly* '; Obviously the entry of .HSL'.S into the coalition 
v;as only,'one of the, many reasons behind this loss: of popularity. as . was. the 
introduction of the ,Provincial Reforms The ecommic .situation in ■ :' 
Slovakia was not too good-inspite of the increase in industrial output 
which by 1929 had oyOrtedten pre-war levels there was''an agridultural .crisis 
and the selling price for*many Gloyalt agricultural commodities remained
' - " gp ' ; " •: ;•
at a low level on the Prague exchanges . *. ■ . ; ■
By • 3.930 ' thé' index of industrial, output in ■ Slovakia, had fallen to 89# %  of , 
the .19.29 level* This fact .was bound to have ah : adverse, effect on the 
general economic situation by further depressihg/the demand for - ■ 
agricultural, produce as the living standards of unemployed indxistrial - - 
workers inevitably foil* Xt is most unlike that îBL*S.were àbi.e to foresee 
the coming economic crisis but #  having-left the op'alities when they 
did they had placed themselves in a better position to exploit the . - :
discontent that the Depression would.arouse•• Had they remained in the 
Coalition they would surely have been seen to have compromised themselves 
in the eyes of some of their supporWrs by their continued association 
.with a government that did not/do-enough to. combat the effects of the '. 
.Depression in Slovakia*. ' :
Although ItLinka steadfastly clung/to his belief that lUlsà was innoçént of 
the charges and saw the trial as a attempt to try and. discredit his party 
in the eyes , of the Slov^^ electorate '/ on the part, of the Central 
Government.he and most of the leading party officials did nOttalco their . 
demands for autonomy to the point of envisaging some sort of association ■ 
with one of the surrounding states either Poland or Hungary* Indeed their
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attitude to Himgary was a markedly negative one# During the revision 
campaign conducted in- 1928 by Lord;#therraere'who'published two articles 
in the Daily Mail (which he owned at .the time)'■-supporting-a .révision of . 
Itogaryls frontiers .and later visite cl Hungary-itself where, he Was accorded 
a raptuous welcome , , the party's united opposition to this was most 
dieÊiflÿ and unequivocally shoxto and all alovaî uid C^ iechosloVaic political 
parties and other organizations wore united in tUonc denunciation of 
Rothermore*s efforts^^f .
This however does not mean that the party did not continue to press for 
the attainment of Slovaît autonomy within the framework of . the Czechoslbvalc 
state# In fact after the reverse of 1929 the. party seems to have recovered 
from:the. strains of being a part of the .coalition/- when there.seemed to , 
be a danger, it might brealt up into several opposing factions ./ and tdien- 
a turn to the right Tidca was replaced by the ardent polonophlle Kar6l 
Sidor, the older generation of s contemporaries was dying out and
was being replaced by younger more radical meh some of whom professed open 
admiration for Europe's authoritarian and Fascist regimes* These mem
became known.-as the iHastupieti after a radical fortnightly magazine Naetup 
that reflected their views. . .
The first act of this new radicalised party was to présent its second.
Bill on. Slovak Autonomy on the 8th H^yl939‘^ '.'Thi.s proposal may have, 
been similar in content to its first Bill which was presented in the 
National Assembly oh 27th January 1922 in the draft of which Tuka had 
a hand* This plan also formed part , of the Zilina MemoraiidvjB (see Chapter 
Five), and with corrections in 1930 and 1934 constituted the baàis of HBL'S' 
demands in June oiid Augixst 1938 and. the Slovak Autonomy law of the 22nd 
November 1938*^^ It provided for wide territorial autonomy for Slovakia 
as a separate province, Ckraiina) vath its. ovm one chamber Diet (m e m ) that 
was to have legislative powers in the follov?ing areas Administration, ;
Schools, Ohprch, Justice, Social Welfare, Trade, Agriculture/ Public 
Works and F i n a n c e There was to he , a Cabinet appointed by the Diet with 
a Provincial President appointed by the President of the Republic* .The - 
areas'of Foreign/Policy, Defence, Posts .and Communications were to remain 
within the competence of the Central Government* This plan was no more 
successful than the, first Bill and was easily, defeated by ..a large 
majority f, ;
By doing so the Central Government had demonstratëd that there was to 
be no change in their attitude to the question of Blovalc autonomy# The ; 
views of such centralist Slovak politicians as Ivan Derer, Minister'of 
Education from 1929 to 1934, were still the decisive factor in their 
refusal to accede to IBD.B demands, . They could argue/ that Slovalciah. 
already possessed an adequate, system of self-government in the form of ■ 
the Provincial administration (see Chapter Five), .and/that .any furthor 
extension of its autonomy.wou3,d be premature*/ By refusing to discuss the/ 
matter further with II8IPB they undoubtedly helped to' maintain it 'in its / ; ‘ : 
radical anti4govôrnmeht attitude and made it harder for .thé-moderates. , 
within the party to control the "radical" wins.*. The.,insensitive handling 
of the quéstion of the reform of the Slovak-orthography (see below) provided 
the "radicalsn . with even more , ainmuaiition*
Attends had been-made, to try and bring - the two literary lariguageS| Czech , . 
and Slovalc,. c3.Ôseri6géther by establishing a new - Slov# orthograpl%r /for' / 
the.literary/language * The effect of this reform wquld.have been/to/have 
narrowed the, gulf between standard literary Czech (spisovna jfë^ tina) .' > 
and 'the Slbvsûÿ. literary language* ÏBL'S was bitt.er3.y opposed to any '
■ ■ ' : ■ ' . , m / ■
such move; ÙB they feared that it was motivated by a , desire to create a ,
"Czechoslovak" literary language.that would undo the.effects of Btur's = ■
reforms (see Chapter,Four) and pave the way for. the Blovaks to return to
. - 
the use of Czech as their literary language* indeed Doror had given
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instructions,for-the production of.a hew gramtar that if as intended to 
bring Czech and Slovak closer together And the reform itself openly 
stated that thisnfas the case and that Czech hdrmo had beeh used as a 
standard . / . ^
Thé-institution that.was most closely connected with these proposed. - 
lihgiiistio reforms-was the Matica Glovenekà* This had been the most 
/important Çlovalc cultural body in the nineteenth century and had been 
closed by order Of the Hungarian authorities ih 1875^ It .did not come 
into being again until the establishment of the Repubiic in I918# Its. 
main functions were to. encourage the development of the Slovak =' language 
and maintain contacts with the various Blbv# coBimunities abroad especially 
in the United States #  ■ . ' : ■ '■
The Matica endeavoured to maintain a strictly hon-rpolitical.stance, and.
. was even criticised by HBL'S for doing so. This was.despite, the attacks 
ffiàde on it by Dr'Brazak and other .extreme "Ozechoslovaîçists" who disliked 
the manner in xfhioh it sought to defend Ulpvalc. individuality (svoibyt. 
nost* ) end the use Of the Glovak language to the extent of Slovalcizing -
ahy articles that appeared in its journal in Czech# ■ This Was, a reversal 
of the older tradition from the first period of the Matiods activity 
1863*^75 when articles were published ,in both. languages'^ ^# -
Thé ' /'Rules of Slovalc-Orthography" appeared in 1931 and were the, results 
of ,;the work of a committee of the Matica under the chairmanship of %clav 
v/ây, reputedly an;.'ardent adherent of the theory of a unitary Gzecho? 
Slovak people # . These new rules.caused a great controversy : and widespread 
discontent among. m m y  ; 'Slovaks because the,reformed-orthography attempted . 
artificially to: reduce Slovalc to; the level of a mere dialect of Osech*:
It ignored the stabilization in:the usage of the Slovak literary language 
that, occurred during-the .(SO/s and *30*s. as well as the,many.advances in; :
'■ .y. ,
Bldvak terminology to which tho increased activities of the Matica in 
the field of publishing had helped to contribute*
A ^ mass ..meeting -of' the Matica held on 12th May 1932? rejected the reforms, 
Vaziiy resigned and the meeting vms taken over by hlinim' s supporters 
who them proceeded to elect several members of 1181*8 to serve on the 
executive committee of the Maticâ^^ÿ. The infiltration of Î-ISLI'S members 
was a continual process and by May 193? tv/o important members of HBLf S , 
Tiso and 'Bur$#sky were elected as committee members - * : IISL.'S was thus 
able to use the Matica for their ovm ends^^ and this was a factor in the 
success that HSh/s had in being able to elicit a gréât amount of .help and 
support in its autonomy campai^ from thé America)! Slovaks $ . . .
A Congress of the Young dlovak Generation was held at Tren'cianske Teplice 
from ,25#26th June 1952 at wliich 500 young Clovalc Intellectuals , of all 
shades of political belief discussed the economic, social and cultural 
problems of Slovakia *, Once again Hlinlca's supporters were' able to gain 
control of the Congress and pass a resolution that deo3*ared their ' ;
exclusive Support for and their total identification with HSL'S efforts to
' ' ' ' ' . 42 - ' ' ' ' ' . ' '
secure autonomy for Slovakia *
The most.important event of 1952 and-the one that show how firmly the . 
party was set on its new and militant Course was thé electoral alliance 
that it now concluded vjith the Slov# National Party (SNS) under the : :
leadership of -Martin Eazus $ in Bvolen in October 1952* This was followed -
- ,y
by a. joint OoagresO held, in Trencin in December of the same ; year at which /
Dlinka said "I shail defend the nation even at the ' expense of the : Republic
' 4 3 " " ' ' . X ' ' . .
(" i sa cenu republikÿ") ■ How far this remark was meant to be t#en as
a-seriousthreat by- the Central Government and t6,what extent it was intended
to impress the voters with the seriousness of the party's intentions is
not clear but it is hard to believe that despite the, tenacity with
which he clung to the single concept of autonomy in his struggle for ' '
" electoral influence in l^ évalcxa x^oix3xl willingly undertalce actions 
del Iberately calculâted to weaken or to undOLmii^ dho ,Republic* It is 
' po Bible that this remark was as much intended tb impress the. radical, 
wing of the party and restore -lïlinka^s authority as leader* : The #5. . 
abandoned its former alliance with the National.Democrats. who,had been/
trying Unsuccessfully to groom the. 8N8 as a co#eî va live-party of big-.
/"A . '-^^44 ' " ' - ' ' / \
' I business in' Slovakia- # and threw in its lot with 1181*8, . Together / -
1 ' 'y /. q - ; ' y ' À ^ 1// / , / - '
' with the ' Ruthehian/ Autonèmous Agricultural Ünion; hn# the. Polish sej^ratist,
parties they later -foiled the Autonomist Bloc* /yit contested the 1935 .
elections as such and not as single parties$• whibh/Mas undoubtedly -
advantageous;to tho smaller groups-who might not btherwise have ystood much
' chance of having, any of their candidates' - elect#/: :. Œhe/rationale - behind :
this bloc was obviously ,one of uniting all theyy #tbh6nu.st forces despite 
■national differences* Yet it is clear that-fflihl-di took care to avoid 
aiiy. sort of li#. with either the Magyar parties ïwho,; contested the election 
as a single united group or Konrad^ y Henleln*s budotendeutsçhë Partei*yy " 
Hlinlca, may well have wanted to . avoid, giving' bhe xiaprèssion , that .HSL'S - s., 
was prepared to work with forces hostile to: the idea of. the. Czechoslovak - 
state as, the homeland primarily of Czechs and Slovaks# For the latter 
group ho wonted to claim/not just minority rights, but the position of // . 
being the second nation in the state* It-v^ as thus crucial that y he. did. not 
base; the case for Slovali: autonomy Upon the same orgmients that were-being 
used by the minorities* leaders* V . -
ÏÎSL'S other Slovalc partner in the Autonomisb Bloc, SNS$, was a small : party ■- 
that had never gained more than 5^ of the vote*. It possessed however /, 
the pretige of having been the oldest and the only real political party 
to exist in Slovakia prior to I918* Since then it had beep;cast; into 
the shadow by the plethora of other parties that had co# into bemg and 
were, playing' a regular part in Slovalc -political life* / '-
One can,.therefore understand this party's willingness, to associate/itself ,
with; a larger ' grouping, although this-iteant'thàt, it tended to ho totally  ^ , .
ihdentifiedawith the policies and taqtics of, the grouping and the ; way 
in which it set abotit presenting its demands# .# 8  was in#ny case ■; ■
numerically fat too weak-for it. to be able to develop any credible/ ; .
aiternativè. to. the programme that I-ISL'S put forward* .. . / ‘
It is hard to determine the exact/nature of the material .advantages, 
that SWS derived ffom its .association VJith HSL.'S .within the Autonomist Bloc* 
The :extra votes that 8N8 oould muster would be welcome enough* although 
somewhat,few in number* wMlst the mere fact that such à-' grouping had been 
created could be exploited in HSL'S propoganda asa sign that it was now 
set on the. right path* ; At long last it had been listened to and its ; v 
opinions agreed with* Such interpretation could be placed upon, SNS* decision 
to agree to the -iormation of an electoral alliance with IÎ8LLS although 
how effectively this could, be exploited to ,vdn new votés; remains open to ; 
question* It is," 1.1A i # * far more likely that, as SRS was the only other y 
Slovak , party of any-: major significahce by "absorbing" it. and drawing it ' 
into close collaboration HBL'S was able to inherit thé kudos that was r. : ;
associated v;it|r SN3é It could thus present ita^^f #;the oiil^  genuine 
SIqv#: party, heir to a long and honoured tradition of defending Slovak 
interests from external oppression* / . - . . .
Siich. motives may hot have. .been present at all*- ïîSL'S may just have been , . 
concerned to try to. form a bloc.'.of all Blovak parties in Slovalcia* .Such, 
a move would ^ have the effect of distancing the Slovak bloc from both the 
Czechoslovak and the Magyar parties in Slovakia* Perhaps/ïUinka hoped ..
W  be able to turn to the party's advantage the discontent that the ' 
.economic situation was causing in Slovalcia where by 1953;there were at 
leasi 88,000 registered imempioyed according to official figures * He -
thus hoped to v;ln extra.support for the Bloc and its policies* judging % 
from thé results Of/the'elections to the National Assembly in 1955 the 
course of action-.that the Bloc followed in demanding autonomy a pre^ •;
requisite for solving Slovaîîià's problems was only marginally successful*
By 1958 hQv;êver the Bloc had made significanfe gains in local government
elections;in Slovalcia at the expense-of the Communists v among others*
Although by then they may have had the successful example of the SdB, f;-;
before their eyes and may well have been influenced by their tactics, and ,
motmethods of organization* . '
In 1955 two serious incidents occurred that demonstrated the extent to ;
which the•question of Slov# autonomy dominated relations,between the
Cehtral Government and many Slovaks* The first of these occurred Irhen
the thon Prime minister Malypetr made a speech in the National Assembly
■in. which he alleged that more was invested by the Gentral Government, in
Slovakia than v/as obtained from it in the way of tasces* This speech made .
on 20th May 1933.was officially placarded all over the toims and villages .
Qf Slovalcia wid stated that for the period from I9I9 to 1932 the .Central
Gpvernmeht expended borne 15,600 million crovms in Slovakia whilst receipts
totalled only some 14,000 million , Not only was Malypetrfs speech
distorted in the Press so as to make it seem that he said things that he
never did such as, the statement that-Bloval-cia was costing the Czech lands
money (Na Slovensko so dopl^x) but such a comparison was; inpossible
:to make# Separate accounts for each province were not kept and the
budget for each Ministry was drawn up on a state«wide basis* Furthermore■
many firms that had branch offices in Slovalcia had their head offices :in.
Prague /and it was there: where they paid .all their taxes*./- This line, of-
argument which had beén first-adduced with a view to providing a reason
Why .Slovakia should not yet be granted autonomy was blatantly unti'ue, /
ineffective and had the added disadvantage of needlessly antagonising part
: / -  - . ^
Of Sloval< pub].ic opinion* Even such a politician as Milan Hodza, who
.could in no way be suspected of favouring HSL'S made a.speech in Liptovsky,
Smt/^Hikulas in which lie openly stated that no such direct comparisons; ,
were possible*
The other incident tlmt Occurred the same, year and which helped to widen
:. ' / -. -i86~ " ' - / - ' -. %
the giilf/even further between the Central Government and the Autonomists - 
was the affair of the Nitra oelebrations, These were intended to celebrate 
the .1/100 anniversary of the founding of the first church in Slovalcia 
in" Nitra ;in the year 833* AiD* Many government figures and local 
dignitaries were invited to the celebrations but Hlinka was not among 
those whovvrere officially invited to attend and spe#^ He did however 
attend in his capacity as a private citizen# His supporters were.highly 
of fended by what they took to be a personal affront to him as well as an 
indication of the Central Government * s unwi3-l,ingness to recognise the 
importance of the Autonomist movement in Slovak public life#. Here the 
viev/s of a such centralists as Derer may have played a key-part, as by ' 
the beginning of the Thirties they were hardly on spedcing terras with ' 
the Slovak Autonomist and this factor may have had; a decisive role in. 
influencing those who were responsible for issueing ;the invitations.not 
to invite Hlinica to address the crowds who hàd gathered to witness the 
proceedings and listen to the speakers#
Minka.'s supporters were present in the crowd in sufficient forcé to, be 
able to ' take over the proceedings: and. bring Hlinlca- to the podium from 
where : he gave,'a-passionate speech demanding autonomy* , Most of those 
responsible for this disturbance went unpunished. ThelDO or so who 
were arrested and charged vjith anti-government rioting later had most of 
the charges against them dropped# .The few.who were punished were granted 
an anmesty in 1935: * Derer however was enraged by this incident:which 
shocked public opinion in both .halves of the Republic and asked the 
Government to dissolve JiSL'S# ; It. however refused to do# / ;
During.October 1933 it did dissolve two German parties the German Nasi 
and the German National Party whose activities seemed to herald the 
dangers .o.f a Nasi upsurge among- tho Republic's tliroe-and-a half million .' 
Germans* This action was taken by virtue of a .ter, passed earlier in 
the year, that empowered the Government to dissolve any political parjy or .
i"' . \ ' //'A- ..
other /organization ohd halt its activities if they constituted a threat ' - 
to national security and'the , safety of the Republic* By its actions : '
the government prevented any ■ overt subversion of the state# Yet the 
removal*of the two.parties created a political;vacuum that was soon :. 
to be filled by a, niqvement led by, a schoolmaster, Konrad'Henlein, which -, 
had # s  roots in Gernian ^mastic orgaiiizations ( Turnvereine ) * Such a 
movement had the advantage of not overtly Nazi from the outset as it limited 
itoolf at first to demanding autonoB^ and more help for German areas that 
wore very badly affected by theDPepression*. Gradually however this : - . 
movement came more # d  more under the direct control of Berlin from where !.
it: received its orders as well as ■financial help in the form of subsidies 
to enable;to carry on its political activities# . ■ ;
Although Masaryk suffered a stroke on the 1st May 1934 that left the ' ,
left side of his body paralysed he.still neverifcheless stood for re-election. 
as President/ , és ho was then unSUre of the National Assomb3.y's attitude 
to Benek, whom he wanted to see as his successor^^^ , He was duly elected 
for tho fourth time on the 24th May and received 32? votes whilst the 
only other candidato\,the Gommunis1^*leader received 38* The National '. 
Democrats, the MqiM^Nationalis and HSL'8  all cast blanîc votes# Despite
his illness however Masaryk did iiot resign till the 21st November 1933 
.when/he nbminated Benes as his successor# By then however elections to 
the National Assembly had t#en placé that had radically altered the 
balance .of forces within the coalition* -
The success of the 8dP in the 1933 elections in which they won 44 seats ' 
in the Chamber of Deputies meant that the ruling coalition was not reduced 
to à minority » As the HdP could not be expected to join unless all its 
deméuids were/met^ something to which the other parties in;the coalition- / 
were loath to agree, the position of HSli'S had been considerably enhanced 
despite the fact that in electoral terms the Autonomist Bloc had not 
done as well as might have: been expected# Negotations/were thus opened.
with a view to . bringing HSLbS into the coalition and lUiika presented 
Malypetr with à list of 32 economic and social damants aa a pre-condition 
to entry* He was however unable to agree to their demands and negotiations 
were thus : discontinued.as fær as entry into the coalition was concerned
■ V'
although both Benes and-Hodza, as we shall see, continued to negotiate 
with HSLiS, .
Bones election to the : Presidency was not as straightforward, as it might 
have seemed, for he did not have the support of all the Czechoslov# parties. 
/Both the Agrarians and the National Democrats were opposed to his 
: candidature and proposed their candidate Antonin Nemec a little-lmovm ■ 
member of the National Democrats* The electoral victory of the SdP whose 
support neither candidate vMshed to solicit as the . party was far too 
’.aggresively anti-government in its attitudes meant that. neither Beh.oA^  
who was supported by the Socialist parties and the Communists as well as
the Czechoslovak People's Party nor Nomec who had the support, of the
' ’ , ' . ' .
Agrarians, National Democrats, Fascists.and: the Tradesmens Party . could .,
/. ' . ■ ■ . :V " ' 54
:raise the necessary majority* The attitude of HSL'B was thus vital *
• V'.
The Communists wore prepared to support Benes because, not only had the . , ■
Soviet Union been admitted to the league of nations in 1934 but a new 
policy of seeking a "united front" of, all•anti-fascist;forces had been 
inaugurated by. the Gommintern in 1933 and prescribed as policy for all ■-
national communist parties * >■/ .:
ILSIj'S would obviously, demand some concession in return .for % their support
and thus Bones entered into negotiations with Tiso who had now become
îllinHa's second-in*^command* According to Tiso's account of their meeting
Benes promised to: use his influence to settle both the Blovalc and the 
: : -V'- _  . .■ ■■ ; ■ . -/ . ■ . : .
Ruthenium questions « In addition he also promised some sort of concrete
forÀ of autonomy for Blovakia^^* This account may or may not be true but
it /is'loaowi that Slovakia was. not granted any new system of self-government
other than the Provincial system that functioned unchanged from 1929 to;
1938 imtii after thé end of the First. RepiU^ Iic in .October 1938* :..
Benel^  election was secured when Hodza decided to hrijcg, over the Blovalc , 
Agrarians to.his side in opposition to the right wing of the party under 
Berah who had now hecome chairman, .occuping the ' post-that had been left 
vacant since Svehla's death. Ilinlca was persuaded by Tiso and the '.
Vatican also exerted pressure on him to swing i#L ' 3 behind Benes^ .
was elected President on the.l8th December 1933 gaining 340 out of .440; -
' 5/ ' . ; ' ' ' - . ' "
votes cast ;v
Meanwhile .HodSa had been appointed Prime 'Minister on the 3th November 
mid he was the first and only Glovale,to hold the post during the first 
Republi#* His appointment in Slovakia however was regarded as. a personal
choice and not as any concession to Slovak feelings for he had never .
■■//. " . , . . .•■:■"/ ' go ' ' ' '
really identified; himself vdth purely.Slovak affairs * Prague not
Slovalcia had been the main centre for his political activities and as head
of the Slovalc agrarians a loz'ge party in Slovakia, and one that was invariably
identified with the Central Government it woUld have been surprising had
HSL'S expected that he would be more sympathetic : to their demands* For the .
Central Government the presence, of a Slovak as Prime Minister was a useful
proof that. 'Slovaks could rise to very high positions and that there was •  ^ : -
no deliberate ' policy of . excluding them as . such in Prague ' s personnel , '
policy* \ '
Hod&., opened negoti&ti-iohs with .BSL'S on. the '21st./January 1936 and HSL'S' 
demands, included the 32 demands. they had earlier put to/Malypetr as well 
as demaiids for a Slov# Diet. (snem), with a wide field of compétence 
including legislative : powers, recoghition. of Slovak distinctness, (Svojbytnost * 
the Slov# language and the restoration of the Minister with full powers. / 
for Slovalîia^ *^ As HSL'S had once, experienced the effects of being part 
of the government coalition on itq electoral support they wGre understandably 
wary and were not prepared to settle for less than #hat was contained in ,
the Pittsburgh Agreement*' Understandably o#y far-reaohing concessions-. 
would be sufficient to convince the voters that they had not sold out v 
merely in order for a few members of the party to become Ministers and , 
sit in the Cabinet * As they themselves had constantly raised the question ; 
of the incorporation of the Pittsburgh Agreement, into the Constitution ■; 
and asked for its provisions to be put into effect, they could not . ' 
therefore affôrd to bo seen by their supporters to be settling for anything 
.less# - - - ' ; . ' ^
Hodza refused to accept these demands on the grounds that they neither = ■ 
were economically viable at the present time nor did the security situation, 
of- the country allow tham' to be carried out, IBh'U then asked for an 
undertaking that, these; would be carried oUt at pomq future date but Hodaa. 
refused to give, it-and the'.negotiations were...bhdkeh'Off on the 2?th March #
The Central''Government was plainly unable to accede to all these demands . . 
in therr ehtirity, .even if they had been willing to do so*. For not only 
would;such a: scheme for Slovalc autonomy destroy the basis on which the - 
; state was built, as :a unitary state for the.Czechs and Blovalcs with legal 
guarantees of the status and rights of etlmic minorities, but once autonomy 
•had been granted to the/Slovalçs. it would be {difficult to resist similar, .
demands on the. part of the Germans or any other etlmic minority*, The 
prospect of; the .State,.,boihg transformed into, a loose confederation ofV , 
autonomous etlmic areas ms.a decidely unwelcome one# The threatening ' 
and aggressive behaviour'of Nazi Germany had made the Central Governnient 
conscious of the heed to strengthen its border defenses whilst the 
hostility of both Hungary and Poland, vdiere Colonel Beck pursued;a 
, markedly prq*German foreign policy,vfere forces still to be,reckoned with#. 
Autonomous areas might/therefore be easier to subvert into breaking av/ay / 
from.the Republic and adhering to, one or other of her neighbours, . 
especially Ikingary whose.loaders still cherished.ambitions of regaining some
if. not, all of lior former territories* One can . thus understand the 
unwillingïiess of the Central Government to aooode to such demands*. In 
the case of Slovalcia full autonomy would most probably have meant tlmt 
HSIJ S would play the major role in the administration of Slovakia* There 
were those in the party amongst the younger and more radical elements, 
individuals whose lof:alty to the Czechoslovalc state was not as unequivocal 
as among the older generation who were more or less on temporaries of 
ïEinica* We îiaye already mentioned tho polonophlle tendencies • of Sidor.', 
aiid the pro-GeUmàn, proWWgàrian,'. Austrian apd Italian tendencies of 
Durqansky bviofbp Qù^but it should be stressed that the ■
discipline and organizational methods of the, principal Fascist regimes 
of the time if not, their actual ideologies made a deep and lasting 
impression on many members of the.younger generation within the party*- - 
111 the .Czech Lands there were those who had been attracted by Mussolini.*a ' / 
.and later. Hitler's style of fascism but they were few in number and without 
much serious, political influence although the extromo right#»wing of the 
National Democrats tended towards Fascism*. The National Democrats and 
two small fascist groups contested the 1933 elections together as the 
National Unity group (Narodnr sjednoceni) but their share of the poll ■ ; .
was not very large* . By 1937 National Unity had been dissolved and the ■ " . 
influence of these Fascist groups remained miniscule and, without importance 
right up till the end of the Republic*
The position of the other political parties in Blovaicia, primari3^y the 
OzQchosIovalc parties, during this period is very interesting and somewhat 
paradoxical* For although their voter support as a percentage of the 
total poll at each election either remained stable or even increased,; as 
was the case of the Oaechoslovalt Booial Democrats? it vîould still be true 
to say that they had been forced into a defensive role by the /'offensive 
.campaign waged by HBL'S* Most of these■parties shared the disadvantage . 
of having almost invariably been part of the ruling government coalition -
/ ; , -192- r  ^ : - - 3 -
and were tlms identified in autonomist propoganda with forceé:inimical ' .
to the. cause of Bloyali atitonpmy* ' During the prolonged economic crisis •
they were unable to produce .any effective solutions for Slovalcia*s ' •
economic ' and social problems*-.,. They could, not expiaih the reasons why
the. cricis had come about except in terms of world economic forces over
which the Central Government had but little control* Thé measures that
Malypetr introduced in June 1935 including a lomi to raise■money for .
public works to relieve unemployment^/^ were only rm r^giUaily .effective*
The Autonomists on the other hand, could claim that conditions in
Slovakia would improve if a) she were ' granted autonomy .mid h) if all the
Czechs in zfloVokia who by 1938 ntmiberpd over 3.20,.0 0 0. together with their % ,
depedents, would leave and thus vacate their positions turning them over ,
to Blovak#./.,) .. -
The Communist. Party also possessed a ready-made explanation that was 
rooted'in Marx'srcritique of capitalist society, a critique that related 
Blovalciais problems to some wider économie and social.criteria», In 1937 . 
they presented a plan.for - the economic, social and cultural amelioration : 
of Slovakia .(Plan hospodarslteho # sociialnëïio ci kultimiAio .povznesenia ■ - 
Slovenska): that forsaw a wide-spread program of .industrialization as the . 
only , why. to' so3.ve these problems of nnder-development.*.,. Inspite of its 
■propqgmida and an increase in the number of strikes and other forms of. 
industrial unrest the Communists v/ero Unable to increase their.share of thé , 
poll to any significant, csâ^tentcalthough by 1.935'they were ab3.e to do /. ■.
, sii^tly bettor than the Social Democrats but remained third after : the. .- ■ 
Autonomist KLOc and the Agrairlans*. ' -. -,
■The latter party were able to fairly.well in maintaining their share of 
the poll in 1935 and HBL* 8 was not able to.msdce any inroads into their . 
basis of àupport ■ among the Slov'alt peasantry* In view of the effects-of ' 
the economic crisis one can oii3y conci^ %de that the more. prosperous section
of the peasàiitry who had proportionally^ larger holdings vrere less affected 
and thus tendecl 'to remain loyal to the Agrarians whilat. the poorer , /
peasants‘with smaller holdings and the land less agricultural ifoiiters 
.aaid seasonal;workers who were far more seyerly affected by the crisis 
'tondecl to support IISIJB and the Autonomist Bloc* The Blovalc Agrarians ■ 
remained consistently/one of the larger and more successful political 
groups in Slovakia/and a great deal of their success was due to the 
leadership of ; Milan Hodza one of the most able and-talented of Slovak . . 
politicians*. / '/
■/. In; comparison with the Agrarians; Social Democratic influence in Slovakia 
was not very great* Against the background of the economic crisis the 
party did very well as its share of the poll increased consistently from 
1929 to 1935 at a time when the number of industrial workers was still 
belqw;the 1930 lovel (see Table Thirty^One) and did not reach that figure 
again until November 1936* -By 1937 the last year for :#ich figures are 
available the total nuigber of industrial workers in Blov#ia was only -- 
.-,1^ higher than the pre-war-level whilst industrial output was only
/ À  " ' y ' ' - ' . ' '/. . ' ' -
higher, * A factpr that could help to explain the relatively/good 
performance of.the- Social Democrats, in Slovalga and the persistence of 
yoter loyalty was that the Social Democratic.Unions wOre reasonably 
- Wealthy and could thus pay unemployment benefits to their members* In 
1937 they numbered some 77»301 members; IGëÈ^ o of the total work-force
: , . :;'//-- ■ ■' ■/■■.. ' - ■ / ' '';■■■■■ ' 65 ■ ■
including agricultural workers and 2%. of all Union members *^ They were 
/ , thus the largest single Union group and probably contained within / their 
. ranks’ the majority of unionised industrial, \torkers in Slovakia* .
By the end of 1937. death,had removed both.the leader of SN8 Martin Razus 
and Tomas':Garri-0 Xie |!asàryk,from the political scene* ■. llinka was gravely 
.: ill (he died the. following year) and Dr* Jozef Tiso took on more/£Uïd,more 
of ; the.' duties of party head* For the coming year 3.938 îISL'S adopted a . new 
slogmw"V Novom Roku./do Utolm" (Into the attack in the NeW/ÿear^^* We
shall examine more/closely what exactly this was to mean in the context 
of the struggle for Slovak autonomy when we come to examine political . 
developments during the. last year of ,the Republic in gnoater details in 
Olmpter Eight* - .
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la trying to assers the amoiait of progrbsa that Slovalcia made dàfiiig the 
First Hepuhlio we must be wary of #akiag comparisons between Slovakia.and 
tbe Csech;Lands which would invariably show that" in every respect Slovakia 
was worse'off* The two-couiitrles having departed froai widely differing levels 
in practically all aspects, of political, economic and cultural life in 193,8^  
•such comparisons. would be. misleading# Valid îu u 13 :of .'reference could only 
be found , in comparison with another territory un Liar to SloWtia attthe . ' ' 
■starting point,--and: in measuring Slovakiafs rate of growth (development),
The former is outside the scope of this dissertation; the.latter will bo . ' 
attempted.' Nevertheless, comparisons with the Oseeh'Ldiids camiot be entirely 
avoided, if only because they comprised the tools of-'political contention - 
,in the period under scrutiny. One. of the other problems, to beïovercome is 
that the. last census , in ihter-war .C^ echoslovalcia wàe held on the 1st, "
December 1930*. ; Consequently we thus have no way .^bif accurately , assessing .:
. ' . '  ' ' ' ' 1'-  ^\ " ' . / : ' - ' \ -
ill as much detail as is provided in a census social and economic conditions .
in Slovakia ' at the end of the Republic. . ;
All -the:-infdrmatidn utilised in this section-has been .draw from, two main ■ 
Sources yi%. the 1930 Consul <md the■ ■ Statistical Handbook ( 'Annuaire 
Rtatistinap) for 1938,:% In the; case, of' the latter work.the-last year for^ 
which complete figures are - given. is often 1936 ,or 1937*. We are-thus ; forced 
to assume that conditions in Gloyàkia were little changed by thé end of 
1938 and .thus the picture that can be built up on the basis of. such - "
availabié date will be little affected by this- fact. ' '
. Becaus.e of ■ this .general paucity ;of - information none of the following, sub--,
• v / : : :    : -
. sections- will be. as detailed as ih'- the previous chapter*. I shall be ' ■ , 
chiefly, concerned with tracing the progress made during'the entire., 
period despite the overall economic and. social effects of the Depression ‘ 
years* Many of these gains ospecia].ly 'in. the field of éducation Mth : 
which we begin this survey vjore to 'serve as a solid base for the future
- development V of Slovalcia during thé years, to C!bine#.:..IndQ0d, one can
: : : - " ' . ' . , ' ' : - p. ' . ' ' 'T V : i::'; - \
suggest that-post-*war progress could^Have beeh -as rapid-as it was thânlçe..-
to the points of departure painstakingly built hp in the previous years*
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Population and Ahigraiion . ' . ;.
S3.ovakià continued to register an abpve^payorage birth-rate although
from 1934 .onwards it fell to below 10 per mille, The population increased
from 2,996*336 ih 19^0 to 3,995il97 in 1937^ *^. an increase of 998,821 in .
18 years but if, We take the excess of births over'deaths in the-same 
period we arrive at a figure of some 714,000* The (difference between 
these, two figures represents the migratory loss which includes both ' 
emigration and migration within the Republics from S16v£üd.a to the Czech 
lands* The loss for this period miouhts: to approximately 159$000 or 2l*7/'« 
of the natural increase* ' Most of this loss must have occurred up-to 
1930 hs, the incidence of emigration was much higher than after'' 1930 although 
Slovakians' share-of those applying -for passports remained'obstinately high, /
The annual migratory loss-per 1000 of population also remained higher
than for the. Czech Lands and. the Republic, .3*4 for Slovalcià as opposed 
to only 0*8 for the Czech Lands^^*, . .
The effects of such a loss as undoubtedly to distort-the demographic 
structure, as .'the .majority of the emigrants must-have.'been able-bol 
men. who. wenti away in search of .work, This inevitably affected .tbèsex
i  r... ■ ■. '■ '
.ratio in certain areas leading to a.decline in the marriage rate*' .Here ■: -
we, can-see, one of the factors'that... led to the continuous decline in the 
birth-^ rate throughout the First .Republic,'Ihis;'caused fears on the part 
of Slovak demographers and doctors that.Slovakia would be faced with the 
additional problem of progressive depopulation and an aging population *
Fortunately the emigration statistics for the period 1930-*1938 show a 
marked decline to a fraction of what they were for the proceeding period,
' ' y . tÿ’i
Emigration to the United States declined-greatly, Canada limited the 
annual quota for Czechoslovalîia.to 6,000-agricultural workers whilst 
Australia reduced her annual quota for immigrants from .the GSR to only
■ 300**^  ^ The migrato3^ y loss for this period A^ as correspondingly lower, 
perhaps no more than 30^000 from 1930 to 1937 although it is difficult p
to arrive at an. accurate set of figures as after 1930 no census \ms held  ^
until 1940, Aiid the Dates from 1940 census in Slovakia, is not available . '
in this country»  ^ '
. A further source of population loss was the high incidence of infant 
, mortality’^ It declined only very slowly from 183*9 p.er. thousand in 1920 
to 161*4 in 1936 aiid: finally, to l43y3 in., 1938* a. decline : of some 22# 9^  
over eighteen :years» . From 1910. to 1938 there were 313*000 deaths of 
Children aged. 1 year and 3-ess but .Slovalcia*s population was still ; 
increasing by 1936 at more than twice the. average for. thé: ..Republic- mid no .
■ less than thirteen; times the rate .for.Bohemia alone* ' : : '
This meant that the Central Governfflent; had to parovide in its politicies 
for. the -ifact that there : would be a large section of Slovaltia*s population 
, consisting of young children# This would place great demands % on the health . 
and education services*, In addition to this high bihth rate the mortality : 
rate fell by 2 3 from 1919 to 1938*'^  ^ This was' due . no, doubt to the . 
improvement in health care* There was thus great pressure on thé productive, 
.segment of the population as the ratio.between thé productive and non^ : % .■
productive sectors improved only marginally from I92I to 1930• .This - y- -'b 
disproportion between the level of development of the Sloyalc;economy which 
by 1930 still remained one based predominantly on agridulturp, to which 
in 1930 ho less : than 62*!%^  of the activ.e.52#3^  ^of the dépendent and 36*8/3
' . - ' '7 ' .'  ^  ^ ---. 3 ' ' "
- of the overa3-l population belonged  ^and the rate of natural increase meant,:;
that the labour market was Unable to supply enough jobs to absorb all the - 
; yearly increase in the:work force* The very success of the Central
Government in helping to loiver both infant and adult mortality rates served 
only to acerbate this problem as not oh3.y did more children survive.but 
they tended to live longer* ' It should be stressed that, this; population 
.increase bore very heavily on the agricultural-:.section of the community* . ; =
. . . For 58 we shall see * they ; ïmâ t o GU%%)ort . more people on less :land^  land 3 
-■ tli&it ,v;as'lésé fortile'aiid iienoe less ; productive than .was the case in thé :/
■; / I  -:':;.
; ' ■ In the tweuty/years ofl.tho First Republic the ...Central Qovorhment .did , V - 
; ■achiovonotable .eucoess .in reducing the lops of life, by a steady reduction 
; in 'mortality, rates * . Unfortunately it had no coordinated employment and 
,•. , deveibpmeht ;policieé;that .would have.enabled it to cope with the . ■
■ . ' ■ cons.cquehces of its .ov/n Actions# .By, reducing.^ ' .mortality rates it had, . "
■ to cbpe with à relatively large yearly increase .in- births* which although..,
■V- A  , 'A ' , '' % r  <  ■, ;
■ i,t'.tended to decline consistontly right up till the. end of .thO Republic*
.''/hëverthelésé:me&mt a.considerable pressure bn'health* education services 
■ / and.thé labour market* In the Conditions of the Thirties the Central; .
: ■■ ■ - : '': ' 'V'- 'v. ■
; Government was not able to adequately solve : the, Blovalc employment problem ;
:/ and this lack of a suitable policy, played- in the hands of the Autonomists who
sought, to show that .the Central Government had. totally neglected :Blova].cia *, 
.• a’ charge that was blatantly, untrue, although; the de.greo of success: of thé
. /'7 ■ ■ ; ■ .Central .Govehmentbin this field was .strictly limited#,
.E ( ^ C a t i o h  .1 ' .. ,'i . ' ' ' - :
The.progress that was made after the establishment of the Republic in 
:l§iS continued after 1930 albeit at a s^iovjer,pace due to the inévitable • 
.réstriction of Gentràl Goveivttient'expenditure in almost all fields# This 
.Ams in turn caused by the fall in tax income that occurred because= of the' 
.drop in- both industrial production and consumption after 1929*
Tables ThirtÿrHine and Forty«One give the total number of educational;, ■ 
establishme;itG' in' Slovakia during the period from 191@ to' 1938* It is 
: readily .apparent that'-: the number of elementary* schools grew at a fas^f
, ; X  . . -^ 200- '' ' :/ -. '43^ , ':- ' \  . 1  ; i. '
rate than those of sècohdarytandUiigher education*; It should he streESed 
that the proportion of the population that vzas aged from 0.4.24 years was
'■ ' - 'A.'-' ' :
higher in Slovalcia^ as folloivs# ■ ■ ■ . . ix '
- , : , - i. i ' . c  \, i
'1 - ' . .r :5^14\ . ' ' iTotal:in.:ii
BSR (Averàse)X :■ f 9.57 ' / IfiX a  19,25- 45,54 :
Bohemia ' : 8*01 - ' .14*62 x-i 18.99. 41,62 r
Slovakia -f: / y 119*^0 /X:;! , ^
In addition to ; this ^faot the proportion that was iaonyactive and thus - - ^ ■. : ; 
dependent on the active section also groAf faster than:: in either'Bohend-a :■ r 
or in the Repuhlio ad a Avhole* : We may ■■thus safely assume that'the. , 
proportion of children of school**agé .(3**l4) A/as W.gher in Glpvalcia thmi 
in the Ozech L^ids as à :result of the higher birth-rate* /
Assuming;: Slovakia* s sh^O of the population to be around 23*7^ i in 3,930 
than on the basis of the above fi^ qires: A/o. may calculate :that Slovakia's . ' 
share of, the total. 5-#l4 age group ih the Republic was \ 28#2^* Any provision 
rpf primary education therefore had to he able to find enough places for.. 
all those.. Children of school»age as attendance was compulsory * By the 
sohool-year 1933*?*1936 Blovahia/possessed'no less than 22#S^ > of the - 
Republic ^s elementary schools (4*480 out of a total of 20*003)$^^ Tïie 
reason vdiy the total, percentage of elementary schools A/as lower than, the 
percentage of children of school'age was that the average sise of classes 
in Slovakia: was, iiigher than the average for the Republic (35#0 as. against ' 
40*0.for the Republic in 1930)* X , , .V
The total humber Of .elementary schools rose front 3*416 in /D.9 21 to 4*133;/;'/: 
in 1930/and 4,316.in 1934-33* .The mtnber of pupils rose from; 466,786/in
igm to .507,7#:#^^ by 1934*35^ tp&al. number :of /GbhpoiB;
in 1918 (before the establishment of the’Republic)/A/as-3,603 of which' no
/-: ' - '.. ' ' /- '/ "f b .: ' ' ' . '' 'X /' -\
/less, than 3 ,298 had Magyar as the language of Instruotion,,/, They A/ore . - -
,; attended by no less than 343*982 ohil'&eh out of a total ' of 376*6o4*/ ..
/.,/■:■ /'-■ ■ //' - : - ' ' ' . . 6^ •>' ■ ■ ;V'-"
There were only 27.6 Slovak schools with 30$ll8 pupils* . x Not only were '
there significant rises in the hUmber of schools and pupils but there /
were important--qualitative changes ah A/ell including the provision, bf .many ;/:;
. new school buildings -and/bhe/improvement ;, of old ones* ,The use of Slovak
as the major language of instruction meant .-that for the .first time 'almost
■ every Slovak child, could receive instruction in his 61m  language.. In •
order for this to be brought about a v/hole new generation of Slovalc .'teaChers-
had to/be trained* In the field of .teacher, training, colleges blovalcia .. ■ .- .
was reasonably v/éll-provided for and by 1933^36 possessed 27*%> of such /
' ' ’. ’ ' ' ;-gh) ' ' ' " '
establishments (I7 ^ ouh of 62), , . ■ / /; . - , . ’ ■'/
.In the'field of secohdary. and higher education the fact that by the end - 
of .the Republic Slovakia had not reached parity v/ith the Osech lands pan/ /. . 
in : no way deter from’-the fact- that a great.-deal had been achieved in a 
.' /very shoit time* There had been no secondary education in Slovak since 
.-' 1873, and thus, not only, had-the central government to- ; provide neA/ buildings 
and have text books printed but it .also had to find/the necessary teachers* 
Till Slovaks themsalvOB could be trained, it was necessary to resort-to .
- a polioy./df employing Czech teachers to fill the gaps^ did hot alv/ays
meet v/ith: the understanding it deserved. Yet it is difficult to see hov; . 
this could have been avoided as most of the Magyars and Magyarisecb. Blovalos 
A/ho comprised the bulk of secondary teachers in I9I0 most probably did/not 
possess sufficient command of Slovalc to be able to teach in it at secondary 
level* As A/e can see/from Table Thirty-Nine -the number of secondary / 
school pupils rose /from 14,621 in 1920-21 to 16,646 in.1929-30. /(No. date 
is available after this date). ,/The Comenius University in Bratislava had 
318 students at the end. of/the v/inter term in 1921,1*761 at the end of 1930
and 2*247 at the: end of 1935# The total number of Slovalc miiverélty  ^
studehts both at tliis university . and those in the .Gzeoh Lands iiever / 
amounted to more than 10r»12?p of the total for the I^ epublio# ;
Secondary and higher eduodtion were however not compulsory*. Even in the 
Czech'lande not every pupil who completed his primary education imnt on 
to study at the socondai'y level* This was^  dependent in many cases on the 
social status of his family and thoir relatives affluence# Slovakia had 
■ a'iov/er standard of living and consequently this was'reflected in a lower 
number of Slovak students in secondary and higher education*: / ■■ / •
If; We compare the,state of Slovak education as shown in these Tables in : 
.1918 and again at.the end,of,the Republic We can see timt much had been 
achieved despite the recurrent economic crisis of;1921^23 ahd 1930-37*; 
Although illiteracy in Slovakia still reraainod, higher than in. the .Czech 
Lands it seems to have declined considerably between 1921 mid 1930* The . 
different age-limit. and the greater variety of date shown in the 1930 
Census make a direct comparison difficult* Talcing the average figures of 
6*73^ for men, 9,*4^ 5 for women and 8*l6?& overall as the basis in 1930 ' 
vio Can see that they represent a great improvement since I921 v/hen ■ : 
oorre.sponding figures were 12*82^ ,^ 16.4%; and l4.71/4 respectively* TMs 
.improvement A/as not equally shared among all the different nationalities ■
' in Slovakia and the, Slovol^ s’ in fqet scored worse than the Magyars, Germans 
and Jews but better than the Ruthenes* This drop in illiteracy was most 
probab3.y due to the institution of compulsory, elementary schooling vihich 
.novj meant that illiteracy was tending to be confined-more and more, to thé 
older .sections of/the population* ’ 4 ^
Health Care
The. general decline in mortality rates, that whs mentioned in the section
_ \ . \ 4' ;.4 ' - ' - ' ;x'._4 X
on population and émigratloh does . .not taJte into- account ihi . fact that . , •'■ : ■
mortality varied , from class .to class and from'one occiipational group to,
another# -OliBiatlc conditions as v/oll as individual.'and publie hygiene •
are aii factors v/hioh influence the incidence of mortality whilst thé "/
number of'doctors, hospital' beds and the ease or difficulty of overland- .
oOmimmications also determine the number of Uiose idio may survive, siclmebs
or injury,-4 ; - ' - . ' . x
Blovalcia had fewer doctors,, hospital beds and pharmacies than the-.Ozech 
lands Oven by the end of the Republic  ^ Yet if we look at the. number of ■: '
doctors who imre practising medicine in Slovakia by 1937 (Table Forty-Three) 
■\fé'noté, that the .number:had.more than doubled since 1920»- .Considering ' - ' 
the lengthy nature of a doctor is training and the rather large .cost to the r 
State, that, this increase had meant* it A/as a significant achievement, and 
repi’e.Bentod a. considerable investment on the part Of the Central Government*, 
By 1936. Slovakia had an above-average number of i%ii({%wives and pharmacies per 
hundred thousand inhabitants but oncè the actual area, of the country A/as . '
talcen into consideration it was not as A/ell provided as the Czech Lands. ' 
Slovakia, had 16*06^ © of the Republic' s^ doctors in 1936 A/hich A/as indeed an %' 
iraproyoment but less than the proportion of the Bepubiic*s population; 
that lived in Slovakia* (23^0* Given the pro dominantly rmral siatiAre of 
Slovakia it was difficult to provide an adequate number of do.ctors to x 
ensure, that every single inhabitant, had access to medical help* The : 
majority of Slovalcia^ s population lived in communities of 3,000 or leas , 
but by 1936 BlovaÎAia still only had. 46/a of the average number of doctors 
per square,kilometre for the Republic and this fact coupled v/ith,a' 
similar shortage, of mid-wives aild pharmacies may well have contributed to 
.Slovakia's mortality rates remaining above- those in the Czech lands* Inspite 
Of its many shortcomings central government policy in this field Wust be 
seen as-, partially successful as mortality rates did fall v/hilst the number ■ . 
: of :■ doctors rose significantly* ' • .* , .4 : ,
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The, following figurés ehow the number of pex^ sons engaged in.: agriculture, 
from 1921 to 193ptin Blovakia*^^ (No,dà^ available after that date)* ■
.4 . 4' X .4 ' . X.. ; ' . .y;
444/.4;" /-'/ X . V  y-x :l92l\.-4' V;4x-4x/-i9ÿ)'4:^^^ 4;:4:--.' .
Active . . ; 4 751*800 - 63. ^  2 ' - 4 -
pe^n&nte :4 4.:^ 1,*019^ W  52^ 3;^  ' 4'
Xotal: 4 4 ; 4; # 811,600 ,60# ^  , , '
Ife call thus see that although the proportion of the . total, population involved 
in agriculture, fell from 60#4?f- to 36* %  between I92I and 1930 whilst there'
■ Was, a rise in absolute terffiS of 76 *lQQ pereons.*, The active population 
fell by only from 63#Q^ to 62*5^ but roà©, in absolute ternis by Îl6.*5d0 " 
uAiilst the dependent sector fell in absolute figurés by.40 *4d6*. This is : 
most probably to- be interpreted as .a decrease in the avorago size of 4, 
agricultural families*, The absolute‘rise in thé number of the agricultural / 
population meant that a,proportion of the natural increase found employment 
in thé agricultural sector of the economy unlike, the Omech hands where 
the'agricultural .pôpiîlâtion fell in both percehtage. and absolute terms*. ■' '■
M  1930. at .least the agricultural.character of Slovalcia had not undergone 
any radical changes* Indeed although the absolute number of Industrial.. 
workers in 1930. stood some 20,000 higher than in 1910, in percentage 
terms it A/as lo\/or at 17*9^ 4 of the total .v/ork-force in 1930,'as against 
19.7/4 in 1910#: : In I92I the total industrial work-forqo was 224,500, 18*9/4 
of the active population* v/hilst by 1930 it A/as 247,300 but only 17*9^»
The economic crisis of 1921-23 and the subsequent closure of some .200 . x
Qn • ■ ■ : . ' ■  . qq ■ ■ . .
factories . in .what asnoimted to a small-scale dismantling x of Slovak
' , '  . -203^ :'  ^X .
.industry %fas undoubtedly a factor.in the process that helped to keep
81oval{la a basically agrarian coUhtry* . -
The results of the laud Reform as.summarised lu Table:Beveuteeu refer 
to ,1936 .when the.process of re-distributiou was more or less completed#
The average.size of the holding that was'distributed to the vast majority 
of applicants OSiC^) was only 1 *37 hectares on average .of which only 
1%3& hectares were agricultural land# Over 70? of such land was distributed 
in the ' form of small holdings whilst the remainder (3(3^ ) ivent in the form 
.of residual estâtes* The Land Reform helped to solve the ’chronic land 
hunger of.: part of the Slovak peashiitryi :. Given hov/ever-the.'constant pressures 
of, population groA/th and the fertility and amount of available ‘ agricultural 
land it Could not be expected to solve/the long-^ term. prohlenis of Slovakiafs 
agriculture# ' . 4x ' ' 4 4  ' x- - -
In addition to the Laiid Reform the Central Government.made a'determined 
effort to implement necessary agricultural works such as thé control of 
river currents and the improvement of water courses as 1#  can see from 
Table Forty-Five, although there doubtless remained a great deal of work 
still to be done* It should be-, remembered that many of the problems that 
afflicted agriculture in Slovakia were not considered as coming under the 
area of - compétence of the Central Government#. These, t/ere generally problems 
that had their origins in the nature of the economic system and the, role 
of market forces within it, forces .which detorm-inod khe levels at, which 
âgTlcultural products could be sold and thus cxcbon#éd for industrial 
goods* The rate of increase in the agricultural population, the ratio , 
between dependent and adtive sections of the population, the average size 
of holding, crop,, yields and. soil fertility were all factors in the complex 
of problems which agriculture in4Slovaitia had ào face#
Slovakia^ agriculture had not undergo any radical changes during the lifetime
/ x ;  : ; ' -:.X; raoeX;:
./of the Republic and Centra], Government policy v/às; mainly concerned v/ith ■ / ;
. ' carrying out the Land Reform and gradually instituting improvements in' x ' 
: agricultural methods in order to try to improve yields*;. A .start : was , ; 4
made, in providing vetexdnary services and building agricultural x ..x ^
colleges : and schools v/here nev/Jcnov/ledge and teclmidues could be imparted ; 
to the v^ 'ising ,generation of : Slôvaîc farmers*-. : -xx- ' ■ ■ '4 x . 4'
Like many other aspectsxof Slovalc life tixe condition of agriculture in x '
191.0 A/as the result of a long process ofxhistoi’ical development stretching.
■ back over himdreds of years# One could not therefore excpect the Central .
Government in a mère ::tv/o decades to be able totsiliy to rectify all its : x
" shbrtcomings* This v/as eyen more true during the period .when/GzechoslovMcia 
v/as : subject to a. persistent economic depression/that hacl: à deep ahcV lasting ■
. : effect bn its ovm economic development*; Under-such circumstances Central -
- :.. . ' ' xx X. -4-. X-/;  ^ 4 X . . x - x - - -x; ' x . i.:
Government { policy cannot. bÇ judged: too critically fCh 'Ih' the . limited areas x " 
Of Land Reform and the provision of veterinary and educational services .
X it v/as fairly successful, as yields in general rose -fairly consistently : . x .;
during the Republic * ; To a (certain extent this ; must have been diie to thé x - ’
succoss that soma aspects ' Of the■ government - agricultiiral ' policy did . 
achieve, in Slovakia*. ; '  ^ >x ' - X; %xX '
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CoiîiHiimlcations
The railway investment program of 1923 was not fully Completed by the ':
end of■ the Republic although most bf the major lines were built. Some 
of : them were clélàyed because of the economic deiiression whilst the 
completion of the Margecahy^Cei'vena SkalaXine was further hampered by 
strikes of construction A/orkore in 1931* .
By 1936 Slovakia together i/ith Euthenia had 4,334 kilométrés of track 
in .Use as oppossed-to only 3,680 in 1921^^ and 3,879 in 1929.^ ' Thus 
toA/ai'ds the end of the Republic Slovakia possessed no less than 2?#73/4 ; 
of the total length of track in use in the Republic# In view of the fact 
liOA/Over that Slovald-a alone contained 32^ of the total area of the Republic 
and population densities were Iqiver in the eastern half of the country it 
could not be said that the neti/ork was sufficient to meet all Slovakia's : 
needs*
The rate of progress in bringing more track into use in Slovakia and - 
.Rirbhenia A/as faster in the second decade of the Republic's existence#. Only 
199 kilometres of track were added to the netv/ork.betvieen 1921 and 1929 
but 437 kilometres betv/een 1929 and 1936 which indicates thatthe pace of 
construction i/as considerably higher during the Eiirties despite the 
economic crisis that, must to some extent must have curtailed government 
spending in this/as v/ell as other fields# A great deal still remained :
undone- however and- such problems as a unified railway tariff A/ere still 
not solved by 193S* Tims Slovakia's exports to the Ozech Tjonda v/ere still 
hampered by a-relatively higher tariff per ton/kilometre than v/as generally 
charged v/ithin the Czech Lands# . The main constraint on Slovakia's - 
development represented by the legacy of all its communication routes being 
orientated toAjards Budapest had been largely overcome by the end of the :
:Republic, but the problems of maintaining the track, updating.and improving
4 - ' ' 4 ./ /. ".acü)-: 4. '
both the rolling-stock and the signalling systems to a uniform standard
still remained to be ..overcome*
The road network was also improved and by 1936 Slovakia.had 14,713 
kilometres of road representing 20#96^ & of the Républic's total -as opposed 
to 11,333 kilomètres in 1930^ '^  and 13,136 (Est) kilometres in 1920*^^
Thus v/e may note that despite the various eco/iomac ozusis-there v/as a 
marked^ if not sufficient, improvement in oveiicuid cent [unlcations in 
Slovaliia between 1918 and 1938* - .
Personnel and Staffing
The . problems %/hich v/ere involved in finding sufficient reliable staff 
to man both the central administrative apparatus and local government 
in Slovakia meant that from the beginning it was necessary to use Czech 
personnel in the absence of qualified and experienced Slovaks* The 
presence however of a large number of Czechs pemanohtiy resident and
working in Slovakia who together with their dependents, numbered 120,096 . ,
Qq . . \ •
by 1930 - was seized upon by SSL'S as proof of its argumehttthat the .Central
Government v/as determined tO treat Slovakia as a colony# A' colony , that was
to be exploited as a source of raw materials,, ruled directly from Prague
through the intermediary of a few Slovalcs and mhhy Czechsloyal to the
Central Government* In return for the loyalty these Czech officials were
regarded v/ith better posts and higher salaries'than many of their Slovak
counterparts* '.
Co have, already discussed the reason for the extra allowances in Chapter 
Five and v/è v/ill limit ourselves to mentioning the that irrespective of ; 
the truth Or falsehood of ESL'S claims it is very doubtful whether 
Slovàliia. could have ■ been administered at all in the period I918-I92I ifere
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it not for these muchfmalijpied officials* Now as time passed and the 
first Clovalc secondary school and nnlversity graduates made their 
appearance it became increasingly obvious that many of the positiOnsn 
which they considered as rightfully theirs by virtue of their educational 
qualifications alone were still occupied by Czechs* The,latter having 
once given up their posts in the Czech Lands or in former parts of the 
Âustro-lîungariQn, Empire thus had no jobs to return to and tended to hang 
onto their posts in Slovalcia* These qualified Slovaks or at least part 
of their number felt that this was the reflection of. a deliberate government 
policy rather than the consequences of an imbalance between the number of = 
qualified applicants and the number of suitable posts available. Those 
Czech officials v/ho already hold posts could not be deprived of them merely 
on account of their nationality* Not only A/ould such actions have been 
felt to be markedly unjust: but also would have tîireaténed the security of 
tenure that many office-holders, irrespective of nationality#, had come 
to expect from their jobs* A simi3.ar situation prevailed in the 
administrative apparatus of the Central Government in Prague v/herq there 
W02# very few opportunities for accommodating SlovalA graduates# Hie 
latter in view of the seriousness of the economic situation would be facing 
competition from Oaech and German graduates from institutions of Ixigher 
education located in the Czech Lands* Here as ajoII some Slovalcs believed. 
that there was active discrimination against, them*
One v/riter, Culen, in a work published during the. quasi-independent. Slovalt 
Republic,A/ent as far as produce a set of statistics, whose origins he 
fails to disclose, that shovj astonishingiy lev; proportions of Slovaks 
employed in Central Government institutions in Prague# Using the 23^ 
of the Republic's population who A/ere inhabitants of Slovalcia and hence 
not only Slovalîs, he then procédés to drew up tables of relative 
discrimination against Slovaks in each of the Mijuistries and other 
institutions* This he does by comparing the extent to lAich the proportion
; - i . . . ; /: ; ': :
pt S3.ovaJ,£8 falls short of $Ms/ Tighre of 25/1# , Suoh mi approach is 
■ highly’suspect,; not oiily bocahso of the imposslMlity of checking the ' 
date : on which .it, is hased but also as it makes the. miBpokeh assumption. :; .
that. there. .was a surplus of Unemployed ■qualified, Blovaicjg^  v;ho, were not 
only sufficient : in nuuhor to staff all .the central and local .government 
Organs in Slovak!.t bur also could have provided 25& of-tho holders of.the - 
posts .in. dontral ';Goyerhinent'bodies# in Prague# In'view'of the fact that ' 
qOcoiidary education:: in .Slovoida had only been available in Slovalc- since ■ - 
i9l8 and:'offectiveiy since 3.920 such an assumption seems false*' The
lOir mimher . of 83-0vales in Prague need not necessarily bo taken as proof . ,
of any.discrimination against Slovaks ,as Ouch on :the Jxirt. of the Centrai 
. Gbvernmont, in Prague* " .
If we examine carefully the date presented in; Table Ti/ehty vjo son see, at 
a glance that there.are two salient points* Oho that the proportion of , 
BloyalcÉ who A/orkod in all: branchoB of administration and, the free ■ •:
professions was as early.as .1920 far higher than one Could have-expected#" ' 
Mo loss than 48^^ of all the administrative ,peraozmel in Blovàlclà. A/ore 
Bldvalcs A/hilst only 25*0o were Oaechs* IJnfor.tnnately these figures : do not 
.give- us'- any indication • Of what, proportion' of W p  high admi’nistrative post's 
Were held by Czechs, although : the latter did tOnd to, pro.dOitinate at the ■ ■ ■ ■ 
higher level especially in the railway service' whore they, were originally . 
' brought in. to overcome the effects of-a ■'cripp3-iilgr railway strike in 1919 
that had been engineered, from Budapest» 4 " ' ' 4
'The numbers and proportions of Magyars shown in the figures for 1920 
are still quite.high'and this, probably reflects’ SrObar's, policy of leaving 
,in place as a t.emporary expedient those former Hungarian officials who 
A/ore prepared to. swoar an oath of loyalty to.the Republic#: By 1930 the 
.number ofMagyars.employed had dropped in all but public service and the:
, free professions* Hieir place had.to a large extent been talten by Blovaka
and Czechs, the numbers of whom show considerable ■..rises# In state service 
the number of Slovai^ s rose by 37*0^ but the proportion of the total number 
of Slovalts : that were employed in this field remained unchanged at 20*8^# ■ 
lilhilst the number, of Czechs rose by only 14#3.^  no fei/Or than 45*1/4, of / ; 
the total number were employed in state serviee in 1930 where' they still, - 
constituted 4l#M of the total number of employees in this field-compared 
to 1920 v;hen 46>i'4 of Ozechs made up 49*4/4 of those in state'service,
Thus we may conclude that despite the increase in the number of Slovaks 
in state service the dominant element remained Gsoch* This field and that 
of the railways and public service were in fact the:only three areas .in . 
which the Czechs: increased their percentage share^ v/hilst, overall their 
share of the total of administrative personnel remained almost, static at 
22*9/^  in 1930 .(23*/0 * ,Thus^although the number of Czechs grow by l6#Dl?4 . ; 
overall in absolute terms in percentage'terms they, constituted no greater 
proportion of the i/holo in 1930 than they/had'done in . 3-920# /From this " 
we may cpncludo that their presence.was not a great inhibiting factor in ; 
the employment of Slovales* Indeed in the ton years that: separate these - 
tA/o sets of statistics, the number of Slovaks groAf ih all fields# with, .: r
the; solo exception of the r ai limy s v;here it remained' almost totally static
Afhilst the actual number of employees foil by 8*1?^*.. The highest rise in
the number of Slovalcs# 126#'^  ^was recorded in the field of public service
: ' ' " 'v ^' ' . ' -  ^ \ . . ' ' . ' ' : ;
and the f3?ee, professions. which itself expanded by 72#31^ iu this period*
In . every .case the rise in the number ,of. Sj.0vales'was, greater than the
percentage increase in' the total number of employées in each field* An
increase Of over a third in the number Of Slovaks in a, decade surely : , ■
indicates, that 'tho-untruth of mWy of the accusations of,,bias and ;
favouritism level3-od at the Central Government, by
If any one group ..had ..cause to complain it, was surely. the Magyars A/hose 
numbers declined by a third overall but by even greater proportions. in the 
fields of state service I railways and posts. In education the .drop A/as of
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the order of one-quarter which in view of the fact that prior to 1918
Magyar had been the most t/idely used language of instruction seems
remarkably small*- It may reflect the fact that despite Magyar complaints
to the contrary : there v/ere at least at the primary level sufficient
teachers of Magyar tongue* The, only bright spot was in/public service .,
and the free professions where the number of Magyars increased by :
Thié re].atively large drop in the number of Magyar may ,reflect not only
government policy, in refusing to employ men whose loyalty ^ àstfolt to be
unreliable but also the fact that a certain number of Magyar officials
had decided to return to Hungary once Central Government power had been
firmly established in Slovakia.
Unfortunately X have been unable to find sufficient data to allot-/ me to 
make a similar broad comparison for the state of affairs that prevailed , 
at the end of the Republic* I can therefore make no firm conclusions . 
about employment trends up to 1938» On.the basis of the information in 
Table Tt/enty we may venture the tentative conclusion that although the 
total of Slovaks employed in these field was relatively small it has never­
theless increased considerab3.y in only a decade. Indeed the, proportion 
of the total v/orking population* engaged in state and public service and 
the free professions in Slovaliia rose from 4*0;o in 1921 to 4.0© in 1930*
The dependent sector rose from to 4*2g© and the proportion of the'total
population that belonged to this category from 3*2^ to 4.0^*^? These 
figures were not much below those recorded for the Czech lands in 1930 
where, those engaged in public and state service and the free professions
reached 3#0^ of the working population, 4*OJ<5 of the dependent section and
qQ
4*7^ of the total population . In absolute terms the numbers of those 
involved in this field were as follov/s*
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VIoridng. population
Dependents
Total
1921 
46#800 
49,300 
96#loo
1930 increase 1921*36
64,200 37*1
:80#800 63*8 .
143,000 :^#9 _
We may note the rise in the number of dependents whicli might.he interprétable 
in terms of an increase in the number of married men idth children in.; ' 
this field .or a rise in.the average size of families. In any oase while ; 
the number of those active in these.fields rose by only 37*1^^ the numbeh 
of dependents rose-by . 63*8;?^* r - . ' . .
We can thus see that the number of Slovalcs employed in state and public 
service .did rise* ’ Although, given the ; economic circumstances there were 
still probably not enough posts to satisfy-all the demand from qualified 
Slovaks* Apart from its .Educational, pol 10reS hpA/ever thè Oentï^ al : ' 
Government did not seem to have any policies t%iat A/Ore epecifioally 
designed to encourage^ the number of Slbyaics. in these fields* This A/as 
probably the v/èalœst point in its efforts to combat autonomist propoganda* 
.The number of jSldvalts rose in response to the demand for qualified personnel 
which A/as.only indirectly a consequence of Central Government policies 
such as a planned expansion in the provision oq educational services and 
the reform of local government* ■ ,
OonClusion . " '
As we have seen many, of the Central Government 
meet with'a limited measure of success in impie 
Yet despite these success. Slovakia was;still fac
policies in Slovakia did 
njienting their bb jeotives # 
ed A/ith serious economic
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and social problems that stemmed mainly from the inability of its basically 
agrarian economy to generate enough wealth to provide the majority of its 
inhabitants with a reasonalile standard.of living* These problems had deep 
historical roots and could not expect the Central Government to solve them 
all-in only two decades* It is clear however that its policies were some 
what piecemeal and patchy* There was no over-riding long' term and inter­
related goals within #hose framework policies could be laid, improvements 
in individual areas such as health and education were often made without 
talcing into account the effect they might have on other areas such as 
employment# The improvements in health care Tec lo a lowering of 
mortality rates and a rise in the number of those who survived, which 
despite the falling birth-rate# had serious conse.quencos* For it threw" great 
pressure,not only on the ability of Slovalciafs economy to absorb the 
extra productive forces within the existing labour market but also on the 
avaii.able food supply that could be grothx*’ Although yields did increase 
there Was obviously a limit to the amount of food that a basically peasant 
system of small holdings could produce under given:climatic and soil 
fertility conditions*
The most serious shortcoming on the part of the Central Government i-ms 
the lack of any industrial policy. The latter should have been aimed 
at developing Slovakia's industries and her mineral wealth# as a means of 
overcoming-the problem of providing enough work for the growing population 
cuid raising the general standard.of living# As we have seen progress on 
the industrial front was virtually static.until the end of 1937 when 
industrial output began to rise once again* In nuf^view this lack of a . 
long-range industrial policy A/as one of the main factors in Slovaltia's 
continuing underdevelopment vis-a-vis the Czech lands* .The effects of 
this underdevelopment and the unfortunate conjuncture of the economic 
crisis that occurred from 1921-23 and during most of the Thirties helped 
to swell support for EBL'8 whose leaders it would be fair to say, did not
' : i ' «iZlSü,; - ' ' . '. -. ' . . :
Wdérstaad the need for economic dëvelopmoht either* . Drawn from the 
ranks of, the small. Slovalc intelligentsia that vas composed, mainly of - \ 
teaohere, priests, làA/yérs and officials, they had very little under­
standing of business, as most of^ .the businesses; in. Slovakia were in 
the/hands of non-Slovaks, Magyars, Germans or Jews up till 1918# None 
of the other political parties:with the possible,exception.of the Communist 
whose call for Slovakia's industrialisation came only in 1937 really under­
stood the deep-laying reasons behind Slovakia's/ problems# % During the ; 
Thirties the Central Government was too occupied with the problems caused 
by the Depression and the threat to its security from Nazi Germany tO; be 
able to devote enough time and energy to solving, Slovvulcia's problems* ;
To a certain extent anyway it was content to leave èconOmio:matters to 
be regulated by the existing market forces and restrained from massive 
intervention in the private sector# Unfortunately, Clov^îia's iadustries 
before the First War had been largely fostered through the,provision. Of. : 
aid from the Hungarian Government-and onco it was terminated under the 
Republic .méâÿMf;'them were unable to continue# The cohtinning failure' , 
of the Central Government to realise the need to encoura^ industrial 
dovolopment in Slovakia ims perhaps the greatest weMmess Of its, policies . . 
which despite the severe economic climate that,, prevailed during; much of 
this period, achieved good and .lasting results.: especially in the field ■ 
of/.QduoatiOn#
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The existence of a political system in which the'government is comprised 
of. several parties, elected at regular intervals., is supposed .in theory - ’. ,
to he highly responsiv© to the public will, Yet. the reasons : that ; impell . 
voters to give their support to or ivithdz#w it from any particular; party . : 
are comp3,éx and difficult to elucidate idth àny degree of accuracy* Thus . ,
on : the surface the results of elections are seen to reflect only the rise 
or fall ih the popularity of ..political, parties and groups without necesBàrily 
helping to reveal the reasons that lay behind voter behaviour*.
The establishment of th© Republic in I918 meant that Blovalcia was to 
experienoe.-almost Overnight a vast expansion in the area of political 
activity* Under Hungary not only was,the franchise,restricted to some 6}ê 
of the adult male population# the ballot open and the constituencies in 
many cases, vdldly gorrymanclered but also even within this framework the ' 
îîuhgàrian authorities exercised a great deal of pressure and intimidation / 
in order to prevent the election to the Diet of bo.th non-Magyar .candidates ' . 
A/ho represented the nationalities and the Magyar opponents of the 
governing ]6arty# - . ' : . . / :
It would be an error to assume hoA/ever that Slovakia A/os characterised'by ■ 
a total lack of political activity# It A/as nevortheiess present despite 
the fact tl'iat it was .on a far loss developed level thanj-in the Czech Lands#
It should be stressed that neither in Slovakia nor in ,the. Czech Lands 
: A/ere political activities Entirely miinflu.oncéd by the general social# - 
economic# polltical .and cultural level of Austria or. îiungary; respectively*■
By the .late. X89O's’-the greater dogreé oiU political .rights under Austria, 
including a A/ider4franchise# had helped to create' the' conditions ■ in .v/hich 
a larger number of iGseoh parties could'flourish* Even at this early stage ., :
y the'-main trends in Gzoob pplitioal development viz4 social democracy,,; • ■ ■.
; 4 agmidanism aiid clericalism bould be clearly seeh*. ' • ■
. In. Slovakia there ivaq in actual fact only a single political party,; the 4 > 4- 
' Slovak National Party (Slovonska nKrodna strana)D:e SNS). v/hiolv functioned 
as an umbrella group under v;hlch divergent, political trends were to, he ■ % l-y. 
' found* These trends had not-yet developed into.separate independent: ;
political parties as their existence would have seemed liiglily problematical ' 
in'viev; of-- Slovakia* s low leVol of material and cultural, development and 
4 the prevailing atmosphere; of Magyarization and nai lo ) il, oppression# /
After Slovakia .Ajas. finally incorppratOct into, the Republic in dime the 
' way:was open for various Slovak political groups to constitute themselves 
as. indopendont political parties# This A/as a.natUral rosponso toya;. ■
. changed situation by Slovak politicians themselves, a Situation in which
■the scope and opportunities for political activity A/ere wider than ever, . 4-
before and the prises for successful parties and politicians correspondingly#^ 
■greater# There is, think, no ■truth, in the ohak'ge that party politics 
and political strife A/ere an umA/elcome ■ gift from the GsOchs to the Slovaks ■ ' 
as even in the pre-v/ar period . disharmony among various groups A/as by no 
I m e d n s  unknown# ■.:. ■ ' : 4.y ■ r; ; ‘ . . ; ■
Inspite of the slightly imperfect electoral lav/ A/hich functioned in such 
a imnmer as to lessen,Slovakia*s' représentation in both chambers/of the 
National Assembly,. for. A/ith 22#%o of the population; in 1930 she A/as: . 
allottid only 61 deputies in the loA/er ' House, the Ohaiiiber of . deputies 
(POS.lajsyecka Bnemovna) instead : of 69, the franchise A/as unquestionably 
A/ider than could ever have been envisaged under Hungary A/here, there A/as , 
ever, only a handful of Slovak, deputies in the Hiuigarian Diet of some 453 ■ ' 
.members# Thus in. the, National Assembly the .Slovalc-members;'had.far-greater 
control over laA/s that/affected them directly as there A/ere noA/ enough of
4 - " ; - . : ' \4 - . . - ' \ ’ ' . - / . ' -yf:. . 4 : ' , ' ;
' them to make their voice heard#, : -, ' ' ;:'V ■
Over a million .and a half people v/ere novt eligible, to vote 'in 1920 in ..the ■ 
.parliainentary elections : in Slovaicia :aione * , ■ This faqt may well' have been :
an attraction to lnâny "Gzechoslovalc^ .^ parties to campaign in SXovaîcla. as , 1 
well as in the Western , part of the country* These parties, had till 1918 
functioned separately;, in thé .Czech Lands* They had either ^ çoalosced A/ith 
Similar groups in Slovakia as in the case of the Caeohoslovalv Sooièl. > - ■' . 
Democrats.and the Gzecho-Slovalt People's'Pm^ty, which contained the small . 
group of SlOvalc clericalsI led bÿ Andrej Hlinka^ or.had simply changed 
their name to include the title Ozechoslovedc in order to comply. A/ith the 
new state - of : affairs that had come into being vm/fch. the establishment of ■. 
the. Republic^ ,: Such'ptu'ties campaigned in Slovakia either by -themselves '
; :.or in ail. electoral alliance V/ith .d. Slovak party* ' In - tho first category , 
com© the Gzeohoslovak People's Party (Adth its Slovak members),4th© Osecho-. 
Slov^î National Socialists and'thé Social Democratei Thé, second category- ■ 
was represented by the Slovak National and Peasants' Farty formed by the 
merger of the old Slovalt National Party and a group ..of Slovak : agrarians 
under the .lc ide-*Bhip of Mi3,an. Hodza# This newly*-fOrmed party/campaigned ■ 
in its oim right in' Slovalcia but : wqs .allied to a Gzechoslovak party, the 
Republican .Party, of Agrarians, vdth t/hom it sat and it voted in. the ■ National 
Assembly* This fact cannot be considered in any way as giving credence - 
to the Autonomist charge that .the .Czechs deliberately introducod party 
politics, into SXovalcia in attempt to "divide aiid rule"* Differences 
of opinion and .class, religious, and etlmio divisions already, existed 4 
in Slovakia* /Even if the .Czechoslovalc parties retedned from campaigning - 
there,Where were, still sufficient/SXovale political groupings v/ho vjould , 
have competed just us hard for as large as possible à share of the vote* ; '
. The 192P election results do not: help'; Us to dédhcé much about the attitudes 
of dif fereiit .groups in Slovaltia; to the Centrai /Qoverhment's policies. For
' ’ ' 4 ; - / , ' -
Such; policies as there v/ere had not yet been placed upon a permanent' basis
by the time of, the elections# Blovaltia had been free of Hungarian forces
V  4-
for less than a yea?? and. 8rchar's administration was struggling to cope
on a day-to-day basis v/ith the many problems that Slovalcia faced# ■
In addition to this Blovaliia like the. rest of the Republic vias affected 
by a great degree of social unrest#.. In most of Europe the first two to 
three years after the end of the Hrst t%rld War ims 'a period of great 
hopes and expectations a/ïiong the war-weary populations of the successor 
states# They perhaps expected that once these states had been.firmly 
established and the peace treaties' signed there 'v/ould -be a swift return 
to the more normal conditions■ of p.eaGe-tirne that/had last prevailed in 
1913* They also hoped to see the implementation of a large number of basic 
social refèrnis such as land reform, and eight-hour woii^ ing day and a forty- 
-eight hour week sickness, unemployment, oid»»age ahd dependants' ' insurance 
sdhemes, -the provision.of various types of pohsions and some form of public ; 
housing* This latter commodity vim -In very short supply in Many countries 
at the end of the war* The expectations of the broad mass of ..the population 
had been undoubtedly hightened and this their disappointment of the fact 
that in view of the tremendous havoc which thé : war' hud caused it would be ,. 
some time before all their demands and expectations could be satisfied, ■ ; .. 
tms'imderstandably all that much greater# Th# Russian Révolution was ■
also an. impoz'tant factor in influencing the mood of the people to a certain 
extent,.it was however by no means the only such one#
Among all the states of Central Europe Czeohoslovalcia was, by and large, - , 
the one that was soonest able to return to some degree of normality* The 
post^war economic crisis whose effects lasted till 1923 and the persistence 
of :revisionist hopes in rump Hungary v/ere hov/ever tv/o factors that darkened 
the overall ;picture* The need to maintain a strong and united state in 
view of the.dangers which these and other factors presented was reflected 
in the.Gohtralist nature of the Constitution adopted in 1920* .It did not
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acknowledge.the.autonomy or iadiviâuallty of any single constituent ' 
part of.the Republic as auch# The status of Ruthenia was still a matter 
on which the final decision layVill the liantts of the Paris Peace Conference,
The centralism of the Constitution was matched by a salient feature of the 
parliamentary elections in Glovaltia in 1920, -Only one party campaigned
as a SloWc party in electoral alliance with a Czech party* This was'the 
Olovak National and Peasants*' Party^ '. - All other groups and parties/polled 
either-as a part of or in conjunction with a'd^echOslovak party* In this 
we may.see a'concern for unity in the face of the many economic» social- 
and political dangers which the Republic seemed to be facing in 1920*. '
Both the results of the 1920 elections in the entire country and in 
Slovakia show certain similarities as can be. seen by a comparison of , ■; ' 
Tables.A in the .Appendix, The Social Democrats » won an overwliealmiag 
share of the vote nationwide vis# 29#7/^  for the Czechoslovak Party, 11 #3^ . 
for the German Party* 1, for the Magyar^Germem Party whilst 8#]$ went 
to the,Czechoslovak National Socialists: a total of 46#?% of the entire 
vote was thus cast in favour of the socialist, parties# In Slovakia itself 
the figures were as follows# . -
Table Forty-Sight ' , . *
Czechoslovak Social Démocrate : 98#9^
Mngyar-germmi Social Democrats . 8,0%
Csechoslovalc National Socialists 
Total of votes.for socialist 48,7%
parties#
This, result is somewhat surprising as not only is it higher than the 
result over the comitry as a.whole but it bears no relationship to the 
number of industrial workers in Slovakia which'was primarily an agrarian
GOimtry#; Tlie victory of'thé Socialists in tho Czech Lmida could he explained 
as .the.: natural eonsequenco •of-the number of industrial'workers amougst the ' 
population vihich- both proportionally end in terras of. absolute. uumhers was 
for Mgher: thaii .in Slovald.‘a* It should however, he pointed but; that in 
later years-,the- Communist Party gained a relatively significant share -of 
the poll. 139 #4% in 1924); i n 'Bubçarpatlxlma Ihtthehia 'which pas even less 
industrialised than Slovakia mid whose- living 'conditions were very low ; ■ 
indeed*: One should therefore he.cautious in analysing votersK motives fpr . 
a particular ^ arty it pay he in ; certain, cases - purely an e^ cpression of some 
form of protest rather than a positive iMentifioation with and commitment ' 
to the particular ideology espoused hy any one of the parties*
The election results for 1920 show the . extent to which Slovakia was', caught 
up in-the same social cUscontent •that ' was sweeping the Czech Lands* A 
notable difference in voter behaviour between the two halves' of the country 
was that whilst it could bo safely assumed that in the Czech Lands many ' ’
of the industrial workers and their dependents *; forming the bulk of; those ::,, 
who supported the socialist parties* #hould continue to. vote for one or 
other of these parties (including the-Communists), at all subsequent 
^parliamentary elections no .such assumption couldl be made about those : 
who had voted socialist in Slovakia in 1920$ They were far more likely . 
to be tempted into switching their support to,any seemihgly credible ‘ 
alternative party* Especially if the,latter'were•to: prove.able'to exploit- 
existing discontent and lay the blame for it at.lhe,. feet of the Central • 
Government and its policies* with whom the socialist parties were strongly 
identified during the period of the so-called Pod-Green.Coalition ,
(primarily of the Agrai'ian'and • socialist parties) from 1920 to 1929* ■ .
The effects-of the'post-war economic: crisis^ of 1921-23 were deeply felt •' .
in;:Slovakia where the process of closing factories and re-asserabling them 
elsewhere had alrbady begun even before the.crisis arose*- .Ti%is process 
was of course not the result of■governmental; initiative or pressure but'
\ : , _ y ..
was niainly dictated by the vjay in which private companies were to interpret, 
economic criteria and;implement these interpretations in practice#; The 
resulting^unemployment and loss.of productive capacity v/ere facts that the 
Sipvale People^S: Party, could muster in their political struggle against the 
Central Government. In this the slogan of autonomy for Slovakia played a 
large part# ; Both'these facts could be interpreted to the Slovak electorate 
as : the result of deliberate government policies, intended to turn Slovakia 
'into a purely.agricultural appendage of the Czech Lands# .In fact after 
1926 there was a return to a free market economy and thereafter the ahiount 
oat direct Central Government intervention in the economy v/as insignificant# 
To a large extent the tactics of IHinka*s party consisted mainly in, 
attributing all Slovakia’s ills to either deliberate or else inept Central 
Government policies# In actual fact many of these problems had doep-robted 
causes and in several cases had been even more acute under the former 
Hungariani administration..
By 1923 however the Slovalc People’s .Party had definitely adopted an anti-. 
Prague coursei This was confirmed by the exaggerated and pathetic language 
Of the;^ilina Memorandum presented at the party’s Congress in 1922* By 
the time of the first JBupy elections in 1923 the party had succeeded 
iri; improving its share of the poll compared with the 1920 p^liamentary ■ 
elections when as.part of the Czechoslovali People’s Party it polled 
233,389 Votes (17*4%) and won twelve in the Chamber of Deputies,
The 1923 parliamentary elections reflect both the growing success of the 
Slovak People’s Party (which now called itself after its leader the Hlinlca 
Slovak People’s Party HSL’S) and the effect of the schism within the 
S00ial : Democratic Party that eventually led to thé founding of an’ 
independent Czechoslovak Communist Party# The latter was perhaps the only 
political organisation to include within its ranlcs members belonging to 
all the major nationalities of the Republic#
The Social Democrats’ share of the poll slumped nationally, from 25*7/^  -
to whilst the Communists collected 13#11% of the total vote. In
Slovalcia this drop was even more pronounced; from 38.3% to a'mere 4*2^  ^
with the Communists gaining no less than 13*2% of the poll.
A,no less spectacular result was that achieved by HSL’S in capturing 
34,3% of the total poll in Slovaîïia., This figure is only slightly smaller 
than that achieved by the Social Democrats in 1920. The Slovalc National 
Party had parted company with the Slovak Agrarians who re-joined the - 
mainstream of the Czechoslovak party. It fared very badly in the-elections, 
obtaining only 2.4% of the vote in Slovakia whilst the Agrarian Party 
gained 17.4% in Slovalcia and improved its share of the poll nationwide 
from 9.7^ 6 to 13#7^ *^
Agrarianism was thus not without its attractions for a certain'section 
of Slovakia’s agricultural population; these were probably those more 
prosperous peasants and land-o\mers who owned enough land, to be able to 
produce a surplus for market* As the Agrarians formed part of every 
government coalition from 1920 to 1938, we are forced to conclude that 
those who were dissatisfied i&th their standard of living and tended to 
blame thé Central Government rightly or wrongly for not doing enough to 
improve their lot, were not among those who voted,consistently for this 
party*
Thus HBL’S must have draim part of its support from the poorer sections 
of the Slovalc peasantry. By 1923 the Land Reform in Slovalcia was far 
from being completed- and even those who received land had on average • 
a very small holding that was barely sufficient to support their family.
A part of the: Slovalc intelligentsia, schoolteachers, civil servants, local 
government officials etc, may also have given their support to IISL’S or 
to * the., Slovak National Party, as a mark of their disgruntledment over the
large influx of Czechs into Slovalcia where they held; high positions 
that were not always commensurate with their qualifications, The 
additional allowance that Czech officials in Slovakia dhow, partly 
because they still often had to maintain two homes, one in the Czech ,
Lands and the other in Slovakia, were often the source of a great amount 
of jealousy and resentment, oh the part of their Slovalc colleagues,
A factor Vïhich should not be overlooked in ascertaining the sources of 
later support for HSL’S is the friction that was caused by the difference 
in outlook between the Czechs in Slovakia and the Slovalcs. The latter 
were still very deeply influenced by the religious teachings of both 
Catholic and Protestant Churches. They could thus not fail to be concerned 
at what they saw as the Czechs’ secularism, their progressive: ideas, and 
lack of respect for Slovak religious feeling. One can therefore understand 
the concern with which the Churches sought to retain ns much control over : 
education as possible, seeing in it a possible barrier against the spread 
of modern secular ideas from the Czech Lands to. Slovakia,
The entry of ESL’S into the ruling coalition in 192? may well have been 
a factor in the loss of 100i000 votes which it sustained in-the 192? &ipv
c;
elections,^ Alternatively it may reflect a growing sense of disillusionment 
on the part of a minority of the party’s supporters, who perhaps felt that 
the party was not really able to bring about, by means of exerting pressure 
on thé Central Government, any real improvement in their living conditions.
The Provincial Reform of 1928 may also have contributed to this feeling 
of disappointment for it contained very few real provisions for Slovakia’s 
autonomy (See Chapter Five).The drop in support for HSL’S from a high 
point of 489,111 in the 1920 parliamentary elections to a figure of 323,388 
in the 1928 elections to the provincial assembly (as the electorate for 
both elections was virtually the same) may v/ell be explicable in terms of
voter disiiliiaiôniîient. , The figures 'C.ontained in Table I^fty-Three show 
that the percentage of the poll which went:, to certain parties remained - '
remarkably stable whilst■other parties .displayed.more volatile . . , . '
rfluctiiatibns#-s The smaller GzeohoslOvalc parties in Slovalcia tended to -
retain a similar percentage of,the poll in both Ideal government and . , .
parliamentary elections, whilst the larger parties seemed to experience . v 
• greater movements in voter loyalty, in percentage terms, II8L’S share, of : 
the poll fell from 34*3% in 1923 to 24.6#% in 1928 (Provincial elections). 
Whilst the< Agr^ians, Social Democrats Czechoslovalc People ’ s Party, 
Ozechoslovalc National Socialist, National Democrats as well as the .Communists 
all. increased their shai-e of thé poll* A certain number of voters therefore 
must have switched their allegiance away fromllSL’S’ to. those other parties. ;
The results of the 1929 parliamentary elections must be considered against 
the background of what was later , to become knom as the Ttdîa Trial. The 
facts of the case are as follows. DtL Vojtech Tuka the editor of Slovak q 
the party newspaper published an article entitled Wacuum; Juris** on New 
Year’s ûb^ I928 in which he asserted the existence of a-:sécret clause in . ' 
.the Declaration of Turciansky Svaty Martin ( Bee Chapters Two and Three). 
According to .the terras of such a clause after a period of ten years had 
elapsed from the date of the founding of the Republic. Slpvaicia would be free 
to decide whether or not she would continue to be associated vâth the Czech , 
Lands in the same manner as before or opt for greater autonomy, independence 
or some form of association with another state.' All laws and ordinances ; ■ 
issued by the Central Government were ho longer valid and a legal vacuum; 
(Vacuum .juris) had ensured which meant for example, according to. the - 
arguments advanced in the article that it would: be perfectly legal to withold 
payment of taxes. . - '
The publication of this article led to Tuka’s eventual arrest on the 29th: 
January 1929 but tMs did hot happen until after a private action over this
.t.. } \  : - L -
/ ' . % .': .' <;' ' - - ' .. ' . 
very question of a ' ’secret clause’ had been brought against him. ; ; He;'. ; /
was tried and sentenced to, fifteen years* imprisonment ;for espionage and .
treason on the 13th October 1929 and his activities as a Hungarian-spy./;
.and. agent provocateur as well as his links v;ith the, Hungarian-financed : '
irrpdent movement in Vieima and Geneva were revenlOd at;his trials ^
The effects Of such revelations on the election results in somewhat : 
problematical* The election^took place: On 2?th October just twelve days 
af ter TUlca*s sentence* Although HSL* S lost'some : 86,000 votes compared to ; - 
the last parliamentary elections; in 1923 it gained 7.8,000 votes : in ; 
comparison, with the 1928 elections to the nev;ly-?formed Provincial- AGsemblies^ 
(Bee Chapter Five), The elections took place on 2nd December.1928 and 
thus the fact of Tukà’s arrest could have played no part in the loSs ;in / 
votes, which HSL’S sustained in 1928* It is hard, to believe.that there t; 
■Was'therefore anÿ; significant. transfer of votes from IISL’S to the 
Çzechoslovalî parties as. although it is clear that they did not fully 
recover the position they held in the 1923 parliamentary elections. Indeed 
although by;the time of the. last parliamentary elections in 1933 they ' '
gained almost the same number of votes as in 1923 percèhtàge-wise their 
Share of the poll ,(30il%) was still below that of 1923 (34.3?0 , Although 
the Autonomist Bloclof ''f^hich H8L* 8 formed" the major pahty together with 
-the Slovalc National party, the Polish autonomous parties.-aiid.a Ukrainian 1 
party (polled an .extra 74*000 votes outside Blovaltia achieving 6*9^ 4 of . 
the national poli), comps^rod to the 1928 Provincial,elections the Agrarians’ 
.share of the poll fell slightly from 20*3% to 19#%^ although in absolute 
terms it rose by 7,000 votes^ Tlie Czéchoslovalt National Socialists, ; : 4 
National Democrats, Social Democrats,all registered small percentage 
.gains whilst the; Gzecho-Blovak People’s Party and the Communists lost 
ground, ' ' A; /:; . ■ ^
As HSL*.S was beginning to expérience a decline in its aharo of the poll,
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indicating a loos.in itG popularity, as early as 1927 when it lost over
100,000 votes in the second gupy elections, v/e may conclude that tiie 1929 
result represented a stage in the party’s recovery from this low point 
in its fortune* If the Tuka trial had really shaken the BlOvalc electorate
Y
then one might have reasonably expected Feldis Juriga’s brealc-away splinter 
parby to have.gained more than the slight number of votes it actually did 
(3,395)• We must thus conclude that the reasons behind the party’s failure 
to regain the position it had achieved in 1925 lay elsewhere*
The departure of HSL’S from the coalition on the 8th October 1929 was thus 
perhaps motivated, not; so much by any decision to defend Tulca based on a 
misguided belief in his innocence (as shorn by his nomination as a candidate 
in the 1929 elections he . was however not returned as far as we Imow) but 
by a realisation, that such a step might help to arrest the decline in 
popularity which the party had experienced* The new provincial system of 
local government that had come into operation in 1928 did not really ensure 
a good measure of autonomy or satisfy voters’ desire for Slpval^ ia to.be 
.guaranteed some genuine form of self-government so that the living standards 
of the mass of the people could be improved. If H8L’ 3 had continued, its 
association with the ruling coalition this might have daimed it in the eyes 
of too many voters as being part of a government which did not do enough 
for Slovakia* A return to opposition might therefore once again serve 
to identify the party as the only one genuine Slovak defender of Slovalc 
interests* Such tactics seem to have been fairly successful, for the 
party gained -28,1% of the poll as opposed to 24,6% in the 1928 Provincial 
elections, , 1
The Social Democrats.in both halves of the Republic continued to improve 
their share of the poll* The Slovalc National Party did not poll 
independently in 1929 but joined an electoral bloc, comprising the National 
Democrats and the Carpathoruthenian Labour Party, which however won only 
4,9?^  of the total poll in the Republic, The SNS never polled on its ovm.
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again, in any parliamentary election, although from the provincial election 
results of 3-92§ and 1933 we may estimate that its share of the vote in 
Slovakia, lay in the range of and ^ ,000 - 40,000 votes. Unlike
HSL’S.it v;as never able to gain a larger following and transform itself 
into a mass, party* ,
Both the German and Magyar minorities in Slovakia had a large number of 
their own political parties. The salient fact about the Magyar parties 
was that they did not apparently attract the entire Magyar vote as the 
total percentage of the poll that went to these parties ima lower than the 
proportion, of Magyars in the population as a whole, although the number 
of those of voting age may have shovm a different percentage# It cannot 
bo ontirely ruled out that a small proportion of Magyar voters may cast 
their,votes for one. or other of the Czechoslovak parties or even for HSL’S 
although this, .econisaa very unlikely possibility. The Germans parties 
were generally far too small to be able to get any representatives elected 
in local government or.parliamentary elections. They tended to form 
electoral alliances either with Magyar parties in Slovakia or vdth German 
parties that polled in the Czech Lands, In many cases the Gorman parties 
in Slovakia were often only branches,of larger similar parties whose main 
sphere of operations lay in.the Czech Lands, Some Germans in Slovalcia (as 
in the Czech Lands) may well have voted for non-German parties,
,1933 gives an interesting opportunity to compare the extent to which voter 
support for each party varied from provincial to parliamentary elections 
or not as the casé may be. In Slovalcia the Agrarians lost a small part of 
their support (See Table Fifty-Three) whilst the Social Democrats gained 
slightly, the relative positions of the other,major parties being but 
little changed. The votes cast for the Autonomist Block in Slovakia 
were about 1§ less thrni the combined votes of HSL’S and the Slovalc 
National Party in the 1935 Provincial elections.
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The économie and political conséquences of the World Depression (1929-1933) 
were not vrithout effect on the 1933 election results in both the provincial 
and parliamentary election results. The growing strength of the Sudeten- 
deutsche Parte! led by Konrad Henlein can be gauged from the fact that 
nationally it polled 13.1% of thë vote, capturing the majority of the 
German vote including most of the German vote in Slovakia* . If we compare 
the results of the parliamentary elections with the percentage that each 
party obtained in the Provincial elections we do not find any great 
variation* If however we compare the 1929 parliamentary results with 
those of 1933 we may see that the four Czechoslovak parties, the. Agrarians, 
the Social Democrats, National Socialists and the People’s Party all 
registered small percentage losses, viz, .
Table
1929 1933
Social Democrats 13*0^ 12,5%.
National Socialists 1 0 , 9#I%
Agrarians 13#(Va • l4*^
People’s Party 8*4fü . . 7*4% . ),
These losses may very : well have been caused by some German voters sivitching 
their allegiance.from.thosepparties: to Henlein*s Sudetendeutsche Partei 
as.-two German parties also showed heavy losses. The German Soclfàl Democrats 
share fell from 6,9% to 3*6% and the Christian Socialist People’s Party 
from: 4,9^ 4 to ^*C%* . .
The success of Henlein*s movement, as well as the economic", social'and 
political conditions of the Thirties, may well account for the increased 
militancy of HSL’S after 1929 when it left the coalition* Henlein’s 
movement may well haVe served as a model for HSL’S although à further factor
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in this process of radicalization was the emergence of a young radical wing
y
within the party called the "NastupistsV (See Chapter Six)#,
Inspite of the 30«Iv» of the total vote in Slovakia which the Autonomist BloC; 
captured in 1953 other influences were still to be felt and îïSL’S could not 
be said to represent the majority of Slovak voters# The Agrarians and the 
'Social Democrats in Slovakia still maintained a considerable share of the 
poll whilst the Agrarians actually polled better in Slovalcia (1?#^) and 
Ruthenia (19#0%) than in Bohemia (12#?%) or Moravia (l4#2%)# Paradoxically 
enough the Communists also obtained better results in Ruthenia (25*6%) 
and Slovakia (12*9%) than in Bohemia (9*0%) or in Moravia (8*6%)#
From.a study of the. election results from 1920 to 1955 we can conclude that 
although minlca’s party and its strivings for autonomy were undoubtedly 
attractive to many Slovak#, Slovalc public opinion as reflected in voter 
support for the various parties that contested both local government and 
parliamentary elections was strongly divided# One cannot therefore conclude 
that all Slovaks desired autonomy per se, more than they wished to secure 
any possible improvement in their material conditions of life*
. BIGHT i 'SLOVAKIA AND' MUNICH: : ' '. ' ' \ : \ - ' .
The extent to, which the.■ demands for. Slovakia’s ' autonomy that HSL’S made : ■  
..during the time of the'Kunich crisis were a factor that effectively. weakened, 
the Gentral Goverhment and rendered it- loss able to, resist the r deman do: of :
,.its;'Allies is one; that; is open to debate* Byv pressing its claims however 
':'at,'..such a crucial .time when the Republic’s government was .being,.subject - 
tp;great pressures from outside HSL’S undoubtedly .did contribute to the -■
■ goheral .complex of forces and events-that were to,culminate .in-the signing 
.of. the Munich Agreement and all that was loiter ' to entail, - ■
Various interpretations have been advanced to e%lain wly the party chose 
to behave 'in such; a way at a time when .the Republic itself was in great y. _ 
danger# Both...communist' writers of tli.é' 30*8^ ' and some Ozechoslovalc exiles • ■
V': -  4 2"':-;:-:.::' ' \ -
in the West have - purpbrted; to show that H$L* S deliberately sought to . 
betray the Hepitblic’s .Constitution by undertaking actions that were designed 
to bring Bloval^ ia out of - the Republic ;mid create an' ihdepondent ■'Blovaîc ■ ■ ‘ .
state, wW.ch.in fact; did not..come iiito. being;until March 1939* . .Such;: . .
interpretations , are - generally based,, on'/tho facts of the Party’s links with 
gother bodies inimical to the continued existence of the.'Republic such as. .,
' the, :sudetendeutsche-Partei. as well; as the creation; of : the independent.; . ■ .
Blpvak state . .that lasted from' 1939. .to 1945 and was controlled, exclusively 
:. by HSL’ B*. .Very often ideological objections. tp,; the ;;ahti-dommuniBt: and .
Gatîioliî outlook of the party and the. Fascist nature , of the Slovalc state 
have .also been adduced as being conclusive.proof of.the:disloyaD.ty of 
HSL’S. If we try; to disregard thè. superficial, one-sided interpretations 
and hurried Judgements that are often;to be found in such studies .and ; , '
consider the-facts in.a more objective fashion we;shall soon see that the 
.truth of the -matter is >more complicated than at 'first.,appears* ,
Two later studies ,one. by:a Slovak. communist. historian and the other by a
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German researcher have been shovm that such is the case* The party was , 
never a moîioXithic whole but contained within itself both pro-German, pro- 
Folieh àhd pro-hungarian orientations# The intervention of-foreign 
governments in the crisis v/as a factor that helped to determine which 
orientation would finally prevail# Hitler calculated that the older 
generation of ESLhS members despite their basic loyalty to the state 
vfOuld be unable to resist-the■opportunity that the crisis presented' 
to, press forward with their demands for Slovalc •autonomy* This does not , 
show evidence of any,collusion between Tiso (who became party leader on 
%inlcaW death) and Hitler or any of his intermedlataries in the SdP as 
at that time not even all its members were fully aware of Hitler’s plans# 
As we shall see thére was;some form of cooperation between BdP and HBLM 
Wh'ch was limited to some measure of coordination of .their efforts, to 
secure autonomy in the parliament# , . .
This does not rule out the possibility that there were contacts between
the .pro-German group"within the party*. M^ch and both 'Burcanslcy brothers, 
âhd Hitler’s '.emissaries in Berlin and Vienna v/ho might have been doing 
all they could to achieve a state of affairs in which.Slovakia could . 
obtain its independence and turn itself into a totalitarian regime oh 
the lines of Germany or Italy# Without the rélevant documents however 
the truth of such an assertion can unfortunately not.be tested*
: ■ -, ■ ■ ' '■ /
The déâth of the leader of the SNS, Martin ïîasus in the summer of 193?-
had removed a moderating influence from the leadership of the Autonomist
Bloc* Witliin the ranks of HSL’B the existence of two distinct groups v/as
becoming more and more evident# The young radical group were lmo#as the
’’Wastupists** and were grouped around a fortnightly publication Kwtstup
6
(Advance) that had commenced publication on I5th April 1933# It was 
published and edited by the f^rcansky brothers Jan and Ferdinand# The 
line of the, magazine was generally anti-communist, anti-semetic and anti- 
Ozech and reflected the views of these young radicals who were admirers
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o,f the existing fascist regimes in Europe and advocates of. their ideologies* 
The Austrian model was especially attractive to them has#d as it was in 
the ideas of the Austrian philosopher Otto Spann# IHs philosophy was v 
essentially a blend of the Christian Socialist ideas that had first been 
Oi^ mressed in an encyclical of j&pe Leo X and thè medieval notion of a . 
corporate state (Standerstaat)# Such an ideology aimed at a society in : 
which the entire population wohld be organised in various corporations 
in Such a manner to abolish competition and class conflict and promote 
the harmonious coexistence of all members of society#
Thè seventh Party Congress of HSL’B , held, at Piestl^"' in June 1933^ showed 
clearly hov; far the "Nastupists" wore: able to monopolize the debates#
They were able to gain the upper hand and get a resolution passed that 
rejected an offer to Join the government on the grounds of the signing of 
the Czecho’èlovak-soviet treaty of l6th May ,1933 against which the resolution 
protested as a sign of the Bolshevisation of the GSR* Mach and others 
wOre able to replace a resolution that expressed a concilatory attitude 
.to the Central Government m t h  one that called for CzechoBlbvakiàlès 
inclusion in the Anti-Comihtern Pact on the side of nations guided by 
Christian.principles# (One doubts whether Germany could have been included 
in this category). Buch a declaration must have been pleasing to the
representatives of German, Italian and French Fascists groups who were
lie
9
' '1 . g
present at the Congress « The report of th s resolution appeared late
and in a censored form in the Blovak Press*'
HSL’S* linics with the numerically insignificant groups of Czech Fascists*
the National'Union of Fascists and the National League of Fascists dated
Ü0
back to 1934 when they held a Joint conference with the SNS and the 
right-wing of the National Democrats at. which issues Of a,.common policy ■ 
and common tactions were discussed* In 1933 one of the Fascist Leaders,, 
Stribmy, vidted Bratislava where he later entered into negotiations with
 ^ .. ' .A" ./ .V . , " V ; :
minim# These however were fruitless as the Fascists, did not join the. 
Autonomist Bloc# ' ; ’ ; y ■ , , , , \ % '
. '. . /' . '' ' .  ^ ' - . - '. ' _ . ; y;
An important decision reached at the seventh Congress was;a generalV -: : .
agreement among.most of the.delegates to arrange celebrations of the
20th anniversary of.the signing of the Pittsburg Agreement,(Bee Chapter .
Four)# This could serve as a focal point for a renewed campaign for the
provisions contained in‘this document to be incorporated into the .
Republic’s Constitution# .By this time however Hlinîm had moved away /
from the idea of demanding mere; atttonoray for Slovakia and towards the
idea of formal political récognition of Slovalc national individuality.
This would be best provided by the creation of an independent Slovak
government vdth responsibility for all areas of'Slovakia’s life except /
Foreign Affairs* Finance and Defence which Èére to be left under the
control of the Central Gbvernment in P r a g u e T h e  recognition of the ;
. Slovalîs as the. second, nation in thé state vrould really have, meant a . '
-federalization of the. Republic* This would-necessarily; have meant the
breation of virtually two sovereign states,with àn elaborate and complex
deliniation of area of joint.interest.and responsibility as was the :
practice of the Austro%mgarian Empire: after the Ausgleicb of I867. It
is not therefore surprising that thé;. Central Government, was unable to ; . : .
agree to such extreme interpretations,,of the ■ notion. of autonomy#
During 1938 the other parties in Slovakia^were, forced ;onto.the defensive 
by HSL’S who were fully aware of the;favourable implication^ of the '
International situation for their struggle to' gain some degree of autonomy 
as Tiso had mialysed the international situation at, a meeting of the '! 
party presidium in 1937# The Republic was only just recovering from 
the effects of th% World economic crisis# Coupled with this fact went 
the additiona]. factor of the European political climate which seemed 
most tliroatoning# ..Roumania and Yugoslavia, OzechoslovalHa partners in 
the Little Sntente* . seemed to be falling more, and more under Gerïîian
domination# Hitler’s occupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 must also 
have troubled the leaders of a state with such a large German minority*
His success in entering and occupying the Rhineland Could not fail to he 
seen as a,great triumph for German nationalism and one that would give 
a boost to separatist,tendencies \d.thin the Sudeten German minority.
G2.echosl6vaîcia*;s allies, Britain and France, seemed hesitant smd unable' 
to moke a firm stand against Germany* The Soviet Union seemed to he an ' 
ally that co$ld not he counted upon either politically or militarily in 
::view of the Moscow show trials and the later purges of the Red Army* The 
Italian invasion of Abyssinia seemed to highlight the insfficency of the 
League of Nations as an instrument .for the maintenan.ce of world peace and 
a means of ensuring the security of'any of its members* One could go as 
far as to say that CzeohosloValcia v;as beginning to be faced with the 
progressive downfall of its security system that had been built up over . 
many,years by Béne^ upon the basis of treaties and mutai non-aggress ion 
pacts between Czechoslovakia and many of her neighbours, agreements that had 
often been concluded under the auspices of the League*
The., invasion of Austria in March I938 o.nd her incoi'poration (Anschluss) into 
the German Reich.was. an event that, at a stroke, nullified and neutralisèd 
the effectiveness not only of the Republic’s many treaties and their 
provisions but also her military preparedness* In short she was not more 
or less surrounded by hostile countries* Her programme of building frontier: 
defences had .been primarily directed against Germany - 'her defences on the 
border with Austria were loss extensive and were not yet in any state of 
completion* Hungary was still implacably hostile and strongly • pro-German 
and pro-Italian* Poland, under Colonel Beck had also been pursuing a 
: strongly prO-Oerman foreign policy and was thus not concomed at the threat 
to Ozechoslovalcia’s security* In..fact she would certainly have opposed.the- 
passage of ^Soviet troops across her territory to aid Gzechoslovalcia in the 
case of-her being .attacked* , ■' .
The ^Nastupiatu v/ihg of fîSL’'S grew in influence as by the end of 1937 all
^ '  ' ' iU5 - :the Party’s Press was in the hand of radicals, Bidor was; the editor of
’ Blov&^" Mach was in charge of /Blovënsk^f Pravda'- whilst Durcansky remained
with ' Nastup^’# The latter publication had been banned for a period of six
months from 1st October 1937 to 15th April'1938 after the appearance of an
article by one of the Durdansky brothers that urged the transformation of
Slovalcia into a totalitarian state* This banning order led to riots at
the Comenius University-in Bratislava among the large number of pro-Nastup
students who were supporters of Mach and'3DÙx’cansky*s ideas* Such ideas were
not BO different from those advocated earlier by Dr* Vojtech Tuka* The . .
latter was pardoned by the President and released in 1937 after having
13made a somewhat relectaht confession on condition that he resided in Plzen - 
and took no part in political life* He returned to Slovakia only after 
Munich* '
In an interview in a German^language Prague newspaper, Bohemia, on 29th ‘ 
December 1937, Ittinka reiterated his demands for the recognition of Slovalc 
national individuality and stated that death would be preferable to 
Czechoslovak unity (i*e, the ‘’unitaryV idea of one,state, one nation and 
possibly one language too), ; The new year 1938 began with a good many 
.slogans appearing in the party Press such; as "V Movom Rpku do utolm-in the 
New Year into the attack” and “Sbohom Pralio#Qood**bye PragueV The latter 
slogan also appeared in an article in Slovak on the 23rd .January that 
threatened to say good-bye to, Prague l,e* that the Blovalcs would sfek' 
independence if no. concessions were forthcoming from the. Central Government 
on the vexed question of Slovalcia'a autonomy*
wIn answer to a declaration by Hodza of M s  willingness to try and reach an
17equitable solution of the Slovak question one. of the party’s senators 
É
Mederly proclaimed .on 4th March a five-point programme of his party’s demands 
which were as follows* ... ;
D/A-»
X) The. recogmition of Slovak national individuality*.
a) The nse of Slovalc as the official language in all areas of Slovak life,
5) A Parliament (shorn) for Slova1.cia*. . ^
4) A réorganisation of the territorial .division of. the state* This; ..
. probably meant that the Moldavian Slovaks would be brought under the
.jurisclxction of Slova.kia, , ,
5) A reform of the schools with.the reorganization of the curriculum along 
Ghrxstiah lines# ' . .
Hod%a replied to these demaiids in a .radio broadcast on the 28th March when 
he stated that the Government would halt de-nationalizing trends and remove 
mioraolieS in its minority policies, This speCch; led to the first joint 
declaration of HBL’S and: the minorities on È9th March 1938, k
Y
A delegation from the SdP %#nt to Rusomberok on the 8th February to discuss 
the possibilities of joint action^  with Andre j îHinka* He however .-was not 
pro-German an<^  was wary of the. German government’s church policy. As an 
e%©ri©need Slovalc politicians, he must have been fully aware of the attitude 
of the Hungarian government on the question of border rectifications and the 
revision of the Treaty of Trianon, It hoped to regain at least the southern­
most strip of territory,along the Danube where the largest part; of the 
Magyar, minority Was to be found, ICLinlca may thus have, sanctioned sOmé sort
; O ' ' '
of cooperation with the United Magyar .Party for tactical reasons in order 
to be.able to exert more pressure on.the Central Government.but he would be 
carefifL to refrain from, doing anything that might be construed as. . 
strengthening the Magyar revisionist claims, Jn.liis talks vdth the BdP 
H3.inlm thus limited himself to a loose coordination of the party Press with 
that of the SdP, An issue of the rBlovalg- on the 27th. February spolie of 
HSiiS and the minorities fight for the same goal i#©,. autohomy*
The Anschluss in Austria had a profound effect pn the internal political
situât ion, r The German Agrarian Party (Bund der Lan&dLrt e ) voluntarily '
dissolved itself on the 22nd March , and joined .‘the BdP and was soon followed 
by the reiminihg two German “activist” parties*. The policy of factivism” 
or German cooperation with the central government was now,effectively dead*. 
The reduction in its parliamentary majority which the coalition thus - 
siifferred made it all the more imperative for the government to try and reach 
an understanding v^th HSL’S* Its'entry Into the coalition was however 
opposed by the Social Democrats and Hodsa was forced to abandon the attempt# 
Hlinka and Tiso fully understood the impact of the ânscliluvss on the central 
Government# HSL’S overcame its reluctance and issued a joint declaration 
on the 29th llarch 1938 with the, United Maggar Parties and the Polish United 
Party* , They-demaiided pblitlGal autonoRjy for the non-Czech peoples and an end 
to, the'.: fiction Of., a Czechoslovak nation* HLinka had ; originally not wanted 
to associate his.'party too close3.y; With this kind of .approach as he .did not 
wish, the Blovalis to be considered as a minority but as the second nation in 
- the-state* Neverthelessthe opportunities presented by:.the .itoschliiBs wore 
too good to be ,missed as by joining forces with the minorities . Hlinha. hopod 
that the Central, Government would be more likely to accede to his demands, 
especially in view of the tense .international situation that"had been 
'.worsened by. thé Anschluss# : • -
attention was primarily.directed .tow#!ds reaching a solution.:of the Sudeten 
German.problem and trying to improve its deteriorating security situation# 
There was also the question of th® : opposition ...to any such demands that 
existed mnottgst the : members of the Various Czechoslovak parties especially 
those Slovaks.who like Derer were strongly committed to political.centralism# 
President.Benestoo,.was opposed-to any weakening of, the:unitâry nature of 
the State and the Gzechoslovgdt ideai  ^ ,‘ : ' - - '  ■
iThe Polish government was concerned to make as much political-and diplomatic 
capital as possible Out of these Blovalc demands for autonomy#' It maintained
" % - ' . : "239- - - - ' : . ' - ' ' ' '
a special section in the Foreign i^ ïinistry , : that devoted'itself to a study 
- of Blovak: affailrs* The Polish Press usually::supported Blovalt demands* 
Hlinlm himself had visited Poland in August 193? and the delegation of 
American Slovaks who brought the original: cbpy of the, Pittsburg Agreement 
to : Slovalcia in June 1938 were accorded great hospitality upon their arrival 
in Poland on route to Slovakia# The Polish consul in Bratislava was 
instructed on the 28th-March 1938 to get into contact with HELbs for the . 
pilepose of arranging"political talks at the highest level#^^ This probably 
would have amounted: to no more than discussions between the consul and. the 
prO#Polish section-of the. party* Bidor was invited to, ; Warsaw. in•May by■> • 
Colonel Beck who persuaded, him Of the. advantages of a Blovaic-Polish union, 
although such a scheme: was decidely Unpopular in Slovakia# ; .
Sldox’ was placed at a disadvantage in the struggle for the leadership of 
the; party after Hlinka’s death-in August 1930* Ms.. polonophile ideas were :
■- .imp.opular both within the party and among the Slovak population as a whole 
- , and ;Minka’s death had robbed him of a valuable patroh whose support:; had. ■' - 
enabled him to maintain his position in the party* He was.thus forced to 
come to an understanding with Tiso who became the undisputed leader of the 
party although the ;position-of-head of the party was formally left unoccupied
' {Si \ ' - ' / -
: foxpa year as a mark of respect for . Hlinka# ./■ -
The -[high point of the autonomy campaign came in June when the Party Congress 
wae ho3d and the delegation from the Slovak league of America arrived# . They 
brcufhv with them the original copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement which was to 
be shown to. the crowd at the.célébrâtions of the 20th anniversary of its 
% signing# This delegation saw themselves as mediators between Czechs and 
■ Sïovâké^ '^  but;-their role, was rejected by the Centralists and they were 
cleverly used by H81’ 8 to put forward their propoganda. Bones and Hodza 
met the délégation and llodza assured them: of his goodwill in solving the 
SlCVaic question*
-“ *240“* - '  i/ /
The Party Cohgréss was held on the 4th and 5th June# Mach and DitrcansKy
put forward a plan for the revision of the Constitution to provide for
Blovalé autonomy .and a separate Slovalc army# As this group had been
maintaining contacts: with Nazi circles in Vienna the creation of a
Separate Slovalc . army might well have been in Germany’s interests# It could
conceivably have been used, given the right political conditions, to subvert
the Republic or to carry out any other-tasks the Reich might have required
of it# .
Several démonstrations where organized at which Hletko^ the leader of the 
American delegationi showed the original copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement 
to crowds of several thousands people# At .one such'meeting in Bratislava the 
representatives of the SdP Wore to be seen at the side of Hlinlta and ïîLetko* 
This was probably a reflection of the tactical necessity that forced the old 
guard to cooperate Mth' the BdP with whose aspirations and ideology they 
felt no sympathy# They were also under pressure from -the younger pro^German 
section of the party, Mach and Surcansky, to' cooperate with the SdP and the 
latter group as we have :seen had been in contact with the Republic’s enemies 
in, Vienna# ' '
Benes was slow to accept the need touiegotiate with HSL’S* In a speech, that
he made on a tour.of Slovakia he urged the Slovaks to stop being Slovaks
- '' ' ' ' ' ' pA- . : '' ' ; \
and to start being Czeehoslovalc# That is they, should consider not merely
their own interests but the dangers facing the Republic » :.
Such lingers had intensified-during the .month of September* On the first; 
day of the month went to Befchtesgaèkn where he received his final
directives on the part the SdR was to play in the doi-mfall of. Gzeohoslovaltia 
where a, sustained campaign of agitation, ostensibly for Budeten'autonomy, 
and of subversion v/as'to be unleashed*, On the Slovak side after thé death 
of Blinka the Party Presidium where Tiso could.effectively command a majority 
agreed on 19th. August to present eighty-page decWent to the National
Assembly# ' This, outlined plans- for the .altération of the - Constitution so ■ ,. 
as\to accommodate .' Slovalc. domaiids for; autonomy# ■ ■ - . . .
No further action 3 talcen.imtil :7th: Septemhex'# , Then, a délégation of . ■ 
ïîSL’S members-weIV uo Prague: to present à memoprandum listing their demands ' 
to/Lord.Runciman, the English mediator.whom thé.Oontral Government :had agreed 
to :aocept. in;an.effort to"solve the: Sudeteh question* - Negotiations between 
the two parties had bo.en goiixg .pn.' for . some. time but so far had not reached.. 
.miy; agreement# It, was yitM for: llitler’j.:plans that .ho ouch agreement should 
bo reached so as to provide him with à ..convéïTiont excuse to seize the border 
areas of Czachpsloyalcia and thus satisfy, his territorial demands*: - :..
The IIBL’S delegation met vfith Hodza Who advised Tiso to seek an audience
'  •; . v  ' :  : ■ - ' D ' - 2 9 . : . v .
With President. Bones, Tiso-was; received the .follomng d a y . B e n e s  was
angered by. HBL*3; contacts with the SdB'aiid, the fact that it had taken part
in joint consult ations ; ; wi th ; the GdP. %whothen. issued- à ■. communique - célébrâting
this fact*. Here .HBL’S ■ let itself be used by the BdP. as a meanS; of .putting ■
even greater pressure' .on the . government .by hint ing thàt -BSL’S might be ' ’
, lured away .from its basic .loyalty, to Mio xclea of a Gzecho-slovak state* It
would then conduct its ;cainpaigh; on the. bar ij of ■ minority rights. ' ,Such .aé .-
approach was quite; dangerous - as it would leave the;'Czechs . as an isolated ■ .
minority (45A8%) of the population . and destroy the ideological basis, for
the Czechoslovak-state* It would thOn be in danger of falling apart into . ;
its constituent area each of .which wouid be easy prey for: such hostile
Tiso refused to let himself bo pUfehed into : such an extreme stance# : He was ..; 
unable to.accept-Béhés offer to settle his demands on/the basis,of the 
Fourth;Plan, one that :bàd been . v;ofked, but in the negotiations with the ' 
Sudeten Germans ..and which .they 'badiré jected. Tiso .declined thi^ offer , :
because it woUld have had.the effect of creating areas for national 
minorities in Slovakia and thus given a measure of self-government, to the ■ '
Magyar .ml3iorlty#' . This, v/as in fact: one, of ; thè demand of thé United' Magyar 
Parties-,- led by Bsterhazyi ..M^io'however xms/itiolihed to view such plans 
With-suspicion for to.create ^ such,areas meant rimnihg the risk -that might 
s'ecede. either yoimiI œitÿ or‘be./subverted .into joining Hungary* Any 
alterations to l^ovaliia’s borders, essentially her long ànd. osipoeed frontier, 
with Hungary ;Wes something .to which most-of-îîSlitU were completely opposed.
^  ‘ \ y T  ' 4  . 4' _  ■ ' ■ '/ . ' ' ''4^ ' ' ' /  - - ' -. ' ' '
The issue of jgloyak on the llth September carried ah article by Tiso, > , .
In it/he stated fhat: his pàtiehcé 'was at .an end and. engaged in angry polemics 
%'Zith Behes : over his, unWillingnLéss to malte any more .concessions to the Party,’s 
demands#. This, .article whs hot,meant to imply that negotiations were at an 
end but were aierely intended to. put pressure bn Bones to bontinue to negotiate. 
Behind the scenes tho other pressures on-him *oiao of which like the Budeten 
German situât ion made ah early: Settlement of tho Jlovai^  demands imperative #
On the 13th Beptèaibor ; h meeting of, :.@lovak senators and deputies belonging 
to the political parties that made up ;the.coalition passed a resolution 
cailing for a reasonable decentralization ;of power, within'the country# ..
At the saiae time, Tiso was ordered by the party leadership to try and reach 
ah agreement with BenOslA délégation. of ; HSL• S members, : consisting of 
Tiso, Bidor, -.Bokol and Bùdày;met with:3ene^ on thé i5tli September, Bones' 
.suggested an.agreement to/regulate/theii* ;differehees but he. was:not prepared 
to give any. recognition in wx^ itihg of Slovak national .individuality wMoh 
he made dependent -on the acceptance of the Fourth'Plan by ,'the Slovaks* The
The same day the Sudeten crisis reached its brealcins-^ point,. Henlein fled 
across the border to.Germany whoro he issued his famous ”Heim ins Reich” 
call to iiis foliowers, saying that . they ; were no longer willing to remain 
part of Czechpslov^d.a but :wanted to go: home to the Reich, : A campaign of 
civil disturbances and'open rebéllioh/bégah in the Budetenihnd and armed 
bodies of men ,\the Freikorps, ' were involve d in/ clashes with Czech■police *.
There were casualties on both sides but o^der Wàs: soon, restored* The 
campaign of; agitation; bluff and GOimtér*»blhff continued .on mi international 
piano uith Hitler using'these events to.exert pressure ;on the British axid 
.Frenoh Governments to force the Gzech6#sloval io agrée to cede those.areas 
that.were inhabited-mainly but nOt oxclusiveiy by Germans to the Ëëioh,
(hi the 19th September Tiso sailed .a meeting of aénators and deputies :
, bo Bx'atislava.'where, they passed â résolution--.-in -which..they stated their -; -
détermination to. continue to fight for autonomy (dobo jovatl bon o autonoroiu)*. 
thi memxt’^that .willy-nilly .hegotations'with. Benes would, have to continue* ■ -
Benes^fOr his part p#t. foiWard à proposai ih. the National Assembly that ESL’S 
should enter'the coalition but he, - was una^ to get a . ma jority for much: a 
plan* Hodzé .however needed the votes of ' i n  order to be .able to 
resist the joint proposals of ,.the British . and French gOvemments* .; ; Uhese 
proposals were, :fOr various territorial Goxicessiohs to be made to appease 
Hitler’s demands*/: In return for their Wupport;lHodza pUt forward a ;plan ',, 
that contained various social économie aiid political’cpncéssiohs*;, 'These 
involved'the handing over, Of Responsibility for educational, cultural, social 
and economic affairs to an elected body, together with. à reGo^ition of :. : 
Slovak national individuality# -% \ ■ *  / ., /'
Tiso promised to put Ihese ■proposals -to. a ' meeting Of : thé tParty presidium - ' 
called for the. 2lst September which-wpuld decide; whether'Or'not' they were y 
acoeptabie* ; Meanv/hile reports . had been -appearing in the Czech Press that. . .., 
HSL’S had: agreed to join., the coalition* These premature reports, angered . 
the-members of the .Presidium and they. a^ only to ; the .talW;^  being : ■; 
continued# ' This however brought. no result and On the 22nd September Bénes, 
dismissed Iîod%i and appointed a .militàry' ,mah\General j*: ..He took,
a more- energetic' stand; on- the need to,' Reaclr an understanding with ,H8L’8 . : ., 
and bring them into the coalition* .Negbtiatiohs began/again and a plah was. - 
dram up that combined various ,proyisions tha;hwere'calculated to satisfy /.
-I ‘  ^ : . ' / ' . " y . -
I'KjL*.s'demands* , ; / • ■ .
Para^aph IVo/of Article One of this plan provided for equal recognition 
for those who wanted to regard themselves as Czechs or Slovaks or even 
Czechoslovaks* .There wei*e provisions.for the use of Slovak as the official 
language (Article Three) as well as various, economic concessions including 
the stipulation that, 3C^ij, of all central government and civil service posts 
Were to foe reserved for Slovaks within a period of seven years# Article 
nine provided for the political administration of ; Slovakia based txpon a 
renewed county (%ipà) systems ' There was also to be a Slovalc par].iament 
(sx^ em) mth competence in leg^ al# administrative # economic and cultural 
matters. - These;provisions however represented no improvement on what - 
Ilotiza had offered but Tiso was by then inclined to accept in view of the % 
announcement'of the Polish and Hungarian ,^ bhat theytoo^had territorial 
demands# . mbst of which concerned parts of Slovalcia*.,., The party leadership 
accepted these proposals only as a buâis for ftrrther negotiations#;
The. .following .day .s<aw the mobilization of part of the reserves#., .It 
prooeoded.smoothly everywhere in ; the Republic and there were various 
declarations Of loyalty to the Republic from groups of Slovaks#, including 
a;resolution of a meeting of workers in Tcnava Organised by the Socialist 
and Commmiist parties in Slovakia that affirmed the loyalty of the Slovalcs 
to the state* . Slovak units assembled and took up their positions without
any signa of disaffection, or disloyalty
.;Negotiations continued and two Slovalcs (but not members of HSL’S) were 
appointed to the cabinet# External events however preoccupied the central 
government to such on extent that by the time if finally accepted the 
; decisions of the Munich conference, on 30th September and began to implement 
plans to give effect to these, decisions no final solution of the Slovalc 
question had been reached* Slovak in fact did not receive autoziomy until 
after the establishment of the second or post^Nunich Republic which.lasted
iîtttiï. the, Germaa;. iïwaoida - 6m' the 14th March 1939# ,Developments in
^ovelcia after Ifimich lie. oÿtëlde -the scope of 'ttdstwork#.
i'he. qttestioh .6f the to wliioh, the . 'playecl à sigtiifIcaiit part
■in the ■ collapse of ■the:;i!irst .repithliô is avHiost difficult matter, to 
deteritihe# - All the SloWi:;. members : of /'the main ■ political parties stood firmly 
behind, the, .Central Government in ita'difficultieaf Only ■.HSD*8•continued to ' 
press'.its demands àt :a most crucial .time: m-ïd it : ih fact deliberately sought ■ 
to exploit the f act. that the ;'Central; Goyernmeiit m o  undo r great pressures ; 
from outside in order to .'make sure'that its demands sere met;# We need not . 
see in this)aiiÿ conclusive .proof, that lise-has; actively ; seeking to betray . 
the.H0ptiblic'..byifealtening the .Central-Goyernment at a time ..of crisis yet ,, 
it: cannot be .entirely, ruled out- that;hé nas biding:his ■tim.el- throughout the ■ 
month of C.eptember and, possibly, ear lier in an attempt to .see how the crisis . 
would hé resolved# In the event of the breali#%p of the republic his first 
concern would be. to protect Slovaicia’s interests even if that vmUe to require 
the création'of an independent.Slovalc state# ' -
Ihe behaviour, of BSId 8- ,during this time could (certainly be interpreted as ' 
irresponsible# Its leaders seemed to-view the crisis merely as a means of 
ittt-ing 'what they . wanted#;. tCliey ncemed blind to the threat that was posed 
io I ho existence of the state orJ Amyba they were totally , apathetic as to 
what was to, happen as long ae/their;dèman^ wefe met#. By presenting. . 
Buhoimai-i .with a memorandum SiUtlining their demands they must, have unavoidably 
created the impression that the .;Slovtte too desired a radical transformation 
of; the.state'and added to the.British feeling that the Czechs were to a 
■large extent.tè blame for their-predicament# The majority of ElIB members 
undoubtedly-did hot intend to .destroy the Dopublic yet,the actions of their 
leaders ; who ■ .may have genuinely, desired .nothing more, tlian that Slovakia 
should gain, autonomy certainly did nothing at all' to, help the situation*
Their demands only added.,to the pressures that the government had to face* 
Neither was the.Government;itSelf entirely blameless# ' It had had many
years In wlilcli to devise some sort of autonomous system that could Havq 
. satisfied the needs of state security as well as Slovak demands# Instead ' ' 
it did nothing and when an occasion ^  Arose/that compelled it to . talce. this ■ . 
matter in hand once and for all it found;itself overtaken by outside.events# 
Events $ that were to radically affect not; only the fate of the Republic but 
that of Slovalcia too and to bring about ./great changes in its history# ; ;.
Effectively it was not no longer possible for the central .government to ' 
procrastinate any longer* Forces were.moving'W  the international stage 
. that were soon to. make'the.:concept of autonomy totally redundant and lead 
to the creation of ^  independent but short-lived Blovak Republic U'iider the 
protective umbrella of: Na^i Germany* -
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OdncXusiona# Achic vemeht# .and,JfaiIttyea of OerttraX' Govemmont Policy in Slovakia ' / •
In m  ntiB.lf&XB of; historical ëvènta wo can only limit ouraalvea to what;- 
■actually oqcurrod t W  oqnditiona and caused-that lay' behind''those': events#
It ;is:\botlj futilp and entirely frultleas.-.to,, engage in apecnlation baaed on ■ 
what might have, happened but did hot* as they ban throw no light on the actual 
ooutaeof events#' The temptation to do-ao/is,j>hrtioulnrly strong in view'- of : 
those tragic tnrhihg^polnta.;;in-Ogeohoslovakiaha history whi'eh-'were to Imve 
seriouB-conseqnmiCQS for bpnntry* a future# In my ânalyais of-'central..;/ ' 
government policy# howevoz'# I; shall attempt to point out those features that : (
might have contributed ■ towards, the growth and electoral Gucéenn of that segment 
of Slovak political opinion which was opposed to the central government and its ; 
policies during mO(|t of the Firet Eepnblio* ' - ";;■%/ ■■■•■'//■; " -/ "
/essence the 'problem■ whiclV'confronted/the' Oentral Govojviment was that. with ■
.the establishment of the Sephbiic-in 19lB-areas'of different and/ unequal 
économie . development were : now joined together in one political and 'administrative 
.trnit# : Indeed in the early yeara of the Republic the unitary nature of the
State was. markedly to the fore# The two different systems:of local self-’" / ' 
government that/WQre instituted in Slovakia in this period were also subject to 
.strong central gdverhmenl; conti'ol* In any case they did/not'-'poeaeaa/any.''.pbwers;' 
with,''regard - to/-the implementation-of.: central .govommcnt policy "in Slovakia which . 
.was.normally done, through the agehby of central government Ministries* -It can 
■be argiièdI ■ therefore|- that there a certain lack of local initiative Ih 
■ the/drafting;of'''pd.aj'cy-,SIS', this/was'done..in.,.Praguc: v/here the various ministers 
and their staffs could not have been as aWare of .conditions in Slovakia:., and the 
: precise''-nature of the economic'and social problems of that region* -,
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Slovakia* as.wç,have seen* was an area with a predomiriantly, agricultural , 
population# Within Hungary* however* it had. also been of ;considerable /;
importance both in thé production ofrraw imterialB for industry and in 
manufacturing capacity# : The establishment of the Republic in I9I0 led to Vexcess 
capacity in view of the fact that the manufacturing industries in the Gséch 
Lands alone* who.were producing forthe entire Auotro-Huttgarian Empire* a : x . 
market of 60 million people* now found their markets shrunken to some l4 million# 
The establishment of the successor states had created extra barriers to experts 
as; each new state had its own customs procedures and duties* which in the . 
context of the Austro-Hun.gurian Empire had not existed*., and was also concerned 
to protect and encourage its own industries behind a high tariff wall.
%rthermore the post war economic crisis of 1921-23 had a substantial effect , 
on industrial production in many countries# Slovakia’s industries had been ' /
established to a considerable extent tliTough the provision of subsidies by the,
Hungarian govei^ nment on which it was still dependent* Although in general 
Hungarian law,remained : in force in Slovakia after I918 those laws that reflated 
the provision of industrial subsidies were naturally not enforced and nothing 
was done by the Central government to prevbht.the closure of many factories
— —  . ;
This-was notj to.; my mind* a deliberate government policy# Hudn decision^ were ; 
not .the prerogative of. the.government .as these enterprise .still remained in 
private hands and the decision to close them.was taken by the firms concerned#
It bas not the reflection of a government'policy aimed at reducing Slovakia to 
a-mere .agricultural appendage of the CKech lands as the Autonomists were later ; 
to suggest* whose understanding of the workings of industry and business was / 
almost nbtt-existant# but rather the reflection of the lack of an industrial 
development policy on the-part of the government* It failed to realise the 
need to maintain industry in Hlov^ia as the only-way to provide extra employment:
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possibilities for the increasing population which in Slovakia and Buthenia , 
increased at a much faster rate than in the Caech Lands# ( Industrial development ^ 
was also the only way in which* given the; nature of Slovakiaagriculture with 
its low yields and fertility and smaller per'capita area of cültivatable land*, 
living standards could overall be raised and the economy of the region stimulated) 
The question arises tliat in view of the low per capita income in Hlovakia the 
dentral gbvernment migh not have felt inclined to grant the region a large 
measure of autonomy if it were still to have to•remain dependent on the Central,; 
government■for the provision of funds both for items requiring capital expehditur* 
and investment (roads* railways etc#) and recurrent costs such as the salaries - 
of administrative staff* teachers etc, ‘ ■
This failure to grasp the significance of industry for Slovakia although > .
mitigated,by both the severé economic Crisis that the Central Government had' 
to face and the political crisis that it found itself involved in with Hungary 
and later with Na^i Germany is not entirely excused.by them# It is in fact : ; (
symptomatic of a wider and deeper failure to grasp the malaise that affected 
Slovakia which was rooted in the discrepancy between the available economic 
resources and the demands being placed upon them by an increasing population; 
for whom agriqulture could no longer provide a source of adequate income* The . 
discontent which many of the poorer sections of the population felt and which 
among Slovaks was exploited with a certain measure of,success by HSL’S must have 
been heightened by the fact that once Slovakia had become part of the Republic 
comparisons of living standards were no longer made between Slovakia and ; 
Hungary, which under most recent times has depended oh agriculture as the main 
occupation of its people but between Slovakia and the Caseh Lands. And in 
every respect Slovakia could be shoiui to be worse off. This however was in 
general the result of the different historic developments and climatic conditions 
which had prevailed in Austria and : Hungary ààdP#tithly. not the fault 'of. x. 
the central government,* The inability of the GeAtral §overnmeht to narrow the
gap between the two areas whiob despite the many significant advances that / 
the Central Êovemment achieved in the twenty years still .remained as wide 
in 1938 as in 1918 is the inevitable reflection of its failure to understand 
both the roots of Slovakia’s problems and the roots of public discontent in 
(Slovakia*
Considerable advances were made in health, education especially# railways and 
the employment of ..-Slovaks in public service and the free professions# These 
could be.classified : as successes of central government policy in themselves 
were it not for the fact that they left untouched the main problem which was 
one of underdevelopment* They provided the basis for the raising of living ' 
standards by laying the foundations for better health and education services, 
better communications and employment opportunities# The continual increase 
in Slovakia’s population, however,: meant that there would be pressure on 
health and education services# Without an increase in the size of the 
industrial sector it would become increasingly difficult to find employment 
in the professions and public service for all those with appropriate qualificatif 
whom the schools and universities turned out, as there must be a limit to 
the number of white-collar jobs which a basic ally agricultural economy can 
sustain* As it m&b the Central government did not do too badly for the 
peroenta%0 of the active population engaged in free professions, state and 
public service rose from 4*0 in 192O to 4## in 1930* Absolute figures it 
rose from 46,800 in 1921 to 64,200 in 1930 a rise of 3?^ whilst the active 
population increased from 1,193,400 in 1921 to 1,393,2(X) in 1930 - a rise of 
only 1^6* Yet at the same time the number of industrial workers fose from 
224,900 in 1921 to; 247,300 in 1930 & rise of little over 1 0  although the
proportion of the active population made up of industrial workers and Hveton’s 
figures include artisans and craftsmen as well, fell from 18,0 in 1921 to 
17*90:in 1930* This last figure suggest that Slovakia had undergone a certain 
measure of deindustrialisation in the intervening period or at best the,
iduBtrial sector had noè grovm. as fast as others* Thé rise ; of 3^^ foz* r 
the . free professions, state and public., service between 1921. and 193® .must 
be explained in part by the expansion of the education service, especially ■
in the field of secbndary and higher education* as by then a large number ;
of Slovak teas liera would have completed their training*
The degree bf success which the Central S^vernment acheived in these fields.’ 
is best illustrated by the fact that the independent Slovak Republic which 1 
lasted from 1939 to 1943 would certainly not have been able to find enough / , 
qualified Slovak personnel to. staff all its administrative' poets had it not 1 v 
been for the policies-of the Oentral government of the First Republic which i : 
HSL’S spent so much of hæs time denigrating and attacking#; ; . i
The failure of the Central government to maintain and expand Slovakia’s ihdustria 
capacity was caused by .several factors* Firstly such a course of action would A 
have required a large amount of money the expending of which in,the conditions 
of économie crisis that prevailed during most of the I93O’s' would have seemed 
a most foolhardy venture in view of the vast amount of idle plant in the Czech 
lande had the money for such a venture been available# Secondly any moves, 
to expand Slovalïià’s industrial output would surely’ hâve; been opposed hy ; 
industrialists in the Czech Lands would; Imve lost their ,markets;, in Slovakia, 
and might have feared that they would have to compete with Slovak products 
in the Czech Lands* .Thirdly, could industrial production be raised in Slovakia 
without having to reduce it in the Czech lands? Fourthly as all thé,, governments 
of the First Republic were a coalition of different parties policies tended 
to have to be agreed: at the level of the lowest common denominator of agreement* 
It is difficult to imagine that all the different political parties would have; ; ; 
agreed to such a policy* Fifthly many of. the decisions on policy in Slovakia 
v;ere ; taken by men who wore primarily politicians and thus could not be bxpe’cted I 
to have a clear understanding of Slovakia’s needs over a long term^fpr despite
the advances which have been made since 1958 it was still not proved possible 
to close the gap between the two halves of the country* although it has been 
narrowed considerably# ;
It is difficult to aseesstthe changes which had taken place in Slovakia’s 
social structure by the end of the First Republic as no Census was hold after 
1950- Ne can however point out the advances in many fields of policy* the 
results of which are to bo found in Chapter Gix, The effects of the Depression 
were however not only economic for in the wake of wide-spread unemployment and : 
the decline in both industrial output and agricultural production that occurred 
in many countries of the world during the Thirties came great political changes.
In Gzechoslovakia these occurred on both a national and.an international level*
The rise of Hitler’s Germany profoundly affected both the Republic’s security ; :
and the;attitude of its neighbours# Poland and Hungary, The latter saw in / 
Germany a useful ally in their sturggle against Ozechoslovakia# Prior to \ 
1955 hostility towards Ggechoslovakia on the part ofboth Hungary and Poland 
had of course existed but relations with Germany were correct if not very cordial* 
The growth of Fascism in Germany affected political developments within the 
Republic as well. The growth of Sudentendeutsche Parte! can be traced both to 
the impact of the Depression and the direct interference of Gernuuiy whilst in 
the case of HSL’S it may be seen in the increasing influence that the “Nastupisf* 
wing of the party began to exert.
We should not however make the mistake of assuming that HSL’B represented the 
whole of Slovak opinion none of the Slovak parties went to the polls independ­
ently but formed electoral alliances with other parties based in the Czech 
Lands pr were part of a Czechoslovak party organisation that covered the entire 
Republic. This was due primarily to the tenseness of the international situation* 
Hungary was still implacably hostile even after the signing of the Treaty of 
Trianon and by 1922 two attempts had been made to restore Karl Habsburg to the
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throne of Hungary# The election results in 1920 showed that nrost Slovak 
voters Imd cast their votes for parties that were firmly committed to the 
Czechoslovak state# Even 81*8 despite Hlinka’s trip to Paris in 1919 did 
not poll on an anti-Prague line and there seems to have been no mention of 
autonomy in its electoral campaign#
Yet by the beginning of 1922 the party was launched on a definite anti-Prague 
line with its demands for Slovaliià’S autonomy* Although it may well have been 
to the advantage of the Hungarian government to whip up autonomist feelings 
in Slovakia the reasons why BL’S latched onto the one issue of autonomy must 
be sought within the context of internal political developments* SL’S had gone 
to the polls in 1920 fully expecting that it would capture a large part of the 
Slovak vote* Its main rival seemed to be the Slovak People’s and Peasants’
Party and not the Social Democrats* Its shook must have been all that much 
greater when the aoutal resuèis of the elections revealed the massive support 
that the latter liad gained# SI’S was a predominantly clerical party whose 
composition reflected the fact that the Slovak intelligentsia was made up mainlyj 
of priests* teachers* lawyers and a few officials. Very few of its members 
were.owners of businesses or factories as such enterprises in Slovakia tended 
to belong to non-Hlovaks* Magyars* dews and Germans* Thus the party’s under­
standing of the role of industry was limited and it tended to regard it with 
suspicion for it feared that industrial workers would very quickly lose their 
Catholic faith the preservation of whose interests was one of the cardinal 
fentures of the party’s ideology# Thus^although it was fully prepared to use 
the economic effects of the 1921-23 crisis on Slovakia’s industries for its 
own purposes^ it load no industrial policies of its own*
It can be argued that just as the massive vote for the Social Democrats in 1920 , 
was primarily an expression of hope for a better future* so the success of HSL'S 
in capturing 3^ 10 of the total vote and probably at least 4 0  of the votes of
Slovaks in 1925 can be çonsidered a, protest; against the inability of the 
Central government fully to cope with the effects of thé ecohomio crisis on 
Slovakia# The party’s leaders, after the 1920 elections may well have realized 
the need for an issue which would enable them, to attract, votes away from the 
Social Democrats* The'schism within: thé ;Social’ Democrats and the economic 
crisis thus.provided the opportunity for such a policy to succeed but it was : 
still necessary to; find an issued that would convince Slovak voters that , 
was the only party that had their interests at heart* The question of Slovakia’s 
autonomy began to assume the role of universal pahacea for all Slovakia’s ills* : 
Thus the party had a simple and direct answer as to why all was not well with 
Slovakia# It seemed to be saying that only autonomy would solve; the, grave 
economic and,social problems that existed in Slovakia. Dohyersely the ' ' 
unwillingness of the Central Government to aCcede to its demands was seen to 
prove, ill-will which it bore towards Slovakia was regarded as palpable evidence 
of its desire to treat Slovakia as a colony of the Czech Lands* There was I 
feel never any real examination of the actual circumstances under,which autonomy 
could make a significant contribution to the raising of living standards in 
Slovakia. , ■ ' //;■•■. ' . . . '/
By 1929 the Autonomis, fervour seemed to be on the wane# /Economic conditions had 
eased somewhat and the political climate in -Gurope seemed fairly quiet* The. / 
prô-Càechoslovak. parties in Slovakia had retained ,a considerable share pf the ; 
poll in 1925 and again in 1929* Borne Slovak historians have tenddd to argue#; 
especially with regard to the 1933 results, that all votes cast for parties ; 
that did not support the Oentral Government should be considered as a vote 
for autonomy and against contralism*Buoh an interprdation is,mistaken for 
it ignores the reasons v/hy the ( Magyar nationalist parties and the Gommunists . 
derived the support they did*;: The Magyars tended to vote for their own parties 
both out of hostility to the state in which they found themselves living and 
aS a protest against their minority status and the irritations that went with
it. The GoînmunistÇ ;however were oppoeed tO the very nature/of Gzeohoslovak 
society and ueio :in practice till 193P;nt least,: contraliots as Slovakia 
did not have its oval independent, party and trade union organs. Among the ,
Slovaks at least there seems,^ittle eVidenco to show that in the 1918-1929. 
period more: than 3 0  of ' the population, v/ero at all sympathetic to the idea 
of the autonomy* /In many oases they tended to follow the advice of their/ 
parish priest ruid may well have voted for ESL»8 "because it was presented to 
them as the one oat ty timt would defend the interests of the Faith*
The beginnings of the world-wide .économie .crisis in 1929 mark a turning point/ : , ;
in the relations between the Blovaks and thé/Central Government* Till then
it had not had/to face any great amount of outside interference by its enemies :
in its struggle with the Autonomists# The sole exception to this was Hungary 
#here thé Horjbhy/government was contunally. occupied in attempts to encourage /
anti-Prague feeiing./for its. oym revisionist ends but such attempts,did not 
pose any‘serious threat/to. the security of the Republic * . : :Àfter an Initial 
period of extreme opposition in the ear3y^/Twenties most of the German parties 
were playing a positive role v/ithin the'political system of the; Republic*:
After 1930. the growing: discontent which the 3)epression. caused v/as/skilfully /
exploited both by political parties, within the. Republic and its external enemiOs* 
The:German minority were especially liard hit as they were almost exclusively 
dependent on industry* In time their discontent spavmed a political movement 
that was ultimcroly to provide Hitler with.a means of subverting the Republic 
from within* After its somewhat mediocre showing in thé 1929 elections when 
it failed .to recapture the position it gained in 1923 HSL’S experienced a 
swing to the right* The hRastupists" vvér.G not characterised by a genuine . / 
respect for the Republic form of government /as were the older generation of 
party members* The converse was in fact tittue and most of the adherents of this 
group were admirers of Fascist ideologies aiid states* .. /
, o
By 1933 autonomist feelings îmd begun to affect the German minority as well/"' 
as a section of the Slovaks and the Magyars# The situation in which the 
Republic found during this period was most perilous. There’ was prologged 
économie crisis which gave rise.to continuing discontent, Na%i Germany had. /. 
joined Poland and Hungary as those states that were hostile to Czechoslovakia . 
and the 1933 eleouions saw the triumph of both the Budetendeutsche Partei and 
ihe Autonomist Bloc, The former - oslensibly demanded; autonomy for the German 
areas of the Republic and increased economic aid for their unemployed whilst / 
the latter was ah' association of HSL’B, the Slovak National /Party, the Polish ' ; i 
separatists^and a/Ruthenimi party# Its.programme was based on demands'for ; ; ; 
autonomy not only/for the/Slovaks but for the other nationalities whose parties/// 
were members of the,Bloq# The Sudetendeutsche Partei became the largest ,///
party In .the Repùbiio as a'resu3-t of the 1939 electipn. and . this made the. // ; ■ 
. creation of a coalition extremely difficult* Attempts were made* to induce ïïSL'^ B /' 
to join the coalition but the price which it demanded was too high. The other // 
; Czechoslovak parties could not bring themselves to agree to, Slovakia becoming 
,/autonomous# This wOiild be imaoceptable not only because it /might well tend 
to increase the party’s power and prestige in Slovakia but because it might 
very well encourage the other.nationalities in their demands* .And this was 
something which the Oentral Government ; wished to avoid at all costs. . . //
;hsl’S tried to exploit every opportunity to press its demands even during 1938 . 
when the Republic was experiencing great international difficulties* Just as 
the Oentral Government failed to realize : the importance of industry in Slovakia’s 
economy so it was unable to come to some agreement with HBL’B. It cannot be ; 
concluded however that even i:t agreement had been reached Munich and its 
■ consequences could have been avoided. Neither can we assume that autonomy 
would necessarily by itself have been able to solve,Slovakia’s problems.
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Autonomy was not the main concern of all the Slovak parties* In 1933 the . 
Ozechoslovak parties gained a larger percentage of the poll than the Autonomist 
Bloc although it is not possible to tell how many Czech voters were resident 
in Slovakia# There seems to be little evidence to show that more tlian 5 0  
of the Slovak population supported and its demandsWhich if they had been
granted by the Central Government wouàd not have meant any improvement in 
economic conditions in Slovakia# The double tragedy was.that not only did 
both the Central Government and HBL’S fail to understand the need to increase 
the amount of industry in Slovakia (as.did most other patties except the 
Communists) buL cXbornal events were moving so/fast that neither party / 
was. to be given thé time to be able to reach a settlement which might have 
laid the basis for a more equitable framework within which the gap between the 
Czech Lands and Slovakia could be narrowed. This however would be a long-term
task as the historical conditions which had determined Slovakia’s development
prior to 1918 could not be overcome in as short a time ..as two decades# By 
1968, thirty years after the end of the First Republic and after the development 
which Slovakia îiad undergone during the independent Slovak Republic, the post­
war Republic and the post- 1948 soGialiBt Republic, during v;Mch a gread deal 
of investment took place in Slovakia and much economic progress occurred, the 
Slovak problem aiid the relations between Czechs and Slovaks were still far 
from resolved* Even,at the time of writing it is still too soon to tell whether 
the type of federalization of the CS3R which took place after 1968 will finally
prove to be the adéquate solution*
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Elementary Schools
1918 1926/27
School Teachers Pupils Schools Teachers Pupils
Slovak 276 390 30,118 2,652 4,354 277,794
Magyar 3,298 5,000 343,992 695 1,235 79,149
German — — — 107 229 14,182
Huthene 31 35 .2,494 101 114 8,203
Mixed 51 234 12,649
State
Communal No full details 1,104 2,244 128,085
Homan Catholic, V
Greek Catholic in 1916-I916 1,758 2,930 209,670
lutheran Reports of Royal 450 569 31,603
Calvinist Hungarian Statistical 216 272 15,828
Jewish' Office : 63 132 5,270
Private 15 19 1,116
Total 3,605 5,425 376,604 3,606 6jl66 392,580
Slovak . ■ 7.6 7.5 7.9 i Magyar 19.2 20.0 20.1
Source Seton-Watson H.N. (Ed) Slovakia Then and Now London 1931 p.12
TABLE TEM GONT'L.
Schools
&918 1926/27
Schools Teachers Pupils Schools Teachers Pupils
Slovak - “ — 109 633 22,826
Magyar 83 * 12,000 (Est.) 17 72 2,235
German - - - 3 12 492
Rnthene - 1 3 138
Mixed - * 6 62 2,105
State 109 670 24,176
Communal
Roman Catholic 
Greek Catholic
18 78 2,460
Lutheran 5 18 629
Jewish B# Data. 3 12 360
Private 1 4 171
Total 136 782 27,796
^ Magyar 12.5 9.2 8.0
Source* Seton-Watson R.W. (Ed) Slovakia Then and How London 1931 p*
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SEGOHDARY EPUOATIOH IN SLOVAKIA 1913/4 to 1927/28
Humber of Secondary Schools
1913/14
aiovafc
1918/19 1919/20 1927/28
Grammar Type 18 35 39.
Teacher Training
Collegos - 6 13 13
Total :'r'- 24 48 52
Gerjaan ■
Grammar Typeo 4 3
Magyar
Grammar Type 44 28 13 7
Training Colleges 15 9 1 2
Total 59 37 . 14 9
Ruthene
Training College - 1 1
Total
Grammar 44 46 52 49
Colleges 15 15 15 16
Total ...... 59 61 67 65
p Magyar 100 60.6 20,6 13.8
Secondary School Pupils 1927/28
of Population /■
Slovak-0 iseoh 68,0 14,224 76.8
German 4.7 1,175 6.3
Magyar 21.5 2,973 16,0
Ruthene 2,8 137 0.7
Source : Seton-VJatson R.U. Slovakia Then and Now London 1931 p#127<
TA OLr; TWFMJd -
r’Mî: 0 ;fK nî.ov/j:iA 1921 and 1930
Siae of farm I'iO. of 1lirmn ■ in. %
In La 1921 . 1530 1921 1930
0»1"2 171,786 . 163,732 40 ,8 36.6
2-5 113,500 ' 125,647 26*9 28.1
5-0.0 81,420 94,807 19*3 21.2
30,50 ■ 48,980 56,207 11.6 12 .5
50-19© 2,161 . 2,574 0.5 0.6
iOOO 3,779 4,369 • • 0.9 1.0
Total 421,626 447,336 100.0 100.0
Slüo of farm Agricultural lund Iwarago D
In ha In 1000 ha in )!) in ha
1921 1930 1921 1930 3921 1930
0.1-2 146,9 148,6 5.8 5,2 0,8 Oo9
2-5 362,6 400,2 13,2 14.0 : 3.1 3.1
5-10 542,3 630,4 19,8 22,0 6.6 6.6
10-50 723,7 816*1. 26,4 28*5 14,7 14 .5
50. .100 110,0 123,4 .4*3 4-3 54.9 47 .5
■KlOO 050 ,6 742,8 31.0 26.0 , 225.2 165.3
Total 2,744,9 2,861,5 100 100 6 ,5 6 .4
"oui'’CO s
y
Svoton, 0. dvoJ. ^tol^niva naXlovoiisku Lirticla
Tab] on 33 oiid 34 
pp,!î 68*-’l69,
TABLE THIRTEEH
H'lvBUL'lV> OEJAu.-; JQi.PQRll IH  SLOVAKIA BY 1931
Land at the diopooition of the La&d Office
Agricultural land
A;gricultural land distributed
To owners of residual estatee
To ownerc of medium-sized holdings
To owners of small holdings
1,406,219 ha 
504(120 ha 
311,981 ha 
57,656 ha
13,792 ha
240,533 ha
Humber of applicants in each category 
Residual Sstatès 483
Medium-siaod holdings ll60
Small, holdings 298,378
Average size of p^ot 
., 120 ha
11.4 ha
0.8 ha
.Source,; SvetoX. J. Vj^oj dbyvatel *Btva na Slovensku Bratislava I969 p*l68.
TABLK EOURTJOEH
BATE OH rROVXI-iOIAL ELECTIONS ÏH SLOVAKIA 1928
/ of poll Ho. of f; No* of
elected nominated
members members
Total
nSL*'3 24.64 9 25.0 6 33,33 15 27,77
3N8 2.46 1 2*77 - 5.55 t: 3,70
Agrarians 20*54 8 22*22 8 44.44 16 29.62
People * B
Party 3*31 1 2.77 1 5,55 2 3.70
National
Socialists 2.74 1 2.77 1 5.55 2 . 3.70
Social
Democrats 7,33 3 8.33 I 5.5$ 4 7.40
Communists 14.42 5 13.88 - 5 9,25
Magyar
Christ# Soo. 9.14 3 8.33 - 3 5.55
Magyar Nat*
Party 7.88 3 8.33 - • 3 5.55
Jewish Parties 3*42 1 2.77 18 1.85
36 18 54
Percentage of poll necessary to gain one member in the Provincial assembly
IIS L «Fi 1.64
SNS 2.46
Agrarians 1*28
Ga* Pcoplo*s Party 1.65
Cz. National Democrats 0.995
Cz* National Socialists 1,37
On* Rocial Democrats 1*83
Communists 2.88
TABLE EOllKTEEH CONT*i).
Magyar Christian Socialists 3.04
Magyar National Party 2.66 ,
Jewish Parties 3*42
Source t Provincial Election Reaults for Slovakia from ^.12.1928^ ; ;
quoted in Idpscher. L.Kv/vina politicked sprayy i>a Slovensku Bratislava 
1969 p.169.
TABLE SIXTEEN
SISE AID DISTRIBUTION OF lAUDHOLDIHGS II SLOVAKIA 71! 1930
Size of holdings in Humter of
Hectares of agricultural Hotdinge 
land
iize in Amount of
Hectares Agricultural land (ha)
Absolute Absolute Absolute
0-1 102,738 22.6 62,693 1*3 49.265 1.7
1-2 77,563 17.0 137,031 2.9 116,270 4*1
2-5 127,730 28.1 505,387 10.8 432.881 15.1
5-10 92,266 20.3 746,077 15.9 22.9
10-20 39,287 8.6 621,894 ,ii, 3;: 18.4
20-50 9,071 2.0 403,045 9.6 260,756 9.1
50-100 2,112 0.5 320,668 6.8 148,445 5.2
Above 100
Vîithout agricultural
2,668 0*6 1,647,715 35.2 673,429 23.5
land
Total
1,520 0*3 243,816 ' 5 * 2 -------
454,955 100*0 4,687,626 100.0 2,862,109 100.0
Source ; Faltu.s, J. , a Prucha V. Prehlad jfiospodarekeho Y^voja na 
Slovonoku Bratislava 196 p.121 Table ,25
1918-1945
TAmsE SEVENTEEN
RESULTS OF Tim LAND RFFORM 111 SLOVAKIA DY 1937
All laud 
In Hectares
Agriqul tural, 1 and 
In ÎIoctaroG
Requested 
% .Exchange
Total for diotribution
Distributed
Returned to owners
Heiao.ining at the disposition 
of the Land Office
Total
1,396,100
11,300
1.407.400 
690,500 
562,100
154,600
1.407.400
496,700
6,500
507.200
323.200
176.200
5,800
507.200
Category of land distributed Humber of Siso in Hectares Average
Holdings (Thousand ha) Size of
Ag. Land Ag*Land holding
Smallholdings of up to 30 ha 107,423 290,500 247,600
liesidual/Estates A 611 74,700 60,000
Other largeÏestates 1,494 325,300 15,600
Total 189,528 690,5 0 0 3 2 3 ,200
.134 55 ha 
122,200 ha 
216*400 ha
Sou roe t : ffal tus * J, a Prucha V* i t>ehl*ad hosi
Sloyensku.19X8-1945 HratLslava p*145 Tables 31 and 35
T m m  0)3 VER THEN CONTINUED
LAND fU'JFORM J¥ SLOVAKIA 1936
Land at the disposition 
of the Land Office
Land distributed to new owners
Land returned to previous owners
Lend remaining at the 
disposition of the Laüd Office
Total in 
Ilcotax’co
1,407,329
684,880
534,175
188,274
Agricultural 
land (!ln hectareo)
504,173
332,932
167,463
3,778
Land distributed
Omall-holdings (0*1-0* 3 ha)
To 186,648 applicants
Residual Estates (6II)
To 564 applie ants
Other lands without buildings (1385) 
Mainly forest to 1,326 applicants
Other
Average size of small-holding 
Average size of residual estate
684,880 . 
298,034 
75 ,225
311,621 
224 
1.59 ha
123 ha
332,932
246,777
60,627
15,520
11 . 
1*32 ha 
.9 9 ha
Source Î Annuaire. 8tatisticiuo 1938 Prague 1937 PP* 55-56
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TAPIE TjEUTY
DIPTHXOUTJOM OF RKRPOaHIKL liï NATIONALITY
IP SLOVAKIA 1921-1930
- m i
■ State Education Public Poatal Railways Total :
Service Service Service
Czech# 9,674 1,398 2,304 1,980 6,272 21,828
Blovak# 11,363 7,090 13,042 4,321 18,739 54,555
I'lngyars 1,466 1,682 4,971 295 1,434 9,068
Rutheneü llB 156 394 152 820
Jews 65 162 1,770 20
Germans 642 577 2,355 108 501 4,183
Others 25 ■ 55 22 102
Foreigners 336 162 1,431 138 2,009
'Total 23,911 11,247 26,267 6,759 27,27$: 95,462
1221
Gzechn 8,654 1,423 1,214 1,718 5,753 18,832
Slovaks • 8,256 4,263 5,736 2,623 18,705 39,605
i-'agyars 3,661 2,290 4,764 686 3,475 14,876
Hu the nor. 92 173 379 21 172 837
Jews 215 316 1,290 24 63 • 1,90a
Germans 860 508. 1,399 148 847 3,762
Others 26 10 154 4 48 242
Foreigners 220 167 836 56 448 1,727
Total 21,986 9,170 15,772 5,350 29,511 81,789
1 Includoz free profoccionz*
Ttim TWENTY CONTINUED
Expre*seà in
State Education Public ,.,'?08tal_: r'.;: .'Bail ways Total
Service Service Bervico
Czechs 41,3 12*4 8.7 M:29^3. ' 23.0 22,9
Slovaks 47,5 63.3 49.7 63.9 68.8 57.2
i'lagyarn 6.2 15.0 18.9 4.4 / , ,5*4- : 10.3
Huthcnec 0.7 1.3 1.6 : 0 .8
Jew» 0.3 1.3 6.7 2.2
Germane 2.5 5.1 . 1.6 1.8 <■; %4.4
Others 0.1 :'W:'O*0
Foreigners 1.4 1.6 0.5 bà ::8.R
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 'ïopyp 100.0 ; : 100.0
1921
Czechs 39.4 15.0 7.7 33.4 19.5 23.0
Slovak» 37*6 46.7 36.7 49.0 63.4 48.5
'.'Magyars 16.6 25.0 :\b\;30.3;., ;\\ 12.8 . 11*8 18.2
EHyithenon 0.4 1.9 IS:..,:. : 0.4 0,6 1.0
1.0 3.4 Ô . E f 0.4 0.2 2.3
'..Germans 3.9 5.G ; 8.9 fv:?
Other» 0.1 0.1 1.0 ' . 0.1 ':.':/:0.3
' Foreigners 1.0 1.8 5.E-'-K ..
Total 100.0 100.0 100.6 100.0 106.0 ; 166.6
TABLE TVJIÆsTY GONTIHIM'H)
Percentage increase or decrease in the numhers of administrative pereonnel 
Of different nationalities in Slovakia 1921-1930
S tate Education Public Postal Railways Total
Service Service Service
Czechs +14.10 -1.7 +89*66 +10.74 +9.00 +16.01
Slovaks +37*60 :+47*0 +126.70 +67*74 +0.20 +37*76
Magyars -59.41 -26.5  ^ +4*25 -57.00 -52.90 -33.36
Jluthenos +20.26 —9 #8 +5.38 -11.60 +11* 26
Jews -69.77 -48.7 + 37*21 —68.20 . +5.71
Germans -25.35 +11.6 +68.33 -27*03 -40.80 +11.26
Others -4*00 +1275.00 -54.10 -58*33
Foreigners +53.64 +9.0 +71.18 -69.10 +20.96
Average +8.80 , +22.6 +72.31 +26.30 —8.10 +14.43
Percentage employment of Czechs a,nd Slovaks 1921-1930
1930
Czechs 45.1 6.1 10.5 9.7 28.6 100.00
Slovaks 20. 0 13.0 23.9 8.0 34*3 100.00
1921
Czechs 46.1 7.6 6.4 9.2 30.7 100.00
Slovaks . : . . 20,8. ■: E-io.a:; 14.5 ■ 6.6 47.3 100.00
.Source: Bohac* A* **Ceci na Sloveneku" Statisticky @bzor Svll6 (1935) 
Nos* 4-5 pp*183-190
Quoted in Macartney O.A* Hungary and Her Successors London 1937 
PP. 133-134 and in Slovenska vlaotiveda Sv.IIT. Bratisla.va 1944 
. Stefanek A. AP^aklady Sociografie Sloveneka*’ p.385
w m
MÎSOELMMOÏÏS DATA OH HATIOHADITY O? ADMIHIS^HÙTIVE PERSONfflSL^
IH SLOm O A
Servants EMPLOYEES Workers Labourers ###############
-Czechs, ■ 2916 b 5Q#5^' : < 5216 21.4 '< 2*4 17 1^5
Slovaks 2456È ' '^ 42.2 '■ 10735 71*6 4494 :: 97*2 1073 82,6
Magyars . , 2.9 ■ 7710 .4,7: 565 7*5 175 13*4
Ruthenes ;.'b;:o,i .' '■ '96- 0*6 0,7 : = Vi"
Germans T' 192 - 5*4 221 : 1*4 : 151 -bl*4 - 15 :■ 1,5
J e ^ % ;  i r 12 b <0.1 , ' ' : 1
Others 'V: ik.. ^  ' 8 b , 4-^ . •"■■' ?
0*6
Foreign
Hationale \ '32 A 0.3 <\42:: 0.8 10 0,8
Total 5774 160,0 15645 100,0 5159 100.0 1299 100.0
;PÉROEHTÀGE Om CZECHS :A# 8LP1^ RAHK
'/■ V'V'siviMsgrs^ . i ^ i â s s s
O z e o K B " / 46.4 :v' ?lb „ 
"SloTOks . ■ : ’.IS.o/V/--/;: : :
Workers labourers
2,0
25*9
0.5
5,8
SCBS DATA,:P0R_lg35
Gzeohs Slovaks Llagyars Ruthenes Gormans Total
District Heads 13";-v\y. 62<: ' i-4 -■ .\1 ■ 77
Communal notaries " '.4 6 0 1602 ; b; 151 , b 24'{. b 17 1234
Local Government 1581 :: : # 0 : ;\,-E267- 82 61 5182
Magistrates. ;Ë .<225 : 79 ' 47 - %; 55 ; 553
Süb-magi strates <46' ; ' :9: - .';i4 154
,01e4 cs eto,.;,-'" ' - 355 --- 836b V ■ ? imo . .86- 1377
' T m m  'pimeY-om  ^ ' 3 ;; <;
:5SïglSâMl2j+;:E':C b;- / <  b - < : <  ' : %tal %ephB.Slov#
m strlo t Headà^  4 6 ‘b  .■’:^ 0»5 \ b.r . X 1(5 . 1 . 5 : 100.6 ;: 0,6 1.2
eoiJràùnal Notaries i: 3V2 ;> 81(2' ,' 12,2 - Mg-; l A  : 100,:0 ' \ 1.8 ' IB.?
,I<joal Government ::ÿ5Q.5' ; ï; 5 2^- ■ : i . 6 / âV l,2/+00,0 70.1 59.0
Magistrates , , Y'#,?/: 26. 5' " 1+3 is,5 10.0 100.0 ,9.9: 2.7
Subt^aagistrates : 25.4 . :. 57»9' : 5,8: . 9,1:'; : 1(3 boo.0 , 1,8 1.8
cierka eto. .  ^ 25.+:;.;'fie.8' 4 ë ,3 :;,:::: ' «: 100.0., 15.8;; 15.0
lOQ.O ioo.o
Sovttoes Slovensi^: Vlaatlveda Sv, I I I  "Baklady. sooiogràfle Slovenska" 
P.385 - '■' 'b. ; /. . ' ■ '
industrial IhidDUGTrOH IE THE" OSll ÀN33 OTHER QOUM'IOES 1929-1934
1929 100
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
OSR 100,0 89; 2| 80,7 63,5 60,2 66,2
Other s?' ‘ ............ '
Uountfies : : 100,0 86,3 74,8 63,0 71,3 77,0
; S ourc e 2 S tati s tickv %pravodaj a » 6 19 38 Tabulkovg Priloha str. 12
(Quoted; in oLsovsky* U* ©t al- Prehled Hoenodrirho W v o ne
Praha I965 P*319
TABLE <:b. ÿ S
EHXQËATÏÔH M M  C8R 1920-1937
tiuV’number of ,passportG grantod and not the actual number 
of those who left the oountiKy permanently) : _ . .
Year , ; : v ’/ ■ SLOVAKIA. .
\v
: OSK . .//;/S ■:
19^ ; ; /  Vv, ;%< ,.:13,3T3/, .b;: ; 34,942 : : 38.2
■;i5i623'' ' b/'b ■ 35,212 ,;b /::■':■ ;42.6
"1922- ; - ■16,737 : : // : 39,459 ' / ;//;:42,4'
19^3:; b /:l6/59,5; b ;./;;.:,;;;',32,3A;. .:,:■; :2-3
1924 %;<<<. ■35,202 . , . ■/■b- ' 54(273,;;:-:; 64.8
■;:/8,715:. 19,350 ; ■■'■ : b/45.0
1926 14(409 \ b /  26,129 ;
" 12,053; .. : ; 23,596 ; 51.1
"13;544. : . :/;/'■:■■ 24,540: y:::
1929 ; I9,40b  : :b/;/ "30, ^ 5- 63*1
1930 - 417,832/ 26,893:b . 62.1
'i9'3l ,s<<7.\ES ; '4(753 ■ .bb ■S/:-;-. 9,845, : , :
1932 ; ■:2,364b;/' V, 5,348 : 64.2
V .;3,132:.:-b./ ;b-b;/''4 .83i;/;:,:;/ b / 64*8
1934 3^18 ,/ -:■■."/b;-/; : .5,065 ;/ b
/:/3,707. /■;',:,/ '.:/</ 5,686 :;/:;; /; 65.1
19.36/:' b; 4 ,831/ b  ' ;:;;:/b:. 7,26i:::;b;bb-b-S- 67^0;
1937 \< ' ■/. 8, 595 ; ;■'■; ' .:.:i4,7.72;;/. / '^.<y.58\,l
'TOTALb :/ ?;b: /213,283v. ' : . 400,193 ;. ;/: <S; 53.3
■1920-30 ,. . \ : 102,885 ; b b ,.' 347,450 : 52.6
;i9# * 37/ y '■'<<.■,3/39^:///: 52,743b: ;■:; : 57.6
Annual,Average
1920-37 '-SE ■'■.n,845b :■;/■;;;; 22,233 .
1920-30 <<;</<>•, b 8,885/4 :;// : 31,588 ./;
1930-37 3,799: ; 6,592 ; ' /"
T/l OLE TUi'NTY-TniU'TJ OOlJTlyUED
Source t Annuaire Statistique 1938 Prague 1937 P*33 
în Mikuc* J, Slovakia A Bolitioa.l lliatory 1910-1950 
Milwaukee 1963 p*3B
IH SLOVAKIA 1929-1936
(in Thou»and»)
Slovakia GSR /'■
1929 2.5 41.6 6.00
1930 4.9 105.4 4.64
1931 17.3 291.3 5.93
1932 , 58.6 554.1 ■ 10.55
1933 88.0 738.3 11.93
1934 87.0 677.0 12.85
1935 92.3 686.3 13(44
1936 87.7 622.7 14.08
Bouroe 1 Annuaire Statistique 1938 I’rsgue p.216-217
TABLE TWENTY-EIGHT CONTINUED
UNléiPLOYmimT IB SLOVAKIA JUNE. 1931- TQ^^MOVEnBEH 1^32
Bate V' bb Indiistrial b :Agricultural / Seasonal Workers ...Total,
S - Worders / b /. -b Workers .% In Agriculture
1/6/31 :b ;/2l,834;bb:/-;bb:n,oi3 / :;b ■ ;; bl9(767b/:; :.52,814
i/7/31 ; /: ; 20, 290 b /;b;:8,+6/;;; ' b 1+ 837// ■ /;://#,463
1/10/31 •■29,9p2V:b/:b:; ;27,864 :/:4.2,p92;b; ;
1/12/31 /, 50,003: ; 45,594 // / 72,1^8/ :. ■. '///. : 1.88,105.
1/1/32 :b/4,939b:.:b/1/50+86'; : ; ;;;b;;;;/b80,419b/ ./; /:;//;.;/;:l85,V84:
# S ; b : . 54,809; b;: ; b /;;+,6o2, . :/80,3S+/b, .182,800
i//32:;;b' b;;52,60L//;b,:;bb42,027 ;-;/70(7S2///'/b: .///'/■;:. ;185,358
: # < /
b 4+329 ;/ '/;;b/;30,808.//b’: /:':- :■.b/;^+2+bb<////;: 128,902
i/5/32;b ;/;/37,+3'b:-; ,^ 26,904b ■ S'b ■ /4 + 210-/ "106,407
1/6/32 :/,/37,988/;K.'.'bb/<5,<*I"'bbb;; ' 38,184 /, 101,819:
+7/32;/; •/"WS, 668//'/■/;':'" "17,%3;/b'b; ' ' ;':3iv4i<b;b<':"'‘'; 84,720
1 /0/32';, 'b^»‘2?|//<;b;E è ^ : ' / / ÿ â
/:b3+i6/b ;; ;; ;//;,//:b / 94,166
1/9/32 b : b41,76+b':-;'7;b 23,342 ' . ;// ■.bb36,8+// ;/.. ,;;//■ i/101,954
1/10/32 ;/■/43,ll6;;:bv.b;;-;;:'27,9+/;,/;-;''' ■';/43,924bb'; "://';: 114,980
Source t MlynarÀc* J * "VyvrOholehie hnutia nezameGthanych na Slovensku- 
v.rokoôh l929-33!l Historicky èaooplG. 14/1966 n#59
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TABLE THIRTY
UNEüPLOYHRHT II-T CHECHOSLOVAKIA 1921-1930
Year Unemployed of Work
1921 71,500 3.2
1922 127,000 5.7
1923 ........ 207,300 9.4
1924 96,400 ■ 4.4
1925 49,000.- 2.2
1926 67,880 3.1
1927 ' 52,900 2.4
1928 38,600 1.7
1929 41,600 1.9
1930 105,000 4.8 ■
1931 291.300 13.2
1932 554.100 28.3
1933 738,300 33.5
1934 ■ 677,000 ■ ' ' ' 30.7
1935 686,300 ' 31.2
1936 622,700 28.3’
1937 408,900 - 18.6
1938 256,200 11.6
Source 3 Ghyba A 'Postavon^ v Kapi feali s tickom
CGHkoQlovonsku l^ raha p.135
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TABLE THIRTY»0 -
Minéral : Fro due t ion- in/31ovalaa. 1950*. 1933-1957
1930
Iron Ore ,
Iron Scrap 
Mangaiieae Or© 
Copper Ore 
Quicksilver , 
Au-Ag-Pb-^n Ores 
Coal -, ''/ 
Asphalt 
Naptha :
Natural Cas 
Salt
Antimony Ore
970,0it2 
21,669 
68,371 
72,378 
219 
#,137 
3 9 8 ,# 0
\ 12$#% 
%831,7$
< 1,770
: ■ m s  m ê  m z
192,274 264,284 362,729 5V1+66 1,057,094
15,42+://l7,920 : 20,000 .19.084 18,361
5/960 40,454 49,165 . 64/336 62,930
b:':/. —T.'. — - •
137 : 5.992 8,668 8,345 . 5,359
58,216 74,450 91,637 101,953 103,025
559,'997 . : 636,754, 641,611 685,109 842,574
' . #### ' ‘ mttm ' m m
: 11,137 12,378 .11,683 ■ 11,802 13,335
135,389: 225(156 232,370 130,760 117,848
-, Figures unreliable■ <
/12:*421 V  14,399 24,161/ I6,il9 18,181
Sources ’ Die. Slowakische -industrie/O Slqyenskem Priemysiub1932-1937
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TâBIÜ IHIIfTY-TOUH
imüSÇRIiO. PiîOWÎCMOM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1921-1937 
, T  ‘ ' IÇtaSksICX) - . ' ■' / - : '
1921 60,1 , , , ' ' :i^9 TWqo.ü -
1922 .'54,7 ■: /; T ' :i9ZK): ' ' 8 9 , 2
1923 57,6 ; ; . ■ ‘ T /■ . 1931 80,7
1924 76,0 , ; ; ; 1932 ' : ; 65,ë
1925 79,0 1933 60,2
1926. 76,7 , , 1 9 3 4  66,5-
1927 : , L- T : % ' igsa, -T ‘ 7û,i,,
.1928 ' 95,8Ï V i V . 1936 ;T 80,1
■ :96,3':
Sourbei fostavenf delnické tr^dy v kaDitaliBtiokem Ceskoslovensku 
■ , p,21; CSyba AntonlSi Praha 72 ïipi£98, ' T , ,
«EÊZÏfBE«EÊÈÉS#,ÈÉ^i%SÏEB
SnssâEi^B-Süâis
].?1() jWoz'QkL
August \ '
October
1920 -January :
/Vn« a '-'N-.T';/-- 
:' October ■ v" ■
1921 Jeùuàry /% ///'"//
;#iroh. ' '?/
'June ' ■"/■/.. '//;/.
October .
1922 January
"■ ■ March ■ c ' ■ /
- June " : ,// ■
/' August - 
, October'',/-,//■ /■
1 9 2 3 - : '/y.X
1924 ' '
1925 " ;'
1926-1931 January
. October . .n .-. '
r ;  : ;
1933
1934 ; : v
1935T'-:' ■; /  -
1936.-/
1937' : " . ' ' - ' -T'.. : T.
: 24*02
: :T7S-81
: 91-99 : 
126-161 
y / 222-283, '
/  287-337.
T t T .181 . ..'
T 261-328 ;
■ 283-328 1
'353-419 
219-277 ' 
y  233-270-4/ , \
'■'
412^183 / :. 
125-140
T / e o  
' ;147 ;
■■4:158
164
.: 134
. ' ' ■
114.
■ . . " ' .■' 
- N  ■ .■
•'.. ,-1.17
U.Sj Dollar
•/.4 4 4.93;;'
147-162 
19.-23 
: ' 29-35 ,
52-79.5 
,74.5-98.5.
. 45.5/4 .
,  74.5-88.8
74.0-91.5
. . .'4. -
.4 ■ 76.0
■ j V
V2.0 .: 
90.5-1(91
52.2-66.5
53.2-62.0
52.4 ' ■ 
2,7.5-41 ;
28.4-31.5 
34.4 4
' # . 6  . ., 
33.33 :
4 33.74' .;
Ï . .
33.93
33.92
20.45
■/AT;
■/
140 28.69
:% m M  THIRTŸ-mVjP continued
19^8 ' // '  ^y 142 28.88
1939 . / : 133 29.23:
Source: Currency Conversion ITables A; Hundred Years of Change Bidwe 11 R.L. (Bfi) 
Hex Pollings Ïaoïîdon 1970. :
TABLB 'i’HIRTÏ-BIX
wz.» w»--'
POPOXAflOB OF 3LOVAKIA .1920-38
3,5,2.1921 ; 2,993,859
1.12.1930 
1937.(Eat.)
3,324,111 : 
, 3,555,&5T
le'âr/" " Births Deaths 4 : Natural Loss/Gain Actual
.increase -4 (Migration etc) Increase
1910- ;839#759 657,319 : 182,440 - -109,238 :
1921-30 1$019,942 565,658 . :454,284 . ' -124,032 : 330,252
1930-40: 849,396 4 ' 510,418 : 4 338,978'■ -116,901 222,077
Year ■. Births;/::... Deaths : natural ' . /', Ipés/Gain>-/ - Actual4
. incroas© / (Migration etc) Increase
PorlOOO Inhabitants . ,
1910-21 27.64 : .. :2i.64 : 4 6,06' V "3.46 ■ 2.54 '
1921-30 / 32.97 / ; : : # 5/4 ,44 : \M.52: ..,/4; /;:-10.59 ' V-:
1930-40 24.17 " 144524 .: 9465 '4 -3.83 : 6.32
Soui’cë 8 : Svebbn; J « V^va t ,bbv3.tel'atyn ita. Slbvensku Bratislava 1969
- pp.255-256 A. 4:.
0?Al]Li; WAVi^ Y-V)¥m 
POPULATION 0I1ANGÎ!
ijl .
3 IB SLOVAKIA 1919-19^
Year Births ' Deaths Natural Inci'oaoc Infant totality
(Per 1000 i»h;?bita'/its) (Por 1000 live births)
1919 . . 30.6, 19.0 11.6 .130.0
1920 32.6 20.4 12.2 185.9
1921 38*2 21.1 17.1 IOI.6
1922 36.4 20.6 15.8 160.4
1923 35.9 17.5 18.4 156.4
1924 33.9 18.0 15*9 161.3
1925' 32.5 17.7 14.8 166.6
1926 32.5 18.7 13.8 179.3
1927 30.9 18.3 12.6 177.4
1928 30.6 17*9 12.7 178.1
1929 29.0 17.2 11.8 165.3
1930 29.2 15.8 13.4 161.4
1931 ■ 27.9 16.2 11.7 a  62 £6
1932 27.5 15.6 11.9 166.^
1933 - 24.6 14.8 10.0 -145.0
1934 24.2 14.5 - 9.7 153.9
1935 23.6 14.3 9.3 141.8
1936 23.0 13.8 9.2 143.5
1937 22.6 14.0 8 .6 . 149.8
19 38 24*1 14.6 9.5 . 143.3
jjouroe i SvotoK. J. 6byVf'.tn3.'atvn iir. GXovonslcu Jlj?o.tîslav;i
- 1969 p.258
TAi3L] !
XLLITlhlAOT Xî! SI OVAKIA 1921 AID) 1930
12.82 Men
16.48 Women 
14*71 Average
(Tlio figures refer to tîioao peroon aged over-six years)
1930
Per 3000 inhabltenc
lien Women Average
Slovaks 62.6 9 1 .5 77 .7
Ruthones 245*3 341.7 296.9
Germans 35*4 50.3 42.0
Magyars 46.1 55*6 50.2
Jews 9*6 28.2 19*9
OtJioro 658.0 699.0 680.4
l-'oro:lg;ncrs 115*5 126.1 121.0
Total 67*5 9 4 .5 81 .6
(lAiguros refer to tJioso aged over ten years)
Sources g 1921 - llaimel Statictigue Vol 11 Prnguo 1925 P* 391
1930 - - Annuaire Statistloue 1938 Prague 1937 p*ll
TABÎ.'iu* Tn:iHaT-NlHE
EDUCATION IB SLOVAKIA 1921-19 ■ ..
a) Number of educational est;iblishments of various typec '
1921/22 1926/27 1929/30 1935/36
Universities 1 1 1 2
Polytechnico ,- —
Agricultural 
Mohools 12 27 29 31
Commercial
Schools 11 19 32 16
ProfeBsional 
■And Induotrial 
Schools 22 25 35 34
Teaohero
Colloges 9 16 14 17
Mlcmcntary
Sohooln 3,306 - 3,606 3,807 4,480
Upper
Primaries 111 136 137 175
Creches 240 127 132 153
necondo ry
School0 . 38 41 44 46
b) Number of stndentBî at-tlio Gomenius University in Bratislava
31.12.-20 247
30*05.21 268
31.13.21 518
1926/27 1,417
1920/29 1,761
1932/33 2,395
1933/34 2,344
1934/35 3,364
1935/36 2,247
ftAo-3 ^
rvi r ^  .ShoivjK ç_ m  i P r a Q Lt t CR.'^ R
TABLi'] MORTY-ONf]
r in MARY tiBUCATIOII vn SLOVAKIA 1923-1936
iSiO. . . .
Language of Instruction Upper primarios 
Schoola Pupils
.Blementary Schools 
1 School 3, Pupil Ü
Slovak 05 14,871 2,315 243,199 .
Ruthcne 1 m 89 6»555 .
Germri.n 33 515 102 1-3,055
Magjr-r IB 3,875 716 Oi,3S4
Othcr/liixod 4 1,260 . 82 11,666
Total 111 20,617 3,306 355,799
Language of Instruction Mlemontary School Annexes 
Schools Pupils
(single Olnaorooffi
Slovak 1,542 50,132
Ruthene Bo 2,655
Gorman 75 2,336
Magyar 565 17,445
Other/Mixed 53 A i m 9
Total ■ 2,315 • 74,417
Number of Primary School Pupils on 31/12/21 according to tho Oonouo
Nationality Upper Primary Elementary Schools
S3-ovnk 16,133 312,511
Ruthon© 137 5,870
Gorman . 560 17,412
Magyar 3,790 101,268
Other 1,679 4,726
Total 24,499 441,787
Language of Inntmotion Upper Primary 
Sohoola Pupilo
ï-llementary School 
Schools Puni1b
Slovak 113 21,960 2,960 ,■ 353,434
Huthoiio 1 140 101 10,016
(rorman 5 566 16^:/ 14,253
/lagyax’ 13 1,684 709 83,568
Otlier/liixed ■ ■ 9 3,041 56 19,055 /
Total 141 27,417 23,99? 480,326
im/.m.
Slovak ' 154 53,478 3,161/ ://'426/309::/:
iiuthene 2 261 /\g/i2,:317%..
Gorman 6 2,664 116 :\//2, % - 368'-
Magyar 13 4,440 729 99/968
Total 175 60,823 4,141 557#962:
Sources 81921 Manuel- StatistlquQ Vol XX Prague 1925 pp*80-24 
1930 - Manuel Statistique Vol IV Prague 1932 P * 362 
1934/35 " Annuaire Statiotique, 1938 Prague 1937 PP*254-255
/: BGHOOL CONSOTGTÏON .IN SLOVAKIA ;X919-1936
Total tJnivei'sitiee Secondary. /Spécial Elementary
No* of Schools ; Gosts ï .No* Goat. : No# Cost'î No* Cost ; No* Cost
8? l49,g t i* 49*3 : 10 31*5! 5 - 8.6 : 71 60*1
.Expressed as a. p^rcehtàge pf ,W e  :tétal number of school^ buÜi in the 
Repubiio ÿed their total coats (In, millions of Res*) .//
Ï2ÎSÎ' . ' M m g È È g s  g:22sa:Ei; , BssgsïsEZ
No. of Gôhoois ,Costs î No* Cost : No. Cost: No* Cost..! No. Cost
14.34 . ; ; 13*93! 3.37 13*86: 22.22 18.22:26*30 32*01: 13*79 11.73
Percentage of dl^lerent types bhilt
Total : %  Becondary . Special Elementary
100,0 %  '/, / - 1,14 11,49 3.73 81*62
Percentage of total.costs
100*0 33*14 21.04 / 3*80 40.02 '
Source:' Annuaire Statistique 1938 Prague 1937 p.246*
TABIÆl r a m .  THREE
PRACTISING 'DOOTOHS IN SLOVAKIA 1920-1937
1920
Î926
1937
769
1253
1431
1805 
, 1878
Source: .Manuel Statistique Vol II p.450
Manuel GtatistiqUe Vol III p*36l
■ Manuel Statistiaue Vol IV p,326
Statistiok^- Ü^ 8^ehkâa OSSR; 1969 .Praha 1969 p,503
S.tatjlatickd IHs^ enka QBBR 1968 Praha I968 p.5'12
Statlstlcka Itfgenka &SR 1963 Pruha 1963 p*433
TABLE FORTY-FIVE
Length of Hiver OontroIX©d Area Heafforested,
■
X919-1936 / //#36 / ,/ /. .(1919-1936 : 1936%
-141,747: ' ' V ; 171,-338 33^281
of such work' done ih^  Hepublio, ' , .
## mi* m# #* 4w «#"# «W #"##**## #*## W  #*#"#"# Ml## ##*###» *»Tk#wM#
27,% ' : % \ : 14^2^ \ /'l7.%
Construction. COStà,.of .such schemes, iii . Million KGS : :/' : .
1919-1936; ' ■■;//Ï936/:r: ' \ ; . '/ . ; 1933 : /  ^1934 '
24,66/", ':3*Ô6 2*  ^
$6 of total cost of : such schemes in .the’Hepublic ■ . //^,,.
. 14*&7:1/: 25*39; %  . '$3*42' / ' /- .23*61.
Sourcei Annuaire Statistique 1938 JË^a^e 1937 pp* 237-238.
TABLE FORTY-8# ;
FOR Tm, u i i u m # W %  (ppsmNEGK/TsmmW)
Name of Party..;' /'"/. Vdtea oast : =
y.y/
deputies Votes cast : S  :ge^utieg
Bpo, Demoorato ■;i»590,520; 74 ' 631,403, ■:869
.Nat* Socialists > 00,821/ A i , 24 609,153 ; 8 ,6
People*a Party ..699,728 11,3 - 691>095 9,7 .4:51 p /"
;Nat* Bomocrats 387,552 ,, 19/ , .284,601: /4,p , 1>,;.;/
Agrarians : ' ;■/ : % # / /9,7 / K / . ; 970,940 13,7 -:;.45/
Tradesmen* à Party ; ' '122,813/ : "• 6"" ,.;286,058 4,0
CommÜîilG.ta : 934,223 13,,2 4l .
8N8 : . ^  /' - - \ . - y- ■' 242,0% .■ 3,9:;: /i2<;; 35,455 0,5
#L's/.; .  ^ '//r/ < 235^389 )■: //.ia^/"_.. :489,111 6 ,9 25 : '
Bimd' dor Xanclwirte: 241,747 3,9 11
■ *. ■ ;
: ? ; 571,765 : 8,0 M/24
German Nat* Partÿ '- Vv-//; a;;' 240,918. 3,4 10
German Naai PcArty - • / . r ' 328ÿ?35:/; . 15 :■: ,168^354 2,4
German Ghrist* Sou* , - ' ■; . 156/751 -2,5' '. 314,438 4,4:
German Soa* BeVaocratB .:/ 6#,589 r; 11,1 '31 :; ; 411,365 5. 8: 17
United. German Parties / ; 129^013/ 2,1 6
Mag, ■ German; Boo#/ Dorn,. ; 108 5^46" 4: "mm
Mag, Goimiàn. Ghria t # Son * 139,353 ; 4 : 98,337 ;; 1, 4:
Magyar Agrarians ;/- ■ .26 ,526/ G,4 ' 1 . ; .
Boqlaliet Party (Hudoc a M
Modr^ok) - / 5 W 0  ' 3 ■''/ y -  \ " ■ tmim ■
TOTAL P // ': . . ' ; 6,200,032!^ ■ 281, , .;: 7, 107, 4l P 298'. y
TADIE FORTï-SIX continued
1* Includes Hl:inka*s group*
2. Polled as Slovak People's and Peasants* Party. Included Slovak 
: Agrarians under Hodaa* ■ ■ :
5* Total of votes ai^ d mandates included in that given for People's Party.
4, Includes votes cast for small parties v/ho did not reach the necessary
. quota in any e3.ectoral district and hence were unsuccessful in.getting
their candidates eleoted* .
Sourcess, De:liny. Geskoslovenska IV Praha 196? pp. 548-549 
Manue3,' Statistique vol II Prague 1925 P*54? 
Hÿcetika CSR 1930, 1925 :«. C» US M Ml !*• ■* ,« M M# >« A <WM j. Ml Xjia
TABL1.S K M ’ï-BEVEH
BLEOTION RESULTE IN OKËOHOBLOVAKIA 1929 and 1935'
IR)R :THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (FOSLANGEGICA SNEMOVNA)
*#* m, *.w mm *#*##***«*####* «4% *## w# W» 4# m# **##*###«# ta#
Name of Party
Hoc* Democrats.
Nat. Eoqialists
People's Party
Nat. Dorao.craté . :
Agrarians. ;.
Tradesmens' Party '
Communists
National Unity
Fasciste
SNS
HSL'S
Votes cast
963,312: 
/ # # 5 7 1  ' 
, 623,322 
3 5 9 * 3 3 3  
1 , 1 0 5 , 4 2 9  
,  '291, 258:
v^.ii.hk.,
Deputies Votes cast
13.0 
10,4
8,4
4.9
15.0
3.9 
10,2
70,85? 0,9
425,052 5,7
Bund der Landwlrte ,
Autonomist Bloc /
German Nazi Party 204,096
Gorman Christ. Boo. 348,09?
Slidetondeutsche i-^ artei -. . ««-
United German.Parties ' 396,383
Regional Ghrlst.Soc. Party 257,231
United Jev;ioh and Polish 
parties 104,539
German National Party ■ 189^071
2,8
4,7
5.4
3.5
1,4
2.6
39
32
25
15^
46
12
30
19
8
14
16
9
4
7
1,034,774
755,880
615,877
1,176,593
448,047
849,509
456,553
167,433
142,399
564,273
162,781
1,249,530
291,831
% Deputies ## ####**"##«*######
12,6 38 '
9,2 28
7,5 22
14.3 45 
5,4 17
10.3 30 
5,6 17^
2 ,0 6
1,7 5
6 ,9 22^
2,0 6
15,2 44
3,5 9
TOTAL (including votes cast 
for smaller parties■not'shovm ■ 
here) 7,385,085 300 8,231,41; 300
TABLE F0RTY-8EV#: (qmtlmed) /:
1. Laqluding: the votes;'cast for.BNE::/ ' ''. '; , ' ' , - / ' :■■ ,
2. /Polled ■ with United. Germaïi Parties ;: ■ ; . . . :;. 'v ■
3# ConeiatGd of ÙSL'B, 3NS, Antonomlst Ukrainian Agricultural Union and 
' PoiisH sopartiatsi-M...* - ■£■•;.■ ' , .M ;
4. Consisted of National DemoPra s anii.tv;o FaSGist parties National
; : : _  M w - ' v /  r :
. League (Btrzbrny). W d  National liont (Dp, Mares); ■ • ' /;
Bojroeq: IV Praha;:196? pp.: 548-5W
" .v"
He^enta CUR 3929 ,md 1935
Manuel L i, l ui u Igue - vols » III and IV, Prague , 1928 aiid 1932
■' M ;;
---
ELECTIONS TO THE C m m E R  OF DEPUTIES (mSLANECKA 8NËM0#A).
RESULTS IN SLOVAKIA 1920 and 1929
Name of Party •
y 18. 4* $0 
Votes cast . .m ■ r ..V
' 23411,23 . 
Votes cast
' ■ t
Soc# Deâiocrats ; '3iq , |4i  ;  : 38,5 :: ;  60,635 «
■ Nat. Socialists ' ;.; ;  ; . 36,909 2,5
Nat. Labour Party .. / / - T : ;  ;
, . • I 3i608. 0,9
People's Party v- :; 235,389 17,5 :.y18,Q36 ' - 1,2
Nat. Democrats ’ 24,954
Agrarians ■ ' .ft 1«•■«otW 248,034 17,4
Tradesmens' Party C ^ .y  ;
c.
: 'mmrn , 11i576 ft 0,&
Communists 189,111 . ; i3, ;
:8*K3\ ' ': ; 242, 045' , 18,5 ' ;  -35,433 f t ' / k
mh*B \  - ' 2 - 489,111 34,3
Bund der Landwirte 109,635 ;  7,6’
German Nat. Party /  % 3,410 0,2
German- oc* Democrats
■:y :■ 5,137 .
0,3:
Mag.-German Cog* Dem i ft 108,5% . / 8,0 ?#«##»
î-îagyar Christ.^dc/ ; - 139,35/ ;  ; ; 10,3 98,337 6,8
Magyar Agrarians ' 26,520 vftft"; .22,0
Magyar Nat. Party 4,214 ' —-  '
Jewish Parties 45,217' f t / y ' '3,4 - 38,448 . 2,7
J ewish Bconomlo Parties = 5,144 0 ,1
Autonomous Provincial Union - - - ; 6,894;: . : 0,4
Independent Communists , V: --:-;356
Tota l/ y -y/y: i i 341,19l  ;  ' : ; T,42‘5.,595 '
1. Polled with GNS as Slovak National and Peasants* Party#
2# Polled with Gaedhoslovak People's Party 
3* includes votes oast for Magyar Nat;# Party. > .
Source! Macartény C*A*■Hunfeaz*y and her Successors Icndon 1937 P#117
TABLE F i m
27.10*29 ' 19. 5. 35
Nam© of Party Votes cast ■ ° i  : Votes oast
Soc* Democrats >;135,506/ - /■: 9,4 184,389 '11,3
Nat* Socialists ,45,968 ,
: 3,0 51,930 3,1
People's Party ; 36$548 2,5 : " 37.489 / 2,3
Nat* Unity 25,490 : 1,5
Nat. Democrats 33,745 / : 3,7 'mmmt '
Agrarians 278,979 . 19,4. 286,739 17,6
Tradesmens* Party 30,134 2,1 . 41,998 2,6
Communists 152,242 10,6 ; 210,785 12,9
SNS ' « . M m * 2* — w « #
DSL' S  ■ :, - 403,683: . 28,1 489,641 30,1'
Slovak People's
Party . (Juiriga) . — . ' 5,395 0,4 m  . mmrnrnm '
Fascists (League against 
tied candidates). 1,8X0 0.2, . ; ' , k
National GPoup of Fascists; : 38,809:.; 2,0
German Electoral Community , 13.704 0,9
Bund der Landvfirte . :/  255 . — **
Sudetendeutsché Partei 27,558 1,6
German Social Democrats /  4, 824/ 0,3 5,409 ft 0,3
Magyar Christ* Soc. 122,801 8,1 —
Magyar Nat. Party 104,106 ft :7,3ft ■
United Magyar Parties 230,713 14,2
Magyar Traders' P^ty 8,901:/ .0,5
Smallfarmers . 6,901 0,5
Jewish and Polish Parties 33,879 ■ f t  2,3:;.'
Total 1,434,926 1,625,549
TÀBLmÿlFÏY i m m m m
X/Polled with National .Democrats*
,3/l*biled as part of Autonomist bloç$ ,
3/Pçilèd as Autonomist. Bloc* - .
4/gollea::.aG part of mtlonal;.Uhitÿ,\:. '
 • ..
5/Polled as part of Magyar Christian Socialist*
ftBoUrcèi ■ Macartney: G *A/-- Hungary ahd Her > aUGCéssèfs London 1937 p*117*
Table fifty-one
RESULTS o f :EÜPA ELECTIONS IN. SLOVAKIA 1923
Social Democrats 
National Socialists / ‘ /
National Democrats . 
Agrarians 
.Tradesmen Party// ;
Communists
SNS. ■ . -
DSL'S ,..:■//-
United German Parties 
Magyar Agrarians ;
United Magyar Opposition 
Magyar Christian.Socialists’ 
Magyar Pèasanta* Party 
Jewish Parties 
Carpathian Ruthpne Party 
Greek Catholic Party . 
National Bloc 
United State Parties . 
Economic Party
%
5*0
2*8
1.2
21.4
0*4
12.9
0.8
30.0
0.5
12*9
3*9
3*5
1.1
Total 1,336,200
Sources Lipscher L, |C Vrfyinu politiokoj jgpravy na Sldvensku 
Bratislava 1966 p«1l4*
TABLE FIFTY-TWO
HESUITS OF PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN SLOVAKIA 1928 and 1935
Name, of Party Votes castW «• «g» «« K« Ml M «N *C9 i - . Deputies Votes cast Deputies
Social Democrats 96,901 7.33 3 148,984 9.86 4
National Socialists 36,181 2,74 1 45,134 2.98 1
National Democrats . ;P6,300 ; 1*99 T 18,579 1*24 “
Agrarians 271,320 20.54 ; 8 ’285,672 18*89 8
Tradesmens * Party 13,371 1.16 ■'■■ " ‘31,641 2.09 1
Communists " 190,593 14.42 :3 185,494 12.26 ;-3 .
People's Party 43,689 3.31 1 30.563 2.02 —
SNS ■ .31,679 2.46 . 1 40,965 2.71 1
HSL'S ;323,388  ^24. 64 9 ; 430,880 28.52 11
Magyar National Party 104,106 7.88 , ■' 3 . polled with Christ soc.
Magyar Clmist Boo* 120,769 9.14 3 225,407 14.91 . 5
Fascists — - .; 26,461 1.73
Magyar Small Traders 13,635 1.03 — — ■ —
United Jewish Parties 45,244 3.42 1
Total 1,321 ,57 8. \ 36 1,469,780 36
Source! Manuel Statistique Vo>l« XV 1932 p.465 ,.
: ,; Lipscher L. |i# Vÿvinu politickej ^pravy na Slovensku Bratislava 1966 
p.169. ■
Rocenka & R  1935 Praha 1935. .
Table fifty-thres
PEROmTAGE OF THE VOTE OADW) BY MAJOR FOLITIOAL PARTIES IN ALL LOCALy  ##*###"##« #,# M* =####**### W& *#mO M# m ,'I ............
GOVERNMK AND PARlJAi4imTARY ELECTIONS IN SLOVAKIA 1920-35
Party ## #*«*#### 1920 . : 1923 '#*#»#« AW. 1gg5 1928 (- m* #.###» . t 192§ ' ,1935 12m
: PEL PEL -y.PR ' PRL PR . PRL
Social Democrats 58.5 , 55fO 44V2 7 .3 9.4 9.8 11.3
National Lpoialista .V ' 2w3 : 2,8 2.5 2 .7 3.0 , 2.9 5.1
National Democrats 1.2 1*7 1.9 3 .9 ;':i.2':
1
1.5
Agrarians, 18.5 21,4 17.4 20.5 19.4 18*84
Tradesmens * Party : o;4 0.8 1 .1 2 .1 2 .0 2*6
Communists 12.9 13*2 14.4 10.6 12V2 12.9
BNG — 2 ■ 0.8 2.4 . 2*4 . — 10 ■ 2.7 ;
HSL'S . ***3 30 .0 ; 34.3 / 24.6 28.1 .28^5
■ tx
50.f
German Boo, Dem* 0.5^ 0.3 0.3 0.3
Bund der Lahdwirté .. 0.9'^ 1,68
Magyar Boo. Dem# 8*0 — . . **••**' , - ■
Magyar Christ* Boo. 10.3 12.9 6.8 9.1 8*1 14.9 14.29
Magyar,:Nat. Party 0.3 7*3 —
Jewish Parties 3*4 ,'/3i5 3.0 ; :^4:/ 2 .3 , ' — —
Gz. People's Party . : 17*5 3*3 ;  ^2 .5 ■ 2.0 2.3
PRL " Parliamentary élection PR, « Provincial election Z - Zupa election
1.
2.
3*
4.
3.
Polled as National Unity 6,
Polled with Slovak Agrarians 7*
Polled with People's Party 8,
Polled with Autonomist Blog 9#
Polled as Autonomist Blog 10.
Votes for United German Parties 
Votes for German Bieutoral Community 
Votes for Sudetendeutsohe Partei 
Votes for United Magyar Parties , 
Polled with National Democrats
SourcesÎ Manuel Statistique Vol II -^IV Prague 1925*32
■ Recenka 1920, 1933* 1925t 1928, 1929, 1935.
■ 1,1" '
gbcmoTÊS'ft ■ , : ; ' ■  ^ , : /}ft ' ■■"■ 4 \ f t ,/ ■, ;'■ ■ "
/ &  ' .;///"//,// / \
1* % Bee Betp]i?Watson È.Wè - ihe 'New; Slovakia Prague 1924 for a detailed ,■
. // account/Of'bucli c'i''©s. ^ ''//-à  ^' - - % "V,/ ..' -f.
2#; ■' ■B.ee Ra^rh. i# Ihc ’^inancial Policy of-Czeclioàlovalda dm^ing thé First 
y : mwjOf/itB: : >, .;/ :y/' ; y ' y. '
« ™ « o  y ' y y y / y y ;  y / ' -  y :  y ft
1. Oddo. G*II. Slovakia and Its People New York I960 u#l#
2„ Denis Les.^ Slovaques Paris 1917 ÙP*87*92». % ■ -
5. Pe;jitiy gloysnska i Bratislava 1961 ' y/ ::" ft
y\-;ftft'y>" ft'ft" "'ftftft ftft" ""'ftyyyyftft -y " ■ : ; ; - .y
4# Kirsohbaüm* J,. Sloval^ia-Kation - at the OrossroadB of Central Europe
y'y ■;/%///,/ft  ^ ft'/-ft/ ft ’ft:'/ ft:'' " "'' 'ft
g. 0 Vza.ibiiinych. vatlahoch KechQY'a alovalcov Bratislava 1956 pp. 99-12k.
6* Sgton-Watsbn H#W.' (Ed) Slovalcia Then and Now London 1931 p»298. .
:7# 'Sinor D. A His tory of #mgary ftlondoh 1959 00*209-212#: :: :
8* ftK Xpociaikon nérodh<âio obrodenia Bratlglava 1964 •qp.97-171*
9* Maearvk T.G. Nova Evrooa.Praha 1926 fto. l6l*/ ft . , - :
ftft/y; ;/' :'//-/"ftft/ri; %./ -y/--- \ . '
10, Butvin* J « *'Phahyft o : zalozenie ilatice Sldvenski^ a . His toricky casopis
ii/i963^pp,^^!i^//.-;'.^ ^  : / ' /'. - ' ' ./' /'
■ft y/ft-ftjft::^'/ft ' /ft"""-' .'/. ' ‘ , ft
11# Rotnagl Jé ftOesi a Slovaci Praha 1945 p.4l, • ■ : ft- 4
12.
13# Î acartney C.A, Hungary and Her Successors Xiondon 1937 p#80,
\/ / /- /'-ft....
ft ft 15. ; Seton.*Watsdn/R. W#. (Bçotüs Viator) Racial Problems iri: Hungary London 1908
:-ft/ 4.. -
■2-
c r o m  gHREB ,;
])* ■ Pé.üny .Blovepskk :II PratiGlaya I968 %#S4-8 paselm# ,. , .
SV ■' :'Hurban J,M* Cesta Slovaka ku bratmn sloVemslwm na Korave a v Cachaoh
-V/' . " ' ' \ , / , :/ -
' .:2illna 1929, .^ ' : ^ ' ://:'/ - -  ^ : . - : ' -
. Ga3.midaaer J# "Jak ae slovenska otaaka pfosWAraia do ceskelio
. ;.. poiitickeho progx^ aim v obdobaT prfprav sampstatneho coGkoaloirensk^ao
, %t(Æa 1916^1918" matdrloky' casoplB 19/1971 ##177^197#
4ÿ : Palaclg# F»-Spisy drobso X Praha I898 p*'79#. , - ' ' ■,
9, ;' Haaaryk a * MovK' W ropa Praha 3.920 p*i6l*
6* ■„ • HruBpYsky %4 Slovensko déni#;" Turolansky Svaty Martin 1939 pp#3^2r3$$y 
7* ■ Slovenskt^  citanka Praha 1923 p#491# , . • ,
8* Mptalc, L# â33vènskû v 20 atorogx' Bratislhth-1968 p,129 : paasimk , ' . "
ompTm;Fom . k , .. : - .' '
■I» ' 'SetoiW&tson R.W, Masaryk in England %ondÔnv 19^3 p»129*: ■'. > ■ - .
.2»;' iknsovaiiy Fr. Op* Git, p,3^4* '.,. ' ; ■- v ' ' - ' '
v^- Form.engllBhcverA^ ; v .  - :
% }%y: Ynrohak P* Thà Slbvalcs VIhiting :ïndiana 19^7 p*p*21i“2l2* ' , . I. '
3 *:;y: hiptmi h* Op* Git* p*69* Here the anthor ibsiots that this stipulation : , 
;h : , A-jas inserted at the insistance of thé Slovak polat3.cian Vavro Srobar*
' v,;:.;-:- one of the original H3.aslsists (see; Chapter Three) :'and who later beemie 
g ' ;;';.'the first Minister with responsibility fop Slovakia (see Chapter Five)*
-, : 4# V Be .jihy Oeskoslovenska III Praim 1968 p*.475* .■ • - .
9,# i-h^ nsbvsky Fr# Op* Cit*;p*368* ' f
6* - ; ,Srobd^ V* Osbobedèna Slovensko PraM 1928 p*lÔ8 .
. : jde.iiny Ceskoslovenska III p*7l4# . /" .■■*,'
7* Steier L* hngarns Vergetmltigwg Vienna: 1928.p♦353* .
8* See also. Cdialoupecky ..Vv *ltetinska'^ dek3.arace a je ji' politick^ oSndy" ' -
Peak/ casQpls fastoricky Vol IV P*328* In this artible the author;claims
that such a-facsimile- was published in thé heyspa’per Siovensky' doimik
On 28th April 1928# ' ■ ■  ^ ■: " .
9, ■ M p t& , U  dp, C it, P,7p,  ^ - ■ A'  ^ ' ; - ■ ... ' ; :
3.0., Ibia 9,70, ■ ■ ' : . , ,
3.3., Hrusovsky Tr, Op, Cit, pp,3S8it*3S9f - , ;.. . . :, :
■ ig, .Masaryk, 3.G, Æhe Mald.bR of k State Ipndott 1927 9,268, , _ / ;■ '■ .
15, Ibia p,208, ' / \. x'.v.,
Ibw.9,2l0,^t^ ; ;
■15, i#%)v@ky.Ag;:p,357,\ , -6 .,, ■ \
■16, D^liny oéskoslpyGnsM H I  pp,724-725, . ,
,17, Krajooyicôv/ H,; ;''SloY0a0k/'Karoâiia racla l.mA't mai.nT-tckv Rasfrois ■
: 17/3.969 w,#7.A97, : : A. r : : ' - ' .: -
' v  "-..f, ; I  ^ V , ■- ' : ;., -
S'todola, k, Statlstlka Slcivenska .airoiaiisk.^  Svaty^Maytln 1910 9 ,120,
9,#). :. ''O-yT ' . - /  : - y  -, , \ ,
5. ■ . Ibia p.l2q,y ■;_■..'66= ' . . "6 ' . , "■ 6'
tv/:àld / :/ ' : ' ' ' "   ' . ■ " / 6.; :
.! ■ : .'6
'dp ' B?eto8 <T* V^Q.i o'byvatbl*etva na'Slovanskii Bratislava I969 E*259 Table 
, 1* t lhe author, gives 381v 71 (^ as: the total increase in population in
-i '% Blovalfia during this, period* . - '= ,, -. V-t :. i;'-.:!;-
.. fit /: -
'8*-;- ' S v e t o ^ f . Slowakeh In Ungam Bratislava-.1.943 p*15*■/ - /
9 ) ; Macartney 0.A*:.Op* -Cit# p.82# i  =' ■' .■ -1'" <
12, ibidB.85,:^ ^  .;(rv.6."' i t . ' . ■
15, ; Faltus, J. m a  Prâcha, . V, Prebl 'ad hoauodàrsklho- -yyyb.la na Slovensktt 
..\l9l8-l945.Bm^ 1967.9,14,; } ' ...:, 6'.'\-66':"6: '= ; ' ' :■: :
14, SvetÆ . =
19*' Faltus* J, and Prugha, V* ;Op*Glt# p#l4, ;
16#; Stodola K* Op* Git* pp*23^ 23#i ': - - c: .} : ' : 3 K. ; .. : =
-17. Kraj&vi&va# Hi Op* :Cit, pp#3.?9Tl82« -r. .
:l8*y 8rpW",:V, \ I/ '
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20, m-'0b% T, Op.: oit.:pp,193.Wl./'; , "
21, ' :#WrAc, , ;■ ' 666 : r 6 =
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38i ':8robar*;V*.0p, Cit*,p.211,,,  ^: ,' ; . .. .,6
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